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CHALLENGES IN WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PUBLIC LIFE IN EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES

Maria-Ana Georgescu[1]; Emilia Herman[2]

1,2 Professor PhD, "Petru Maior" University of Tîrgu Mureș

Abstract: The study is focused on challenges regarding women's participation in the public life and their seats in decision making bodies. An analysis and comparison is made regarding women's presence in these domains in Romania and in the EU countries. The major factors of policy making - the vision and perspective, need to be supported by highlighting the gender realities in the public life. Our analysis aims to raise awareness among the decision factors upon the measures needed to improve the women's activism, mainly on the political arena.

Keywords: women, public life, decision making positions, gender gap, political empowerment.

1. Argument

The mentality changes all over the world regarding gender contribution to social life are related with ways to promote women representing just over half of the population, to attend economic and public positions, to gain economic independence and public visibility.

Analysing the civil society organizations' (CSO) discourse related to gender equality, it can be noticed that it underlines "women's rights as human rights which are indeed fundamental to societal growth and well-being" and the need to secure gender equality in leadership roles (Chaney, 2016, p.288). Comparing government discourse and the CSOs', some authors make a distinction – the government discourse can be characterized by an overriding concern with public administration whereas CSOs' emphasis the citizen protection and empowerment (Idem, p.287).

There are several organizations which fight to sustain the feminine cause so as to become open and balanced societies, but the engine of the society merges all these standpoints and changes their meaning according to the cultural, economic and general political background (Popa, Gavriliu, 2015, p.1205).

From the perspective of the need of personal fulfilment, general and human, women, like in the case of men, have the possibility to accede to multiple success ways. Yet, in order to achieve this they have to be become *independent*, to affirm their identity without being satisfied with living through and for the others (Lips, 2001).

International Labour Office's Resource guide on gender issues points out that "There is ample evidence that improving women's employment prospects can have not only positive effects

on women's economic empowerment, but engender broader economic and social benefits as well. Yet, gender concerns have not been fully integrated with mainstream policies" (ILO, 2014).

Some authors state that despite major gains over the last century, gender inequality is still widespread, suggesting that the goals fostered by feminisms remain relevant (Swirsky & Angelone, 2015). Namely on the political arena, women's access to senior positions is difficult. The *Handbook on promoting women's participation in political parties* states that „The extent of women's representation in elected office in any given country is determined by a wide range of factors, including the general progress towards achieving equality of rights and opportunities among women and men in public and private spheres, the choice of political and electoral systems, and the level of institutionalization of – and transparency in – decision-making processes within political parties" (OSCE/ODIHR, 2014). The document underlines that political parties are often referred to as the "gatekeepers" of women's political participation.

In the particular case of Romania, the year 2000 brought for the gender literature an un-precedent development (Popa, Gavriliu, 2015, p.1201).

The objectives of our paper are to present the realities regarding gender balance in the public life of the European countries, in order to change and improve women's activism. We present arguments that reinforce claims in recent studies on gender issues in Romania, regarding the more reduced access to the management positions for the female employees, problem that remain of actuality (Istrate, Bănică, 2015, p.324).

The methodology used is the empirical approach and secondary analysis of statistical data available and related to presence of women in decision making positions and in top levels of the judiciary, global gender gap. The series of data that we have selected starts in 2008, when the economic crisis was triggered and stops with the years 2014-2015, until official data are published.

2. Women in Public Life and Decision Making Positions

In the context mentioned above, one would expect an improvement in terms of using women's talents effectively in different domains.

As regards female membership of the **economic boards** (*highest decision-making body*) of the largest publicly quoted companies, the situation is as follows: in 2008, women represented, on average, only 11% of these board members at EU-28 level. The percentage reached 23% in 2015, representing a more than double increase.



Figure 1. ***Share of women members of the highest decision-making body of the largest companies in each country, 2008-2015***

(Own processing based on EC 2016)

In our country, unlike European trend, the situation remained stationary (as shown in Fig. 1), respectively in both 2008 and 2015, female participation is the same, 12%.

On the **political arena**, women's situation shows large disparities. It is presented in the same figure (see Fig.2) their presence in national parliaments and in governments - senior ministers.

The average percentage of female members of national parliaments, in EU-28, was 23% in 2008 and 28% in 2015. In Romania, Hungary and Malta, their presence was precarious; it represented only 10% in 2008 and 12% in 2015, in our country.



Figure 2. Share of women in national parliaments and national governments (senior ministers), in 2008-2015

(Own processing based on EC 2016)

Among senior ministers of national governments (ministers with a seat in the cabinet), the share of women, at EU-28 level, was 27% in 2008 and the same in 2015. In Romania, the situation has improved substantially: at incredible value of 0% in 2008, the percentage has risen above the European average, reaching 35%. Greece, Hungary and Slovakia were three exceptions in 2015 because they had no woman senior minister in the government. In the share of women representatives in the European Parliament, Romania ranks 7 to the bottom (see Fig.3).



Figure 3. Share of women in European parliament, 2015

(Own processing based on EC 2016)

With a share of 28%, our country has 9 percentage points below the European Union average, which is 37%. Malta is in first place with 67% women, but this place was not difficult to achieve, knowing it has only 6 members in the European Parliament.

A precarious situation exists in terms of women's representation in regional assemblies in several countries, as Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Italy, with a share lower than 20%; in Czech Republic and Greece, the share is 20% in 2015 (Fig.4).



Figure 4. Share of women in regional assemblies (president and members), EU 20 countries, 2008-2015

(Own processing based on EC 2016)

In 2008, one can notice that in five countries there was no female president of regional assemblies: Czech Republic, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. In 2015, four countries had no female president of regional assemblies: Belgium, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. It seems that, at regional level, Romania is constantly failing to promote women.

An image of the decision-making position on the **administrative level (non-political)** is given in the 2016 Report of The National Agency for Equal Opportunities between Women and Men (ANES). The decision-making levels include the following positions:

- Decisional level 1: Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, Director General and Deputy Director-General.
- Decisional level 2: Director and Deputy Director.

Table 1. The share of women in administration decisional levels, in 2014 and 2015

	Year 2014				Year 2015			
	Decisional level 1		Decisional level 2		Decisional level 1		Decisional level 2	
	Women(%)	Men(%)	Women(%)	Men(%)	Women(%)	Men(%)	Women(%)	Men(%)
EU-28	31	69	40	60	34	66	40	60
Romania	**46**	54	**57**	43	**45**	55	**56**	44

Source: ANES 2016

The situation of Romania in the online database of the European Commission is provided for the last two years (Table 1). As can be seen, the percentage of Romanian women at the administrative level decision-making positions, both Level 1 and Level 2, is higher than the EU average, for each of the two years.

According to a typology that classifies ministers into 4 categories – BEIS, there are the following functions: B – Basic functions, E – Economic, I – Infrastructure, S – Sociocultural.

The gender balance according to the BEIS typology, in our country, is found in Table 2.

Table 2. Romania's ranking in the European Commission Database 2014

	Position in the ranking in EU Member States	
	Level 1 administrators	Level 2 administrators
General	**2**	**2**
Basic functions	**9**	**2**
Economic	**4**	**3**
Infrastructure	**4**	**9**
Socio-cultural	**7**	**8**

Source: ANES 2016

In the central public administration of Romania, the positioning of women is distributed in a much more balanced way compared with other fields and our country occupies leading places in the hierarchy.

Regarding the gender balance in decision-making position in central public administration, Romania "has met the quantitative indicator of the Theory of Critical Mass which, in the opinion of some analysts, is of 40% for each sex" (ANES 2016, p.12). The situation (See Tables 1 and 2) reflects the concern of the Romanian Government to promote women.

3. Women in Top Levels of the Judiciary

As regards Judges of supreme courts by gender Romania is well situated (see Fig.5). The gender balance is better in the supreme courts at national level. It should be mentioned that this is due to the larger proportions of women amongst senior judges. Also we can note that in Romania women are very well represented: 75% in 2008 and 84% in 2015. In 2015, Romania has the first place in the percentage of women in the Supreme Court of Justice.



Figure 5. Share of women in Judges of supreme courts, in EU, 2008-2015
(Own processing based on EC 2016)

Across Europe, there are nine countries where there is a good gender balance (at least 40% of each gender) amongst Supreme Court judges in 2015 and there is a single case of real imbalance, with less that 10% women, in the UK.

4. The Global Gender Gap Index

According to World Economic Forum (2015) through *The Global Gender Gap (GGG) Index* is measured one important aspect of gender equality, respectively „the relative gaps between women and men across four key areas: health, education, economy and politics." This index is based on four fundamental categories (subindexes): *Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival* and *Political Empowerment.* The highest possible score is 1, which means **equality** and the lowest possible score is 0, which means **inequality.**

In 2015, the Global Gender Gap Index was calculated for 145 countries, and published by World Economic Forum. Of the 28 EU states, 19 countries are in the top 50 (out of 145 countries). Romania ranks 77 out of 145 countries and on the 22-nd place in EU-28, with a score of 0.691, over the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta (see Fig.6).

In the Balkan countries, although the legislation related to gender discrimination problems has been aligned to the Community one, the operating stereotype forms of the societies can overcome the legal normality (Tudora et al., 2015, p.663)



Figure 6. Global Gender Gap Index in EU-28, 2015

(Own processing based on WEF 2015)

The worst sub-index in our country is the *Political Empowerment* (a score of 0.090, ranks Romania 113/145), followed by *Economic Participation and Opportunity* (0.693 score, rank 55/145 countries).

From the perspective of *Health and Survival* sub-index, Romania ranks 42 (0.979). *Educational Attainment* sub-index positioned Romania on the place 64/145 Countries (0.994) and on the 22-nd place of 28 in the EU.

As Finland is the leader country in the GGG hierarchy, we made a comparison between this and Romania on the four pillars of the index (see Fig.7).



Figure 7. Four pillars - The Global Gender Gap Index for Romania and EU leader, in 2015

(Own processing based on WEF 2015)

As shown in Figure 7, Romania has two strong pillars, score almost 1, like Finland, respectively Educational Attainment pillar and Health and survival, which means gender equality. Conversely, if the economic pillar is almost similar to that of the country leader (score 7 for Romania and score 8 for Finland), instead, political pillar Empowerment is at 0.09 level, which means huge gender inequality in our country. This situation seems to prove the following statement: "Barriers such as direct or indirect gender-based discrimination in party procedures and practices, a lack of gender-sensitivity in candidate selection and outreach, or an inequitable distribution of party resources among candidates are some of the complex challenges faced by women within political parties and, in particular, by women candidates in their electoral campaigns" (OSCE/ODIHR, 2014).

Conclusions

The changes regarding the gender stereotypes in our country deal with social management measures to be taken for improving women's participation in the public life and in the decision making process, by adopting policies specifically designed to ease women's access to all areas of social and political life, but especially in those where the gender balance is totally unfavorable to them.

As positive aspects, we underline that Romanian women are well represented in top levels of non political, administrative positions – decision level 1 and 2 - the percentage recorded by Romania being superior than the average percentage recorded in EU; that Romanian women occupy significantly more seats in the Supreme Court of Justice, our country being a leader in this regard. Also, two of the pillars of General Gender Gap, namely *Survival and Health* and *Educational attainment*, places Romania in the first half of the 145 countries surveyed.

Negative aspects are related to women's participation in public decision making on the political arena - it is very poor, placing Romania on a low position in some hierarchies such as: share of women in national parliaments, share of women in regional assemblies (president and members). We noticed that there are in Romania aspects regarding female participation, opposite with the European trend, such as keeping the same share of women of the highest decision-making body in companies (see Fig.1), rather than increasing it.

The worst sub-index of the Romanian *Global Gender Gap Index* is the *Political Empowerment*, that can be improved by adopting measures that force political parties to promote women in a share of at least 30% on eligible positions, in order to have access to public life. This is the major challenge for the Romanian gender's imbalance – the participation on the political arena.

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Abstract: The *framework-hypothesis of this study is based on the recent research, which generally highlights the impact of Christian religious behaviour, and particularly of the Christian orthodox one, in modern society. Thus, from the perspective of Christian morality, the Kinship is a powerful axiological filter for „symptoms" or „marks" of the secularizing process in contemporary society. The objectives of the present study are taking shape around the central idea of the role played by the „kinship" or spiritual descent in the dialectic of secularization as a cultural-historical process of Christian „belief conditions". Thus, cultural-religious component of descent – filiation and parenting – guides the strategies of secularisation in a positive or negative sense. Continuity of kinship being supported by the „genealogical memory" contributing to the „removal of secularization" and the accumulation of cultural and religious capital. This, in turn, constitutes a spiritual-religious resource that can be directed towards achieving stability, harmony, making family relationships across the generations.*

Keywords: Secularizing process; Christian Family; Religious Marriage; Contemporary Kinship; Parental Responsability

1. Introduction. The paradigm of secularization between latent Modernity and Post modernity

The evolution of mentalities and religious symbols brings us to the "desacralization phenomenology" joined by "the multiplicity of religious experience" as a characteristic of the modern spirit called for dialogue, "otherness" and "cultural communication"[1] Emphasizing the timeliness of Mircea Eliade's thinking on "the social and religious mentality" of the European man (modern, our note), socio-anthropologists note the presence of religious, political and (multi)ethnic diversity, which require acceptance and correct interpretation in the spirit of "otherness" and of "creative hermeneutics"[2]. In this spiritual context, our study focuses, from a paradigmatic perspective, on certain *hypothetical coordinates* conditioned by *the assessment and reassessment of the secularization process* in relation to the manifestation of *the religious phenomenon* in *modern and postmodern society*.

From the scientific findings on the *religious phenomenon* in the secularized modern society we learn that it is presented as "an existential alternative" pertained to *the actual type of modernity*. The problem, as Mihail Neamţu highlights in "The Grammar of Orthodoxy …", for example, is

[1] Gavriluță, Nicu. 1998. *Mentalităţi şi ritualuri magico-religioase. Studii şi eseuri de sociologia sacrului*. Iaşi: Editura Polirom.
[2] Gavriluță, Nicu. 2009. *Antropologie socială şi culturală*. Iaşi: Editura Polirom.

mainly caused by multiple and serious "confusions and indeterminacy"[3] regarding the status or role of *theology* in modernity and postmodernity. In a famous work entitled *A Secular Age* (2007) considered a paper of reference for studying *the transformation of religion in the West*, John Taylor distinguishes "three meanings" of the term "secularity" namely: "gradual abandonment" of faith in God which becomes "the central axis of political life"; "decline of faith in God"; "new conditions of «belief»" that currently influence, *religious or nonreligious experience*. In the conception of Taylor, the term "belief" which means "faith" has a broad referring to a holistic approach to options existential in general, compared to the term "faith" which refers to "religious belief"[4].

As Ioan Alexandru Tofan shows, in Taylor's view, secularization pertains to "the conditions of faith" taking "the shape of a complex of cultural, scientific and theological factors", which make the manifestation of religious belief as an existential "option" more or less comfortable[5]. From this perspective, defining the secularization as an *emerging process* for the existential choices of modernity as "a concrete era" cannot be reduced either, to the strict reporting of the religious institution to the laical one or to the presence or "absence of transcendental reference" in the public space on the one hand or to issues related to religious beliefs, the weakening of faith, "church attendance or involvement into the religious life as a whole" on the other hand[6].

In Taylor's view, *the new conditions of belief* are emerging in modern society following some steps:

a. In the first stage, the cultural minority imposes "exclusive humanism" as "an alternative to the Christian faith";

b. The second step is to diversify *in extenso* the religious options belonging to the intermediate layer, placed between "the exclusive humanism" and "Christian faith coded by the Church" (*the nova effect* at the elite level that causes fragmentation of culture);

c. The third stage, traced near the 60s, is represented by the "expressive revolution" that produces the generalization of fragmented culture throughout society.

The holistic perspective that permeates the philosophical, historical and sociopolitical analysis of John Taylor, nuances however, significant differences between Europe and America on the tension between the "«neodurkheimian» model" – embraced by the United States during the *Age of Mobilization* – and the "«postdurkheimian» model" – adopted by the *European societies* with multiple challenges and dilemmas, with inherent deviant forms – which refers to "the recognition of a radical variety of religious nonreligious and atheist options within the public space"[7]. Practically, Taylor's approach completes the secularization framework analysis strictly from a conceptual perspective offering at the same time the possibility of widening the area of research over *the*

[3] Neamțu, Mihail. 2007. *Gramatica Ortodoxiei. Tradiția după modernitate.* Iași: Polirom.
[4]Taylor, Charles. 2007. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Quoted in Ungureanu, Camil. 2011. „De la comunitarism la pluralism. Notă introductivă" to Taylor, John. 2011. „Religia astăzi" (translation into Romanian by Raluca Ana Alecu). In *Religia în democrație. O dilemă a modernității*, coord. Camil Ungureanu, 141-185. Iași: Polirom.
[5]Tofan, Ioan Alexandru. 2011. "Secularizarea". In *Concepte și teorii socio-politice*, coord. Eugen Huzum, 7: 207-230; this title was edited within The Knowledge Based Society Project supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU/89/1.5/S/56815. INVEST IN PEOPLE!
[6] Taylor, Charles. 2007. *Op. cit.*
[7]Quoted in Ungureanu, Camil. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 141-143.

dimensions of the secularization process identifying "the signs or symptoms"[8] of this phenomenon, referring, for example, to "the religious decadence", "the secularization of the religious" or the nihilism as a sort of "mundane drift" of the religious, "desacralisation", "privatization of religion" turning religious forms into secular ones-protestant ethic (Max Weber); "invisible religion" (Thomas Lukmann, 1963); "civil religion" (Robert Bellah).

As a result, *the issue of modernity* is emerging, at least in Europe, in relation to two defining aspects brought to our attention by Mihail Neamţu namely "the answer of the medieval social ideological fall patronized by the Church for centuries ..." as well as " ... the tolerant and philanthropic ethos of secular Europe" which was successful in the 60's. That is, while "eastern societies have not succeeded in providing a model of friendly coexistence ..., Western Europe pays the price of "a mass axiological disorientation." As a result, the *elite* of the time split either into "the leaders of religions' books" or "secular liberalism champions" are called to a "permanent interpretative exercise" being "engaged in a symbolic legitimation process of universal values"[9]. Responses to problem areas are soon given in the international circle of philosophical and theological debates being represented by important figures such as NT Wright[10], Oliver O'Donovan[11] or John Alaisdair Milbank[12]. Summarizing the contribution of the three experts in *social theology*, whose work is widely presented by Mihail Neamţu in separate chapters from "The Grammar of Orthodoxy …" we keep the following aspects in mind[13] (Neamțu 2007, 196-205):

a. Emphasizing the relationship of the Church with secular power, the authors *contest the separation between Church and State* adopted by the modernists and, at the same time the reduction of the spirit of Gospels to "*politically correct*";
b. Analyzing the genesis of modern social thought – European and North American patterns of thinking – through the relationship between theology and culture whilst proposing the separation of the logos of theology from "the secular terms adopted by *humaniores*";
c. Highlighting the risks of post modernity which emerges as "political paradigm made to tolerate variety and mixture". At the same time, the trend reveals the bulimic tendencies of contemporary man as "myth and logos" which sustains "the entertainment postmodern culture";
d. Propose a "hermeneutics of modernity" deeply indebted to "the Christian vision of man" asking theology to rethink "the community project drawn by Church".

In conclusion, we can say that research results regarding *social theology* bring up to date, in the spirit of "creative hermeneutics", Mircea Eliade's vision by highlighting the positive aspects of secularization (as editor and publisher of the journal *Academica*, Elena Solunca Moise points in a recent interview[14], only 5% of the approaches to secularization have "positive connotations") within the *postmodern philosophy of the event* namely *the theology of the event* proposing a "renaissance

[8] Quoted in Tofan, Ioan Alexandru. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 210.
[9] Neamțu, Mihail. 2007. *Op. cit.*, pp. 193-194.
[10] N. T. Wright, Bishop of Durham, internationally known biblical scholar.
[11] Oliver O'Donovan , Anglican Priest, professor at the University of Oxford.
[12] John Alaisdair Milbank educated at Oxford in the late 1970s belonging confessionally to the Anglican Church.
[13] Neamțu, Mihail. 2007., pp. 196-205.
[14] Solunca-Moise, Elena. 2015. *Interview*. Trinitas TV Sunday, May 3, 2015.

of religion" within the binomial *desacralization / charity* (proposed by Vattimo Caputo) or "redistribution of opportunities, meanings in relation to the ethical or political interest of time"[15]. As a result, "the secularization-event" interpreted as a gesture of "forgetting the fundamental liturgical nature of the Christian experience of the world"[16] gives Christianity the chance of rehabilitation even "during the crepuscular era of modernity"[17].

One aspect worth noting in the context of the analysis conducted by Charles Taylor on the manifestation of *religious phenomenon* in *contemporary society*, refers to the *impact of migration* on the *religion-family-State* triad using as an example the evolution of the American model and the establishing of some *religious communities* (the phenomenon of building "new Churches" very present in today's European society, especially in the Romanian diaspora!). If at the beginning, "the sides of this triangle have supported each other" subsequent intermingling with each other will be affected by receiving "simultaneous strikes from each of the three constituent parts". Therefore, the "*virtues"* of "the American way of life" and "the positive image of the nuclear family" began to decline given the following considerations[18]: the fight against the segregationist legislation during the 1876-1964 period (Jim Crow laws); "the agony", the anguish felt by the American people regarding the war in Vietnam; the feminism, "the new expressive culture" and "the sexual revolution of the '60s".

On the other hand, the analysts of these allegations consider the phenomenon of "the new Presbyterian Church" rather as denoting the "idea of social identity" than "that of God."[19] Referring comparatively to the "new European identity" as well (tributary of the two world wars), John Taylor states that the phenomenon combines two dimensions – the "national and civilization character" – a model involving "distance", "passivity" and even "a certain repulsion" to "the original, intense form" of both nationalism and the religious sentiment (for example, in the synthesis "being British, decent and Christian")[20].

Within the socio-political and cultural context of Europe, "the religious paradigm proposed to social life" practically places the fragile Romanian democracy in "an intermediate situation" in relation for example to "the dictates of religion" in the public space to the *Islamic fundamentalism* or to the "weak secularization" – "privatization of religion" and the *Protestant ethic* – or to "the strong secularization" of the Western world that oscillates between the extreme of *the religious-spiritual phenomenon proliferation* and *the postmodern nihilism*. An analysis of the *Romanian context within which we witness the manifestation of modernity and (post)modernity* reveals "successive transitions, quick and contradictory" which are associated with a number of problem areas caused by "«particracy» and ideological deficit". Thus, the "transition after transition process" both from a historical and longitudinal perspective as well as "the double transition" – "institutional" and "attitudinal" – from a cross-cutting approach brings to our attention an ex-

[15]Rorty, Richard and Gianni Vattimo. 2008. *Viitorul religiei. Solidaritate, caritate, ironie*, ed. Santiago Zabala. Pitești: Paralela 45. Quoted in Tofan, Ioan Alexandru. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 224-226.
[16] Tofan, Ioan Alexandru. 2011. *Op. cit.*, 2011, p. 224.
[17] Neamțu, Mihail. 2007. *Op. cit.*, p. 203. In this convincing argument, Mihail Neamțu, *op. cit*., note1, refers to authors like William T. Cavanaugh (2002) or B. Wannenwetsch (2004).
[18] Taylor, Charles. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 144-146.
[19] Will Herberg. *Protestant, Catholic, and Jew*. Quoted in Taylor, John. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 145.
[20] Taylor, John. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

Communist society "which encounters difficulties in consuming modernity and therefore meets even more trouble in assimilating (post)modernity"[21].

Linking the religious phenomenon characteristic of the Romanian people to the European secularized or de-secularized context raises a number of questions, not rhetoric, in our view, such as: What are the "marks" or "symptoms" of secularization in the actual *Romanian society*? What *type of modernity* can *the religious phenomenon*, namely the Church be related to in Romania[22]? The answers are very soon found, at least from the perspective of Mihail Neamţu, who refers to the causal determinations of secularization ever since the time of classicist culture in Romania focusing on the "opacity of the secular pole" coupled with "the reserve and marginality complex developed within evidently «pravoslavnice» circles"[23]. A further argument questions the dispute between "anti-Christian modernization" and "the structurally anti-modern Orthodoxy" highlighting "the risk of an ideological approach", a context in which very few "alliances" have been formed between "conservative moderns" and "Christians optimists". If the Church through the scholars of the time omits reflections on the "profound challenges of modernity" it insidiously establishes "the secular current of the interwar culture" characterized by "excessive confession" and "the removing of laity from the living sources of Orthodoxy". Of course, except for some cultural figures of the time (Ion Gh. Savin, Mircea Vulcănescu, Nae Ionescu or Nichifor Crainic) who denounced "tyranny" while representing a viable alternative to the "massification", "the totalitarian state worshiping" appears very soon announcing "the Communist fever"[24].

An interesting phenomenon that catches our attention and which is very clearly defined in Mihail Neamțu's thorough approach of social theology is "*the civil religion of Communism*" by desperate attempts to achieve a "mystical repositioning" balanced between "personal assumption" and "institutional failure". The decrease, sometimes to the lower limit, of the mystical experiences undergone by community has led to "the absence of a plural culture" the author focusing primarily on the negative effects of the phenomenon upon the bond with the Anglo-Saxon thinking[25]. The author summarizes the characteristics of "the Communists' civil religion" and also condemns "the diagnosis failure" conducted in the first place by the Orthodox theology. The next historic moment with negative influences on modern Romania is the "Enlightenment ideology" that produces "progressive ghettoization of Christian theology" induced by Kantian philosophy and the German model of idealism. Thus, the takeover "of Immanuel Kant's sectarian perspective" and "the segregation of academic theology" induce "modernity dualism" where practically "theological culture loses its meaning" being born as a "defensive reaction to the challenges of postmodernity"[26]. The marginalization of theology in academic debates becomes obvious causing mutual misunderstandings.

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[21] Carpinschi, Anton. 2011. „Partidocraţia şi deficitul ideologic. S-ar putea şi altfel?". In *Voturi şi politici. Dinamica partidelor româneşti în ultimele două decenii*, 39-56. Iaşi: Editura Institutului European, pp. 39-41.
[22] Neamţu, Mihail 2013. *Credinţă şi raţiune. Dialoguri, contradicţii, împăcări*. Bucureşti: Lumea Credinţei, pp. 37-38.
[23] Neamțu, Mihail. 2007. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.
[24] Neamțu, Mihail. 2007. *Op. cit.*, pp. 12-15.
[25] *Idem*, p. 19. See the example of England, country which supportted the importance of introducing a chapel in every college, as opposed to the 1886's France that forbidded priests to teach in academia.
[26] *Idem*, pp. 16-23.

In cultural terms, Mihail Neamţu generates a tough reaction, defining the concept of "neopăşunism" or that of "the dictatorship of one's own opinions." However, in outlining some solutions, the author insists on *the dialogue* between *tradition* and *modernity*, the binder being represented by the "importance of education" within "the issue of modernity" aimed, in particular, at "assuming the public dimension of Christianity". So theological seminaries are called upon once again as they were during the nineteenth century in Iasi (1860-1864), Cernauti or Bucharest (1889) in order to mitigate the "shock of secularization."[27]

As such, the Romanian Orthodox Christianity (86.72%) comes as a "proposal" not as "imposing" its spiritual deposit, the Romanian Orthodox Church thus contributing to "the de-secularization of faith".[28] For example, one of the "social and cultural motivations" of the cultural fact lies in the interest and fascination shown by the "educated youth in post-December Romania" regarding "the close relationship between religion and culture" which would allow "«the path towards the sacred»". However, as the socio-anthropologist of religions shows, there are many cases in which "a man of culture wants to be faithful" and "he cannot" but assume "that the cultural fact is the best *means* toward the absolute ..." because "the meaning of culture" is given, paraphrasing Andrei Pleșu, "ultimately, by God"[29].

Moreover, the "meaning of life" is conferred by "what love for Christ signifies within all of us", says Priest Constantin Necula, in a plea-invitation regarding "the resistance through the culture of love" as "therapy for the soul"[30]. On the contrary, "nothing of what we live and plan without Christ will be strong enough to succeed not even in the world that does not love Christ" concludes the same Priest, referring to what the philosopher Andrei Pleșu calls "memory fracture" of the Romanian people oppressed by Communism, which separates the West from Romania. Specifically, the separation refers to the gaps at the level of religious culture development and transmission, aspects that constitute the "marks" or "symptoms" of secularism in Romanian cultural space.

We list below in a synthesized conclusion like manner "the secularization symptoms" on social life as described in Nicu Gavriluţă's vision[31], professor of the sociology of religion:

- rationalization of social life or "privatization of religion" and "isolation" of the spiritual-religious phenomenon interpretation;
- increasing the autonomy of social institutions in relation to the Church;
- diminishing the resources dedicated to the sacred/spiritual and religious practices;
- the general orientation of people toward the empirical, the pragmatic, the concrete[32];
- the impact of "new media" and of modern technology upon the symbolic-spiritual and religious life.

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[27] *Idem*, p. 12.
[28] Manolescu, Anca. 2011. „Democrația pluralistă: o șansă pentru desecularizarea religiei?". In *Religia în democrație. O dilemă a modernității*, coord. Camil Ungureanu. Iași: Polirom, p. 378.
[29] Gavriluță, Nicu. 2009. *Op. cit.*, pp. 173-176.
[30] Necula, Constantin, Priest Associate Professor, PhD at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology "Andrei Șaguna" in Sibiu. "Love in Christ - therapy for the soul", part I – conference organized by ASCOR Iasi branch in Aula Magna "Mihai Eminescu","Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, on March 10, 2015 starting at 6 PM.
[31] Gavriluță, Nicu, Professor, PhD at the Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political, „Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Iasi University. 2014. „În căutarea sensului. O radiografie sociologică a secularizării", interview by Deacon Sorin Mihalache during the program entitled „Lumina celui Nevăzut", TVR Trinitas, Thursday, July 10, 2014. (for details see website: www.tvrtrinitas.ro/arhiva emisiuni).
[32] Gavriluță, Nicu. 2013. *Sociologia religiilor. Credințe, ritualuri, ideologii.* Iași: Polirom, 236.

Concerning the last issue defined as" a symptom of secularization", the socio-anthropologist from Iasi gives repeated explanations regarding the phenomenon of "desacralization" of social life, referring specifically to "*the virtualization of orthodoxy*" when considering "the religious fact in contemporary Romania".[33] As an exegete, Nicu Gavriluţă highlights the lack of "mythological and religious" justification characteristic of the postmodern technique to whose challenge "authentic tradition" should respond. He also shows in an interview[34] that "atheism is not a problem in Romania" not even "religious intolerance is", except for "intolerance reactions" of "philosophers who undertake research focusing on problematic areas "(regarding the Church, religion, etc.).

2. Secularization strategies of the Christian family and the issue of contemporary Kinship

"Love, where is your Church? I'm tired of faraway places!"[35]

Beyond the explanations regarding "the American exception" *versus* "the European exception" concerning *the secularization thesis*[36], our approach focuses on *its impact upon family life* shown through the *phenomena* of *globalization and cultural relativism*, which represents, in fact, "family challenges for the future of the society and of the world".[37] As the authors cited above highlight "the globalization of current relativization is the one referring to the Christian family" leading not only to a "reinterpretation" but also to a "desintegration" of it causing a strong *alarm signal*.

Moreover, the crisis of the postmodern world is linked to the upheaval of values and the confinement in the crucible "«death culture»", a reality revealed by the worrying demographic statistics – especially the *fecundity* aspect – which signal "Europe's demographic crisis"[38]. As regards this issue, Mons. Michel Schooyans presented within the International Congress "Family and Life at the beginning of a new Christian millennium" the causes that maintain the critical situation of the family using statistical analyzes concerning the *fertility rate*. The factors are summarized as follows[39]:

a. *The decrease in marriage rates*, *delayed marriage* and *the increasing age of first motherhood*;

b. *The demographic mobility of population* (rural-urban migration), *professional nomadism* and *female careerism*;

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[33]Gavriluță, Nicu. 2015. „Ipostaze sociale ale sacrului contemporan". In *Mit, magie și manipulare politică*, author Nicu Gavriluță. Iași: Institutul European, pp. 79-92.
[34] Gavriluță, Nicu. 2015. *Interview* by Priest Dumitru Păduraru on "Religion class in school". Radio Trinitas, February 26, 2015, 2-2.20 PM.
[35]Seferis. 1924. Poem *Fog*. Our translation. London. Quoted in Prot. Kallierghis, Antonios. 2011. „O moarte lentă pe canapea". In *Criza familiei*, coord. Dimitra Gouti and Maria D. Kokkinou. Translated from the Greek by Priest Șerban Tica, 97-118. București: Editura Sophia, p. 97.
[36] Tofan, Ioan Alexandru. 2011. *Op. cit.*
[37] Priest Professor PhD Leb, Ioan Vasile and Priest PhD Nicolae-Dragoș Kerekes. 2011. „Provocările familiei pentru viitorul societății și al lumii". In *Familia în societatea contemporană*, coord. Priest Professor PhD Viorel Sava and Priest lecturer PhD Ilie Melniciuc-Puică, pp. 319-335. Iași: DOXOLOGIA.
[38] Leb, Ioan Vasile and Nicolae-Dragoș Kerekes. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 326-330.
[39] Mons. Michel. 2001. „La situation démografphique en Europe et spécialement en Roumanie". *International Congress Family and Life at the beginning of a new Christian millennium*, 95 sq. Romania Bucharest: Patriarchal Palace. Quoted in Ioan Vasile Leb and Nicolae-Dragoș Kerekes, *Op. cit.* note 547, pp. 327-329.

c. Strong *ideological socio-demographic policies* (*gender ideology*, *anti-birth techniques devaluation* and even *destruction of maternity*) that lead to *unfavorable measures against family* (abortion, contraception, eugenics, gender choice) supported by an inconsistent, contradictory and even incomplete legislation;

d. *The disastrous* role of mass-media which maintains *the bouleversement of family values* presenting a deformed, distorted image of both *sexuality* and *couple relationships*, of *family* as a whole.

Our approach gives great importance to the analysis of *modern and (post)modern family* seen in *crisis contexts* which acquires specific connotations when viewed from the perspective of *Christian morality* proposing a positive sense of the term "crisis"[40] of the family. Correlating "the Christian family" with spirituality, Priest Filoteu Faros tells us that "its origins are transcendent" that is, "even though family exists in the world, it doesn't originate in it" and that family relationships – *family or parental system*, broadly speaking, (our note) – represent "our spiritual resources in times of crisis" defined by *losing control* "over our lives" and "then looking for help elsewhere". At the same time, viewing the crisis as "a potential creative conflict" reveals the need for successive transitions along life as "God created us with an innate need to grow and develop" in a "living, dynamic process".[41]

The *key question* of our study starts from the interrogation, not rhetoric we hope, if *family itself* represents *a value* in contemporary society any longer. The answer can be found, from our perspective, by analyzing *family relations* in terms of the ideological component, namely the "religious-socializing"[42] type of *identification* / transmission. In this regard, the issue of family relationship or "kinship" which has become the "key concept"[43] of *classic cultural anthropology* brings us to the "modern form" of expression represented by "the nowadays parental system."[44] The bridge between socio-cultural anthropology and *Christian theology which* reveals "the transcendent origins of the family" – with reference particularly to the Christian family defined as the entity preserving "the spiritual resources"[45] – is built by applying *Christian morality* to "the universe of parenting"[46].

The huge challenge of current research is that, although modern and postmodern contemporary society "invites us" (our note) to "redefine family" constantly attacking *the legal basis for marriage* (by proposing and even imposing through the legalization of "alternative non marital forms"), *maternity certainty* (see the legalization of substitution motherhood and "the syndrome of «mercenary mothers»" described by socio-anthropologists)[47], the attack against *the*

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[40] "... In real terms, crisis is actually human thirst for truth, for the genuine and substantial meaning of personal and conjugal life."..."so-called crisis of the family" ... "It is the perspective of searching the real life."..."it is the orientation of hope towards a genuine conjugal life. Thirst for a life that focuses on Christ and walking on the same road with Him." (Prot. Kallierghis. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 116-117).

[41] Pr. Faros, Filoteu. 2013. *Criza vârstei de mijloc.Provocări și perspective*.Translated from the Neo-Hellenic by Gabriel Mândrilă (Priest PhD) and Laura Mândrilă. București: Sophia, pp. 20-25.

[42] Ember, R. Carol and Melvin Ember. 2002. *Cultural Anthropology*. Ediția a X-a. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Quoted in Mihu, Achim. 2002. *Antroplogie culturală*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia.

[43] Iluț, Petru. 2005. *Sociopsihologia și antropologia familiei*. Iași: Polirom, p. 12.

[44] *Idem*, 225-227.

[45] Pr. Faros, Filoteu. 2013. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

[46] Firth, Raymond (ed.). 1956. *Two Studies of Kinship*. London: Athlone Press. Quoted in Iluț, Petru. 2005. *Op. cit.*, p. 225.

[47] Gavriluță, Nicu. 2009. *Op. cit.*, pp. 210-216.

presumption of paternity, moderate but still an attack[48] (the mother's husband may be excluded from paternity by a third party donor in the *assisted procreation* situation), *overfiliation*, *fictitious filiation* and "unnatural lineages"[49] (readjustment of paternity incontestability in the situation of filiations as a result of medically assisted procreation; establishing and proving parentage of children either being adopted by homosexual couples or born from previous heterosexual relationships), *pressures* made by *homosexual couples* in order *to access the artificial procreation* ... etc. ... And such examples may go on (some detailed herein) ... however, there is hope *to reduce the negative / anomic effects of the phenomena concerned*, namely, "the phenomenon of kinship"[50] which, crossing the socio-economic and cultural component of the domestic space maintains its *continuity* by identifying itself in the *moral-religious* area.

Thus, by reporting *family relationships* to the *Christian moral values* the concept of *kinship* or spiritual kinship, reborn in contemporary society, is viewed as *parentage* broadly speaking[51]. The inclusion of "the ideological component within the parental system" outlines the "*kinship*" of inter-generational descent which generates (family relationships), through "religious identification", effects on "the religious-socializing area", economic area, as well as the zone of social prestige[52].

All the aspects presented above argue the core idea of the distinction between the *traditional family* and *the modern family* which, in addition to "the split ... inside the parenting network ("kin") is characterized by "moving the focus ... within the nuclear family members"[53]. This situation supports nuances, family sociologists drawing attention to the transition from the "conjugal family" to "parental family". In this context, as Emile Durkheim noted many years ago (1892)[54], the family is losing ground, while marriage is reinforced ("marriage seen as a binding component of society"), but "moral education" is based on reason and not on God!!! Reinforcing the idea of the French sociologist, marriage revival is indeed reflected today by the diversification of the marriage types including non marital alternatives which unfortunately cherish *the unnatural, the frivolity and the instability*. From the Christian moral perspective, these aspects are considered as ignoring family and therefore "the spiritual kinship".

We note that Emile Durkheim's theory expressed many years ago concerning "the fact that family is losing ground", has re-occurred in today's society while "marriage is strengthened" defining what we mean today by "nuclear family" torn from the *parental network* or *kinship*. The difference, I would say significant, is that Emily Durkheim's reasoning is a secular one, very different from what the Church Fathers have always taught us about the *Sacrament of Marriage*. Reiterating the message from the perspective of Christian morality we can strongly affirm that indeed *religious marriage* can be *the bonding component of family, kinship and society as a whole.*

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[48] Mihail Vasile Jakotă. 2003. „Cuvânt înainte". In *Filiația. Abordare socio-juridică*, author Maria Sandu. Iași: Editura Fundației AXIS, pp. 13-14.
[49]Segalen, Martin. 2011. *Sociologia familiei*. Iași: Editura Polirom.
[50] Harris, Christopher C. 1998. *Relațiile de rudenie*. Translation from English by Antonia Opriță. București: Editura DU Style. From Harris's perspective, "the phenomenon of kinship" is determined, in a causal sense, by a "set of values, beliefs and rules that structure social action" having a broader meaning to the socio-legal sense of *Kinship*.
[51]Parenting" broadly means "the parental universe" or "the parental system" that aims the magnitude of kinship relationships or lineage but also other "selectivity variables" such as culture, organized in the spirit of social solidarity. The concept should not be confused with narrow-sense *parenthood*, which designates taking *parental responsabilities* related to *maternal* or *paternal roles*.
[52] Iluț, Petru. 2005. *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.
[53] *Idem*, p. 87.
[54] Durkheim, Emile. 1998. *De la division du travail social*. 5-e éd. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

This is true because even if *civil marriage* or *free union* is directly related to family relationships through *co-parenting* and *filiation*, the destruction of the kinship has negative effects on the whole inter-generational family system.

As shown in a previous work[55], *the hypotheses* of our study focus on the results of recent research which highlights *the impact of Christian religious behavior* in general and of *Christian Orthodox*, particularly upon modern society[56]. In this sense, *the kinship* or "spiritual kinship" plays an essential role in *the dialectic of the manifestation of secularization* as a cultural and historical process concerning the achievement of "the conditions of *Christian faith*"[57]. Thus the *cultural-religious* component of the intergenerational lineage can lead *secularization strategies* either in a negative or in positive direction, in the latter hypothesis, *the kinship* being a powerful *cultural "buffer"* (our note) namely *Christian religious*, *the Orthodox branch*, for "the symptoms" or "marks" of the secularization process in the Romanian society.

In this regard, Prot. Antonios Kallierghis in his study entitled "A Slow Death on the Couch" with a suggestive title as a variant of answer to the question "Why do you want to marry?", summarizes the "sociologists' observations" regarding the crisis in marriage and family relations, as follows[58]:

a. "Instability" seen as the inability of man to cope with contemporary rapid transformations related to "individualization, atomization living conditions" resulting in a reality "fragmented in limited realities"; for example, marriage and creating a family are separated from sexuality; the birth of children is separate from marriage; confusion between the roles of the spouses, etc.
b. Beyond statistics, *the family* is a *relationship between persons* , and in this respect, we witness discrepancies between "needs" and "capacity" expressed for example in the *commodity* of the contemporary man doubled by *inauthentic communication*; sociologists highlight that one of the effects of such attitudes is represented by "the incompatible roles of the sexes";
c. "*Idolizing life's expectations and needs*" explained by "shifting the focus from the person of the partner" on "secondary issues" such as material issues (prosperity, well-being);
d. Exaggerations concerning "the achievement of equality" between the sexes which stem from a mentality supported by the "immaturity of men";
e. *Idealization* of marriage supported by the media offering a *paragon*;
f. "The fanatic approach to marriage" supported by superstitions and "the religious way of the time";
g. "*Idealization of family and natality*" expressed by the desire "of making a family" and "having children" aspect which carries the husbands away from living the *Sacrament of Marriage* from the *Orthodox perspective.*

2.1. *Religious marriage* and the issue of union between man and woman

[55] Mihăilă, Maria Marinela. 2015. „The Effects of Secularization on Spiritual Kinship". In GIDNI International Conference „Globalization, Intercultural Dialogue and National Identity", May 28-29, 2015.
[56]Georgescu, Bogdan-Costin. 2014. *Încercări de hermeneutică antropologică asupra ritualurilor religios-creştine*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura EIKON, 15.
[57] Taylor, John. 2007. Quoted in Tofan, Ioan Alexandru. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 209.
[58] Prot. Kallierghis. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 99-109.

In general, the writings concerning *Christian theology*, *Christian morality or ethics / Christian bioethics* bring to your attention that "the sexual issue"[59] is linked to "the family issue" and we dare state, what we are going to argue later, that the *Christian family crisis is*, in fact, *the crisis of sexuality*, specifically *the crisis of responsible love between man and woman.* The remarkable Patriarch of Constantinople, St. John Chrysostom, using *the historical, philological, critical and contemplative method*, is a model for current scientific researchers because his surveys are always accompanied by *moral conclusions*, in comparison to current studies that separate the analysis of the biblical text from the *moral and homiletic element*. But how can the *Christian family* be defined? First, starting from "the essential purposes of creating a family", as St. John Chrysostom highlights in his book *Life Issues*[60], namely:

- mitigating carnal inclinations toward sensuality and sexuality through marriage fulfillment and conjugal discipline;
- proliferation of the human race, through the birth of children;
- acquiring holiness by the spouses working together and helping each other in the difficult process of attaining salvation.

In this sense, Priest Ioan C. Teşu, Professor, PhD from the Faculty of Theology within "Dumitru Stăniloae" University from Iasi, defines the family in terms of the Christian faith as an altar of sacrifice of the self to the exaltation of a community way of life, based on love and mutual giving of the spouses to each other and of both towards the children God blesses and adorns their existence with"[61]. At the same time, he describes, with reference to the religious literature, the fact that both men and women face the problem of *self ignorance* and of course, *partner ignorance* also proposing a Christian model of husband-wife relationship.

A profound argument of biblical nature is brought forward by Priest Professor, PhD Petre Semen from the Faculty of Orthodox Theology, "Dumitru Stăniloae" University starting from the biblical Hebrew meaning of the term "*baith*" which refers "not only to the edifice housing those belonging to a single family (Iov.18, 5)", but also to "its members and descendants (Gen. 18, 19)." Further arguments show that breaking the matrimonial vows was permitted only in exceptional circumstances and "the sacred context of the legal prescriptions" was focused on the protection of women and the family in general. Moreover, the position of the Israelite woman in the family enjoys "honor" and "appreciation" on behalf of the husband who "often treated her as his equal (I Kings 1, 4-8; II Kings 4, 8-24)" being happy to meet "a virtuous woman and a good housewife" as "companion for life".[62]

The theme of "natural love" is reiterated and this is related in the Orthodox Christian vision, to *The Sacrament of Marriage*, which belonging to The Sacraments of the Orthodox tradition of services is "of priceless theological depth." Referring to this beautiful "Orthodox service", Priest Professor, PhD Ion Vicovan insists on "its soteriological function" and its catechetical role that can

[59] Leb and Kerekes. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 320.
[60] Sfântul Ioan Gură de Aur. *Problemele vieții*. The translation was made after the original Greek by Cristian Spătărelu and Daniela Filioreanu. Editura Cartea Ortodoxă. Editura Egumenița, pp. 102-119.
[61] Teșu, C. Ioan. 2011a. „Familia contemporană între ideal și criză". In *op. cit.*, coord. Viorel Sava (Pr. Professor PhD) and Ilie Melniciuc-Puică (Pr. lecturer PhD), 266-318: 287.
[62] Semen, Petre. 2011. „Contribuția Bisericii, a școlii și a familiei la formarea religios-morală a tinerei generații". In *ibidem*, 301-318: 301-302.

be (to the living, our note) "a valuable religious lesson."[63] To underline the "richness" of the Sacred Marriage service, Priest Professor, PhD Ion Vicovan refers the "the perspective of the biblical historical personalities" mentioned during the service and who, "according to their life or to the moment of their life which is being invoked at the time of the service", "express a blessing, a prayer, a profound message"[64] for the spiritual life and wealth of the family. Paraphrasing G. Chapmann, who writes about *The Five Languages of Love*, Priest Professor, PhD Ioan C. Teşu presents "Christian marriage" as an extension of "eternity" every one of us being obliged to give an account to the "Righteous Judge" of "the gift he or she received in the person of the wife or husband"[65]. But unfortunately, there is an increasing tendency today to alienate ourselves from the *Christian model* of the Sacrament of Marriage.

From the perspective of our research[66] – based on a questionnaire survey conducted on a sample of about 100 couples (married / unmarried / divorced) and interviews with subjects in the target group – we underline worrying answers to the question: "Is it important for the spouses to have the same religion"? Few under half of the respondents (48.9%) pointed that it is important for spouses to have the same religion. It's significant to note that an important percentage is represented by those who are not interested in this matter (30.5%), although to the previous question: "Is it important that parents be married religiously"? the majority of respondents (89.4%) stated the importance of parents being married religiously, the rest (10.6%) claiming otherwise.

Among the causes and manifestations of contemporary family crisis, which are defined, by the authors mentioned previously, as "the wounds of contemporary family" we summarize below the problem areas in terms of Christian morality, namely: "pornography or "the «dictatorship of sinful images»"; "autoerotism or masturbation"; "premarital sex" and "consensual union"; "betrayal of family loyalty – extra-conjugal sex (adultery, infidelity)"; "homosexuality –"«terrible madness»"; "«loneliness in two»", the absence of dialogue, communication crisis"; "family violence"; "divorce – «crime against nature and against the law»"; "abortion – "«deadly wound of the ethnic soul»"[67].

We note that *the contemporary Christian family issue* revolves around the idea of *sexuality* which is clearly defined by the Church Fathers, ambiguities originating in our manner of interpreting and of relating to these *moral precepts*, depending on how we stand on the *hermeneutical polarized scale* the "worldly sense" and the "Divine meaning" of things. Contrary to views that see religious marriage as a restriction of freedom (namely sexual restrictions), the conjugal relationship, "as one of the most intimate aspects of family life" is of interest to both traditional and modern theologians. Thus Priest Professor, PhD Ioan C. Teşu shows, paraphrasing St. Paul, called the "Apostle of Nations", that inside the "Christian family", "the woman isn't the owner of her own body any longer because it belongs to her husband; similarly the husband isn't the owner of his own body anymore because it belongs to his wife (I Cor. 7.4)." Basically,

[63] Vicovan, Ion. 2011. „Taina Sfintei Cununii din perspectiva personalităților istorico-biblice menționate în cadrul slujbei". In *ibidem*, pp. 255-265: 255.
[64] *Ibidem*, pp. 263-264.
[65] Teșu, C. Ioan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 283.
[66] Sandu, Maria. 2016. *Efectele secularizării asupra relației părinți-copii. Studiu de caz*: *Iași*, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza" din Iași.
[67] Teșu, C. Ioan. 2011b. „Răni ale familiei contemporane". In *Familia contemporană între ideal și criză*, author Ioan C. Teșu (Pr. Professor PhD), 223-351. Iași: Doxologia.

regulating the relations which should exist between spouses, it shows that they become "one body" and their giving up to "bodily pleasure" – "soul and body abstention" for spiritual practice, through "fasting and prayer" – "must have «the spouses reciprocal agreement»" (I Cor. 7.5)[68].

Although according to the Christian faith, as Priest Professor PhD Ioan C. Teșu highlights "sexuality is an innocent and righteous affection" which became part of the "human nature", "together with the other feelings 'through the original sin, it is however at the same time, "the sensual (animal-like) aspect our nature".[69] In other words, it is very important the "use or direction" these feelings are given by man because as long as sexual impulses and instincts are satisfied within the "normal limits", they "support the overall spiritualization of the man", whereas losing control and indiscipline or "over satisfaction" lead to *addiction* and therefore to "sin". The sin "of excessive self-love" is considered "the source of all evil and the mother of all passions."[70] Therefore, "reducing the gender relationship between a man and a woman to sex" post-modernity places *the relation between a man and a woman* out of the "*natural logic*" proposing an "*immoral «șamoralț» game*" which, in the name of freedom of expression and human rights sets *the modern and (post)modern couples* in a state of *confusion, self-delusion and false power* that excludes them from the "metaphysical mysteries."[71]

Also, analysts note that we are confronted with the phenomenon of the *fear of marriage* which is maintained by such matters as: "precaution" towards "the traditional model" of family; "lack of confidence toward the opposite sex" which is sometimes reached because of the "transient" and irresponsible relationships; "the fear" against the worsening of "personal" problems which could be doubled by the problems of a "second person"; "the fear" against the worsening of "personal" problems which could be doubled by "possible pregnancy and children". To the question of a male listener addressed from the perspective of a father – "Why don't people marry any longer nowadays?" – Priest Mihai Aurel[72], answers synthetically using the following arguments: "lust" corroborated with "the decline of human nature"; "careerism" linked to "the desire of acquiring proprieties"; "refusing to live with parents" as an expression of "libertinism"[73].

2.2. Conclusions. "Sacrificial love" *vs* affective conjugality and their effects on parental responsibility – The results of a sociological study.

Also significant in terms of our research is the intrinsic link described by St. John Chrysostom, between *the spouses living happily together* and *the good upbringing of children*, with positive effects on *relatives, friends, neighbors* and therefore of the community as a whole. "Why? Because if the spouses live in good understanding, then their children will thrive and the neighbors will be delighted by the scents of their Christian life, their friends will be glad and the relatives will be proud. But if the reverse happens, all will clutter, all the family aspects will be disturbing and

[68] Teșu, C. Ioan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 291-292.
[69] Stăniloae, Dumitru. 2002. *Ascetica și mistica Bisericii* Ortodoxe. București: Editura Institutului Biblic și de misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române. In *Op. cit.* 2011a, author Ioan C. Teșu (Pr. Professor PhD), note 432, p. 274.
[70] Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul. *Răspunsuri către Talasie*. Quoted in Teșu, C. Ioan. *Ibidem*, notes 433 and 434, p. 275.
[71] Leb and Kerekes. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 320.
[72] Answers given by Priest Mihai Aurel during the "Answer listeners" issue made by the Priest Ciprian Ulinici on topics related to *family*, Radio Trinitas, Monday, May 4, 2015, 21.30-22.45 h.
[73] Mitrofan, Iolanda and Nicolae Mitrofan.1994. *Elemente de psihologie a cuplului*. București: Casa de editură și presă «ȘANSA» S.R.L. In *Op. cit.* 2011a, author Ioan C. Teșu (Pr. Professor PhD), note 443, pp. 277-278 .

confusing."[74]. Given the role of *imitation* and therefore the pattern of family "taken as a model" by children, Priest professor PhD Petre Semen from the Faculty of Orthodox Theology "Dumitru Stăniloae" Iași, in the section entitled "Risk Factors in Educating the Young Generation," asks not rhetorically, "what kind of family could be considered a model" because one encounters "families and families."[75]

a. The inclination of some parents towards *overprotection* who, focusing their attention on applying "the rules" in the family, behave more like "policemen or judges" losing sight of the establishment of a "true and stable relationship from person to person.";
b. *Parents neglecting their children* as opposed to the overprotection issue, a phenomenon which is defined as "carelessness or negligence in raising children, total or almost total indifference specifically to the fundamental needs of the child" (shelter, food, clothing, healthcare, education and collaboration with school, healthy lifestyle);
c. *Family abandonment and the divorce of parents* directly affecting the vulnerability of children represents another "major problem" with destructive effects on family in general and on the children in particular. At this point, Priest professor PhD Petre Semen refers to the serious difficulties faced by neglected children ranging from emotional and material insecurity, the feeling of guiltiness, "mimicry", addictions of all kinds (psychoactive substances, people, gambling etc.) idolatry and "suicide";
d. *School abandonment* is presented not only as a negative effect of child neglect by parents, but also as "another huge problem" affecting school, "family, Church" and "society" as a whole.

The definitions proposed today by *parenting researchers*, in a psycho-socio-legal approach, are visibly different from the meaning of the term "parenting" proposed by the French dictionary *Le Petit Robert*, which clasifies the qualities of "parenthood" into the quality of "mother" and the quality of "father". Or, as we argued previously, *the current trend*, supported mainly from a legislative perspective, is *to redefine family* through *virulent and insidious attacks* of what precisely is *relevant and defining* for the existence of the family in *socio-cultural and religious* terms: *marriage*, *maternity and paternity*. The alternatives proposed by the zealous legislators are already known. What seems very serious is that by attacking marriage as a *civil and religious institution*, we don't harm parenting as an abstract term, but *its contents*, namely *motherhood* and *fatherhood* which are inextricably linked to the *child's identity*. Giving up the terms of "mother" and "father", as current *family and demographic* policies propose, means to give up our *identity* intimately linked to *family and kinship* as *essential resources* in achieving *socio-cultural protection* – with *spiritual and religious meanings – of family and children in the European context*. Or maybe we believe that by giving up *love*, namely *family*, *marriage*, *mother* and *father* we become "multicultural Europeans"? Or maybe we think we will better protect the children whose parents are alienated from *the natural and the essentially sacramental* aspects of existence in living their so-called "love relationship"?

[74] St. John Chrysostom. *Op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.
[75] Semen, Petre. 2011. *Op. cit.*, pp. 311-318.

Indeed, we witness today the emergence of *the parental family* as a denial of *marriage crisis* doubled by the harsh reality of *divorce* and *separation*. The myth of the "child king" who brings forward the primacy of his rights and interests *above all* is denied by the myth of the "child-prosthesis" or "crutch" of the parental couple, the child's interest being regarded as "an empty bottle inside which everyone deposits whatever he wants to find"[76]. "Investment" in the child crosses the traditional paradigm of "the promise for the future", who is perceived through the prism of "adult interests" as "the primary source of love" the child becoming the substitute for trust within the couple relationship as a vector of a negotiated relation!

We define in our research, starting from the concept of *parenting in extenso* – contemporary *kinship* within the *extended family* and *kinship relations* including the *religious component* – as a *resource* on *parenting in the narrow sense*. As a result, our attention focuses, by means of our sociological investigation, on the term "parenting" related to the process of *assuming parental responsibilities* including *religious identification* and *transmitting the moral, religious values* related to *maternal* and *paternal roles.* Only in this way, "affective conjugality" and assumed parenthood could be prerequisites for the *reconstruction of the contemporary family*, this regaining the status of "ruined or changing sovereignty"[77]. The answer to the question of whether *the couple parenthood* and *filiation* "can rely only on willpower"[78] is negative on the grounds that "individual will" and "family rights", promoted to the rank of "fundamental realities", deny precisely "the meaning and depth of human development"[79].

Therefore we get to analyze nowadays controversial triad, namely the interdependence between *Family-School-Church* affected by the changes produced by *the secularization strategies* which have negative consequences on our children, whose *bright future* we all strive to assure not always managing to choose the *correct approach*. Sociologists of religion have identified and explained, for example, "the decline" of human identity - "one of the faces of secularism" – which results in "losing the ecclesiastic meaning" of life and paradoxically, "the pagan search for meaning (be it «duhovnicesc»,ecclesiastic)!"[80] From the sociological perspective of Cristinel Joja from the Faculty of Orthodox Theology in Arad, the drama "of the contemporary Christian identity", is "Christian pagan" and "pagan Christian" life which has undergone a "spiritual decline" or spiritual-religious "syncretism".

However, the sacred voice of St. John Chrysostom cries from the depths of existence: "I beseech and implore you to take special care of your children and look for their soul's salvation."[81]. Suggestive in this regard are the results of our research that highlight the special care that parents have for the *socio-professional safety*, followed by *authority and rules*; unfortunately they focus less on *communication and developing a personalized parent-child relationship* (with significant

[76]Dekeuwer-Defossez, Françoise. 1995. „Réflections sur les mythes fondateurs du droit contemporain de la famille". *Revue Trimestrielle de Droit civil* 2, pp. 249-270: 262.
[77] Roudinesco, Ėlisabeth. 2006. *Familia în dezordine*. București: Editura Trei, p. 138.
[78]Vergely, Bertrand. 2006. „Despre modificarea dreptului familiei". In *Bioetica şi taina persoanei*. București: Editura Bizantină, pp. 153-158: 154.
[79] *Ibidem*, p. 158.
[80] Joja, Cristinel. 2015. Interview with the program „Dialogues Trinitas" Radio Trinitas, on 31 March 2015 from 18.30 to 19.00 hours.
[81] St. John Chrysostom. *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

differences between mothers and fathers). However, the answers given by parents regarding the *communication on religious matters* and religious practices such as *Holy Sacrament of Confession* and *Church attendance by children* are surprising and auspicious.

A significant percentage of favorable responses applies to the statement *I make every effort to offer everything the child needs* (92.9%), while only 68% of parents *are aware* of the child's reading list, and 32.6% watch *the child's activity on the internet*. These results indicate an increased involvement from parents regarding the *child's social life path*, but a lower presence concerning the child's individual activity and his consumption habits.

The first aspect that has gathered the most positive answers is related to the reactions of parents when they see that the child has done something wrong: 82.3% percent of those questioned use verbal punishment: *I scold him whenever I think he is wrong* and only slightly above average (56%) of the parents surveyed said they generally go to the doctor at any sign of illness of the child, the same percentage of parents having the habit of *reading to their children* or *talking to them before bedtime*. Distribution of answers depending on the gender of the subject shows that *mothers* are more concerned with *maintaining a direct contact with the child.* At the same time, with a significant difference compared to the percentage of fathers, *mothers* are those *who engage in initiating a positive context for the bedtime discussion* – be it reading or conversation (70.9%). On the opposite side, only 37% of fathers have this habit. Two thirds of respondents said they *talk to their children* about topics on *religious subjects (*67.9%). The children of 67.1% of the respondents go to confess to the Priest, and 43.2% often go to Church. Only 29.3% of respondents' children use to read various religious books. All religions sociologists provide a solution to the phenomenon of "re-sacralization of social life", specifically, family life. Thus "the search for meaning" as the sociologist of religions, Nicu Gavriluță, stated in an interview at Trinitas TV, "relating to God"[82] must be a constant preoccupation of our lives consisting in "communicating our spiritual state" – here, the sociologist referring to the "lack of wonder, contemplation, special experience through Prayer" – "communion within the Church" (as a spiritual therapy against individualism, our note) and the ability of "concentration, will and control" (as antidote to abate positive energy in a secularized world, our note).

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[82] Nicu Gavriluță. 2014. *Interview* to Trinitas Radio, see endnote 19 of this Article.

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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GRAVITATIONAL WAVES DISCOVERY

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Abstract: The paper explores some philosophical and epistemological significances of the breakthrough discovery of GW. The event, compared with the moment when Galileo, four hundred years ago, directed a telescope to the sky, seems to promise equal cultural consequences. The revolutionary Copernican model would have been a simple peculiar model of Cosmos in the absence of Galilean observations. The empirical detection of GW, predicted 100 years ago by Einstein's Theory of Relativity, brings to the fore this hypothetical conception of Universe, with major consequences on the present conceptions of causality, space, time (space-time), the nature of determinism, and the relation of the human mind with the Universe. It proves once again the core function of interdisciplinary perspectives in contemporary science.

Keywords: Singularity, GW, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Interdisciplinary Stance.

LIGO Detection

"The Discovery of GW", "Einstein's GW found at last", "«It's Just Too Perfect»: Inside the First Gravitational Wave Detection", "Einstein's GW «seen» from black holes" are some of the titles which swamped the Internet in February 2016, after the announcement made by LIGO (Laser Interferometer Gravitational-wave Observatory). The GW were detected on September 14, 2015 at 5:51 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (09:51 UTC) by both twin LIGO detectors, located in Livingston, Louisiana, and Hanford, Washington, USA. "This confirms a major prediction of Albert Einstein's 1915 General Theory of Relativity [GTR] and opens an unprecedented new window onto the cosmos," it is said in the official statement.

The paper focuses on the epistemological consequences of this experiment and its effects on the perspective on scientific activity. If we adopt a straight falsificationist perspective (or dogmatic falsificationism),[1] there is no experiment that could be a "proof" for the existence of Gravitational Waves [GW], but only a strong evidence which supports this model. In Science we have only the models and not depictions of reality. But the radical falsificationist limits are obvious. "If factual propositions are unprovable then they are fallible. If they are fallible then clashes between theories and factual propositions are not «falsifications» but merely inconsistencies. Our imagination may play a greater role in the formulation of «theories» than in the formulation of «factual propositions»,* but they are both

[1] Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, London: Routledge, 1963.
* Incidentally, even this is questionable. (*authors note*)

fallible. Thus *we cannot prove theories and we cannot disprove them either*. The demarcation between the soft, unproven «theories» and the hard, proven, «empirical basis» is non-existent: *all* propositions of science are theoretical and, incurably, fallible.[2] Understanding the process of scientific knowledge requires a more complementary perspective that fusion both the falsificationist and verificationist dimension.[3]

Does the discovery of GW confirm GTR?

But if the empirical settings could only definitely prove that a model is wrong and not the other way round, what is the purpose of this experiment? The detection of predicted GW is a strong evidence in which B-confirms the GTR.[4] The LIGO detections add new evidence, besides the already existing ones,[5] that the depiction of GTR could be suitable for explaining the physical phenomena observed. In 1974 Hulse and Taylor inferred from the hanging orbits of paired neutron stars observed, which comply with Einstein's general relativity prediction, that the other consequence, the existence of GW, should be also true. In the LIGO experiment, on the base of another fundamental postulate of GTR, i.e. the constant light speed, the scientists measured the changing laser time travel between mirrors, which correlates at that moment in two observatories, and inferred the existence of GW.[6]

The prior probability of GTR was based more on its success to solve the open problems left by classical theory of Universe. Some data could not have been explained in the classical theory framework and Einstein provides a new perspective where most of those observed data fitted: "anomalous" precession of the perihelion of Mercury, deflection of light by the Sun, gravitational red shift of light or light travel time delay testing, among other modern experiments. All these observations and experiments increased the probability of GTR, which accommodates better the existing evidence than the classical perspective. Until now the existence of GW was an unconfirmed direct consequence of GTR. Why is the detection of gravitational wave so important for the probability of GTR? In the Bayesian theory of confirmation the prior and posterior probabilities of a theory are formally related: P(T/E) = P(T)*P(E/T)/P(E): the posterior probability of T (P(T/E)) is equal with the prior probability of T (P(T)) multiplied by the ratio between likelihood of evidence given T (P(E/T)) and the expectedness of evidence (P(E)). GW was an evidence predicted on the base of GTR and not a fact previously known. GTR was made for "accommodating" the old

[2] Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, eds. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp 99-100.
[3] Bogdan Popoveniuc, "Falsificaţionism, verificaţionism şi complementaritate (Falsificationism, verificationism and complementarity), in Sorin Tudor Maxim and Bogdan Popoveniuc (coord.), Analele Universităţii "Ştefan cel Mare", Seria Filosofie şi Dicipline Socio-Umane (Annals of University "Ştefan cel Mare" Suceava, Philosophy and Social-Human Disciplines Series), Suceava: "Ştefan cel Mare" University Press, 2004, pp. 19-30.
[4] B-confirmation of a theory is a concept from Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) which states that evidence affects the degrees of belief that people have about a theory in ways determined by theorems from probability theory such as Bayes Theorem. A certain evidence (would) confirms (in some degree) the T theory just if the probability of T conditional on E is greater than unconditional probability of T.
[5] The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the Nobel Prize Physics for 1993 jointly to Russell A. Hulse and Joseph H. Taylor, Jr, both of Princeton University, New Jersey, USA for the discovery of a new type of pulsar, a discovery that has opened up new possibilities for the study of gravitation. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1993/press.html.
[6] B. P. Abbott *et al.* (LIGO Scientific Collaboration and Virgo Collaboration), "Observation of GW from a Binary Black Hole Merger", *Physical Review Letters*, 116, 061102 – Published 11 February 2016.

evidence as the "anomalous" precession of the perihelion of Mercury". This was evidence which GTR was meant to explain. The GW is a posterior evidence "predicted" by GTR. However, the confirmation probability of a theory seems to be equal if it succeeds to accommodate some old fact, or it predicts new ones because they are symmetric: "both prediction and accommodation consist in the deduction of some facts; and that they apply the term «prediction» when the facts has not established, and the term «accommodation» when it has."[7] As a rule, a theory is accommodating if it was designated to entails the datum, and theory correctly predicts datum when it wasn't designed to entail it.

The GTR is a deterministic theory and the new predicted facts probability should be equal with 1: P(E/T)=1. In this case P(T/E)= P(T)/P(E). In probabilistic theory of confirmation, P(E) should not be 1, because this will lead to the known problem of old evidence (P(h/e) = P(h)). The question is: what will make this discovery more relevant for GTR, a low or a high value for P(E)? In the Bayesian theory of confirmation it seems that low values for P(E) increase the probability confirmation of theory. Intuitively speaking, the more surprising the evidence is, the more confirming it is for that theory. For the scientific community working on verifying GTR the belief in E, P(E) was extremely high, almost 1, given the huge amount of investment made in LIGO and other facilities designed to confirm the predictions. For the public, the credibility was definitely very low, given the hard to imagine reality of GW.

The information that a theory correctly predicted certain facts enhances its credibility more than the news of the successful accommodation of the same data, only amongst those people who are not acquainted with the theory. Maybe they heard about it, as in the case of GTR, but they are unfamiliar with its principles. "But if, on the other hand, we grasp the theory and can rationally assess its plausibility, then no information about whether the entailed data were predicted or accommodated should have the slightest evidential value."[8]

Does this mean that GW discovery has a minimum impact on the confirmation of GTR? This is not necessarily the case. Even in the Bayesian confirmation theory, it is asserted that the power to accommodate or predict are unequal relative with the probability of a theory.[9] Predictions which have high values for P(E) and for the likelihood ratio are decisive to determine that E is evidence for T and, also, P(E) must be high in order to justify the Bayesian conditionalization on E.[10] In other terms, the surprising evidences discovered are not raising the probability of a theory as much as (with high probability) expected ones because of its relation with the high probability of the likelihood of evidence given the falsehood of -T (P(E/-T)), or other concurrent theories. "[P]rediction provides epistemic goods and additional assurance above and beyond accommodation at a number of points in scientific inference. For inferences from data to phenomena, from phenomena to theories, and from theories to framework, prediction provides distinct epistemic advantages. These epistemic assurances include: insurance against overfitting, evidential relevance to the explanatory structure of a

[7] Paul Horwich, *Probability and Evidence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 109.
[8] *Ibidem*, p. 117.
[9] Patrick Maher, *Betting on Theories*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
[10] Sherrilyn Roush, *Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence and Science*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

theory, and reliable production of successful theories. In addition, novel predictions provide other epistemic goods, such as uncovering new relevant evidence and new evidence/theory relations."[11]

In the case of GTR and GW, the problem of confirmation is more special because we are dealing with a universal paradigm that represents a radical change from the previous one. The GTR is that sort of Universal Theory that neither the falsificationist one, nor even the pure verificationist one could account for its validity and development. Like the Newtonian theory of gravity, it does not forbid any "observational state of affaire" and could not be entirely rejected on the basis of any single evidence (not even more). A similar situation is found in Quantum Physics where scientists learned their lesson sooner that astronomers when they try to confirm their model for particles. They found that a particle is however it is measured. You may think it is corpuscular; hence your measurement device is set for particles detection and will discover a particle; you may think it has an undulatory nature, then you will build a device for measuring waves and this is all you have got. So is each and every model true? Both models are true? Or maybe there must be another solution?

The gravitation waves were inconceivable before GTR. In this case the theory predicts evidences which previously did not even exist as theoretical possibilities. Therefore, the detection of GW represents an example of godly power of mathematical language able to put order in the Universe. The efforts to accommodate past classical theory with observable data failed, and the human mind conceived a totally different kind of order, which implies a totally new understanding of physical reality. "Even if we know all the evidence on which a theorist based her theory, the fact that certain datum was predicted rather than accommodated, may provide further evidence for the theory."[12] It is a big accomplishment of GTR model that we can get used with to understand the universe, it fits to a lot of observations, better than the previous ones, and it is more solid because it predicts in advance what should be discovered.

Competing theories

We see that the combination of empirical falsifiability and confirmation with available and experimental evidence acquired makes out of GTR an epistemological superior theory. The detection of GW is less probable to be an "Einsteinism": "correct prediction, wrong reason." Most of the competing theories, at the GTR level of comprehension, are unable to provide testable consequence and make fallible statements. They are more metaphysical constructs based on a queer dogmatic verificationism. According to their authors' personal beliefs, these "theories" have such a flexible hermeneutics, that it could adjust and re-interpret the event of GW detection in any desirable twisted ways. They could even become proofs that "Big Bang cosmology is not operational science. This observation in no way strengthens claims that the alleged Big Bang happened. The Big Bang necessarily still needs many unverifiable fudge factors. It is still unreasonable."[13] GW are not a "proof" of Einstein's

[11] P. D. Magnus and Heather Douglas, "State of the field: Why novel prediction matters" (2013), *Philosophy Faculty Scholarship*. Paper 23, p. 24, http://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar/23.
[12] Roger White, "The epistemic advantage of prediction over accommodation," *Mind* 112 (448) (2003), p. 668.
[13] John G. Hartnett, "What impact does the detection of GW have on biblical creation?" Creation Ministries International, Published: 16 February 2016, http://creation.com/detection-of-gravitational-waves-and-biblical-creation.

"space curvature" as the "mechanism" of gravitation, but "it really would prove nothing more than that space is not empty and that it contains a material medium capable of transmitting motion over great distances."[14] In such dogmatic interpretation the experiment confirms just the opposite: the dead of attraction gravity idea, that the space is not empty and the Aether must exist![*]

Other limits of GTR are also pretexts for contesting this amazing success. It predicts well the events and phenomena and the formation of black holes at a certain size. We also know that in time the black holes lose thermal radiation and shrinks reaching at the end a quantum size. TGR could not depict what happened with the final remnant, because it will depend on the way of how gravity behaves at Planck scales, and this is not covered by theory. Overall, the TGR gravity is not compatible with the gravity conception from Quantum Physics. For this is it necessary to upgrade the GTR to a Grand Unified Theory or to propose another model, like the EVTD^2 theory a model "based on the existence of an electromagnetic primary wave (EMW) that permanently format and animate by vibration these elementary entities having dimensions with values in the proximity of Planck dimension."[15]

But a Physics of Everything as EVTD^2 that allows a great number of propositions for the understanding of physics phenomena, based on the main principles of simplicity and coherence of natural existence could prove to be, at the end, a Theory of Nothing as long as it could predict everything, hence nothing and make untested infallible assertions. In the harsh world of scientific progress, such theories are condemned to remain mere imaginative exercises, potentially viable as long as they fail to produce inter-verifiable and testable outcomes. In spite of the high level of abstraction and discourse involved in the modern scientific and metaphysical world, the rejection of dogmatic justificationalism makes the difference between a scientific theory and a purely metaphysical one. "The success of current scientific theories is no miracle. It is not surprising to the scientific (Darwinism) mind. For any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only successful theories survive."[16] The epistemic competition between theories is not so much about on which theory is actually true, but on which theory adequately (accurately) describes the observable world.

In my opinion, the arguments in the debates on the superior value of predicting power over accommodation attribute are far from being conclusive, especially because the confirmation theorists strive to construct a mathematical demonstration for epistemic certainty. The mathematics is the most powerful tool invented by the human mind, but it is only an instrument that, like Midas hands, transforms everything it touches in quantitativeness. When we try to understand the human mind and everything which is related

[14] Glenn Borchardt, "Gravitational Attraction is Dead," April 14, 2016, http://www.naturalphilosophy.org/site/glennborchardt/2016/04/14/gravitational-attraction-is-dead/.
[*] "Neomechanical Gravitation Theory" explains gravity through the rising of Aether pressure away from ordinary baryonic matter. Hence, the baryonic matter acts like a vacuum, making material objects to be pushed toward massive objects.
[15] M. Conte, I. Rosca, *Physique de Tout. Les EVTD2*, Brașov: Graphica Print, 2004.
[16] B. van Fraassen, *The Scientific Image*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 80.

to it, we reach our limits. This also happens because the mathematic language could not provide its own explanation.

However, in Physics, it seems that scientists are speaking the language of rational God, that is mathematics. If "mathematics is the language with which God has written the universe", as Galileo Galilei believed, we are able to comprehend it by using our minds when "thinking God's thoughts after him" as Johannes Kepler asserts. Why people would build lasers and the mirrors in kilometers-long tubes, with fancy interferometers with electronics and hydraulic actuators and much more which cost many hundreds millions dollars if they didn't believe in those equations? Nevertheless the psycho-social mechanism is similar in Science and Religion. People need to receive certitude from a comprehensive story of the entire world. They need to gain the feeling of knowing their place in the World. The scientific language is promoted in Science because it is the most clear and distinct of them all. But from here results an erroneous idea. "It is that in physics the ultimate reality is a mathematical prescription, an equation. In fact, the ultimate reality is a little story or myth."[17] Unlike religious myths which imply a conformational hermeneutics in order to put the reality in accordance with the myth, the scientific myths are collectively constructed through a falsificationist process and changed according to the new data. The signs for the truthiness of a scientific myth consist in its predictive power. "[I]n science we have found out that when we know all about the adventures amid events of material physical objects and of scientific objects we have most of the relevant information which will enable us to predict the conditions under which we shall perceive sense-objects in specific situations."[18] Any physical theory describing the ultimate limits of the Universe – as the unconditioned of the absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given conditioned in composition and division – is grounded in a myth which will eventually come to be taken as reality. This is true for GTR and Quantum Theory as well.

Unlike religious myths, the mathematics language seems to convey more hidden information about the World. If hermeneutics of religious texts reveal new meanings for old myths, the scientific hermeneutics for mathematical equation describing the Universe reveals a new way of understanding the Universe, which in turn, predicts new phenomena. Whilst people invest so much time in energy in these equations, it seems that more comes out from them than it goes in.

The Metaphysics of GW

It seems that Newton's warning for the generations of physicist to come: "Physics beware of metaphysics" was a faulty one. If we look at the famous "black-hole war" between Stephan Hawking and Leonard Susskind and proposed solutions, conservation of energy in a parallel Universe, the smearing of information in two dimensions around the edge of the black hole respectively, we found ourselves in a pure scholastic ardent debate about the nature of God and its creation. The holy texts which sustain the Universe are to be found in information bits on the cosmological horizon. According to Holographic Principle "at each level of space,

[17] Lewis C. Epstein, *Relativity Visualized*, Insight Press, 1985, p. 76.
[18] Alfred N. Whitehead, *The concept of Nature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 170.

everything enclosed may be described as a holographic image but when we go looking for the hologram it is always out at the next level."[19] If we apply Susskind's solution to the whole Universe, the physics of our known space-time universe (4-D) becomes a holographic reality working on an alternative set of physical laws, operating on a "real" 3-D boundary of space-time somewhere.*

Physics was and will always be Meta-physics. Every physical model will have, sooner or later to address the cosmological Ideas of for the consistency of their ground. The Physics is the science of "the mathematical total of all phenomena and the totality of their synthesis — in its progress by means of composition, as well as by division." The Universe is the World in its totality. The modern Physics dare to ask the question of its infinity in space, time and division and found there are legitimate question and not just Ideas of Reason.[20] By hesitating in front of the greatness of the Universe, the philosophers wanted to keep the Physics out from Metaphysics and assert these limitations on the legitimate questions areas. But the discovery of GW adds to the other proofs (i.e. the possible eternal Big-Bang, the quadri-dimensional spherical geometry of the Universe that makes it spatially finite but unlimited, the a infinite repetition of a finite number of possibility (or the incessant realisation of infinite possibilities) in Multiverse, and the quantic division of space) for the legitimacy of Kantian Cosmological Ideas and the unlimited power of human mind to conceive genuine meanings and comprehend the Universe. The contemporary models for the Universe, as a whole and at its fundamental structure, started from the need of explaining the existent evidence and it progressed by imagining experiments for proving the subsequent predictions. The GTR model of Universe and The Inflationary Model promise a consistent solution for the Kantian antimony generated by the cosmological Idea of the "absolute completeness of the *composition* of the given totality of all phenomena in space and time". The quantum mechanics supports a consistent solution for the antimony caused by the cosmological Idea of "the absolute completeness of the *division* of given totality in a phenomenon." The quantum causality reveals itself as a promising consistent solution for "the absolute completeness of the *origination* of a phenomenon." And the Great Unified Theory, process physics or Theory of everything could resolute the logical conundrum rised by the cosmological Idea of "absolute completeness of the *dependence* of the *existence* of what is changeable in a phenomenon."[21]

Kant wanted to prove that reason fails in insoluble antinomies when it rises the question of the Absolute condition of the existence in Universe. But GTR removed the Absolute and, along with Quantum Theory, set the problems at a new level, above the classical logic of intuitive apprehension. The Kantian conception was limited by its fundamental dogmatic justificationism, which does not accept any interference to its

[19] Leonard Susskind, *The Black Hole War: My Battle with Stephen Hawking to Make the World Safe for Quantum Mechanics*, Little, Brown, 2008, p. 301.
* If we only take into account the cosmic space, the three dimensions we observe are in effective description only at macroscopic scale and at low energy, while the "real" Universe consists in two-dimensional information structure «painted» on the cosmological horizon.
[20] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Harvard University, 1855, p. 260.
[21] Bogdan Popoveniuc, *Iluziile raţiunii. Antinomiile matematico-transcendentale şi destinul lor în filosofia şi ştiinţa contemporană*, Bucureşti: Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, 2009.

assumption base from "external world". But "if we accept the demarcation criteria of dogmatic falsificationism, *and* also the idea that facts can prove «factual» propositions, we have to declare that the most important, if not all, theories ever proposed in the history of science are metaphysical, that the most, if not all, of accepted progress is pseudo-progress, that the most, if not all, of the work done is irrational. If, however, while still accepting the demarcation criterion of dogmatic falsificationism, we deny that facts can prove propositions, then we certainly end up in complete scepticism: then all science is undoubtedly irrational metaphysics and should be rejected. *Scientific theories are not only equally unprovable, and equally improbable, but they are also equally undisprovable*. But the recognition that not only the theoretical but *all* the propositions in science are fallible, means the total collapse of *all* forms of dogmatic justificationism as theories of scientific rationality."[22]

The detection of GW proves once again the power of the human mind and its collective masterpiece tool, the Science. Einstein knew nothing about black holes or even about lasers, but he laid the theoretical foundations for both. His theoretical and abstract conception reached to the fundamental basis of the things as far as the level of knowledge and technology allows at the time he lived in. His theoretical insights were tested one century later and proved to have a very strong predictive power. His work is no less than a highly creative metaphysical thinking strengthened with differential geometry and mathematical analysis which the same major aim of transforming the unfamiliar unknown and chaotic world in an organized, harmonious known Universe.

Future openings of Gravitational Astronomy

The detection of GW represents the beginning of a new era where the field of gravitational wave astronomy became a reality. When the lasers were discovered, there were few those which believed in their practical usage, and nowadays they are one of the most and widely use application. This new field has no interest for many, but for researchers it could illuminate some of the fundamental mysteries of the Universe. For example, the GW astronomy is the only one that could give us information before 380000 million years from the beginning of the Universe, the time limit for standard astronomy based on other electromagnetic waves (light, X-rays, microwaves, radio waves).[23] In the last decades two major theoretical predictions, made by the two most successful theories of XXX century, i.e. GTR and Quantum Physics, were confirmed: the directly detection of GW and discovery of the Higgs boson. Using the new gravitational wave astronomy, other predicted physical phenomena wait to be revealed and questions to be answered: the direct observation of the dark matter, the inner workings of black holes, if neutron stars are rugged and how looks the actual dynamics of what goes on inside the supernova, what makes stars to explode, the evidence for inflation (e.g. tensor modes) in the cosmic microwave background (the oldest light in the universe, dating from shortly after the Big Bang) and how fast is the Universe expanding, if the GW travels at the speed of light, if there are gravitons, if space-time is made

[22] Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," p. 103.
[23] Until then the Universe was filled with hot ionized gas, i.e the electrons and nuclei were separated and only free electrons were flying around scattering wildly the photons of light and blurred the information they could carry.

of cosmic strings and, maybe, the discovery of particles which are not in the Standard Model.[24]

As one of founding member of LIGO, Kip Thorne said, the most important significance of gravitational-waves detection is the cultural enrichment brought for the future generation. "When we look back on the era of the Renaissance, and we ask ourselves, «What did the humans of that era give to us that is important to us today?» I think we would all agree it is great art, great architecture, great music. Similarly, when our descendants look back on this era, and they ask themselves, «What great things came to us?» … I believe there will be an understanding of the fundamental laws of the universe and an understanding of what those laws do in the universe, and an exploration of the universe. (…) LIGO is a big part of that. The rest of astronomy is a big part of that. And I think that this cultural gift to our future generations is really much bigger than any kind of technological spin-off, than the ultimate development of technology of any kind. I think we should be proud of what we give to our descendants culturally."[25]

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THE DIPLOMATIC POSITION OF ROMANIA IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT OF JUNE 1967

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Abstract:The Arab-Israeli Conflict of June 1967, also known as the Six-Day War, represented an important moment in the troubled history of the Arab-Israeli relations in the second half of the 20th century. Romania's diplomatic efforts to mediate between the two parties involved were considerable and were concentrated not only in Bucharest but also in Cairo, Damascus and Tel Aviv. This paper intends to offer a broader approach to this delicate moment in the history of International Relations by analyzing the existing bibliography, but more important than that by offering a personal view on the existing documents in the Romanian National Archives.

Keywords: Romanian Diplomacy, Six-Day War, International Relations, International mediation, territorial changes.

Unul dintre cele mai importante momente din istoria conflictului arabo-israelian l-a reprezentat războiul din 1967, conflict cunoscut în literatura de specialitate şi sub denumirea de Războiul de şase zile (5-10 iunie 1967). Este vorba, după cum spunea Peter Calvocoressi, de cea de-a treia rundă a conflictului arabo-israelian, care a avut însă consecinţe majore asupra echilibrului de putere în Orientul Mijlociu[1]. Factorul major care a determinat această schimbare a fost reprezentat de pierderile teritoriale suferite de către statele arabe, ceea ce a dus la o întărire a poziţiei Israelului în regiune, dar şi la o creştere a implicării comunităţii internaţionale în problemele Orientului Mijlociu[2].

Scopul articolului de faţă este de a surprinde câteva dintre aspectele implicării României în rezolvarea pe cale diplomatică a acestui conflict. Trebuie menţionat aici faptul că, există numeroase contribuţii bibliografice care au valorizat şi interpretat critic acest moment important din istoria diplomaţiei româneşti[3]. În articolul „Conflictul arabo-israelian din iunie 1967 şi reacţii diplomatice faţă de modificările teritoriale", Cristina Nedelcu a publicat două documente extrem de relevante pentru poziţia României în cadrul acestui conflict, respectiv **Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din 12 iunie 1967** şi **Stenograma şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC al PCR din 6 mai 1968, unde a**

[1] Peter Calvocoressi, *Politica mondială după 1945*, Editura Allfa, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 368.
[2] Cristina Nedelcu, „Conflictul arabo-israelian din iunie 1967 şi reacţii diplomatice faţă de modificările teritoriale" în Nicolae Ecobescu (coordonator), *România. Supravieţuire şi afirmare prin diplomaţie în anii Războiului Rece. Comunicări, articole, studii*, vol. 2, Fundaţia Europeană Titulescu, Bucureşti, 2013, pp. 347-348.
[3] Ion Calafeteanu, Alexandra Cornescu-Coren, *România şi criza din Orientul Mijlociu (1965-1971)*, Editura Sempre, Bucureşti, 2002;

fost analizată politica statului Israel în Orientul Apropiat[4]. Intenţia mea este a completa imaginea oferită de către aceste documente cu un alt document valoros, respectiv **Note de la întâlnirea conducătorilor partidelor comuniste şi muncitoreşti şi a guvernelor socialiste – Moscova, 9 iunie 1967**[5]**.**

Această întâlnire la vârf survine în momentul de apogeu al crizei internaţionale generate de către Războiul de şase zile. Scopul principal al acestei reuniuni era de a oferi Occidentului şi lumii întregi o poziţie comună, de condamnare a Israelului şi de susţinere a statelor arabe, din partea tuturor statelor ce constituiau Blocul Estic în frunte cu Uniunea Sovietică. După cum vom vedea în continuare, România a fost singura ţară din cadrul blocului care a adoptat o poziţie proprie, refuzând să subscrie la declaraţia comună şi să întrerupă relaţiile diplomatice cu Israelul. Dar să vedem care au fost mecanismele interne ale reuniunii de la Moscova[6].

Întâlnirea a avut loc în 9 iunie 1967, discuţiile începând la orele 15,30. Delegaţiile au fost conduse de: tov. Todor Jivkov, prim-secretar al C.C. al P.C. Bulgar preşedintele Consiliului de Miniştri al R.P. Bulgaria (Republica Populară Bulgaria), tov. Antonin Novotny, prim-secretar al C.C. al P.C. din Cehoslovacia (Republica Socialistă Cehoslovacă), tov. Walter Ulbricht, prim-secretar al C.C. al P.S.U.G., preşedintele Consiliului de Stat al R.D.G. (Republica Democrată Germană), tov. Iosip Broz Tito, preşedintele U.C.I., preşedintele R.S.F.I. (Republica Socialistă Federativă Iugoslavia), tov. Wladyslaw Gomulka, prim-secretar al C.C. al P.M.U.P. (Republica Populară Polonă), tov. János Kádár, prim-secretar al C.C. al P.M.S.U. (Republica Populară Ungară). Delegaţia sovietică a fost alcătuită din: tov. L.I. Brejnev, secretar general al C.C. al P.C.U.S., tov. A.N. Kosîghin, membru al Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.C.U.S., preşedintele Consiliului de miniştri al U.R.S.S., tov. N.V. Podgornîi, membru al Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.C.U.S., preşedintele Prezidiului Sovietului Suprem al U.R.S.S.. La rândul său, delegaţia Republicii Socialiste România era compusă din tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al C.C. al P.C. Român şi tov. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, preşedintele Consiliului de Miniştri al R.S. România[7].

Reuniunea a început cu intervenţia lui L.I. Brejnev, care a realizat o expunere cronologică a evenimentelor din Orientul Mijlociu. În finalul acestei prezentări, Brejnev conturează extrem de clar poziţia Moscovei, pe care ar dori-o adoptată şi de către celelalte state participante:

„Ce intenţionăm noi să facem în continuare? În primul rând, să cerem retragerea trupelor izraeliene în limitele frontierelor iniţiale. Consiliul de Securitate să confirme că Izraelul n-a încetat agresiunea şi că a lansat o provocare O.N.U.-ului şi statelor iubitoare de pace.

Evenimentele pot fi însă analizate numai în contextul politicii generale imperialiste. Desigur, Izraelul singur nu putea înfăptui această agresiune, el se află în solda forţelor

[4] Cristina Nedelcu, „Conflictul arabo-israelian din iunie 1967 şi reacţii diplomatice faţă de modificările teritoriale", pp. 358-363.
[5] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secţia Relaţii Externe, dosar nr. 43/1967, filele 1-39.
[6] Întrucât la întâlnire nu au fost admişi stenografi, relatarea discuţiilor se face pe baza notelor luate de traducători.
[7] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secţia Relaţii Externe, dosar nr. 43/1967, filele 2-3.

externe, ca satelit. Tactica Izraelului a fost mârşavă. Când Dayan, ministrul forţelor armate ale Izraelului, a spus că Izraelul doreşte pacea, să lăsăm să lucreze diplomaţia, aviatorii izraelieni probabil că primiseră deja ordin de atac.

Trebuie să apreciem lucrurile în mod realist. Imperialismul încă menţine baze militare în această regiune şi exercită influenţă chiar şi în statele arabe. Se poate constata că până la 5 iunie, statele arabe au obţinut unele succese politice, dar şi-au supraapreciat forţele. Unitatea ţărilor arabe nu a fost demonstrată prea puternic în faţa agresiunii. Acum ele vor avea nevoie de ajutor. Să ne gândim, ce paşi putem întreprinde pentru a întări solidaritatea cu ţările arabe. Duşmanii noştri vor folosi în propaganda lor ideea neeficacităţii solidarităţii cu ţările socialiste”[8].

După aceasta au urmat luările de poziţie succesive ale lui A. Novotny, I.B. Tito şi T. Jivkov, toţi susţinând atitudinea Uniunii Sovietice faţă de acest conflict. A urmat intervenţia lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, care conturează deja opinia distinctă a României cu privire la evenimentele din Orientul Mijlociu:

„Aş dori pe scurt să exprim câteva considerente în legătură cu problemele pe care le discutăm. Evenimentele din Orientul Mijlociu sunt deosebit de grave. Cred că nu ne-am propus aici să analizăm cum s-a ajuns la această situaţie. Pentru aceasta am avea nevoie de timp. Ar fi fost mai bine dacă ne-am fi întâlnit pentru un schimb de păreri nu acum, ci înainte de dezlănţuirea războiului. Am fi avut atunci posibilitatea să facem un schimb de păreri mai cuprinzător, să vedem cum trebuie acţionat pentru a asigura pacea şi a apăra interesele popoarelor din Orientul Mijlociu. Cred că acum nu este momentul să facem o asemenea analiză, dar ea va trebui făcută cu altă ocazie, cu atât mai mult cu cât ea aparţine trecutului.

Analizând cum stau lucrurile în Orientul Apropiat, după părerea noastră nu poate fi vorba de o soluţie militară în favoarea arabilor. Este bine să li se acorde ajutor, însă aceasta nu va duce la schimbarea situaţiei în favoarea lor din punct de vedere militar. De aceea cred că trebuie să acţionăm cu toată fermitatea pentru ca încetarea focului să fie efectivă, să nu se permită reluarea ostilităţilor, să fie retrase trupele în limitele frontierelor dinainte de război. Trebuie să facem totul în această direcţie, deoarece dacă am admite ca trupele izraeliene să rămână pe teritoriul ocupat, aceasta ar însemna o încurajare a forţelor reacţionare. Este bine să se desfăşoare o activitate politico-diplomatică intensă pentru ca problemele din această zonă să fie rezolvate atât în favoarea ţărilor arabe, dar să asigure în acelaşi timp existenţa Izraelului, să se creeze condiţii pentru a se evita un nou conflict.”[9]

Devenea extrem de clar că România nu va adopta o atitudine de condamnare a Izraelului şi de susţinere necondiţionată a statelor arabe, preferând o poziţie moderată, centrată pe rezolvarea imediată a problemelor de natură militară şi continuarea eforturilor de mediere politico-diplomatică.

[8] Ibidem, filele 9-10.
[9] Ibidem, filele 16-17.

Discuţiile care au urmat însă şi luările de poziţie din partea lui J. Kádár şi W. Gomulka au întărit poziţia sovietică de condamnare a Izraelului şi de susţinere a statelor arabe. În acest moment, participanţii au solicitat o pauză.

„În timpul pauzei a avut loc o discuţie între tovarăşul N. Ceauşescu şi delegaţia sovietică. Tovarăşul N. Ceauşescu a arătat că proiectul elaborat este inacceptabil, deoarece nu corespunde realităţii – în timp ce Izraelul este acuzat ca agresor, nu se spune nimic despre ţările arabe; proiectul conţine, dimpotrivă, promisiuni privind sprijinirea politicii pe care aceste ţări au promovat-o până în prezent.

În consecinţă, a fost întocmit un contraproiect român care cuprindea ideile ce au fost apoi dezvoltate în Declaraţia C.C. al P.C.R. şi a guvernului R.S. România în legătură cu situaţia din Orientul Apropiat.

Delegaţia sovietică l-a considerat inacceptabil, întrucât nu conţinea condamnarea Izraelului ca agresor. Partea sovietică nu a difuzat proiectul român celorlalte delegaţii.

după pauză

Tov. L.I. Brejnev: (având în mână textul refăcut al proiectului de Declaraţie)

Cum procedăm tovarăşi? Citeşte fiecare în parte proiectul sau îl citesc eu cu voce tare? Ce părere aveţi?

Tov. T. Jivkov:

Citiţi cu voce tare.

Tov. N. Ceauşescu:

Tovarăşi, am o problemă principială. Delegaţia noastră nu poate să-şi însuşească acest comunicat. Noi suntem pentru adoptarea unui comunicat scurt şi să lăsăm ca fiecare partid să rămână la aprecierile sale. În problemele pe care le-am discutat există aprecieri diferite. De aceea, trebuie discutat mult şi n-are nici un sens să discutăm aici. Într-un comunicat scurt să arătăm să arătăm hotărârea noastră de a apăra pacea şi drepturile popoarelor din Orientul Apropiat.

Tov. W. Ulbricht:

Să luăm notă de declaraţia făcută de tov. Ceauşescu şi să continuăm discutarea proiectului de Declaraţie.

Tov. N. Ceauşescu:

Rog pe tovarăşul Brejnev ca să fie ştearsă România din partea unde se enumeră ţările care au adoptat Declaraţia.

Tov. L.I. Brejnev:

Eu nu sunt directorul şedinţei, aşa că nu vă adresaţi mie, ci întregii consfătuiri.

Tov. A. Novotny:

Delegaţia noastră, din considerentele arătate, este pentru principiul declarării Izraeleului ca agresor. Nu este vorba de Egipt, ci Izraelul este acela care a pornit agresiunea împotriva altui stat.

Tov. I.B. Tito:

Nu se poate adopta un document, în care să nu se scrie că Izraelul este agresor. Cum mă pot întoarce altfel acasă, cu o Declaraţie în care nu se spune acest lucru pe care Iugoslavia l-a declarat de la început.

Tov. J. Kádár :

Şi eu sunt de aceeaşi părere.

Tov. W. Ulbricht:

Şi eu sunt de aceeaşi părere.

Tov. L.I. Brejnev:

Deci, toţi sunt de aceeaşi părere că Izraelul este agresor.

Tov. N. Ceauşescu:

Tovarăşi, eu n-am cerut altceva decât să fie ştearsă România din rândul celor care acceptă această Declaraţie. Declaraţia să fie făcută în numele celorlalte ţări, afară de România.

Tov. L.I. Brejnev:

Nu-i putem forţa pe tovarăşii români.[10]"

În continuare, participanţii la întâlnire, afară de delegaţia română, au discutat proiectul de declaraţie elaborat de partea sovietică. În final, toate delegaţiile au semnat Declaraţia, mai puţin partea română. Întâlnirea s-a terminat în jurul orei 24.

Reuniunea de la Moscova din 9 iunie 1967 a ţărilor membre ale Blocului socialist a demonstrat încă o dată traiectoria proprie pe care se instalase deja politica externă românească, bineînțeles în limitele impuse de statutul ţării noastre de membră a acestui bloc. Războiul arabo-israelian din iunie 1967 a constituit un bun prilej pentru diplomaţia românească să joace un rol activ pe scena mondială în medierea acestui conflict. Poziţia neutră şi echilibrată a României a fost apreciată de ambele părţi implicate în conflict. Aflate în căutare de mediatori neutri, care să nu provină din rândul Marilor Puteri, ţările arabe au găsit în România un partener de dialog de încredere. Poziţia politico-economică a României în zona Orientului Mijlociu s-a consolidat considerabil după evenimentele din 1967. La rândul său, Israelul a apreciat gestul României de a nu-l condamna ca şi agresor şi refuzul de a rupe relaţiile diplomatice cu acesta, după model sovietic. Desigur, există multe alte aspecte ale politicii externe româneşti din această perioadă tensionată care sunt puse în evidenţă de documentele de arhivă şi care merită să fie supuse atenţiei unor cercetări ulterioare.

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STUDY ON THE ASSESMENT OF PARTICIPANTS TO FORMATION

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Abstract: Studiul actual își propune să realizeze o analiză complexă care să contribuie la optimizarea calității în educație.Actorii principali, adică formatorii/ cadrele didactice implicate în procesul instructiv-educativ trebuie să fie bine pregătite pe toate componentele ce formează acest proces, deci implicit și pe componenta evaluării.Astfel, lucrarea de față își propune sintetizarea, explicarea și cercetarea fenomenului numit ,,evaluare'' fără de care nu se poate în activitatea unui formator realizat/complet.Este, deasemenea esențial să se înțeleagă în profunzime conceptul ,,evaluării'', pentru ca în finalul unei activități rezultatele să fie de calitate, iar participanții la formare să resimtă această etapă ca pe una constructivă, obiectivă, de progres și nu invers.Cunoașterea corectă a dimensiunilor procesului de evaluare, evaluarea obiectivă a competențelor celor evaluați,cercetarea unor noi strategii de evaluare în contextul noilor orientări ale educației, converg toate către ceea ce trebuie să îndeplinească evaluarea, adică să aibă un rol reglator fiind în măsură să optimizeze ruta, calitatea, eficiența și oportunitatea educației, în mod secvențial sau global.

Keywords:evaluare, educație, calitate, cercetare, formabil.

Abstract: The current study intends to achieve a complex analysis which will aid in educational optimization quality. The main actors, well, the trainers / the teachers involved in the educational process should be well prepared on all components that make up this process, so by default and evaluation component. Therefore, this paper aims at synthesizing, explaining and researching the phenomenon called,, evaluation" without which it can be the activity of a accomplished/full trainer. It is, also essential to understand the concept depth ,,evaluation,,because at the end of an activity results to be quality and participants in the training to feel this stage like a one constructive, objective, for progress and not vice versa. Knowing the correct size evaluation process, objective evaluation of the skills of evaluating, researching a new assessment strategies and the new orientations of education, all converge towards what must meet the evaluation, that have a regulatory role being able to optimize the route, the quality, the opportunity and efficiency of education, by sequentially or global

Keywords: evaluation, education, quality, research, mouldable.

În educaţie, evaluarea are rol reglator fiind în măsură să optimizeze ruta, calitatea, eficienţa şi oportunitatea educaţiei, în mod secvenţial sau global. Evaluarea este, în linii generale, un procedeu psihopedagogic complex de stabilire a valorii unor procese, comportamente, performanţe, prin raportarea acestora la un set de criterii prestabilite, cu valoare

de "etalon". Aşa după cum arată Daniel L. Stufflebeam (1980), în literatura de specialitate sunt acceptate trei perspective principale de definire a evaluării, în funcţie de trei echivalenţe posibile (Cucoş, 1996) :

1. evaluare = măsurare
2. evaluare = congruenţă
3. evaluare = judecare

Ce evaluăm de fapt ? Există mai multe elemente de evaluat: calitatea programului de formare (curriculumul), performanţa cursantului, performanţa formatorului, calitatea livrării programului (situaţia de predare – învăţare) etc., dar în cele ce urmează ne vom opri asupra evaluării cursantului/participantului la formare/formabilului.

Evaluarea cursantului/participantuluii la formare/formabilului cuprinde câteva aspecte:

• evaluarea nevoilor de învăţare ale cursantului/participantului la formare/formabilului
• evaluarea/ identificarea stilului sau stilurilor preferate/ predominante de învăţare
• evaluarea rezultatelor învăţării.

În evaluarea rezultatelor învăţării (al nivelului de stăpânire a unui set de competenţe vizate de programul de învăţare), nivelul achiziţiilor se raportează atât la obiectivele urmărite de programul de formare, cât şi la nivelul „de pornire" al cursantului/participantului la formare/formabilului.[9,10,11,23,42]

De aceea, evaluarea rezultatelor învăţării în cazul programelor de formare din universităţi trebuie să se raporteze la competenţele pe care programul de formare îşi propune să le formeze sau să le dezvolte.

De reţinut:

În educaţia studenţilor la fel ca şi în educaţia adulţilor se disting patru nivele/ paliere de evaluare în raport cu orice stagiu de formare (Kirkpatrick, 1994 citat în Sava,., Ungureanu, 2005):

– evaluarea reacţiei cursanţilor (dacă le-a plăcut cursul, profesorul, etc);
– evaluarea învăţării cursului;
– evaluarea conduitei post-învăţare (dacă manifestă în mod curent comportamentul profesional vizat);
– evaluarea rezultatelor stagiului în termeni de rentabilitate (dacă şi-a conştientizat costurile, generând totodată valoare adăugată).

Evaluarea și autoevaluarea pot fi analizate din următoarele perspective:[45]

1. Dimensiunea normativă a autoevaluării şi evaluării.

Dimensiunea normativă a autoevaluării şi evaluării se referă la ansamblul influenţelor directe şi imediate pe care acestea le au asupra predării şi învăţării. Manifestarea efectivă a dimensiunii normative a proceselor anterior menţionate se concretizează aşadar în modificări observabile şi uneori chiar măsurabile produse atât la nivelul structurii şi conţinutului activităţii de predare a profesorului cât şi la nivelul stilului şi efortului depus pentru învăţare de către format

Prezentăm în tabelul I.1 principalele funcţii subsumate dimensiunii normative a autoevaluării şi evaluării.

Funcţie Specifică	Conotaţii în plan Autoevaluativ	Conotaţii în plan Evaluativ
Constatativă	*modalitate de surprindere a nivelului de pregătire atins şi de raportare a acestuia atât la expectanţele proprii cât şi la cele ale profesorului;*	*Indicator de bază al gradului de optimalitate şi eficienţă cu privire atât la desfăşurarea procesului de predare cât şi la derularea celui de învăţare;*
Diagnostică	*radiografiere a capacităţilor performanţiale subevaluate sau supraevaluate şi interpretare a discrepanţelor constatate;*	*Evidenţiere şi interpretare a lacunelor existente în planul pregătirii cursantilor şi a cauzelor acestora;*
Prognostică	*reconsiderare a stilului propriu de muncă şi a modului de dozare a efortului de învăţare;*	*Identificare a modalităţilor de restructurare a strategiilor didactice în vederea optimizării lor;*

Tabelul 1. Funcţii specifice dimensiunii normative a autoevaluării şi evaluării

Funcţia constatativă cunoaşte, aşa după cum se poate observa în tabelul 1., forme de manifestare specifice şi intercorelate atât la nivelul evaluării cât şi la cel al demersului autoevaluativ al cursantului

Astfel, dacă prin intermediul funcţiei constatative a evaluării didactice formatorul are posibilitatea de a-şi forma o imagine asupra eficienţei actului de predare şi a modului de articulare al secvenţelor de predare şi învăţare, cursantul, la rândul său, conştientizează pe baza demersului său autoevaluativ, corelat cu cel al profesorului, nivelul performanţelor sale efective. Concomitent, cursantul are oportunitatea de a raporta nivelul de pregătire atins atât la standardele proprii cât şi la cele ale profesorului.

Funcţia diagnostică se manifestă pe fundalul funcţiei constatative şi urmăreşte în linii generale, atât în ceea ce priveşte profesorul, dar şi la nivelul cursantului, găsirea unor explicaţii cauzale relative la situaţia educaţională constatată. Funcţia diagnostică are deci rolul, atât în planul demersului autoevaluativ cât şi în acela al evaluării, de a pune în evidenţă carenţele procesului instructiv-educativ şi de a identifica sursele acestor disfuncţionalităţi. În acest sens profesorul inventariază posibilele neajunsuri survenite în predarea cunoştinţelor, iar cursantul caută modalităţi explicative pertinente pentru acele capacităţi performanţiale pe care şi le-a subevaluat sau supraevaluat.

Funcţia prognostică a autoevaluării şi evaluării se întemeiază la rândul său pe cea diagnostică şi este caracterizată în esenţa sa de efortul de identificare a strategiilor optime de restructurare şi optimizare pe viitor a învăţării şi respectiv a predării. La nivelul profesorului această funcţie a evaluării se concretizează în precizarea cu o mai mare claritate a obiectivelor urmărite şi prin recurgerea la metode de predare alternative în raport cu cele utilizate în mod

curent. La rândul său cursantul, analizând eficienţa stilului de învăţare practicat până la momentul respectiv, îşi revizuieşte prin intermediul demersului autoevaluativ strategiile de învăţare şi modul de dozare al efortului depus în acest sens. Dorim să reamintim în acest context, aşa după cum menţionam şi anterior, faptul că între funcţia constatativă, diagnostică şi prognostică există o foarte strânsă intercondiţionare de nivel normativ, disfuncţionalităţile survenite la nivelul oricăreia dintre ele alterând în mod semnificativ eficienţa celorlalte funcţii.

2. Dimensiunea formativă a autoevaluării şi evaluării

Dimensiunea formativă a autoevaluării şi evaluării include totalitatea efectelor şi consecinţelor acestora care se manifestă indirect şi mediat în sfera derulării procesului instructiv-educativ. Ne referim în acest sens la acea categorie de influenţe ale autoevaluării şi evaluării care nu impun prin ele însele şi în mod direct modificări în planul acţional al adultului cursant sau profesorului ci care se manifestă drept fundal al activităţii acestora. Prezentăm în tabelul 2. principalele tipuri de funcţii subsumate dimensiunii formative.

Funcţie Specifică	Conotaţii în plan Autoevaluativ	Conotaţii în plan Evaluativ
Motivaţională	*efectul motivaţional este mediat de structura de personalitate acursantuluii şi de relaţia existentă între autoevaluare şi evaluare;*	*Sancţiune sau recompensă acordată cursanţilor în funcţie de gradul de apropiere al acestora în raport cu criteriile de evaluare;*
Decizională	*reper pentru aprecierea de sine şi pentru relaţionarea socială în cadrul grupului de apartenenţă;*	*Suport pentru plasarea adecvată a cursantului în ierarhia grupei sau în raport cu standardele docimologice;*
Informaţională	*element central pentru mediatizarea predicţiilor privind evoluţia profesionala ulterioară;*	*Mijloc de informare a cursanţilor, şi societăţii cu privire la randamentul realizat;*

Tabelul 2. Funcţii specifice dimensiunii formative a autoevaluării şi evaluării.

Azi, tot mai multe stagii de formare îşi propun să formeze competenţe. (Sava, Ungureanu, 2005). Evaluarea cât mai obiectivă a competențelor reprezintă o cerință esențială pentru obținerea calității în sistemul de învățământ.[8,12,13,18,20]

Evaluarea rezultatelor învăţării se desfăşoară pe două nivele:

• evaluarea capacităţii de transfer a cursanţilor – adică a măsurii în care folosesc eficient cunoştinţele, abilităţile şi atitudinile pentru rezolvarea problemelor concrete cu care se confruntă în situaţia de muncă;

• evaluarea competenţelor asimilate de cursant în urma absolvirii cursului validate prin rezultatele muncii absolventului (evaluarea de impact a programului de formare).

Într-un sistem bazat pe evaluarea competenţelor, evaluatorii emit judecăţi pe baza dovezilor colectate dintr-o varietate de surse în legătură cu atingerea standardelor sau a unui set de criterii de către un individ.[1,2,3,17,19,23]

Evaluarea obiectivă a competențelor se bazează pe următoarele principii de bază: validitatea, credibilitatea, flexibilitatea şi corectitudinea. (McDonald, Boud, Francis, Gonczi, 1995)

Metodele de evaluare trebuie să conducă la producerea de informaţii relevante în raport cu ceea ce se urmăreşte în evaluare. Aceasta presupune că:[4,5,14,16,25,26]

- evaluatorii ştiu ce anume evaluează (evaluarea este proiectată şi realizată pe baza unor criterii sau pe baza rezultatelor învăţării stabilite în prealabil);
- dovezile colectate sunt rezultatul îndeplinirii unor sarcini relevante pentru ceea ce se valuează.
- capacitatea de adaptare a procesului de evaluare la varietatea contextelor în care se desfăşoară.
- evaluarea foloseşte metode care conduc cu consecvenţă la aceeaşi decizie privind ompetenţele evaluate;
- evaluatorii vor demonstra că au experienţă în competenţele pe care le evaluează.
- oferă şanse egale tuturor candidaţilor, îi plasează pe toţi în condiţii egale, fără a defavoriza sau avantaja pe unii sau pe alţii;

Criteriile pe baza cărora se ia decizia sunt clare şi cunoscute de toţi candidaţii. Sunt utilizate o varietate de instrumente pentru evaluarea beneficiarilor programelor de formare continuă: proiectul (individual sau de grup), portofoliul, evaluare on-line, eseul etc.[27,33,34,35,36,37]

În procesul evaluării un rol important îl are în egală măsură cu evaluarea și autoevaluarea competențelor formatorilor/cadrelor didactice.

Etapa autoevaluării (autoevaluarea competenţelor) este etapa care oferă formatorului/cadrului didactic posibilitatea de a reflecta asupra competenţelor reale pe care le deţine şi care îi sunt utile în activitatea de formare. Etapa de autoevaluare include:

- Reflecţia asupra biografiei: contexte de învăţare şi rezultate ale învăţării
- Reflecţia asupra competenţelor
- Realizarea unei hărţi a minţii personale
- Portofoliul: anexarea documentelor relevante (de ex. documente de calificare, certificate)

Orice evaluare cuprinde în diferite proporţii evaluarea cunoştinţelor şi a comportamentelor noi.[40,41,43,46] Intenţia evaluării este a de urmări măsura în care cursantul/participantul la formare/formabilul şi-a integrat schimbările aşteptate în urma instruirii. Instrumenele de evaluare cele mai frecvent utilizate sunt:proiectul (individual sau de grup), portofoliul, evaluare on-line, eseul etc.

Tehnologiile moderne oferă câteva oportunităţi pentru evaluarea performanţei în învăţare.[15,21,22] Există nenumărate proiecte la nivel european care vizează utilizarea noilor tehnologii în învăţământul superior, iar câteva dintre acestea vizează şi îmbunătăţirea sau eficientizarea practicilor de evaluare a studenţilor.[24,30,39] Întotdeauna trebuie pus în balanţă

ceea ce este posibil şi este facilitat prin tehnologie, pe de o parte, şi ceea ce este făcut mai dificil sau inhibat de către mediul nou folosit, pe de altă parte. Punctul de plecare îl constituie metodele tradiţionale de evaluare de performanţe, care sunt preluate şi validate (de cele mai multe ori, de practică) în mediul tehnologic.

Avantajele utilizării calculatorului şi Internet-ului în evaluare au fost enunţate de diferiţi cercetători şi practicieni (Bennett, 2003; Raikes & Harding, 2003; Greenwood, Cole, McBride, Morrison, Cowan, & Lee, 2000) şi includ costuri administrative scăzute, adaptare crescută la caracteristicile individuale ale studenţilor şi mai puţină muncă din partea profesorilor. Problemele care se pun constau în aspectele privind eficienţa evaluărilor cu ajutorul computerului, precum şi cele privind relaţia dintre modalitatea de evaluare şi comportamentul studenţilor evaluaţi.

Cel mai proeminent subiect abordat se referă la efectele mediului de comunicare asupra modului în care studenţii gândesc şi înţeleg sarcinile din test. Astfel, se pun în balanţă ceea ce este posibil şi este facilitat prin tehnologie, pe de o parte, şi ceea ce este făcut mai dificil sau „inhibat" de către mediul nou folosit, pe de altă parte. Punctul de plecare îl constituie metodele tradiţionale de evaluare de performanţe, care sunt preluate şi validate (de cele mai multe ori, de practică) în mediul tehnologic.[6,7,31,32,38,44]

În ce priveşte aspectele comparabile ale evaluării cu ajutorul noilor tehnologii versus evaluarea tradiţională, etapele care sunt mai avantajate de utilizarea noilor tehnologii sunt administrarea testelor şi analiza rezultatelor obţinute (Harvey, 1999, p.17).

Unii cercetători se întreabă dacă cursanţii sunt pregătiţi îndeajuns pentru a putea face faţă cu succes unei evaluări online sau pe calculator (Hanrahan şi Isaacs, 2001, McDowell şi Sambell, 1999). Alţii pun sub semnul întrebării echilibrul dintre inovaţiile în evaluarea studenţilor şi pregătirea cadrelor didactice pentru a implementa în practică aceste inovaţii (Segers şi Dochy, 2001, Savin-Baden, 2004).

Evaluarea cu ajutorul TIC poate îmbrăca diverse forme şi se poate face în diverse moduri. Enumerăm în cele ce urmează principalele puncte de incidenţă între evaluarea cursanţilor şi utilizarea noile tehnologii:

- cursanţii sunt evaluaţi printr-un test scris, pe care îl rezolvă/ completează pe calculator;
- testul poate fi salvat local, pe calculatorul pe care lucrează studentul (la facultate sau acasă); reveniri succesive, pe măsură ce studentul progresează în materialul de studiu, pot fi posibile
- testul poate fi dat pe Internet/ Intranet; opţiunile studentului sunt înscrise automat într-o bază de date şi se poate calcula pe loc un scor;
- variantă mixtă, în care un test din cadrul unui program de instruire trimite opţiunile prin Internet, la un server care preia datele şi le stochează;
- rezultatele pot fi consultate oricând de către profesor sau studentul respectiv;
- cursanţilor li se cere să elaboreze o lucrare sau să dezvolte un proiect pe care îl vor prezenta utilizând un calculator şi un videoproiector/ Whiteboard (alternativ, lucrarea sau proiectul pot fi trimise prin email cadrului didactic şi colegilor);

Doar o etapă din evaluare – analiza rezultatelor – se face cu ajutorul calculatorului: evaluatorul înscrie datele obţinute din evaluări în baze de date, pentru stocare, prelucrări statistice, comparaţii, ameliorarea predării, intervenţii precise pentru ameliorarea performanţelor.

Aplicaţii:

1. Enunţaţi cât mai multe cuvinte care au legătură cu conceptul „EVALUARE”. Pornind de la cuvintele enunţate se formulează câteva definiţii ale evaluării, aşa cum este văzută din mai multe perspective.
2. Construiţi un test docimologic adaptat disciplinei pe care o predaţi.

În concluzie se poate sublinia faptul că evaluarea competențelor este un proces complex care trebuie privit și înțeles în întregul lui. Este, deasemenea esențial să se înțeleagă în profunzime conceptul „evaluării‘‘, pentru ca în finalul unei activități rezultatele să fie de calitate, iar participanții la formare să resimtă această etapă ca pe una constructivă, obiectivă, de progres și nu invers.[28,29] Cunoașterea corectă a dimensiunilor procesului de evaluare, evaluarea obiectivă a competențelor celor evaluați, cercetarea unor noi strategii de evaluare în contextul noilor orientări ale educației, converg toate către ceea ce trebuie să îndeplinească evaluarea, adică să aibă un rol reglator fiind în măsură să optimizeze ruta, calitatea, eficienţa şi oportunitatea educaţiei, în mod secvenţial sau global.

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ANCIENT GREEK DEMOCRACY AND MODERN DEMOCRACY

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Abstract: The word democracy has its origin in ancient Greece, meaning that all the citizens of a city-state (polis) were equal before the law in the exercise of their public rights. In ancient as well as in modern times, democracy has suffered dramatic setbacks in times of crisis, which proved that it is not a perfect political system, but, unlike dictatorship, it is still perfectible. Today the meaning of the word, which is about 2500 years old, is quite different from its original meaning. Developed in citadels, the ancient Greek democracy remained a revolutionary political innovation, the key feature of the political organization in ancient Greece, represented by a civic community (koinonia), a community of citizens. Although the word itself remained unchanged, the ancient Greek democracy has little in common with the modern democracy.

Keyords: democracy, freedom, equality, citizenship, voting.

Din secolul al IV-lea î.Hr. democraţia antică greacă a parcurs o perioadă de criză care s-a manifestat pe plan economic, social dar şi politic (manifestându-se prin sporirea dezinteresului cetăţenilor pentru pentru participarea politică). Colapsul democraţiei antice a intervenit la scurt timp, odată cu supunerea spaţiului elen de către Filip al II-lea, regale Macedoniei şi fiul său Alexandru cel Mare.

Deşi etimologia nu s-a schimbat, democraţia modernă diferă în profunzime de democraţia antică greacă, reanalizată de gânditorii moderni în secolul al XIX-lea, atunci când a fost evocat precedentul atenian[1]. Pentru antici practicarea excerciţiului democratic în cadrul democraţiei directe presupunea participarea la viaţa politică a cetăţenilor care reprezentau doar o minoritate în cadrul construcţiilor politico-sociale greceşti de tip oraş-stat (polis). Cetăţenii nu reprezentau mai mult de un sfert din populaţia Cetăţii, dar beneficiau de drepturi politice, în detrimental majorităţii populaţiei, democraţia antică greacă fiind restrictivă şi inegalitară.

Benjamin Constant (1767 – 1830), unul dintre promotorii constituţionalismului, a lansat discuţia asupra distincţiei dintre libertatea la antici şi libertatea la moderni[2]. Constant remarca deosebirea dintre sfera privată, rezervată existenţei individuale şi sfera politică, spaţiul de desfăşurare a vieţii sociale. Pentru el libertatea este individuală, cuprinzând existenţa personală caracterizată prin „autonomie totală", domeniu unde societatea nu trebuie să se amestece. Deşi încă din 1806 Constant a dezbătut această problematică într-o lucrare pe care nu a publicat-o niciodată, în 1819 a reluat ideea şi a dezoltat-o (*De la liberté des Anciens compareé à celle des*

[1] Lucian Boia, *Occidentul: o interpretare istorică*, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 2013, p. 156.
[2] V. Benjamin Constant, *Despre libertatea la antici şi la moderni*, Iaşi, Institutul European, 1996.

Modernes). El o preluase de la Germaine de Staël, dar i-a acordat mai multă coerenţă. Constant a făcut referire la oraşele-state din Antichitatea greacă unde a constatat că viaţa individuală nu era separată de cea socială, societatea constituindu-se „ca un tot indivizibil". Neexistând independenţa individuală, oamenii erau nevoiţi să se supună voinţei arbitrare a comunităţii. Aşadar, - observa Constant - concepţia asupra libertăţii era diferită şi se referea strict la dreptul de participaţie la viaţa politică a oraşului, în timp ce, sublinia el, în societatea modernă o astfel de organizare politică ar fi de neacceptat. Pentru omul modern existenţa individuală reprezintă adevărata libertate, fiind mai importantă decât existenţa în societate. În epoca modernă se individualizează asocierea dintre conceptul de libertate şi respectarea autonomiei persoanei în raport cu statul[3]. Libertatea modernilor reprezintă acordarea de garanţii pentru evitarea intervenţiei statului în viaţa personală a individului, aşadar, reprezintă „libertatea anti-polis", aflându-se în opoziţie cu libertatea anticilor[4].

Pentru omul modern, libertatea înseamnă, în primul rând, respectarea drepturilor individuale, în timp ce libertatea la antici numită de Constant „libertate colectivă", reprezenta implicarea în viaţa politică a cetăţii, individul rămânând însă total subordonat autorităţii de stat. Constant era de părere că, deşi se bucura de drepturi politice, cetăţeanul era un simplu „sclav" în relaţia sa cu statul. Fiind cetăţean, era parte integrantă a corpului colectiv şi hotăra asupra unor probleme de cea mai mare importanţă pentru comunitate, precum aprobarea unei declaraţii de război sau încheierea păcii, putea adopta decizii în privinţa exilului sau condamnării la moarte a unor persoane. Însă, fiind, la rândul său, un membru al corpului colectiv, putea fi exilat sau condamnat la moarte în mod arbitrar, fără a avea posibilitatea de a se apăra. Legislaţia nu îl proteja pe cetăţean în raport cu statul, colectivitatea putând interveni orcând în viaţa individului, incapabil să se opună angrenajului din care făcea parte. Condorcet sublinia, cu îndreptăţire, că anticii nu conştientizau conceptul de drepturi individuale. Cetatea se manifesta în mod totalitar faţă de locuitorii săi, acest totalitarism bazându-se pe legi şi religie. În calitatea sa de membru al corpului colectiv, cetăţeanul vota legislaţia şi îi judeca pe magistraţi, însă statul putea interveni oricând în viaţa personală a indivizilor, după cum remarca Fustel de Coulanges[5]. O persoană putea fi ostracizată fără a i se putea imputa nicio vină dacă 6.000 de cetăţeni votau în acest sens.

După cum constata Constant, pentru omul modern cele mai importante sunt drepturile individuale, drepturile cetăţeneşti. La antici, libertatea se exercita în mod colectiv şi direct, cetăţeanul putând vota în privinţa unor probleme vitale care priveau Cetatea, libertatea însemnând participarea la viaţa politică, iar această „libertate colectivă", nu intra în contradicţie cu subordonarea totală a individului faţă de ansamblul social[6].

Libertatea de tip modern era de neconceput în societăţile din Antichitatea greacă şi romană, individului lipsindu-i independenţa personală întrucât „acţiunile particulare" erau riguros supravegheate. Acesta era „suveran" în relaţiile publice, împărţind o parte din suveranitatea

[3] Oliver Nay, *Istoria ideilor politice*, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2008, pp. 380-381.
[4] Adrian-Claudiu Stoica, *Europa la apogeu: o viziune istorică asupra lumii moderne europene*, Târgovişte, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2015, p. 66.
[5] Fustel de Coulanges, *Cetatea antică: studiu asupra cultului, dreptului şi instituţiilor Greciei şi Romei*, Bucureşti, Editura Meridiane, 1984, vol. II, pp. 51-52.
[6] Adrian-Claudiu Stoica, *De la Antichitate la Renaştere: cultură şi civilizaţie europeană*, Târgovişte, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2013, pp. 50-57.

colectivă cu restul cetăţenilor, era „sclav" în cele particulare. Deşi adopta decizii importante ca parte a colectivului, în calitatea sa de persoană particulară toate acţiunile îi erau îngrădite. De altfel, după cum am arătat, însăşi participarea la viaţa politică era rezervată unei minorităţi. Cetăţenii erau singurii implicaţi, adică bărbaţii de peste 18 ani născuţi în cetate şi înscrişi în registrele sale. După vârsta amintită urmau doi ani de seviciu militar obligatoriu (aşa-numita efebie), pentru ca de la vârsta de 20 de ani cetăţeanul să-şi poată exercita dreptul de vot în cadrul Ekklesiei (Adunării poporului), cea mai importantă dintre instituţii. Categorii largi de populaţie erau excluse de la practicarea exerciţiului democratic: femeile, străinii sau metecii (colocatarii) cum erau numiţi la Atena şi sclavii (mai numeroşi decât toţi oamenii liberi la un loc)[7].

Pentru antici libertatea reprezenta exercitarea drepturilor politice colective, în timp ce pentru moderni libertatea constă în consacrarea independenţei personale. Aristotel afirma că omul reprezintă un animal politic, ceea ce însemna, de fapt, că acesta aparţinea „întregului social", respectiv societăţii. Gânditorul antic nu se referea la faptul că omul avea o existenţă individuală, care putea fi separată de ansamblul corpului social. În viziunea grecilor din Antichitate nu exista nicio diferenţă, nicio distincţie, între „om" şi „cetăţean", în timp ce implicarea în viaţa politică a cetăţii echivala cu „a trăi". Evident că individul beneficia de prezenţa unei existenţe private. Însă, termenul grecesc *ídion* (privat) se afla în opoziţie cu *koinón* (elementul comun), având semnificaţia de privaţiune, iar termenul piorativ *idiótes* semnifica faptul că individul căruia îi era atribuit nu avea calitatea de *polítes*, fiind, prin urmare, un noncetăţean, caracterizat prin ignoranţă şi preocuparea gregară pentru promovarea exclusivă a binelui personal. Constant sublinia că grecii din Antichitate „nu concepeau, practic, individul ca *persoană*"[8] şi, în consecinţă, în calitatea sa de „fiinţă privată" care trebuie să se bucure de respect. Noua viziune asupra individului a început să se coaguleze începând cu impunerea religiei creştine şi a cunoscut o evoluţie în perioada Renaşterii, a Reformei şi cu, deosebire, odată cu lansarea conceptelor privitoare la dreptul natural[9]. Grecii antici nu conştientizau concepţia de „spaţiu privat legitim" cu semnificaţia de proiecţie moralo-juridică „a fiinţei umane individuale". Libertatea politică grecească nu includea libertatea individuală întemeiată pe drepturi personale, au arătat Constant şi alţi analişti. Grecii antici nu conştientizau noţiunea de libertate individuală, ceea ce însemna că ei nu dădeau importanţă ideii „de respect pentru individ ca persoană", protecţie acordată de interesul pentru protecţia drepturilor individuale, prezent în societatea modernă[10].

Democraţia greacă nu manifesta respect faţă de individ, ci o permanentă neîncredere. Ostracismul nu avea un caracter punitiv, ci unul preventiv, constituind o modalitate de a-i îndepărta din cetate pe cei care se afirmau în detrimentul altora. Exemplul lui Socrate este notoriu în acest sens, obligat să bea cucută acuzat fiind că nu crede în zei şi îi corupe pe tineri. Sfidându-i pe judecătorii săi şi, în definitiv, sfidând Cetatea, şi-a pecetluit soarta[11].

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[7] Robert Flacelière, *Viaţa de toate zilele în Grecia secolului lui Pericle*, traducere de Liana Lupaş, Bucureşti, Editura Eminescu, 1976, pp.
[8] Giovanni Sartori, *Teoria democraţiei reinterpretată*, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 1999, p. 260.
[9] *Ibidem*.
[10] *Ibidem*, p. 261.
[11] *Ibidem*.

Fără îndoială că democraţia grecilor antici a reprezentat un experiment novator şi unic în felul său. Însă, nu putem avea o imagine obiectivă a democraţiei din Grecia antică dacă nu excludem evoluţiile ulterioare care au condus la îmbogăţirea conceptului după ce democraţia antică a devenit de domeniul trecutului. Astfel am dobândi o perspectivă reală, adevărată a democraţiei greceşti şi nu am fi dispuşi să reluăm experimentul, după cum sublinia şi Giovanni Sartori. Democraţia modernă reprezintă rezultatul unor acumulări, al elaborării unor valori esenţiale europene pe care grecii antici nu puteau să şi le imagineze şi nu aveau cum să le înţeleagă.

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THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN ROMANIA AND THE INSTITUTIONAL STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED

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Abstract : In Romania, environmental protection appeared in 1990 as an independent area of the national policy, when it was first established the Ministry of Environment and the environmental policy has been constantly evolving, minimum environmental protection measures being adopted. Since 1996, the national strategy begins to align to the community strategy regarding the principles, priorities and objectives in the field of the environment, so that the national environment strategies from 1992 and 1996 are the documents on which the national environmental policy was structured until 1999, when the National Programme for the European Union Accession was adopted.
In Romania, the issues of environmental protection are created as a result of the local pollution, mainly in the oil exploitation and mining industries, processing ores and petroleum,the chemical industry, wood and pulp processing, the electrical industry and machine building industry, the cement industry, transport, communal services and agriculture. Apart from government institutions involved in achieving environmental policies, NGOs and environmental foundations help develop and implement the national environmental policy, focusing on specific issues and clearly defined areas, where the authorities have not yet reached.

Keywords: policies, environment, objectives, strategies, institutions.

In the European Union environmental protection is now a horizontal policy with the principle role in the development and implementation of all policies in Member States. With the start of accession negotiations of Romania to E.U. in 2000, the environmental policy in our country has been developing in line with the strategy developed by the European Commission for candidate countries under Agenda 2000.

Thus, in its quality of member of the European Union, Romania must act to align with EU standards in terms of its environmental policy and prosthetics. Representing one of the biggest challenges, this entails special efforts on the one hand to harmonize the Romanian legislation with the acquis environment [1]one of the European Union and on the other hand achieving institutional reforms that lead to the development of an institutional mechanism capable of implement and monitor the implementation of the adopted legislation. To achieve the objectives of environmental policy in our country have been created government bodies and new institutions with jurisdiction in a process called environmental institutionalization.

[1] P.Anghel, *European Institutions and negotiation techniques in the integration process*, Humanitas Publishing House, 2004 pages.130 -131.

Environmental protection appeared in 1990 as a field independently of national policies, when it was first established a Ministry of Environment and after two years the first official document "National Strategy for Environmental Protection" was drafted setting national targets in the field.[2]

This strategy was updated in 1996 and 2002 and refers to:

- the main natural resources;
- elements regarding the economic and environmental factors;
- general principles of environmental protection;
- priorities and objectives in the short, medium and long term.

In terms of principles, priorities and objectives, since the first update (1996) observed an adequate national strategy to community. The principles are followed:

- preservation and improvement of human health;
- lasting development;
- pollution prevention;
- conservation of biodiversity;
- preservation of cultural and historical heritage;
- "polluter pays";
- stimulation of environmental recovery through grants, soft loans, etc.

Also, priorities identified, do not increase only the national needs but also the trends and initiatives globally, which are aimed at:

- maintain and improve health and quality of life;
- maintaining and improving the existing potential of nature;
- protection against natural disasters and accidents;
- maximum cost-benefit ratio;
- compliance programs and international conventions on environmental protection.

With the opening in 2002 of accession negotiations on Chapter 22 - Environmental Protection has drafted the document entitled ,, Roadmap "in mentioning environmental issues related to development capacities for the implementation of environmental legislation adopted in order to promote development policies of environmental and sustainable transformation into a political crossbar.

The issues considered in these negotiations concern continuing to transpose Community legislation[3] implementing environmental legislation already adopted and strengthening administrative structures required for full implementation of the acquis environment representing the horizontal and sectoral governing environmental EU policy.

The objectives of environmental policy in Romania are divided into short-term targets until 2000, in the medium term until 2005 and long-term until 2020.

Strategy and Action Plan of Romania on climate change in the period 2005-2007 were obtained putting a series of actions both in terms of limiting greenhouse gas emissions greenhouse and

[2] *National Environmental Protection Strategy was developed with the help of World Bank*
[3] *At the end of 2005, it adopted framework law on environmental protection, respectively O.U.G. No 195/2005 which repealed Law no.137 / 19 95 environmental protection.*

adapting to the effects of climate change. As a member of U.E to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases Romania after 2012 will have to comply with the objectives of European Union policy stipulating[4]:

- that by 2020 the EU has to reduce emissions by 20% greenhouse emissions compared to 1990;
- increasing the share of renewable energy in overall energy consumption need to grow by 20% at EU level;
- increasing energy efficiency by 20%;
- a minimum consumption of 10% of total biofuel consumption in the transport sector.

The National Strategy for Romania's Sustainable Development Horizons 2020 is to:
ensure the efficient and safe national energy system;

- achievement of the current EU average in terms of intensity and energy efficiency;
- achievement of obligations assumed by Romania in the legislative package ,, Climate change and renewable energy;
- promotion and application of measures of adaptation to climate change and sustainable development principles.

Romania will continue under agreements in force at Community level and internationally to contribute effectively to the implementation of all environmental policies and will push to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change effects.

Institutional actors

The profound political changes that began in December 1989 and especially the access to information quickly expanded the area of environmental concerns and thus many NGOs and even political environmentalist parties have been founded, some in symmetry with existing ones in Western Europe. The executive and legislative structures, have created institutions (ministry, parliamentary committees) focusing on environmental policy and the first acts of primary and secondary legislation in this area were issued.

Environmental policy in E.U.[5] and in member countries is supported by a number of institutional actors involved in the preparation, definition and implementation in global or national policies.

Developments in environmental policy are reflected both in the objectives and priorities and the large number of the instruments of implementation, grouped into three types:

- legislative instruments (represented by existing environmental legislation);
- technical tools (in the form of environmental quality standards and the best available technology);
- economic- financial instruments (represented by the LIFE program and Cohesion Fund) as well as aiding tools (the tools that complement standard acting as incentives to adopt environmental protection measures).

To achieve the objectives of environmental policy in our country government bodies and institutions having new powers have been created, a process called environmental

[4] *Strategia National Sustainable Development of Romania Horizons 2013-2020-2030.pag.41*
[5] D.Mazilu, *Community environmental law*, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 14-18.

institutionalization. Central Environmental Authority (created in 1990), has undergone many changes in the organization, operation and attributions.[6]

Lately, stands and an increase in the trend of affirmation and consolidation of administrative structures focused on the protection and sustainable management of the environment at national level.[7]

National Environmental Protection Agency (established by H.G.nr.1625 / 2003); Environmental Guard (founded by H. G. 1167/2001); Or administrative Environmental Fund (established under Law No. 73/2000). Also, in order to coordinate international activities on the environment, various advisory bodies, inter-ministerial bodies and national structures for international cooperation on environmental issues sector[8] have been created. Institutional arrangement in Romania in terms of environmental protection has undergone many changes in recent years and so it is that change area even at nominal responsibilities among government determined the occurrence or transfer of new competencies in environmental protection.

1. Ministry of Environment and Forests

Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government institution fundamental to the environmental management, experienced the most recent major reorganization in 2001 (GD 17/2001 - organization and functioning MAPPM) called the specialized body of central public administration and subordinated to the Romanian Government. Responsible for the specific policy in the field of water and environmental protection, MMP develops strategies and regulations in line and consistent with the Government's decisive respective fields. The new structure of the Ministry branch's devides the overall strategy into four state secretariats that have a coordinating role and completeness of the action to the environment: environmental protection, water, European integration, relations with Parliament. Yet on another level, but keeping the areas DGs were also formed, being directly responsible for these areas which in turn subordinated environmental inspectorates, and other specific units established at the county level. These DGs have the freedom to call up in exceptional cases up to 200 teams of specialists for emergency intervention in an area affected by a disaster or in danger of being threatened by a disaster.

Under the supervision of The Ministry of Environment and Forests ,there are other bodies-theNational Commission for Nuclear Activity Control, Coordination Unit implementing structural instrument for pre-accession ISPA, the National Research and Development for Environmental Protection, the National Institute of Meteorology, Hydrology but also other institutes and agencies with local roles and specific activities. Regarding the EU pre-accession, the Ministry of Environment and Forests has the competence to manage together with other ministries on specific areas not also the Phare funds, but also those of ISPA, and in extraordinary cases with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development on specific programs and on the SAPARD. At a comparative level only the first two have been successful in the pre-accession, while SAPARD was a failure and due to a faulty promotion without taking

[6] *The last change was made by GD no. 308 2005*
[7] St.Ţarcă, *Environmental Law*, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 344-348
[8] *National Committee for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (CNPSO); National Commission on Climate Change (NCCC).*

into account the characteristics of eligible people (ordinary people in rural areas) for this program.

2. Ministry of Public Health

Ministry of Public Health is the main ally of environmental policy being subordinated to the government and having the most important role in determining the legislative and executive air safety policy with its standards. Another major concern of this institution is government waste management. Moreover, as a curiosity, the first level of environmental protection that was achieved on European standards of local institutions was that of hospital waste.

3. Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure

Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure took over responsibility for spatial planning since 2001, becoming manager of toxic emissions policy the various transport modes. In early 2006 the Ministry of Transport announces the imminent introduction of the environment tax on cars that do not meet standards EURO3. It entered into force immediately on 1 January 2007. Although it came after a general outer recommendation, the introduction of this tax proposal is an example of shared jurisdiction assumed by the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure and the Environment and Forests in the same sector policies, just as it is the domestic fleet rejuvenation meant to reduce urban pollution.

Among other governmental institutions, there is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Forest which oversees the smooth running of the ecological programs concerning the chemical fertilizers, pesticides as well as forest protection. Ministry of Finance is the authority responsible for domestic mineral resources and their exploitation, while the Ministry of Education and Research promotes formative basic concepts aimed at creating a nascent consciousness of instinctive protection of the environment. The City Hall is responsible for planning, managing and protecting the green spaces while other local environmental agencies deal with specific problems of the area in collaboration with local police stations from the National Environmental Guard. Environmental foundations and NGOs help develop and implement national environmental policy, focusing on specific issues and clearly defined areas where the authorities have not yet arrived. It can be said that they are following a program of complementarity in terms of environmental protection.

Conclusion

After a prolonged and quite traumatic transition to pluralist democracy and market economy, Romania has recovered to reduce the disparities that places it behind other European Union member states. Although there has been progress at the level of 2016, Romania still relies on intensive resources, in a society that still needs education on protection and preserving the environment and on a natural capital facing the risk of damage that may become irreversible. Dangers now confronting Romania [9]in September are the climatic changes taking place globally affecting us as well(especially the last two decades we have dealt with different climate phenomena- storms, floods, landslides), mismanagement of the environment (massive and

[9] A.Teodor P.Simion, *New (dis) order geopolitical world* , Publishing University Press, Targoviste, 2011, page 104.

uncontrolled deforestation) and watershed sub financing, incompetence and corruption. Being affected by climate change, of course, we will face global changes that will result in:

- desertification over one third of Romania (the most affected areas will be Oltenia, Muntenia, Dobrogea, Banat, Crisana, Moldova and South East) that will lead to incalculable negative consequences for economic, social and political;
- floods affecting river basins of the Danube and other rivers large and small;
- periodic droughts and temperatures increasingly higher;
- landslides and other geomorphological processes that bring annual aside vast areas;

In these attacks, the necessary national policies and strategies supported massive community support so as to cover the following areas:

- National Afforestation Programme (Romania being under the European average);
- National programs of land reclamation, river basins, irrigation and other works;
- National programs on agriculture science (technology, new varieties and species) and involvement in the production of agricultural research;
- Education and training of population starting from school children and adults on these phenomena and their consequences.

Given all that no country can be evaded by these phenomena and their serious consequences, the Romanian leaders and the whole community must act in favor of firm action, accurate and efficient.

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REGION. REGIONALIZATION. GLOBALIZATION. THE SEA - TERRITORY OF GLOBALIZATION

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Abstract: The world is undergoing a historic transformation, some of those political, economic and social upheavals momentous, about wich we have not red in the history books. It is happening today, as in the past, new alliances are forming, old unions are fracturing, novel ideas are spreading, older nations are fading. As we come to understand the human and natural makeup of those geographic realms, we learn not only where they are located but also why they are located where they are, how they are constituted, world and what their future is likely to be in our changing world. The sea, vast territory that ensures the development of most of world trade, is in a sharp dispute between major world actors in expansion, to monopolize its resources

Keywords : region, spatial systems, globalization, location, seaborne trade

1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL REGION – CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS

Dictionaries define region as a great stretch of land, which has specific characteristics: land, area[1] or an area especially in a part of a country or the world having definable characteristics, but not always having fixed borders.

Defining the region term implies diverse aproaches, conditioned by the existence of some perspectives. Generally the region can by defined by some geographical elements as surface, boundries or the position on the globe. In the same time, these geographical elements can be sustained by detail atributes, as for example for position: absolute position, defined by geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude) or relative position: when the positioning is done depending on adjacent regions. For example we present the administrative organisation of Romania on 10 lands, instituted by King Carol the Second in the period 1938-1940 (figure 1)[2].

[1] ***https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/region
[2] https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6094080 accesat 02 oct 2016 20:10, from Andrein – Own work, Public domain, Roumanian lands

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

Figure 1 Romania administrative organisation on lands, 1938-1941

Another aspect which must be taken into consideration is homogeneity, which, in its turn can be reported to cultural particularities(population related), to the natural setting characterstics or to both. For example, o region can have a less numerous population, characterised by a dispersion of settlements, which, at the same time are of small dimensions and similar shapes, a certain climate, and a certain fauna and flora. When the regions are characterised by an internal homogeneity, often visible and cuantifible, it is called a formal region. Yet, not all formal regions are visibly uniform. For example, in a surface delimited region, most of its population can speak a certain language. This fact cannot be observed in the landscape, but it exists as an objective reality, so that it becomes necessary using other criteria for correct delimitation. Other regions are not marked by internal similarities, but by functional integration. These are defined as teritorial systems, being formed by their areal activity expansion which define them.

When the city's influence exceeds its urban area we can talk about the limit of a functional region. Sometimes this contrasts between center and periphery can be strong enough to endanger the stability of the country. All regions are interconected - interdependent. We can ask if this interdependence is done at a cultural layer.

Presently we can talk about a differentiation of states by their urban model: „center" states, „primordial" and „peripheric" states, if the income is taken into consideration. Despite this, the developed states can be characterized by diferences(Spain and Saudi Arabia are two rich states, but have undeveloped regions), as well as states with reduced income can have big city atributes (sky-scraper buildings and high standard of living).[3]

[3] JESSE H., et.al.., (1991) *Regional Geography of the World* (University of Missouri-Columbia), London, Sydney

As rich states get richer and poor states get poorer, the averages reported to the national economical statistics lose much of their geoghraphical meaning. It is imposed the use of a regional indicator, which can provide a more apropiate image of the reality. Geographical separation cannot be just and real if we consider developed and undeveloped areas. For instance: East Asia, is dominated by the presence of the low income economies, but it also includes Japan, one of the richest states; Europe is one of the most rich areas, but the image changes if we look at states like Moldavia, Ukraine or Albania or even Romania or Bulgaria(table 1 and graph 1).

Table 1 The Gross Domestic Product in the European Union in 2014[4]

Nr.crt.	**Country**	**GPD per capita (Euro)/2014**
1	Belgium	36000
2	Bulgaria	5800
3	Czech Republic	14700
4	Denmark	45000
5	Germany	35200
6	Estonia	14800
7	Ireland	40200
8	Greece	16300
9	Spain	22800
10	France	32400
11	Croatia	10200
12	Italy	26600
13	Cyprus	20500
14	Latvia	12100
15	Lithuania	12400
16	Luxemburg	96900 (USD)
17	Hungary	10500
18	Malta	18600
19	Netherlands	38900
20	Austria	38500

[4]http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics explained/index.php/File:GDP_at_current_market_prices,_2003%E2%80%9304_and_2012%E2%80%9314_YB15.png

21	Poland	10700
22	Portugal	16600
23	Romania	7500
24	Slovenia	18100
25	Slovakia	13900
26	Finland	37400
27	Sweden	44300
28	United Kingdom	34400

Table 2 The Gross Domestic Product in Europe in 2014 in some european countries[5]

Nr.crt.	**Country**	**GPD per capita (USD)/2014**
1	Ukraine	8300
2	Albania	11400
3	Moldavia	5100
4	Serbia	13600
4	Norway	68000
5	Switzerland	58800

Graph 1 The Gross Domestic Product in the European Union in 2014



Not long ago the states were included in the following groups:

- First world (capitalist and developed);
- Second world (Communist and Socialist);
- Third world (Undeveloped states);

[5] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html

- Fourth World(Very undeveloped states);
- Fifth world (poor states);

Currently the distribution can, and will be made on the notion of advantage. This can include or can refer to the geographical position, raw materials available, form of government, political stability, economical productivity. Generally we accept, at regional level, the existence of the relation between center and peripheria. The economical indicators show the increasing difference between the developed and undeveloped states.

The regional economic contrasts have benn assigned to different factors, from which we mention:

- the climate considered as a limit of the human capabilities. From this point of view is the theory of Ratzel regarding the differences north-south viable? Judging by the current economical model with a high developed north, with a standard of living used as a standard and a south with big issues regarding the rithm and level of living, we tend to belive that the theory has not lost its valability. More than that, even at low scale, at statal level, we can talk about this kind of differences (North Italy and South Italy, North and North-east Spain and South-central Spain, North Romania and South Romania)[6];
- cultural legacy, especially in the multicultural states which are marked by the exacerbation of the tradionalism or conservatism (India, China);
- colonial exploitation;
- neocolonialism.

2. FROM REGION TO REGIONALIZATION

Regionalization is defined in dictionaries as being the action to share a teritory in regions especially for administration reasons[7]. Regionalization is different from regionalism, which has the meaning of „*atitude which tends to create in different regions of the countries a decentralizing activity, independent from the capital; the overrating of a region, local patriotism*"[8]. The regionalism is regarded by many as a double meaning term: „a downwards movement (regionalization), and an upward movement (regionalism)." Both are concepts which describe regional movements, acting mutual on one another. Despite that there is a difference „regionalism as a political speech term, can lead to federalization (a teritorial ensemble with a common history and culture which can gain public

[6] JONES C.F., *Economic Geography*, Mac Millan Co., New York, 1992
[7] http://www.thefreedictionary.com/regionalization
[8] http://www.webdex.ro/online/dictionar/regionalism

politics abilities)" and regionalization which is an „*administrative action which targets the creation of cooperation areas and defines new teritorial-administrative units*". [9]

Clearly the natural resources available and the teritorial position play a key part in development and the movement of regions towards regionalizations. Some areas always had more oportunities regarding interaction and trading. The isolation from the main exchange directions has always been a disadvantage.

One of the key elements of the national areal organization is the primordial regions which focus the human activity and acomplish the role of command and control, assuring the majority of the exchanges.

Generally, we tend to associate this regional concept to the primordial region of a country as being the bigges concentration of population, the most productive and influent region, which has the greatest centralization and accesibility and, which, usually includes the capital.

The situation is not new. There have been discovered evidences of some early states, which had dominant cities. These were initally small cities, but became state-cities (Ancient Greece), cultural centres, empire capitals, tehnological revolution sources. These centers could not develop wthout the contribution of the surrounding areas.

An eloquent example of history is the aprittion and development of the Roman Empire. From a small region situated around Rome (figure 2), its inhaabitants- the Romans (which lived in the Italic Peninsula along with other nations) managed to establish the republic as government form in the year 509 B.C.

Figure 2

Source: http://www.vox.com/2014/8/19/5942585/40-maps-that-explain-the-roman-empire accesed 02 oct 2016 20:53

[9] Mihăilescu, G., *Regionalizarea - clarificarea unui concept*, http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-13813058-regionalizarea-clarificarea-unui-concept.htm, 14.12.2012

From here, after succesive conquests theu constitued the Roman Empire, which had its maximum expansion in 117 A.D. when Emperor Trajan, with a surface of over 5,000,000 km^2, which represented the entire Europe, except its north, as well as North Africa (figure3)[10]. In that time Rome was considered the center of the world, object of fascination and envy for its power, culture and luxury. In exchange, the peripheria of the empire were always unsecure, in a continuous movement and fight with the „barbarian" world atracted by the wealth of the empire. The fall of the Roman Empire has occured, on one side because of the migratory nations, and on the other of the coruption and the incompetence of some of the emperors. After it split in the Western Empire and the Eastern Empire, the first will cease to exist in 476 A.D. and the other one until 1453.



Fig.3 Extinderea maximă a Imperiului Roman în anul 117 d. Hr.
Source: http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/top-25-cele-mai-intinse-imperii-toate-timpurile

Today this relation between the center and the periphery hasn't changed, but got worse. It can be identified almost in any state of the world, being synthetical expressed by the expresion the center- has, the peripheria- does not have. For example: in the african states, Senegal, Kenya, Zimbabwe, the former colonial capitals symbolizes presently the privilege, power and control.

In their proximity there is the space which offers products to these cities. The situation becomes unrecongnisable as we go further away. Geographicaly speaking, for instance, the localization of an activity at the peripheria of a city comes with lower salaries, compared to a more central location. It develops the equivalence that the center means business and the peripheria production. A different case is constituded by the multinational companies, which can contribute to

[10] http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/top-25-cele-mai-intinse-imperii-toate-timpurile accesat 02 oct 2016 20:25

the development of the peripheria but only in certain situations, like guvernmental guarantees and the comeback of the profit. This can determine the aparition of some social-political effects. Mostly it comes to „hiring the elites" which in some cases do not represent the intrests of the entire ensembly centre-periphery. Thus, a „loialty division" process occurs, especially because not always, what is beneficial for the multinational companies is beneficial for that state. The states from the so-called periphery, constitute at the same time, qualified and highly qualified workforce provider, in this context the lose being amplified, by the „brain drain" process.

The stagnation stage, underdevelopment of the peripherial states implies, also, cultural atitudes and traditional values, so that the introduction of new elements, belonging to the center, it implies the aparition of some reactions, often mistaken to fundamentalism.

The states of the periphery must overcome some serious issues. This internal problems are enhaced by the agressive interventions of the „central states". The way the first use their resources is conditioned often by external intrests.

In the Europe of the second half of the XVIII century, the need for raw materials created the premise for the colonial expansion. The manufacturing contributed to the increase of the colonial control. Thus the Occidental Europe plays the role of producer while the entire colonial system was only a raw material provider. It takes place an intenational system based on capital flow. This system knew few or insignifiant changes at the end of the colonial period, when, the finances replaced the political power, leading to economical dependence. Among the factors which maintain a low level of development or even contribute to stagnation:

- Political (often etnical) – tensions and instability;
- military regimes;
- coruption at the highest level;
- elites – rapacios leading class;
- priorities – unwise chosen;
- traditionalism.

3. GLOBALIZATION – CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS

The globalization is defined in dictionaries as being "*the trend to transform the world in a unit (economical) with supra-state institutions"*[11]. Globalization is a concept and a process ex-tremely complex, even in in early stage, which arises ideological, political, cultural and imaginative disputes. A vision over globalization is that of the existence of a single human society, unrestrained by

[11] *** Dicționarul universal ilustrat al limbii române, vol. 4 Editura Litera, 2010

geographic space or boundaries and belonging to a single culture. But the general perception over the phenomenon is that it favors uniformity, homogenization, Westernization or Americanization of cultures, existing, as in all subjects regarding this process, contradictory opinions sustained each by arguments more or less viable.[12]

The problem that arises is that of the model to follow; the winner takes all or everyone will have something to say; the uniformity model (Coca Cola – McDonalds – Hollywood) or the tolerance, access to life and resources for all model. The globalization presented as an economical phenomenon is in fact a political and cultural one in which the world is not what it was, in which the states will lose their power and their role of social and economic development engines.

We can establish that with the apparition and development of politico-economic associations like the European Union or economical like: APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), *ASEAN* (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), *NAFTA* (North American Free Trade Agreement), the states gave up more and more their influence over their national economies to the international market and to borderless financial flows, in hope of a strong and stable development. For instance EU is leader in world export in over 20 years (6162 billion USD, 33% of the global market), and NAFTA is second place with an export value of 2493 USD representing 14% of the global market.[13]

Conventional development models, in their open and closed versions, offered analytic support for the idea that there is a reversed relation between the per capita income (or the industrial productivity) and its future growth, the economic convergence. Testing this idea generated empirical ascertainments, which animated the recent talks over globalization. There is, though, methodological issues in the empirical attempt in understanding the link between opening, growth and convergence. More than that, even presuming that there is a positive bond between opening, integration and growth in some cases it still remains open the link between the causality, with plenty of reasons to presume this happens from the internal productivity growth, to the increase of commerce and further liberalization and not the other way around.[14]

3. THE SEA – GLOBALIZATION TERRITORY

A way in which „globalization" grows is world trade with goods and services. The ideal support for economical exchanges is the sea.

[12] Negrea, A., P., *Globalizarea și problema identitară*, Revista Economie teoretică și aplicată, volumul XIX (2012), No. 9 (574), pp. 69
[13] WTO, International Trade Statistics 2015
[14] ***UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2016, p. 37

The sea has always been used for linking different points of the land, for transporting troops and weapons, or for goods and passangers. The created bonds, called maritime comunications, include in a modern view the consacreted navigation routes, known and exploited by the entire world, but also the ports and the means of transportation, as well as economical and political relations which ensure the secure conditions of this world socio-economical process. The Earth is a maritime world, its water surface represents 71% of its total surface. For many people this reality must be proved. To support this reality, we have the statistical data: 70% of the world population lives within 200 miles from shore, 80% of the world capitals are under 300 miles from shore, over 50% of strategical objectives (cities with over 100,000 people, oil fields, important economical areas) are within 100 miles from shore[15]. The sea represents the raw materials and food reserve of the World, the maritime trade represent almost 85% of the world total trade[16].

In these conditions it is expected that the maritime economical activities will amplify in the near future in an unprecedental maner, and the competion for the maritime control to become tighter. The great players of world geopolitics widen their development area to the planetary ocean elaborating doctrines regarding controling the land from the sea, so that, even though, the geographical factor seems to have lost its importance in the world power ecuation, this fact seems to be contradicted by the reality

The maritime communications represent a base component of the riveran states economical infrastructure. The development of the maritime routes has been determined by the geographical and the politico-economical factor.

The strong development of the world economy, the american, the west european, the asian and the mediteranean one have stimulated lately the economical development of these states.

The sea, international communications route, has become indispensable to the economical development of the states, assuring a cheap way of transportation in large quantities for the raw materials as well as manufactured products. Also, it represents a source of wealth for the riveran states, but also for the continental ones. The need to conquer this treasure has increased the world competion. Geographic-economically speaking the maritime communications can be defined as infrastructure elements (its extension on the sea) of the economy of the states with sea access as well as the others without access to the sea, but which promote their intrests over the sea.

The formation and development of the maritime comercial routes have been determined by the evolution of politics and economy of the riverine states, but are directly influenced by geographical factors, but also by the military ones. The sea access, keeping or losing it, the maritime

[15] http://www.iris.no/research, report, 2004
[16] https://clarksonsresearch.wordpress.com/tag/seaborne/, *Just How Big is an Economy Without Borders* ?, report 22 july 2016

areas control, the direct or indirect access in the strategical maritime spots, has always been connected to the increase or decrease of the economical and political powers of the state.

The power of the Mediterranean or West European states developed in strong conection to the access to the sea and the control of resources and trade on the sea. The expansion of the navigating nations had a double purpose, political and economical made the sea to become more and more traveled and known by the men.

Presently the maritime commerce is an economical activity very wide and complex, in value of the goods (table 3) as well as the material value which adds to the huge investments of high technology, represented by ships and ports. The International Maritime Organization shows that at January 1 2015 the world fleet consisted of 89,464 ships, with over 1.75 billion tdw, in which an important ammont the portcontainer and multifunctional ships influenced the values[17], belonging to the strong industralized states but also to some multifunctional states, interested in globalizing the trade and maritime transportation.

Table 3 Goods volume transported on the sea and the world fleet capacity 1960-2014

Year	**Goods transported on the sea volume(mil.tonnes)**	**World fleet capacity (mil. tdw)**
1960	969,5	157,7
1965	1674	204,5
1970	2605	326,1
1975	1742	546,3
1980	3705	690,8
1985	3382	664,8
1990	4008	658,4
1995	4651	734,9
2000	5984	799
2005	7109	895,8
2010	8409	1396
2014	9842	1689

Graf. 2 Evolution of the world fleet and the goods transported on the sea 1960-2014

[17] http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/*rmt2015*_en.pdf



The data analysis refering to the volume of the goods transported on thesea and the weght of the world fleet show the following: for both technico-economical indicators the general trend is increasing; the volume of transported goods on the sea increased 9.72 times in 44 years and the world fleet increased 10.71 times in the same period. The mid of the decades 7 and 9 is characterized by a big setback of the volume of the goods transported on the sea.

CONCLUSIONS

We can state, without doubt that inter-regional interactions lead to globalization, process which has as effect the reduction of differences throughout the intesification of exchanges, regardless of their nature (cultural, economical, political).

The globalization, as a socio-economical phenomenon, is an objective phenomenon, led by subjects with different political intrests and intention, and even oposed, positve or negative.

The concepts of region, regionaliation and globalization are in a continuous development and ajustment and it creates fierce disputes, between different types of national and supra-statal organizatons, international and local political players, states, governments and citizens.

By regionalization it is followed the increase of cooperation between states (or parts of them) which belong to a geographical regions. The regional cooperation cannot be only economical, but, it also presumes, firstly financial cooperation, political, military, justice and internal affairs, culture and education.

The regionalization can be considered the first step of globalization in which the state-nation still keeps its atributes and force. The regionalization can accomplish, in predictible and controlable conditions the passing to globalization, global economy and behind it the global state. The

globalization is not a new concept, considering the situation in the begining of the XX century, when the european colonialism contributed to the spreading of ideas, tehniques and products. So that from goods to games (soccer), populations from different regions of the world began to accomplish similar things(for instance the english language has become the official language of the globalization process).

The global economy evolution did not follow easier predictions of a world in process of globalization. Firstly, the global increase has been decreasing constantly starting with the '60 (exception the short period in th 2000). There is no common view regarding the reason of this phenomenon, but there is no doubt that this originates in the trends in the developed economies. The slowing of the growth of the economies in the last 3 decades has opened the door of retaking the convergence between north adn south, if the increase of developing countries would have maintained its previous pace. More than that, this period cannot be described as an recovery era of the countries under development[18].

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ACTIONS OF REPRESSION DIRECTED TOWARDS THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT: DECEMBER 1989 IN TIMISOARA

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Abstract:This study aims at accurately presenting the structure of the headquarter repression of the manifestations for democracy in December 1989, while detailing the actions that took place at that time. The repressive actions occurred under the coordination of a team. They were conducted directly from Bucharest, first through the mediation of the party and local administration institutions, along with units from the areas of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Ministry of National Defense. Later, officials in control of the Communist Party, the Army, Militia (former Police during the communist regime), Prosecution, and Securitatea (the secret or intelligence service within the communist system) were sent to Timisoara, as well. On December 17, around 4.30 pm, there was a shoot up, whereby many persons were killed and others were wounded. The repression troupes occupied the city and made sure that the traces of the revolt have been erased. The medical evidence was largely destroyed. Likewise, the authorities refused to engage in dialogue with the revolutionaries, as their only attempt in that respect occurred on December 20, 1989. In such conditions, the communist regime from Romania continued the repressions until December 22, at 12 am, when demonstrators relegated Nicolae Ceauşescu from his position of power.

Keywords: repression, Ceauşescu, Romanian Revolution, Timisoara, authoritarian regimes

Introduction

The year 1989 was the year of democratic changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Romania entered that direction of protests and democratic reforms rather late, as the changes were difficult and painful (Tismăneanu, 2014). Ceauşescu's country makes a discordant note in the series of peaceful revolutions, because the repression forces of the communist regime decided to open the fire, which led to 162 dead and 1107 wounded, until Nicolae Ceauşescu left his position of power on December 22, 1989. In Timisoara, a city located near the Western border of Romania, where the revolutionary movement started on December 16, 1989, 73 deceased and 324 wounded were registered before the dictator's escape (Szabo, 2014: 32). 43 corpses were picked from the Morgue, taken to Bucharest, and incinerated (Rotar, 2010). The massacre was possible as a result of the actions that the repression teams had organized (Hall, 2000). On the evening of December

16, those were performed by the local forces of *Militia*, *Securitate*, Firefighters, and Rangers, with the implication of the communist leaders from administration.

Beginning December 17 in the morning, several officials serving important functions arrived, one at a time, from Bucharest to Timisoara. On Sunday, but in the afternoon, the brigade led by the secretary for special problems of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Ion Coman arrived, as well. Important high officials from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of General Prosecution, and high leveled activists of the party accompanied Ion Coman upon his arrival. Some of them were stuck with him permanently, but others coordinated the repressive actions from subordinate units divided in sections. Wednesday, December 20 brought the arrival of Constantin Dăscălescu, the prime minister of the Social Republic of Romania at that date. Yet, he stepped aside (on the back door!) and was at no time available for a real dialogue with the protesters.

As regards the above commandment, there was no formal written decision to have it constituted. Yet, most certainly, such an order existed and functioned, in virtue of the centralist system and the pyramidal stratification of command specific to the dictatorial communist regime. Of course, there were situations when the lack of coordination between the party leaders (the Romanian Communist Party), those from the Army (the Ministry of National Defense, including Patriotic Guards and Civil Defense), and those from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (with several structures: Militia, Securitate, Firefighters, Rangers, and Safety and Securitate Troupes) gave the impression that the action was not being conducted in centralized coordination. Yet, despite that dysfunctionality, the commandment was as real as it gets. Its role and actions clearly emerged and stood out in the verdict given in the Timisoara Trial: "Through the concerted action of the forces under the command of the former secretary of CC of RCP, Ion Coman, the dissolution of the demonstrators was pursued in the first place, and not the annihilation of those who, by taking advantage of the events' evolution, committed acts of destruction or circumvention" (Orban and Rado 2010: 231). In Bucharest, Nicolae Ceaușescu and, in his absence, Elena Ceaușescu led the commandment, by giving direct orders to the ministers and the secretaries of the Central Committee.

The officials who organized and led the repressions

The Bucharest team who coordinated the activities of the repression forces from Timisoara consisted of: Nicolae Ceaușescu, the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party; Elena Ceaușescu, the prime vice-prime minister of the Romanian Government; Emil Bobu, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party; Manea Manescu, the vice-prime minister of the Government; Tudor Postelnicu, the minister of Internal Affairs; Vasile Milea, the minister of National Defense; Nicolae Popovici, the general prosecuting attorney of the Social Republic of Romania; Maria Bobu, the minister of Justice; Iulian Vlad, the director of State Department of Securitate. There were several party activists involved, as the leaders of

the Romanian Communist Party used to have lots of authority, while responsibility on the party line was foremost important to them (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). The team commanded repression measures, directed towards the persons that manifested in favor of freedom and democracy, either by using the subordinates that led the institutions and military units in the area, or via the representatives from the center that were sent over from Bucharest or other locations in order to perform actions against the protesters. Their actions were intensely supported by the huge repressive system of the communist state.

Among the persons who came from the center to suppress the movement in favor of civil liberties in Timisoara, we are pointing out: Ion Coman, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, who coordinated all the activities of the repression forces; Gheorghe Diaconescu, the adjunct of the general prosecuting attorney; Nicolae Bracaciu, the adjunct of the minister of Justice; Ilie Matei, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (former prime-secretary of the Party Committee of Timiş County); Cornel Pacoste, the prime vice-premier of the Government of the Social Republic of Romania; Nicolae Mihalache, the adjunct of the chief of the organization section of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party; Constantin Nuţă, the adjunct of the minister of Internal Affairs and the chief of the General Inspectorate of Militia; Ştefan Guşă, the chief of the Great Major State and the prime-adjunct of the minister of National Defense; Victor Atanasie Stănculescu, the adjunct of the minister of National Defense; Mihai Chiţac, the commander of the Chemical Troupes from the Ministry of National Defense and commander of the Bucharest Post; Velicu Mihalea, the adjunct of the chief of the General Inspectorate of Militia; Emil Macri, the chief of Direction of Ecomonic Contrainformation of Securitate of the State; Nicolae Ghircoiaş, the director of the Institute of Criminalistic Techniques of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Dumitru Rosiu, the chief of Judicial Service of the General Inspectorate of Militia; Tudor Stanica, the chief of the Direction of Penal Investigations within the General Inspectorate of Militia; Mihai Onţanu, the adjunct of the chief of the Direction of Penal Investigations within the General Inspectorate of Militia; Gheorghe Carasca, the adjunct of the chief of the Direction of Penal Investigations within Securitate of the State; Dumitru Ştefan, the alternate of the chief of the Direction Circulation within the General Inspectorate of Militia; Filip Teodorescu, the alternate of the chief of the Direction Counter-espionage within Securitate of the State; Gabriel Anastasiu, the alternate of the chief of the Direction of Internal Information within Securitate of the State; Dan Nicolici, the chief of the Center of information-documentation within the General Inspectorate of Militia; Gheorghe Glavan, the informative chief of RSAS (the Romanian Service of Anti-terrorist Struggle); Gheorghe Manta, instructor within the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party; Florea Carneanu, the alternate of the commander of the Commandment of Antiaerial Defense of the Territory; Dumitru Ionescu, officer within the Great Major State of the Army; Teodor Ardelean, officer within the Great Major State of the Army; Gheorghe Radu, the alternate of the chief of the Direction Operations within the Great Major State.

The local repressive commandment

At the county level, the prime-secretary, a position Radu Bălan filled at the time, led the repression commandment (called of "Defense" in the official documents). Vasile Bolog, the propaganda secretary, Florea Sofronie, Viorica Boiborean, Teodora Avram, and other members of the County Committee of the Party supported it, as well. Petru Moţ, the mayor (officially, the prime-secretary of the Municipal Committee of the Party from Timisoara) and Ioan Rotărescu, the secretary for organizational problems functioned at the municipality level. As the prosecutors recorded within the indictment that was put together for the arraignment of the defendants in the Timisoara Trial, there were merely repressive intentions and no attempt at clearing up those who came out on the streets. Here is what they say about Radu Bălan and Ilie Matei: "The demonstrators were brutally attacked on the evening of December 16, 1989 by intervention brigades of *Militia* and subunits of *Securitate* and Firefighters Troupes, which used maces, tear gases, and water tanks against them. Through those acts of violence, the two defendants, who refused to discuss openly with the masses of demonstrators, manifested their overt intention to suppress any anti-dictatorial movement" (Orban and Rado 2010: 206).

Romeo Bălan showed that some communist leaders of the country from that period were aware that it was all about persons who retrieved rights and liberties. Among them, there was the minister Vasile Milea. For the purpose of opening the fire against the demonstrators, he specified: "The demonstrators will be seriously warned, and then shot at the feet level." And because demonstrators were at stake, the Army had no reason to shot them: the opening of the fire was a murder, because "the order referred to demonstrators and not hooligans and apaches" (Bălan, 2011: 15-16). We must mention that, even against hooligans, legal measures do not refer to execution in the street.

If the persons from the repression commandment coordinated many actions against the peaceful demonstrators, some of them standing out through their direct execution, there were officers who came from various areas of the country who, along with those from the local structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense, executed a large variety of actions to limit the protest and identify its leaders in order to silent them. They handled collecting information by trailing and infiltration among the crowds, by interrogating the persons who were detained within the Penitentiary and the Arrest of the Internal Affairs Inspectorate from Timisoara, as well as the wounded persons in the hospitals (Szabo, 2013b: 100). Gabriel Anastasiu, the alternate of the chief of the Direction of Internal Information within Securitate of the State specified that he came to Timisoara accompanied by subordinate officers, naming lieutenant-colonel Ioan Pop and captain Adrian Barbulescu, while colonel Victor Achim was brought from Drobeta Turnu Severin. Lieutenant-colonel Gavril Oniceag and Costică Tănase were already in Timisoara, and were ordered to stay put (Rado, 2013: 111). Colonel Nicolae Glăveanu from RSAS Bucharest was also in Timisoara at the time (Radu, 1990).

The people from Securitate

The Timiş Securitate involved via the activity of its chief, colonel Traian Sima, and his adjuncts, lieutenant-colonel Gheorghe Atudoroaie and major Tinu Radu. Lieutenant-colonel Petru Pele and colonel Constantin Cîntăreţu commanded the officers from local Securitate, through Services I and II, and worked in teams to collect information. The chief interrogator, lieutenant-colonel Gheorghe Salajan (sometimes written as Gheorghe Sălăgeanu) also came to the front. Colonel Aurel Rogojan, lieutenant-colonel Felician Ceghi, Adrian Cârstea, Gheorghe Diaconescu, Dumitru Popescu (chief of the Romanian Service of Anti-terrorist Struggle – USLA), Constantin Tănasie, Andrei Uram, Ştefan Demeter, major Ion Adamescu, Adrian Bradisteanu, Nicolae Zarcula, Nicolae Mavru, Ion Ungureanu, Petru Veltanescu, captain Aurel Cighi, Vasile Grui, Mihai Pereschin, Vasile Petrea, Ion Ţepeneu, Ionel Ionescu, Mihai Florian Vidican, Eugen Zaharia, Saul Beloia, Marin Vasile, Mihai Petenchi, lieutenant-major Liviu Dinulescu, Marian Ştef, Liviu Baniac, Mircea Novac, Vasile Marian, Aurelian Cioabă, lieutenant Ioan Clava, Valerica Fulga, all acted under their command. Some of those mentioned above were officers responsible for the various economic objectives and were there for the time of the revolutionary events. They tried to intimidate the workers, so that they did not discuss what happened, did not take attitude, and did not organize to come out in the streets for massive protests. The impeded events became, eventually, at the price of numerous victims, the reason for the fall of the communist regime.

Gheorghe Atudoroaie, one of the alternates of the chief of Securitate, Timiş, admitted, indirectly, the following aspects: "Around 7.30 pm, on December 16, 1989, I sent by order the officers from Securitate II to the economic objectives, without any munitions, with the mission to stay there over night, as well, in order to control de state of mind of the working personnel, to firmly assure and secure the economic units, and to prevent events with grave consequences" (Rado, 2013: 164). We can see in Atudoroaie's declaration that his first objective referred to the people's states of mind, as attacking the units was out of the question, while reference to preventing the serious events was simple rhetoric, to distract attention from the main idea. The officers in economic units supplied periodic reports, while captain Aurel Cighi took them up and processed them along with the chief of services II, major Zarcula.

The people from Militia

The chiefs from the center had as their subordinates Militia employees brought from Bucharest and executing officers without any position, besides those already mentioned. Among those, there were: colonel Florescu and lieutenant-colonel Obăgila from the Direction Safeguard and Order within the General Inspectorate of Militia, colonel Ardeleanu from the Judicial, colonel Lupu, lieutenant-colonel Beldeanu, major Mihaiasa, Mihai Florea, captain Neagu, all from the Direction of Penal Investigations within the

General Inspectorate of Militia. Among the Timiş Militia officers who acted upon the population during those days colonel Ion Popescu, inspector-in-chief, colonel Ion Deheleanu, the head of the institution, lieutenant-colonel Ion Corpodeanu and major Ioan Popa, the alternates of Deheleanu, colonel Constantin Ion, lieutenant-colonel Constantin Tufariu, lieutenant-colonel Gheorghe Farcasu, colonel Fuieru, lieutenant-colonel Ioan Dumitrescu, lieutenant-colonel Ioan Haprean, major Gelu Popovici, Iosif Veverca, Sabin Bădescu, Gheorghe Dragoş, Traian Bolosin, Pavel Rădulescu and Adam Mureşan, captain Pavel Ţoia, Vasile Cândea, Mihai Matei, Ciocan, Flore Tocut, lieutenant-major Dorin Iepure, Traian Olaru, Mircea Drăgan, Dorel-Aurel Mureşan, Codreanu, lieutenant Dorel Andras and Florin Dragomir, all came to the front. Lieutenants Ioan Bara and Mitariu were very active, especially in detaining the demonstrators, on the night of December 16, 1989.

Colonel Ioan Bunoaica and the chief of the major state, lieutenant-colonel Tomus commanded the Troupes from the Safety and Securitate Brigades in Timisoara and worked to their continuous coordination. Lieutenant-colonel Ion Sasu, with his subordinate officers, among which Horia Septimiu Bodocan, conducted the formations from Firefighters, in strong connection with the intervention teams of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Army. Firefighter troupes in the area came to their support. An officer called Dumitru Ţăran led a team that came from Arad. Commander colonel Petre Teacă coordinated, from the Capital, the repression devices that the Rangers Teams took part of, in their turn. They switched, for a few days, from subordination to the Ministry of National Defense to subordination to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The passing-receiving operation in Timisoara was over on December 18, 1989. Lieutenant-colonel Neculai Nechita, the chief of the Major State at that time, then the commander of the unit, as well as lieutenant-major Ion Clavac from Rangers came to the front. Colonel Pantelimon Ciocoiu from Bucharest stood out, as well.

The Army people

The Army had an overwhelming role in the repression, as the local forces gave their very best in that respect. We are talking about colonel Gheorghe Rotariu, the commander of the Post and of the Antiaerial Defense Division, lieutenant-colonel Constantin Zeca, empowered to command the Mechanized Division 18 Timisoara, and Nicolae Predonescu, the chief of the Major State of the same unit, the officer who commanded the shooting up for the first time in Timisoara, on December 17, 1989, around 4.15-4.30 pm, in the Liberty Plaza. The fire came from the balcony of the Mechanized Division 18 Timisoara (Szabo, 2013a). Likewise, lieutenant-colonel Constantin Caraivan, who commanded the Artillery within Division 18 and lieutenant-colonel Ştefan Balaş and major Gheorghe Vlăduţ played an important role. Important names in the repression were lieutenant-colonel Mihai Bulai, the former commander of the tanks regiment from Giroc, colonel Constantin Rogin or lieutenant-colonel Gheorghe Visinescu from the same unit. Major Vasile Paul, Dorinel Biriş, captain Neagu, Octavian Pruneanu, lieutenant-major

Dorel Romanescu came to the front on the Giroc Lane. Major Gheorghe Borodan, Ioan Burci, Ion Dincă, Aurel Dima, Moise Iercosan, Octav Plesca, Ioan Ungur, captain Nicolae Benghia, Marin Chiriac, Constantin Miu, Marin Ene, Dumitru Caseriu, Nicolae Ilie, Iordache Mare, Adrian Neagu, Gheorghe Oprisoreanu, Marin Patrulescu, Florin Predescu, Tiberiu Savin, lieutenant-major Daniel Botez, Constantin Gheorghe, Vasile Cindea, Maricel Cristea, Constantin Maiescu, lieutenant Traian Ardeleanu, Daniel Dinu, and Daniel Craiu participated to the repressive actions, in their turn. Lieutenant-major Maricel Cristea, who came with Vasile Paul's unit from Lugoj, witnessed the repression measures on Girocului Lane and was the only one among those present who was honest and humane enough to relate what happened, by indicating those guilty for the massacre.

Major Velicicu, the chief of Counter-information Services of the Mechanized Division 18 was also involved. Other involved officers were lieutenant-colonel Vasile Ceuca, major Constantin Judele, lieutenant-major Adrian Vladila, but also Marius Bora and Dorel Rus. There were soldiers such as Petrea Ioan Cristea, the chief of the Major State, Ion Partenie, Dănuţ Eftimie, Gheorghe Vasile, and Ion Bădărău, officers from the Patriotic Guards Timiş.

Among the officers from the Ministry of National Defense who came to Timisoara for the repressions, lieutenant-colonel Ilie Gurschi, the commander of a detachment of paratroopers who came from the Army Unit Deveselu, Dolj County stood out, due to his actions. On December 21, 1989, the detachment involved in the blocking of the activities in the Polygraphic Enterprise Banat, when they tried to thwart the appearance of the manifesto of the Democratic Romanian Front. At the same time, Gurschi took part of the group that was constituted, on December 22, 1989, in the morning, to capture the leaders of the Revolution from the Balcony of the Opera House in Timisoara and destroy the amplification equipments. Tinu Radu, a participant from Securitate Timiș to those preparations testifies in that respect (Szabo, 2013a). At the same time, Gurschi (with his subordinate soldiers) assured the evacuation of the prime minister Constantin Dăscălescu and the other party and state leaders from the building of the former County Party Committee. Some of the victims among the Timisoara people recorded on the night of 22 to 23 of December, 1989 can be attributed to them, because they were the ones who acted in the Opera Plaza - the Banat Museum - Central Hotel area, where several persons were killed or wounded. Lieutenant-colonel Daniel Dinu from the Ministry of National Defense was wounded in the left foot in the same area. On the evening of December 22, 1989, around 11 pm, he was patrolling in front of the Opera House. Caporal Ioan Kantor reported to him that an armed paratrooper refused to identify himself and disappeared. A few minutes later, the soldiers left in the direction of the Banat Museum to look for the paratrooper and the civilians that accompanied him. Then the fire was opened from that area and lieutenant-colonel Dinu was wounded by a bullet that rebounded (Milin, 2007a: 2495).

Other involved institutions

Chiefs of institutions or their employees participated to the local repression teams, in their turn. We should mention Rodica Novac, the director of the Sanitary Direction Timiş, Ovidiu Golea, the director of the County Hospital and adjunct director at the Sanitary Direction Timis, Elena Topală, the president of the Timiş Court House, and Mihai Teperdel, the territorial inspector of the Cults Department. Local prosecutors (coordinated by Laurean Tilinca), as well as those brought over from around the country (Bucharest, Arad, Caras-Severin, and Hunedoara) acted at the order of the adjunct of the general prosecution attorney, Gheorghe Diaconescu (military magistrate), whom Nicolae Popovici, the general prosecution attorney sent in mission to Timisoara. Mihai Ionescu, Ion Onofrei, Ioan Mihai Alexandru, and Gheorghe Mocuta came from Bucharest along with Diaconescu. The role of the prosecution attorneys who came from outside was to interrogate the demonstrators retained in the Timisoara Penitentiary, situated on Popa Şapcă Street. On the morning of December 17, when he landed in Timisoara with a Tarom flight, Diaconescu went to the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Timis to organize the repression together with generals Constantin Nuţă, Velicu Mihalea, and Emil Macrea (Milin, 2007b: 3429). The prosecution did not emit any bench warrant during the Revolution period. There were hundreds of arrested people in Timisoara (around 800), while the issue of arrest came up in the case of another 28-30 files. They were those persons upon whom goods stolen from the devastated stores had been found (Milin, 2007b: 3533). The prosecution did not involve in the release of those who were detained illegally, on which no evidence has been found and who, anyhow, were there beyond the legal term of 24 hours.

But what is truly staggering is that the prosecution attorneys did not make the smallest attempt to identify the persons who shot the population! Of course, the corpses have been examined, which required an extra presence from Bucharest in the persons of prosecution attorneys Ovidiu Petrescu and Vasile Grevdea. Another team, with many components from Romania's Government, came to Timisoara around 1 pm on December 20, 1989. Constantin Dăscălescu, the prime minister of the Social Republic of Romania commanded it. Emil Bobu, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, a person very close to the Ceauşescu family, accompanied him. Nicolae Vaidescu, the minister of the Electrotechnical Industry, Eugeniu Rădulescu, the minister of Automobile Constructions, Maria Flusca, the minister of the Light Industry, and Ioan Toma, the general secretary of the Communist Youth Union, in fact, the minister of Youth were part of the delegation, as well. The ministers who were present in Timisoara had the task of going to the large companies in their area of expertise to prevent the emergence of the employees in the streets and determine them to get on with their work. They did not even try to intervene, because the workers were already in front of the County Party Committee and in the Opera Plaza (Victoriei). They limited to some discussions with the directors of the companies, most of them empty at the time. In fact, the ministers who came from Bucharest were surprised by what they found out in

Timisoara, as in Bucharest the true dimension of the revolutionary events has been unknown.

The repressive strategies

The teams who acted against the fighters for democracy, liberty, and a better life in Timisoara applied an entire range of repressive techniques:

1) *Intimidation.* First, intimidation techniques manifested through the presence of several employees from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, either wearing a uniform or dressed like civilians, on the streets. Starting the night of December 16 to 17, 1989, patrols of the Ministry of National Defense took place in town. Their presence there had the purpose of discouraging people from getting together to constitute groups that would act in an organized manner. Even since December 16, the demonstrators were intimidated by use of Firefighters automobiles, Ministry of Internal Affairs automobiles, by use of the cars of those in high positions of power (which had small numbers), as well as Army's vehicles, all of them having an apparent and distinct presence in various places of gathering of the demonstrators. On Sunday at lunch, the tanks and the armor-plated amphibian transporters (AAT) came into action and occupied the city.

2) *Misinformation.* The most important act of misinformation took place on December 16-17, when Nicolae Ceauşescu, the former general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and the president of the Social Republic of Romania was informed only that there were commercial units that were broken, not about the fact that the heavy part of the protests concerned democratic reforms. That act of cowardice on the part of the local communist activists, of Militia officers, and people from Securitate from the local area favored the drastic, excessive measures dictated by Nicolae Ceauşescu against the Timisoara people. Previously, Ceauşescu has been informed that there were just a handful of fanatical church-goers in the Reformed Church. Later, on December 18 and 19, the Ceauşescu spouses were intoxicated with another lie, according to which the demonstrators had attacked military units. In his discourse that was radio and TV mediated, on the evening of December 20, Nicolae Ceauşescu invoked the reasons above to justify the introduction of other drastic measures in Timisoara and around the country, while not knowing that they were false. He was also misinformed as regards the involvement of some foreign agents and powers in the revolt from Timisoara. Yet another piece of misinformation that has been locally used was that the shot persons, defalcated from the Morgue and taken to Bucharest in order to be incinerated, fled across the border.

3) *Threats and blockages.* Since December 16, the Timisoara people have been permanently threatened. There was a large variety of verbal phrases, combined with insults. They were used to try and push people away from the sensitive issues. The families of those deceased were included in the threatening process, as they were looking for their own. Many times, speech was accompanied by gestures, when the members of the forces of order raised bludgeons or weapons and simulated shooting. There were also threats by use of auto-vehicles, whereby they simulated marching into the crowds with

tanks and AATs. The city was submitted to blockage, while on the main access ways there were filters installed, to prevent the entrance of the outsiders and the people from leaving the town. The telephonic conversations were stopped, while the state of necessity was installed (Ban, 2012).

4) *Violence.* The members of the repression teams exerted, beyond verbal violence, physical violence that is hard to imagine. People (men, women, children, young, or old) were beaten with the palms, the fists, with wooden sticks, stones, wrecking bars, cables, rubber maces, and the back of the weapons. Likewise, they were shot by use of submachine guns, flame spray guns, semi-automatic rifles (with lunettes), or machine guns from the AATs or tanks. Throughout the entire interval, the demonstrators did not have any fire guns upon them. From time to time, they also turned to bludgeons, stones, bottles, or jars (full or empty). They had a way more powerful weapon, though: the will to overthrow the regime (Szabo, 2014: 16).

The modes to annihilate the demonstrators

The repression between December 16 and 22, 1989, in Timisoara, developed along two coordinates: 1) Direct actions against the demonstrators, resulting in arrest, bats with various objects, as well as gun fire; 2) Informative actions that were meant to identify the leaders of the demonstrators' groups, in an attempt to annihilate them (by detainment or shooting). Within this frame, the suffering of the wounded or arrested did not matter to the soldiers, Militia officers, people from Securitate, firefighters, rangers, and party activists. The drama that Adrian Costin went through perfectly illustrates the idea. On the evening of December 17, he left home to pick up his wife from a different ward of the city. He joined some groups of demonstrators and, in the 700 Plaza, he was shot in the shoulder, as the fire started from the Opera Plaza - Timisoara Hotel area. That was an area were several victims have been recorded. Although he was wounded, A. Costin did not go to the hospital; instead, he went home, accompanied by his friends, yet without having found his wife. Near the Northern Train Station, they were arrested, taken to the Transportation Militia, beaten, and required to write declarations as regards their presence on the street. From there, along with other arrested people, they arrived to the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Timiş, where they were all brutally beaten by officers dressed in uniforms or like civilians. Upon dawn, they reached the Penitentiary. There, they have not been beaten anymore; instead they were interrogated as regards their reasons for getting on the streets and as regards the shouted slogans.

Unlike other injured people, Adrian Costin informed the officials that he had medical problems in the shoulder. He was promised medical care, but no one attended. On December 20, upon pressure from the demonstrators from the Opera House and the County Party, he was released, along with other persons. The wound did not look well, so he went to the New Clinics to get medical care. He refused to hospitalize himself. After the Winter Holidays, he went to a policlinic, where he received treatment. On February 2, 1990, he was subjected to surgery on his arm, and the bullet was taken out, eventually

(Milin, 2007b: 3142-3143). This is a complex case, but most of the victims recorded in the Timisoara Revolution from December 1989 went through one or more of the sequences mentioned: arrest, beating, shooting, and interrogation. All those tragic events came as a result of the order that Nicolae Ceauşescu passed: "taking measures", including shooting up, "measures" put into practice by the repression teams, became the first priority.

Guilt, lies, and retracted declarations

Ion Coman, the chief of the commandment of repression of the demonstrators for democracy and citizen liberties in Timisoara, explicitly admitted either that he gave orders for the opening of the fire, or that he passed Nicolae Ceauşescu's order to shoot up the demonstrators: "I had the representation that by giving the order that the fire should be opened, there will be a massacre, which, fortunately, did not occur" (Rado, 2013: 8). During the impeachment, Coman retracted many of the declarations he previously gave the prosecution attorneys. In some cases, he was right, as the case is in the matter of the shoot up, as the order was passed around 2.30 pm. Vasile Milea gave the order from the Ministry of National Defense, while Tudor Postelnicu passed the order from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Both of them were resort ministers, the only ones in the position to pass those orders. Later, in the declaration given during the arraignment, Ion Coman declared that he was reported "only" 58 deaths, which, in his view, was proof that the number of the shot people was limited.

The easiest excuse, often invoked in the court, was that the shooting up order referred to the hooliganism elements, as they devastated institutions and attacked the forces of order or military units, an aspect that does not correspond to reality. Then, another excuse was that the shooting up was made in conformity with the legal requests, that is, summons, fire on vertical plan, followed by fire at the feet. Yet, most of the persons hit by bullets had penetration orifices in the abdomen, chest, and the head areas. Ion Coman reconfirmed the order for the opening of the fire given by telephone by Nicolae Ceauşescu to the chief of the forces of repression within the Army, general Ştefan Guşă, as well as to the chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, general Constantin Nuţă, around 6.30-7 pm, on December 17, about an hour after he took command in Timisoara. Yet, as proven, the first shot victims appeared shortly after 4 pm, in the Liberty Plaza in Timisoara, where soldiers from the Mechanized Division 18 fired their guns. Ion Coman piqued himself on his not allowing, as he declared, the use of heavy weapons, such as tanks and cannons, although it is clear that machine guns from the AATS have actually been used. The former chief of the repression commandment in Timisoara specified, upon arraignment: "Even from the moment I arrived, I forbad the use of heavy munitions against the demonstrators. I ordered gun shooting by use infantry weapons (automatic rifles) only. I gave the order that tanks, cannons, AATs, helicopters, and planes will not be used" (Rado, 2013: 17-18). Yet tanks, AATs, and helicopters have been used. The

tanks played an intimidation role, while the helicopters served to observe the moves of the demonstrators.

The fear Ceauşescu provoked and his misinformation

A few things stand out as regards the actions of the huge mechanism of repression from Timisoara. First, Ceauşescu was reported that the initiated movement meant destruction operated by hooligan elements. No person in a position of power dared mentioning to him either the slogans in favor of democracy and fundamental liberties, or the fact that the requests were elementary: bread, heat, electricity, and medication. Another aspect is that the shooting often occurred after the economic units have been devastated. When the fire was opened, the targets have not been those engaged in destruction, but the groups of demonstrators. Thus, fire was opened -- and there were many victims -- upon the persons gathered on the steps of the Cathedral, both on the evening of December 17 and on the night of December 18. The Cathedral was not at risk of being devastated. Instead, nothing was done to stop the devastation of the stores across the street, a few meters from those who opened the fire.

Cristian Liviu Campean was 13 years old when he was wounded in the Liberty Plaza. His clear glance and fresh mind helped him to recall the following aspect, which he later related in court: "After everything was broken, then they opened the fire. After!" (Milin, 2007a: 2842). That was an aspect the court retained when they gave their verdict in the Timisoara Trial, an occasion to emphasize that the forces of order had the role of protecting people and goods, not the role of killing: "The forces that were supposed to assure the protection of the stores involved in the shooting up against the demonstrators, and the result consisted of many dead and wounded" (Orban and Rado, 2010: 267). As a matter of fact, the court recorded that there was no legal ground for the shooting, as the devastation of the institutions and commercial units did not in any way justify the use of guns, especially since innocent people were exposed to danger, some of them being killed, and others only wounded (Orban and Rado, 2010: 313).

The conclusion that we may infer is that in Timisoara, during December 16 and 22, 1989, a commandment of repression existed. Even though it was not formally constituted, it acted directly against the persons who retrieved civil and political rights. Out of fear and cowardice, the leaders of that commandment did not inform Nicolae Ceauşescu correctly about the protests. Instead, they sustained his wrong decisions and actually commanded the repressive actions directed towards the insurrectionists. More, they supported the decisions regarding the erasing of traces of the revolutionary actions, including that of incinerating corpses.

After the dismissal of Nicolae Ceauşescu from his position of power, it would have been natural for Romania to head the direction of democratic values and construct a society in which fundamental rights and liberties would be respected. In fact, the right to justice was almost totally ignored. There was no adjudgement for the practices and actions that the representatives of the communist regime executed. It was not before

December 18, 2007, in the Romanian Parliament, that the conclusions of the *Final Report* of the Presidential Committee for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania have been presented, a report greeted with remarkable hostility (Cesereanu, 2008). A few days before, on December 5, 2007, generals Victor Atanasie Stănculescu and Mihai Chiţac, two of those responsible for the Timisoara massacre, were finally convicted. Their trial took a very long time because they both held very important positions within the first post-revolutionary government, the former as the minister of Economy, and then of National Defense, and the latter as the minister of Internal Affairs. In the Timisoara Trial, which started on March 2, 1990, whereby officers from Militia and Securitate, as well as four leaders of the communist administration have been judged, few persons have been convicted. In such conditions, the lack of sound judicial investigation that would shed light on the crimes from Timisoara and their authors affects Romania's efforts at building a society centered on respect of the state of the right and responsibility for committed actions. Within this context, research should be continued to identify all the persons involved in the repression, their actions, for the moral purpose of their bringing to account.

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GEOGRAPHYCAL, GEOLOGICAL, METEO-CLIMATIC, HYDROLOGICAL, SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL CONDITIONS INFLUENCE ON SEABORNE TRADE IN THE BLACK SEA

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Abstract: Since ancient times Black Sea has been explored, crossed, and taken into possession of by seafaring peoples, who built on its cities-ports, which standeth until today. Physical-geographical and climatic factor are primaly for choosing favorable sites for these constructions. Today physical-geographic, climatic, social - political and economic conditions ensure the necessary development framework of international and Romanian shipping in the Black Sea Basin. Black Sea has been, is and will be a major topic of interest and research for both riparian countries and various international institutions

Keywords: Black Sea, seaborne trade,

1.INTRODUCTION

The Earth is a maritime world, the water surface represents 71% of the total surface of the Earth.

In this conditions, it is expected that in the near future, the world maritime activities will develop in an unprecedented manner, and the competition for the control of the maritime space to become tighter and tighter. The great actors of the world's geopolitics are widening their development to the planetary ocean, elaborating new doctrines regardins land control from the sea, so that, even though it seems that the physical and geographical factors have lost their importance in the global power ecuation, it is contradicted by the reality.

The sea has always been used for establishing the connections between land points. These maritime communications, include, in a modern acception as well as consacrated navigation routes as well as the ports and the means of transportation, and also economical and political relations which ensure the safety of this world complex socio-economical phenomenon.

From a geographical and economical point of view, the maritime communications are defined as elements of the economical infrastructure of the countries with acces to the sea and also to other countries which promote most of their interests on the sea.

The formation and development of the maritime trading routes have been determined by the political and economical evolution of the riverain countries, being influenced directly by the geographical, political and military factors. The access to sea, keeping or losing it, the control of maritime spaces, the exercise of influence, directly or indirectly in maritime strategical points, has always been related to the increase of decrease of the political and economical power of the respective state, including Romania.

The complex physical-geographical and climate conditions which influence the development of trading and seaborne in the Black Sea are not fully known, and as such, we discover the need for understanding how to use these as optimization factors of these activities. The sea, international communication way, has become indispensable to the economical development of states, assuring a cheap and size increasing way of transportation for crafted goods as well as prime materials. Also, the sea is a spring of wealth for riverain countries as well as continental ones. The need to control this spring has born and enhanced the global competion, competition which started with the development of human society.

2.GEOGRAPHICAL, GEOLOGICAL, CLIMATIC, HYDROLOGICAL, SOCIAL, POLITACAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WHICH INFLUENCE TRANSPORTNATION IN THE BLACK SEA

From the origins point of view, the Black Sea is an interior sea, a ingression one and represents a part of the Pontic lake, from the Sarmatic sea, which formed with approximately 10 million years ago. In quaternary, important transgressions and regressions took part at sea level cu high amplitudes (the most notable regression took place in Neoeuxin, approximately 12000 years ago, with a value of at least 70-80 meters), proof being the underwater valleys, today clogged, of the schelf in front of the Black Sea coast. Presently we notice a small increase of the sea level, based on general oscillating background[1].

Morphohydrographic and morphodynamic elements of the Black Sea, important to navigation and maritime transportation, reveal the following:

[1] Boşneagu, R., (2004) Influenţa condiţiilor geografice asupra rutelor de transport în bazinul Mării Negre (sectorul vestic), Editura Cartea universitară, București, 2004, p.10

- the hydrographic network of the Black Sea basin with a surface of over 22 million km^2 spreads on a wide area of Eurasia, the contribution of fresh water and sediments being notable
- the Black Sea shore is divided, from a geomorphological point of view in 17 main areas with specific characteristics;
- even though is a closed sea, the Black Sea is connected to the North by the Kerch strait to the Sea of Azov and to the South, by the Bosphorus and Dardanelle straits, with the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; the Black Sea is considered the most eastern Mediterranean of the Atlantic Ocean.
- from the characteristics of the sea bottom point of view, the Black Sea is dived in two areas, one with low depths up to 200 m, in the north and north-west and one with depths higher than 200 m in the south and south-east. Distinctive is the fact that after the continental plateau the slope of the bottom is steep, excepting the north-western sector of the Black Sea (figure 1);
- The Black Sa is a deep sea, with an average depth of 1271 m and a maximum depth of 2212 m; the level difference between peak Elbrus (5633 m) and the maximum depth is 7878 m;, the 100 m isobath passes almost parallel with the shore, at distances of 1.5-6 nautical miles, exception being the west and north-west parts, and near the Kerch strait, where the distance increases up to a value of 50 nautical miles, so that the navigation of big ships is possible near the shores without problems.

Figure1
Source: Encycopaedia Britannica, 1994

Even though the shores of the Black Sea are relatively crested there are still favorable conditions to ensure the development of ports and sheltering the ships agains winds and storms as following:

- ports developed in bays like: Burgas, Varna, Odessa, Suhumi, Samsun, Zonguldak etc.;
- the form and size of the Black Sea determined the length and orientation of the trading routed between ports;
- considering the relatively short distances in the Black Sea, tens and hundreds of nautical miles, the transportation routes, and average speeds of 12-14 Knots, cand be covered in short intervals of hours and tens of hours;
- a special characterstic of the Black Sea shores is their constant modification.

The Black Sea climate is influenced by the geographical position of the sea, by air circulation, winds regime etc. In the cold season the winds from the northern sector and intensified, very strong along the coast and weaker offshore. In the warm season, the north-west, west and south-west winds dominate, in the western side of the Black Sea and from the sea to the land in the other sectors of the sea. Regarding the wind speeds distribution, on speed scales it can be shown that 40-50% of the speeds are between 1 and 5 m/s.

In the Black Sea area there are many types of aeolian circulation. The average duration most probable is from 6 to 24 hours, with a frequency of 67% of the cases.

The air temperature regime is as following: the average annual temperature on the Black Sea shore is between $10,0^0$ to $15,2^0$ Celsius, with very hot summers and poor in raifalls and relatively warm and wet winters, excepting the south-eastern part with a climate close to the subtropical one.

The most reduced temperatures of the air offshore are in January and February, and the highest in July and August.

The atmospherical humidity follows the air temperature variation . the thermohygrometric regime determines the atmospherical instability, the reduction of visibility and a very wide area of meteorological phenomenons. The hygrometric regime is determined by the evaporation specific to the sea and to the advection of the mediterranen adn oceanic air. The annual value of atmospheric circulation over the sea basin is approximately 3.600 km^3 water.

The average relative humidity has a variation reversed to the temperature. The average annual nebulosity in the Black Sea area is approximately 5.6 tenths.

The influence of meteo-climatical factors over navigationa dn maritime transportation in the Black Sea basin (based on the processing of meteorological data of over 40 years - 1968 – 2010 done by the author) is given by:

- *the presence of winds and storms* (the average annual number of days with storms are 20-40, which means a reduced activity of 5-12%);
- *the air temperature:* the winter average temperature varies between -2° Celsius in the north and 9° Celsius in the south, in the summer between 20° to 24° Celsius in the entire basin of the sea, which ensures the development of maritime activities almost the entire year.
- *the air humidity* (the relative humidity of air varies between 70-85%, rarely surpassing the thermal confort limit with a negative influence over activities on board and in ports);
- *fog* (the average days with fog is 30 in the west, which produces the reduction of activities with 8 to 10 percents);
- *visibility,* lower in the transition seasons (the average days with zero visibility is from 7 to 10 days on the Roumanian sea shore);
- *nebulosity,* more accentuated in the cold season (the average days with maximum nebulosity in the roumanian shore is of 10 to 15 days per year);
- *moderate rainfalls:* do not significantly influence the maritime activities (the annual average being 300 to 500 mm).

The Black Sea is characterised by a brackish regime and presents salinity values lower than 24% over the entire water volume, with values very reduced in front of the river mouths in the north-west. The water volume at the surface has a average salinity of 18%, and the depth one, over 24%[2].

The Black Sea water level is in relatie growth with 0.1...12.2 mm/year. The water level variations depend of the wind and direction of the winds, the shape and nature of the shores, the sea bottom topology. The physico-geographical condition of relative isolation, specific to the Black Sea, impose that the water exchange to, and from, the Black Sea to be insignificant raported to the total water volume in its basin.

The marine surface currents do not have generally, significant speeds for big and average ships navigation. The seis periods in the Black Sea varies from minutes to 13 hours, with an amplitude of a few centimeters to 2 meters (exceptionally). In the Black Sea the tide has values between 10-12 cm, insignificant for navigation[3].

But, very important for navigation and maritime transportation in the Black Sea are waves, wind and sea state. These can have a direct, negative, strong and even dangerous action over the sea

[2]*** Black Sea Pilot 4th Edition, 2013, UKHO Publications, London, UK
[3] ibidem

offshore as well as over hydrotechnical constructions. The wind waves are higher in winter and autumn, when the winds from offshore dominate. In the west basin of the Black Sea the height of the waves is 6 to 8 meters, with a maximum of 14 meters. At the shore this value varies por instance from a value of 4.3m at Odessa, 5.7m at Sevastastopol, 6 m at Constanţa, 8 m on the mountain shores. The strong waves apear in the cold season of the year (10% frequency in some areas), and less frequent in the warm season (3%). Periodical storms, very strong, especially in the cold season have caused coniderable material and human losses, including on the roumanian shore of the Black Sea.

In the cold season of the year the degree 6 and higher states of the sea frequency is over 10% and the calm and degree 1state of the sea is 20-30%. In the warm season the frequency of sea states degree 6 and beyons is 2%, the strong winds form from the west to the north, with maximum heights of 6-7m, but predominant are the waves with height of 1 m. At the transition to the cold season, the sea agitation remains similar to the one in the summer, and starting with octomber and november, the sea agitaton level increases, the degree 4 sea state extends to 5-10% in some areas. The predominant propagation direction of waves is from north-east and east and sometimes even south, with maximum heights of 6-7m.

Generally, the length of the waves in the Black Sea is 30-50 m, with a period of 6 sec, but in the eastern and south-eastern areas, there are frequently wind waves 100m long, with a period of 10-12 sec and swell waves long of 150-200m, with a a period of 15..17 sec[4].

In conclusion, the hydrological factors influence over navigation and maritime transport in the Black Sea basin is important and it is given by:

- shore line dynamic, with implications in the distruction of the hydro-technical constructions;
- the shore erosion accentuated in the last years which caused major distrustuction of the roumanian beaches, but also in the wes side of the Black Sea;
- the level oscilations – unwanted oscilations of the ships during harbor operations;
- wind waves which cause unwanted and even dangerous oscilations during navigation;
- marine currents – produce the drift of ships from the established course.

3. RESULTS

The analisys of the geographico-economical realities of the riverain countris of the Black Sea, regarding teritory, population, shore length, human development indicator, GDP, electrical energy

[4] ***Black Sea Pilot Card, Maritime Hydrographical Direction Constanța Publisher Ex Ponto, 2006

production, exoport-import value, merchant fleet total dispacement, number of ships and ports looks like this:

1. the riverain countries teritory represents 13.17% of the Earth surface; population represents 5.13% of the world population; Black Sea shore length is 4.047 km, (table 1);

Table 1 Geographical potential of the Black Sea basin states (2015)

Nr.crt.	Country	Surface(km^2)/place in global hierarchy		Population (mil.) / place in global hierarchy		Black Sea shore length (km)
1.	The Russian Federation	17.078.242	1	142,6	10	
2.	Turkey	738.562	37	80,3	20	1.695
3.	Ukraine	603.550	46	44,2	32	2.782 (including Sea of Azov)
4.	Romania	238.391	83	21,6	59	225
5.	Bulgaria	110.879	105	7,14	102	354
6.	Georgia	69.700	121	4,92	123	310
7.	Republic of Moldova	33.851	140	3,51	133	-
	Total	18.873.175		304,27		4.047

2. Regarding the Human Development Indicator (HDI), the riverain countries are situated in the second category - HHD-*High Human Development* and Republic of Moldova in the third category MHD-*Medium Human Development*[5] (HDI is calcuted for 4 categories of countries) (table 2);

Table 2 Human Development Indicator (HDI-2015) of the Black Sea riverain countries

Nr.crt.	Country /place in global hierarchy		HDI	GDP per capita (USD)
1.	The Russian Federation	50	0,798	22.362
2.	Romania	52	0,783	18.106
3.	Bulgaria	58	0,782	15.586
4.	Turkey	72	0,761	1.677
5.	Georgia	76	0,754	7.164
6.	Ukraine	81	0,747	8.178
7.	Republic of Moldova	107	0,763	5.223

3. GDP of the riverain countries of the Black Sea is approximately 3.2% of the global total (table 2)[6]; total trading volume (export/import is 1.123 billions USD/2015)[7]

Table 3 Black Sea riverain countries repartition by GDP - 2015

Nr.crt.	GDP	GDP (billions USD)	Place in global hierarchy	GDP per capita (USD)	Place in global hierarchy	Annual development rate (2015)	Place in global hierarchy

[5] http.www.report.hdr.undp.org., Human Development Report, 2015, accessed 07.10.2016
[6] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html, accessed 07.10.2016t
[7] ibidem

		2015		2015			
1.	The Russian Federation	3.718	7	25.400	73	-3,7%	210
2.	Turkey	1.589	18	20.400	86	3,8%	86
3.	Romania	413.8	46	20.800	85	3,7%	73
4.	Ukraine	339.5	50	7.500	114	-9,9%	220
5.	Bulgaria	133.9	77	19.100	89	3%	104
6.	Georgia	35.6	120	9.600	138	2,8%	109
7.	Republic of Moldova	17.8	149	5.000	169	-1,1%	204

Table 4 Export/ import value of the Black Sea riverain countries - 2015

Nr.crt.	Country	Export (billions USD)	Import (billion USD)
1.	The Russian Federation	337,8	198,3
2.	Turkey	153,6	204,3
3.	Romania	54,5	63,1
4.	Ukraine	35	37,1
5.	Bulgaria	24,5	27,6
6.	Georgia	3,5	7,4
7.	Republic of Moldova	1,9	3,9
	Total	586,3	536,7

4. total displacement of the merchant fleets of the Black Sea riverain countries is approximately 51.4 millions tdw (4,3% of the world total of 1.750 millions tdw); total number of trading ships is 3.847 (2,93 % of the world total of 89.000 ships)[8] (table 5); total number of ports: 43, from which 9 are considered main ports, as following: (Romania - 7, from which 4 fluvial, main port Constanţa; Bulgaria - 3, main port Varna; Turkey - 13, main port Istanbul; Georgia - 3, main port Batumi; Russian Federation - 3, main port Novorosiysk; Ukraine – 14, from which 4 fluvial, main port Odessa; Moldavia: main port Giurgiulești (on the Danube)[9].

Table 5 Negre Trading fleets of the Black Sea riverine countries 2014/2015 (tdw; ship number, global fleet percent)

Nr.crt.	Țara	2014 (displacement tdw/number of ships)		2015 (displacement tdw/number of ships)		Global fleet percent(%)
1.	Turkey			27.687.770	1.530	1,6 (place 15 globally)
2.	The Russian Federation			18.324.079	1.730	1,06 (place 20 globally)
3.	Ukraine	3.081.000	409			0,184
4.	Bulgaria	1.297.000	81			
5.	Romania	1.044.000	94			
6.	Georgia	8.000	3			
	Total			51.441.849	3.847	
	World fleet total			1.750.000.000	89.464	4,3%/2,93%

[8] ***UNCTAD, Review of Maritme Transport, 2014, 2015
[9] ***http://portfocus, 2016, accessed 08.10.2016

5.the goods trading in the ports of the Black Sea is 267 million tonnes, as following: Romania: 45 million tonnes; Bulgaria: 31 million tonnes; Turkey: 17 million tonnes, Georgia: 11 million tonnes, Rusian Federation: 66 million tonnes, Ukraine: 60 million tonnes; total goods loaded/unloaded in the Black Sea ports approximately 267 million tonnes[10] (table 6); number of ships that annually transit the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits: over 26.663[11]; harbor trading capacity in the Black Sea is over 390 million tonnes (Romania 123 million tonnes), Ukraine 80 million tonnes, The Russian Federation 76 million tonnes, Bulgaria 62 million tonnes, Turkey 24 million tonnes, Georgia 16 million tonnes;

Table 6 Trading capacity and goods trading through ports in the Black Sea -2015

Country	**Port**	**Trading capacity (mil. tonnes)**	**Goods trading (mil.tonnes)**	**Total goods trading - country**	**Total trading capacity - country**
Romania	Constanţa	105	56.3		
	Galaţi[12]	10	9.1		
	Brăila[13]	4	2.2		
	Tulcea[14]	3	2.5		
	Mangalia	0.4	0.2		
	Midia	0.4	0.3		
	Sulina	0.5	0.3	***70.9***	***123.3***
Bulgaria	Burgas	50	25		
	Varna	18	17		
	Nesebăr			***42***	***68***
Turkey	Eregli	10	6.0		
	Samsun	4.3	2.5		
	Zonguldak	4	3.0		
	Trabzon	2.5	2.0		
	Giresun	2.5	2.0		
	Inebolu	0.8	0.5		
	Ordu	0.2	0.07		
	Fatsa	0.2	0.15	***17***	***24***
Georgia	Batumi	5	4.6		
	Poti	7	2.5		
	Supsa	4	3.5	***11***	***19***
Russian Federation	Novorossijsk	60	50		
	Tuapse	16	16		
	Soci			***66***	***76***
Ukraine	Odesa	38	20		
	Ilyicevsk	20	13.2		
	Yujniy	15	15		

[10] http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=mar_mg_aa_cwhd&lang=en, accesat 08.10.2016
[11] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/record-number-of-ships-sail--through-bosphorus-in-2014.aspx?pageID=238&nid=71753, accessed 08.10.2016
[12] http://www.romanian-ports.ro/html_nou/index.php, accessed 08.10.2016
[13] ibidem
[14] ibidem

	Nikolaev				
	Theodosia				
	Eupatoria				
	Yalta				
	Kerci				
	Mariupol				
	Berdiansk			***60***	***80***
Total				**267**	**390.3**

To be able to better understand the economical potential of the Black Sea riverain countries, with influence in development of the maritime transportation in the Black Sea and from the Black Sea, we present synthetically the level of production for a few products, where the riverain countries are situated in the first 20 places of the global hierarchy for the year (2013/2014/2015)[15]:

Wheat (thousands of tonnes) -2014

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	30.2
2.	Ukraine	22.3
3.	Turkey	3.9
4.	Romania	3.2

Potatoes (thousands of tonnes) -2014

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	59.7
2.	Ukraine	24.1
3.	Turkey	19.0
4.	Romania	7.6
5.	Bulgaria	5.3

Soy (thousands of tonnes) -2013

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Ukraine	3.9
2.	Romania	2.01

Vegetables (thousands of tonnes) - 2013[16]

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Turkey	28.3
2.	Russian Federation	15.5
3.	Ukraine	8.8

Fruits (thousands of tonnes) - 2013

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Turkey	15.3

Wine (thousand hl) - 2013

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Romania	669
2.	Bulgaria	247

Swine (thousand heads)[17] - 2013

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	17. 500

[15] http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-capacity/countrystathome/methodology/en/, accessed 08.10.2016
[16] https://www.statista.com/statistics/264662/top-producers-of-fresh-vegetables-worldwide/, accessed 08.10.2016
[17] http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4691e.pdf, accessed 09.10.2016

2.	Ukraine	9. 700

Sheep (thousand heads) - 2013

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	17.300

Horses (thousand heads) - 2013

Nr.crt.	Country	Cantitate
1.	Russian Federation	2. 200
2.	Romania	820

Tobacco (thousand mt) - 2014

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Turkey	90
2.	Bulgaria	52

Rock oil (million tons) - 2014[18]

Nr.crt.	Țara	Cantitate
1.	Federația Rusă	534,1
2.	România	4.0

Coal (million tons) - 2014

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Fderation	357,6
2.	Turkey	70,6
3.	Ukraine	60,9
4..	Bulgaria	31,3
5.	Romania	23,6

Natural gases (million tons) - 2014

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	520,9
2.	Ukraine	16,7
3.	Romania	10,3

Cement (million tons) - 2014[19]

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Turkey	75
2.	Russian Federation	69

Synthetic rubber (thousand tons)[20]

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	1.138

Aluminium (million tons) - 2014[21]

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	3,5

Steel (million tons) - 2014[22]

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity
1.	Russian Federation	71,11
2.	Turkey	31,52
2.	Ukraine	22,93
4.	Romania	3,16

Electricity (Terawatt/h) - 2014

Nr.crt.	Country	Quantity

[18] http://www.bp.com/statistical Review, accessed 09.10.2016
[19] http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/cement/, accessed 09.10.2016
[20] https://www.statista.com/statistics/275405/synthetic-rubber-production-in-leading-countries/, accessed 09.10.2016
[21] http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/worldStatistics.html, accessed 09.10.2016
[22] http://www.worldsteel.org/, accessed 09.10.2016

1.	Russian Federation	1064,1
2.	Turkey	250,4
3.	Ukraine	181,9
4.	Romania	63,3

4. CONCLUSIONS

1.In the Black Sea, once with the development of the riverain countries, the maritime trafic increased, the trading fleets have increased in number and quality.

2.The combined influence of the meteo-climatical factors with negative influence over navigation and maritime transportation in the Black Sea is not bigger than 10-12% of the period of a year, thus, the Black Sea basin is auspicios for these activities.

3.The complex analisys for the period 1990-2014 of the physico-geographical potential, demographic and economical of the countries in the Black Sea basin, with direct implications in the maritime transportations, show the following:

1. *The trend of increasing evolution* in the last three years of the economy and maritime transportation of the Black Sea riverain countries;
2. *The customization of trading routes* in the Black Sea depending on the type of transported goods, the loading and destination ports;
3. *The conduct of some modernization programs of the ports in the Black Sea* noteworthy the modernization of Constanţa port – the biggest port in the Black Sea;
4. *The development of the Free Zones* at the Roumanian shore and other riverain areas;
5. *The increase of the maritime transportations lucrativeness* on the transport routes in the Black Sea by modern ways and means (containerization, modern multifunctional ships, specialized terminals, the intraharbour economy development etc.).

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EVOLUTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE VATICAN

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Abstract: Since before the Great Schism, the Vatican played an important role, not only within the "movement", but also in international relations. Today, the Pope – the head of the Catholic Church and papal state – is the spiritual leader of a community which has over two billion souls worldwide. The European Union a political-legal and socio-economic structure emerged in the middle of the twentieth century, with a current population of over 700 million inhabitants, of which more than half are under the "hearing" the Catholic community leader. Given these considerations and putting it into the public law terms, we can state that relations are rather inter-institutional relations. It is important to see how the relations between the European Union and the Papal States have evolved during the nearly seven decades of existence of the European Union, but also the way the Catholic religious thesis influenced the philosophy of the European political construction.

After the Second World War we can observe, with impetuosity, a nodal characteristic of the Christian Democracy, i.e. the commitment to "promoting a policy of peace". Keeping the proportions, we can say that the Roman Catholic Church has been represented – at least spiritually – since the early beginnings of establishing the European Community, as the "founding fathers" of thereof were mostly Christian Democrats, some of them even practicing Catholics.

Keywords: European Union, Vatican, Pope, Christianity, Catholic Church.

The legal status of Vatican

From the legal point of view, the Vatican is a subject of international law, but a totally atypical one as it meets only a few of the elements of statehood. While it may conclude international treaties and is a member or has an observer status in various international organizations, the Vatican is not a perfect state, whereas its form of statehood is not a complete one. Even if it exercises sovereign jurisdiction over its territory and has administrative governance in religious matters, public services remain in the exercise of the Italian Republic.

Through the Lateran Pacts of 1929, Italy recognized the exclusive and sovereign property of Vatican over 44 ha of territory of Rome, its inviolability, as well as the right to diplomatic representation, and then, in 1984, the two countries recognized their independence and sovereignty towards each other. [1]

Regarding the role that the Holy See plays in international relations, the Lateran Treaty provides in Article 24 that the Vatican establishes its position of neutrality and distance from

[1] Adrian Năstase, Bogdan Aurescu, *Public International Law: syntheses*, 7th Edition, C.H.Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 136.

temporal competitions between states and within international congresses convened with such a purpose, except when the opposing parties simultaneously call its mission of peace, but it reserves its right to put forward its moral and spiritual power.

Christian democracy in the construction of Europe

Konrad Adenauer, one of the founders of the "United Europe" concept, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and Jean Monnet are some of the voices that gave a Christian democratic character to the initial stages of integration. Robert Schuman, whose name is linked to an intense activity within Catholic organizations[2], managed to maintain the confessional regimen and the school system in Alsace and fought for getting an enhanced role of the Church within the French society, as well as for social justice[3]. Besides, of the founding fathers, Alcide de Gasperi, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer (who said that "my goal is to dream that, one day, we could applaud the United States of Europe" [4]) were the Christian Democrats and Jean Monnet had received a Catholic education. Therefore, it said that the Community of Europe of the 1950s and 1960s owed the most to Christian democracy and its ideas of transnational cooperation.

If we were to make a plea for the Christian-democratic doctrine, the arguments are multiple. From the literature, we learn that Christian democracy is the ideology to which the European People's Party (EPP) and also the pivot of European construction, based on the rationale that it is the heir of the European Regional branch of the Christian Democratic Internationale, which has currently become the Christian Democratic Internationale[5].

The EPP is the political force with the most representatives in the European Parliament, rooted in ideologies brought by the parents of European construction. Over time, Christian Democracy was reported in two political lines of development, namely the social-Christianity, which designates "the confessional line" of Christian democracy, and the "secular" Christian democracy, which is autonomous in relation to the Church, but based on its principles[6].

Diplomatic relations of the Vatican with EU

In 1970, the Holy See delegated a papal Nuncio (who is also the dean of the diplomatic corps) in Brussels, to represent its interests within the European Community but who also represents the Holy See in the relations with Belgium. Only after 26 years, in 1996, a separation was made, the Holy See being represented by different nuncios, both within the European Community and in Belgium, with substantially different activities[7]. Since 1980, the Roman Catholic bishops of Europe are represented in Brussels, forming the *Commission of the Bishops Conferences of the European Community*)[8]. This Commission is currently in function, with the presidency ensured by a bishop and the General Secretariat from Brussels is led by a priest. The

[2] *********Encyclopedia of the European Union*, Desmond Dinan (ed.), p. 415.
[3] https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Schuman, accessed on 20.09.2016.
[4] Paul Magnette, *Political Europe*, Iași, 2003, p. 11.
[5] Victor Ionescu, *European Christian democracy and Romanian Christian democracy*, Lumen Publishing House, Iași, 2006, pp. 27-29.
[6] Florin Șomlea, *People's Parties in the European Union*, Cartimpex Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2007, pp. 12-13.
[7] Ibidem, p. 139.
[8] http://www.comece.eu/site/en/whoweare/ourhistory, accessed on 20.09.2016.

Brussels office is well structured, covering areas as diverse as: Legal and Institutional Affairs, fundamental rights, research and bioethics, migration and asylum, economic and social policy, sustainable development. The Roman Catholic Church is also represented in Brussels by Catholic NGOs, which cover a considerable number of areas, such as, for example, *Caritas Europa*.

The first head of the EU delegation in Rome, Luis Ritto, was accredited to the Holy See on the 24th of June, 2006, following approval by Member States of the European Union on the 4th of April, 2006. It is important to mention the visit paid by the European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, to Pope Benedict XVI on the 5th of May 2006, a visit that paved the way for this accreditation and showed the interest and commitment of the EC President to establishing full diplomatic relations between the European Union and the Holy See. At this meeting, José Manuel Barroso – a Catholic Portuguese – said that "many of the founding fathers of Europe were Catholics, and today, despite the fact that the institutions are secular, we have a duty to recognize the contribution that Christianity has always had to the European idea."[9]

Earlier, in 2005, Pope John Paul II designated Archbishop André Dupuy as nuncio in the European Communities. This function has grown in importance due to the integration process conducted by the European Union. Cardinal Angelo Sodano, secretary of state, on the 4th of February, when he received the visit of Josep Borrell Fontelles, President of the European Parliament, highlighted "the importance of the apostolic nunciature accredited to the European Union, to foster a fruitful dialogue on the major issues of the moment"[10].

In 2007 and 2009, Commissioner Figel visited the Vatican, and in 2009 was visited by Commissioner Rehn. Moreover, in 2007, President of European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, was received by Pope Benedict XVI in a private audience. Following that meeting, Pope Benedict XVI was invited to speak before the plenary of the European Parliament. The next visit to the Vatican was made by the successor of Hans-Gert Pöttering, Jerzy Buzek, in February 2011. At his installation, Pope Francis received the visit of European Council President, Van Rompuy, European Commission President, Barroso, and European Parliament President, Martin Schulz[11]. The latest visit has been paid by President Barroso in 2013, when he had a private meeting with Pope Francis, the dominant themes of the discussion being: *the European integration, economic crisis and promoting religious freedom*. In the statement to the press office of the Holy See, it was written: "The cordial discussions provided an opportunity of a useful exchange of views on the international situation, with particular attention to the European integration process and economic crisis that continues and has serious consequences over the job market, especially for young people, and a negative impact on family life. Further discussions were focused on *the positive contribution that the Catholic Church could make in the current context, for the material and spiritual welfare of Europe*. Finally, a particular attention was paid to promoting human rights, especially religious freedom, and the protection of Christian minorities worldwide"[12].

On the 6th of February 2012, Ambassador Laurence Argimon-Pistre presented his credentials to Pope Benedict XVI as the new Head of the EU Delegation to the Holy See. In June

[9] http://www.catholica.ro/2006/05/06/presedintele-comisiei-europene-s-a-intalnit-cu-papa/, accessed on 20.09.2016.
[10] Ibidem.
[11] Petr Kratochvíl, Tomáš Doležal, *The European Union and the Catholic Church*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 44.
[12]http://www.catholica.ro/2013/06/16/papa-francisc-l-a-primit-pe-presedintele-comisiei-uniunii-europene/, accessed on 20.09.2016.

2012, Pope Benedict XVI designated Archbishop Alain Paul Lebeaupin as apostolic nuncio to the European Union, the French prelate succeeding Archbishop Andre Dupuy.

On the 25th of November 2014, following the invitation made on the 11th of October 2013, Pope Francis made a speech in the European Parliament[13], where he underlined the connection between the Catholic Church and the EU: "I want to renew the willingness of the Holy See and the Catholic Church, through the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community (COMECE), to maintain a fruitful, open and transparent dialogue with the EU institutions. I am also convinced that a Europe able to cherish their own religious roots, knowing how to perceive the richness and their potentialities can be even more easily immune to many forms of extremism that permeates the world today and the great ideal gap at which we witness in the so-called West, because forgetting God, and not His glorification, generates violence". Emigration, environmental protection, promotion of human rights and democracy were the issues highlighted in a speech that urged Europe "to rediscover its best parts."

Also, President Martin Schulz stressed the "common objectives" of EU and the Catholic Church to promote "the values of tolerance, respect, equality, solidarity and peace," adding that "the European Union means rather inclusion and cooperation than exclusion and confrontation"[14].

Topics addressed in diplomatic relations

The institutional presence of the Roman Catholic Church, like other Churches, in Brussels is closely linked to the evolution of the European construction. Thus, the prospect of achieving a major European markets, political union by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), and the extension to new Member States by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) made possible the European construction for Churches. The final Act of Amsterdam Treaty contains the *Annex Statement no. 11* on the Status of Churches, which states: "The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status that churches, religious associations or communities in the Member States have by virtue of national law".[15] Likewise, the White Paper on the European Governance recognized the role and the specific contribution of churches and religious communities to civil society. This attitude was taken, by the Lisbon Treaty, in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where art. 17 states that "The Union respects and does not prejudice the status of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States under national law[16]".

In this context, the Churches in Europe were actively involved in discussions on the reform of the European treaties. Between 2002 and 2003, the Roman Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church and some Protestant communities took positions in this regard, with their presence and work showing that they can work together effectively to build a united Europe. The ecumenical witness of such an effort is obvious, since this is primarily about values which these churches consider being fundamental for a strong European construction and would be indispensable in a new treaty. The relations between the Holy See and the EU develop in the context of modern,

[13] This is the first visit of a sovereign pontiff to Romanian Parliament, after that of Pope John Paul II, who addressed the Parliament in 1988, a year before the fall of Berlin Wall.
[14] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/, accessed on 20.09.2016.
[15] Jurnalul Oficial, *C 340, din 10/11/1997* – http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, accessed on 20.09.2016.
[16] Ibidem.

secularized and rising Europe. With the threat of communism, the church came to perceive social liberalism and individual rights as the biggest threat to their beliefs about world peace, family, sexuality and reproduction. In this situation, the Vatican and its conservative allies correlate social liberalism with the "eurosecularism" – a growing indifference to religion and hostility towards institutional authority of the Church.

European Constitution – Christian elements?

With the imminent accession, in May 2004, of ten countries joining the EU, the Union decided that its institutions to be reformed. Improving decision-making mechanism and efficient functioning of the Union were continuous processes and in those moments when the European Union is in full process of enlargement, this was all the more necessary. Therefore, the issue of creating a European Conventions was raised as the Union member states that concluded that the previous system was not working properly and that the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice did not achieved the expected results. The *Convention on the Future of Europe*, known as the European Convention, was tasked with drafting a new Constitution, which will define the rules for political life in the EU, once it includes 25 Member States or more. A total of 105 delegates, representing the European Commission, the European Parliament, the governments and parliaments of the 25 countries concerned, and nine observers from civil society took part in the convention.

For the Vatican, this was an opportunity to support their point of view. Pope John Paul II and received Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, President of the Convention, Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament, Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Joshua Fischer, German Vice Chancellor and others in private audience. He also called on all Member States ambassadors who were accredited to the Holy See to a meeting to inform them about his desire to have certain items included in the European Constitution.

Focal points were:

Recognizing the "institutional dimension" of religious freedom. The Vatican argued that full religious freedom has three dimensions: individual, i.e. the right to choose a single system of belief; the collective dimension or the right to associate with others in order to live up the precepts of one's faith; the institutional dimension, which means constitutional recognition of religious communities as political players in their own right, but in a specific form, different from other players of civil society. As common associations of civil society are usually interest groups formed to defend a cause or a small group of activities, the religious dimension includes the whole range of human concerns and provides connection to the church in almost all aspects.

Recognizing the right of the church to self-determination, thus giving the church the right to organize and manage as a community of faith, in accordance with its own rules.

Structured dialogue institution, which assigns a specific consultative status with to the church. By doing this, they wanted the Catholic Church to be consulted in the run up to drafting legislation on a large range of issues where the church is considered capable of expertise.

Mentioning God and Europe's Christian roots in the Constitution. European Commission President, Romano Prodi, supported in 2003 the initiatives of those who considered that the future European Constitution cannot exclude cultural and religious traditions, especially the Christian one, which led to the formation of the European continent: "In the process of building the new Europe, nothing can be left out or slighted or even excluded – Romano Prodi stated – the cultural and

religious traditions cannot be disregarded, especially the Christian one, which was and still is indispensable for defining the past and the hope of future Europe"[17].

In January 2004, Pope John Paul II insisted that the future Constitution of the European Union to recognize explicitly the Christian roots of the old continent and urged the Italian Government to do everything possible to achieve this goal. The Sovereign Pontiff expressed this request on the occasion of presentation of credentials of the Ambassador of Italy, Giuseppe Balboni Acqua, to the Holy See. Recalling that the Christian religion is part of "the historical patrimony of the Italian people", the Holy Father asked Italy to do everything possible in order that "Europe, in the relevant bodies, to recognize their Christian roots." These roots, he explained, "are able to provide the citizens of the continent with an identity that is not ephemeral or not rely only on political and economic interests, but on the deep values that are not transient"[18].

Failing to refer the Christian roots of the continent made Pope John Paul II to publicly express his disappointment with the Constitution, supported by the EU leaders: "We cannot be separated from our roots." Also, the Vatican's spokesman, Joaquín Navarro Valls, issued a statement recalling that "the Holy See cannot but express sorrow for the opposition of some governments to the explicit recognition of the Christian roots of Europe. It is a problem of non-observance of historical evidence and the Christian identity of European peoples."[19]

Conclusions

Pope Paul VI was wondering, in a speech to ambassadors accredited to the Vatican, if the Holy See should frequently use the means of diplomacy, as long as the mission of the Catholic Church is essentially a religious one and whether it would be better that it does not interfere in the affairs of international organizations that have strictly a temporal power. The question, of course a rhetoric one, finds its answer not only in art 24 of the Lateran Treaty, but also in the conduct that the Vatican had over time. Although it is considered a microstate, due to its very small territory, the role of the Vatican in the contemporary diplomacy is huge and indispensable to human progress and world peace, as, in fact, history has already shown.

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[19] Ibidem.

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THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

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Abstract: Since 2003 the European Union, in the first phase, and the P5+1 group (comprising US, UK, France, China and Russia plus Germany), in the second phase, have constantly tried to reach a comprehensive and long-term arrangement with the authorities in Tehran regarding the nuclear programme. The last in a long road of agreements has been signed in January 2016 by Iran and the P5+1 group, and it leads to the lifting of the crippling economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the international community. While the members of the P5+1 group prefer to stress that the deal will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, Iran underlines that it has the right to a peaceful nuclear programme for energy purposes. In these circumstances, it remains to be seen whether this is the long-term comprehensive arrangement that the entire international community was waiting for and how easy its implementation shall prove.

Keywords: Iran, nuclear programme, sanctions, EU, United Nations

1. The Iranian nuclear programme - a chronology

Iran made the first steps towards developing an indigenous nuclear programme in the 1970s, with the support and assistance offered by Western states. The theocratic revolution in Iran in 1979 brought a new leader but also a new vision on the future of the country, a vision in which nuclear arms were considered to be immoral and contrary to the basic norms and values of Islam. In the middle of the 1980s this vision changed and the nuclear programme was revived and continued with small experiments, procurements of technology and nuclear material from different sources.

All these evolutions came to surface in 2002, when the international community was warned by a rebel organization in exile about the existence of an Iranian secret nuclear programme that included two nuclear facilities: one in Natanz for enrichment and one in Arak for heavy water production. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) started its own investigations which revealed that Iran developed the capacity to enrich uranium and produce plutonium.

There are numerous motivations that determined Iran to start developing a national nuclear programme. The first of these is the right of any state to develop a nuclear peaceful programme, because as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty states in article IV: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty"[1]. To these legal stipulations, we add the support of the population and of the entire Iranian leading class for developing and maintaining a nuclear programme despite the opposition of the international community.

[1] United Nations, *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 1970.

A second motivation is related to the energy needs of Iran and the desire to ensure energy for future generations through the diversification of energy sources. The statistical data reveal that natural resources represent indeed an asset of the Iranian state, including the third world's largest oil reserve (around 10%) and the world's second largest natural gas reserve (around 15%)[2], but it is not the only state rich in natural resources that would use nuclear energy for producing electricity.

These pragmatic motivations are supplemented by national pride and prestige of the Iranian state, as the nuclear programme is considered "a matter of honor, a sign of progress and a symbol of the scientific evolutions"[3]. In this context, nuclear arms do not represent an end but also a mean for attaining other foreign policy objectives on the international arena and becoming the hegemonic power of the region, but also for ensuring the support of the population at the national level and the survival of the Islamic regime.

To all of these motivations, we add the moment of opportunity, having in mind the international context. The beginning of the new millennium was considered by the Iranian leaders as being a favourable moment to start a nuclear programme. The international community was well too preoccupied with Iraq and hesitant to accuse any state of having nuclear arms before a thorough international investigation took place. This moment of opportunity was seized by Iran in order to develop a nuclear programme which would contribute heavily to ensuring the national state security in its unstable and conflicting regional.

In the first comprehensive report issued by the IAEA in June 2003, Iran was accused of failing to respect its obligations from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by not reporting the construction of the nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, not declaring the import of uranium in 1991 and for denying the access of the nuclear inspectors to the Kalaye Electric Company[4]. By August 2003, when the IAEA issued its next report on Iran, the Agency's inspectors have already made new discoveries on the evolution of the Iranian nuclear programme consisting in the presence at the nuclear facility in Natanz of highly enrich uranium, the testing of the first centrifuges at the pilot plant in Natanz and proofs on the existence of an uranium enrichment programme since 1980s for which it benefitted from external support[5].

Since these first discoveries, more than ten years have passed and the most significant evolutions in the Iranian nuclear programme can be summarized as being: the continuous production of P2 type centrifuges, finalization of the nuclear plant in Busher in 2004, enrichment of uranium up to 5% and the testing of new centrifuges in 2006, the inauguration in August 2006 of the first heavy water plant at Arak, the start in 2007 of the construction of a new enrichment facility near Qom announced only in 2009, the start of uranium enrichment up to 20% in 2010, the start in 2011 of uranium enrichment up to 20% at the nuclear plant in Qom, in 2013 start of the activities at two uranium mines and a plant for processing uranium, continuous works at the military complex in

[2] William R. Polk, *Understanding Iran*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, p. 154.
[3] Herve de Carmoy, „Iran Case Study: Is There a ‚Plan B'for Iran?", in *Nuclear Proliferation. Risk and Responsibility*, p. 32.
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[5] International Atomic Energy Agency, *Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, GOV/2003/63, Vienna, 26 August 2003, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf, accessed on September 20, 2016.

Parchin suspected to cover illegal nuclear activities. By the end of 2015, "Iran could theoretically produce enough weapon-grade uranium to fuel a single nuclear warhead in less than 2 months"[6] using the 9000 first generation centrifuges operating at Natanz fuel enrichment plant.

2. Efforts of the international community to stop the Iranian nuclear programme

The European Union (EU) through the UE3 group formed out of Germany, Great Britain and France was the first organization that acted as a negotiator between Iran and the international community with the aim of solving the Iranian nuclear file. Already in June 2003, the EU asked Iran to answer all questions addressed by the IAEA and to urgently conclude an Additional Protocol, steps that were considered to be essential in order to prove that the Iranian nuclear programme is indeed a civilian one.

The first agreement to be concluded in October 2003 between Iran and the EU3 group has been the Tehran Declaration. Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol with the IAEA and to suspend its enrichment activities, while the EU states promised in exchange to offer better access to technology and ensured supplies in a number of fields[7]. The signing of the protocol meant that the IAEA inspectors would benefit from extensive rights and access to all suspected Iranian nuclear facilities.

After intense negotiations between the EU3 group and Iran, at the end of 2004 a new agreement entitled the Paris agreement was concluded with the support of the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana. The agreement stipulated that Iran shall extend the suspension to include all enrichment and reprocessing activities, including the production, testing and assembly of centrifuges, any activities related to plutonium separation and all tests and production activities at the conversion uranium installations. The European states agreed to restart the negotiations with Iran for signing a Commercial and Cooperation Agreement and to offer clear security arrangement to Iran.

Despite the numerous meetings, discussions and negotiations that took place in 2005, the two parts could not sign a new agreement, due to the lack of confidence between the two parts and the absence of a real wish to get to a compromise. Iran decided in August 2005 to restart the activities at the conversion facility in Isfahan, a move which determined the international community to accuse Iran of failing to respect the provisions of the NPT Treaty. In order to avoid for the case to be deferred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Russia came with a new agreement proposal which was rejected by Iran on the reason that it was too immature and incomplete.

This rejection together with Iran's decision to restart the enrichment activities determined the IAEA to send the file for analysis to the UNSC. With this step it starts a new period in the evolution of the reaction of the international community to the Iranian nuclear programme, a period dominated by multilateral as well as unilateral sanctions. As a consequence, on July 31, 2006 the

[6] Iran Watch, *Iran's Nuclear Potential before the Implementation of the Nuclear Agreement*, November 2015, http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable, accessed on March 15, 2016.
[7] *Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers*, Tehran: 21 October 2003. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml, accessed on August 25, 2016.

first resolution on Iran is adopted by the Council. Although Iran was not sanctioned by the international community, this resolution expressly requested the suspension of all uranium enrichment activity as of August 31, 2006.

This first resolution was followed by a second one in December 2006. Despite the divergences within the P5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany), with the United States and Great Britain opting for harder sanctions, on one side, and with France, Germany, Russia and China preferring in the beginning to adopt milder sanctions, on the other side, they reached in the end an agreement foreseeing the adoption of multilateral sanctions.

Up to now the international community adopted four more resolutions which either reiterate the existing sanctions or completed them. The sanctions adopted through these resolutions can be resumed as being: a ban on the transfer to Iran of dual use nuclear and ballistic goods and equipments, with the exception of light water reactors; a ban on the exports consisting in arms and technology useful for developing weapons of mass destruction; a ban on the investments in the uranium mining industry, nuclear technology; a freeze on the assets of individuals and entities suspected of being involved in nuclear activities.

However, the sanctions against Iran were not only weak but they also cover a range of areas of little importance for Iran, a state of fact which cannot but prove the lack of unity of the great powers in adopting harder sanctions. Apart from these sanctions, some members of the international community decided to impose tougher unilateral sanctions on Iran. For example, the European Union imposed an oil and gas embargo starting with 2012. In the meantime the EU, supported from 2006 also by the international community under the formula P5+1, did not lose its faith in negotiations. Proposals for agreement have continued to be presented to Iran every year starting with 2006 but without any notable success.

The election of Hassan Rouhani in June 2013 as president of Iran brought significant changes in the evolution of the nuclear programme and in the negotiations process. The new president pleaded for a policy of reciprocal detente with the Western states. In this new atmosphere the negotiations between Iran and the international community continued and leaded to the conclusion on November 2013 of an interim agreement entitled the Common Action Plan. The text of the agreement reveals that it represents an interim solution until the adoption of a comprehensive long-term solution between the parts, a comprehensive solution which will have at its basis a process of step by step reciprocal concessions[8].

The plan stipulates expressly the voluntary measures that shall be undertaken by Iran and the big powers in this transition period and the principles that shall stay at the basis of adopting a long-term comprehensive agreement. While Iran agreed to restrict its nuclear activities and cooperate intensely with the IAEA, the permanent members of the UNSC and Germany shall partially eliminate the sanctions applied to Iran and abstain from adopting further multilateral and unilateral sanctions.

It is sufficient to mention that while the United States of America declared that this is only a first step for concluding a comprehensive agreement which shall decide the faith of the nuclear

[8] European External Action Service, *Joint Plan of Action*, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf, accessed on August 26, 2016.

programme, Iran preferred to underline that once this agreement is signed the right of Iran to enrich uranium is recognized. Despite these different views, the agreement represented a novelty having in mind that for almost a decade, since the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2004, the parts could not get to a compromise.

3. The new deal with Iran: long-term comprehensive agreement?

The Common Action Plan was initially concluded for six months, period in which the parts should negotiate a long-term comprehensive agreement. Negotiators from the P5+1 and Iran announced on July 14, 2015, after 20 months of negotiations, that a comprehensive agreement aimed at limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities had been reached, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Under the agreement, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. For the next 15 years, Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67%. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities for the same period of time. Uranium-enrichment activities will be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges for 10 years. Other facilities will be converted to avoid proliferation risks. To monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities. The agreement provides that in return for verifiably abiding by its commitments, Iran will receive relief from U.S., European Union, and United Nations Security Council nuclear-related sanctions[9].

There are several reasons why Iran would sign this agreement considered to be historical, and most of these reasons are related to Iran's economy. According to the Economist, Iran is a regional power with an industrial economy and lots of educated people and the mismanagement of the former president combined with the effects of the unilateral and multilateral sanctions have severely affected the country's economy. Iran is in much need for economic investments, especially in the gas and oil industry[10].

On the other side, many have wondered why the U.S. and the other world powers would sign this agreement. The first and most obvious reason is that this agreement shall prevent a military conflict in a regions which is already in strife for decades. Moreover, no one has identified yet a better solution to solve the Iranian nuclear issue compared to agreements. The international community has indeed used sanctions, unilateral and well as multilateral, but they have not proved to be successful in determining Iran to limit its nuclear programme. Secondly, and related to the first reason, the agreement shall lead to cooperation between the international community and Iran. In a region so affected by conflicts and wars, the international community and the U.S. need to find partners open for cooperation, while Iran is known for its desire to become the region's hegemonic power.

[9] Politico, *Full text of the Iran deal*. http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/full-text-iran-deal-120080, 2015, accessed on September 3, 2016.
[10] The Economist, *Iran's nuclear deal becomes a reality*, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/graphics-iran-sanctions-and-nuclear-deal, accessed on August 28, 2016.

Thirdly, this agreement shall guarantee that Iran's nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful and guarantees the access of the international inspectors to Iran's nuclear sites, which means in practice that any possible diversion could be detected in time. Fourthly, the economic sanctions imposed on Iran had considerable effects not only on the Iranian economy but also on the world's economy. Thus, the agreement shall allow investments to be made in Iran and shall contribute to improving the global economic environment.

The agreement has its critics, not few, on both parts. The Iranian critics of the deal prefer to underline that the leaders have made many concessions to the Western states and that the attitude of the Western states has not softened as a consequence of the deal. The Western critics of the deal prefer to underline that the deal represents a legal cover for Iran to continue its nuclear quest, and will prevent the international community to know precisely when Iran possesses nuclear weapons unless it tests them, that the most important commitment that Iran shall not seek to develop nuclear weapons is placed in the preamble of the treaty, and that Iran will not take political commitments too serious[11]. Even more worrying for some critics is that Western states, including Germany, France and Switzerland, have rushed to lift the sanctions and to start commercial talks with Iran, indicating that the most important element of the deal was the economic one and not the nuclear one.

Despite these and other critics, on January 16, 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran has completed the necessary steps under the Iran deal that will ensure Iran's nuclear program is and remains exclusively peaceful. To be more specific, since October 2015 until January 2016, Iran has undertaken the following steps: shipped 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium out of the country, dismantled and removed two-thirds of its centrifuges, removed the calandria from its heavy water reactor and filled it with concrete, provided unprecedented access to its nuclear facilities and supply chain

Because Iran has completed these steps, the U.S. and international community can begin the next phase under the JCPOA, which means the U.S. will begin lifting its nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. However, a number of U.S. sanctions will continue to remain in place, such as sanctions on missile technology and conventional weapons, terrorist list sanctions .

The agreement does not stop here, as Iran has various obligations under the nuclear agreement: it must reduce its level of uranium enrichment, reduce the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium, reduce the number of centrifuges, and agree to free access for all types of international inspections. For those who are afraid that this deal it's all about economics, it is important to mention that not all nuclear sanctions will be lifted immediately, but rather in 10 years time. But for now, Iran Iran will be able to sell its oil again on world markets and its banks will be able to connect to the global system.

4. Conclusions

More than 10 years of negotiations, offers, rejections, discussions were needed for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to be signed in July 2015 by Iran and the P5+1 group representing

[11] D. Jonas, *Five reasons why the Iran Nuclear Deal is still a really bad idea*, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/five-reasons-why-the-iran-nuclear-deal-is-still-a-really-bad-idea/, accessed on August 3, 2016.

the international community. Is it a long-term comprehensive agreement? The length of the document and its implementations time framework supplemented by the number of concessions and commitments agreed by all parts indicate that this is indeed the case. Is it the best deal that the parties could agree on? The agreement is probably not perfect, as many critics prefer to underline, but it is the best deal that the parties could agree on at this moment and the only feasible solutions to a prolonged problem. Only time shall prove whether the international community has made the right decision when signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran.

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TRENDS OF ROMANIAN POPULATION: DECLINE, MIGRATION AND GENTRIFICATION

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Abstract: The paper provides an analytical perspective on the evolution of Romanian population, with special focus on what happened in the last quarter of century: firstly, it is analysed the main trends of the population in the last century, their evolution in interwar Romania and during the communist period. Secondly, the paper focus on the positive and negative effects of population structure changes on economic and social development, especially regarding its impact on some social phenomenon such as rural development, urbanization, educational level increase, industrialization, flows of capital and investments, etc. Thirdly, there are analysed changes that took place after 1989, looking to phenomenon as poverty, migration of the population (either to urban area, or to more economically developed European states) and on the general European and Romanian trend of gentrification of population, especially of rural population. On this particular point of the analysis we use a comparative approach between different regions of our country.
In conclusion, some demographic trends are similar with those from the European and other economically developed countries, but a few of them are regional trends that can be observed only in the Eastern part of the Europe (the former communist countries). The article concludes that it is extremely important to have a long-term strategy in order to change those negative trends that will affect our country's population in the future and will affect its incomes, education levels, health situation, pensions, etc.

Keywords: poverty, demographic trends, population decline, migration, gentrification

Introducere

Sociologul Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 2010) arăta că ritmurile de dezvoltare ale societății umane, pe parcursul istoriei de jumătate de milion de ani ai omenirii, au fost deosebit de lente: dezvoltarea agriculturii, premisă pentru trecerea la societățile sedentare a avut loc în urmă cu 10.000 de ani; primele civilizații umane urbane, bazate pe forme de organizare economică și politică mai complexe au avut loc acum aproximativ 6.000 de ani, etc. Astfel, utilizând o formă foarte plastică și sugestivă, sociologul britanic conchide că, dacă am lua dezvoltarea umană ca o zi, agricultura ar apărea la ora 23:56, iar civilizația umană la 23:57. Societățile moderne industriale în care trăim ar avea loc aproape de miezul nopții; aceasta înseamnă că dezvoltarea fără precedent a civilizației umane a avut loc într-un interval istoric extrem de scurt, iar ritmurile transformărilor tind să se accelereze. Timpul și spațiul s-

au comprimat, societatea umană devenind una globală, cu efecte pozitive, dar și cu multe consecințe negative.

O evoluție similară a avut loc și în cazul numărului populației: până în epoca modernă, populația globului a fost una relativ constantă și cu un număr redus de persoane (estimările situează populația globală în jurul a 200-300 de milioane de indivizi). Explozia demografică a avut loc în paralel cu revoluția industrială, începând cu anul 1800, moment din care populația globului a cunoscut o creștere constantă; astfel, conform datelor statistice existente la nivel mondial (United Nations, 2015), populația mondială ajunge la 1 miliard în 1804, 2 miliarde în 1927, 3 miliarde în 1960, 4 miliarde în 1974, 7 miliarde în anul 2015, proiecțiile pentru viitor fiind unele de creștere rapidă la 9,7 miliarde în 2050 și 11,2 miliarde în 2100.

Dacă este să luăm cazul României, integrarea în aceste tendințe ale sistemului mondial a avut loc cu o întârziere determinată de evoluția istorică anterioară și de dependența de Imperiul Otoman, până la începutul secolului al XIX-lea. O scurtă istorie a evoluției țării noastre pune în lumină atât momentele de progres, cât și cele de regres, petrecute în ultimii 200 de ani, precum și consecințele acestora asupra situației din prezent.

Evoluția populației României până la sfârșitul secolului al XX-lea

Analiza evoluțiilor demografice dintr-o țară, la un anumit moment istoric, permite cercetătorului să identifice cauzele unor fenomene și procese sociale ce altfel nu ar putea fi explicate sau ar fi explicate nesatisfăcător: creșterea bruscă a populației poate însemna foamete, dar și dezvoltarea resursei umane necesare pe piața forței de muncă. Relația directă dintre populație și dezvoltarea economică a devenit atât de evidentă încât, în toate statele dezvoltate asistăm, din secolul al XIX-lea, la o preocupare constantă pentru analiza periodică a evoluțiilor populației statului respectiv (sub forma unor recensăminte periodice ale populației) și corelarea acestora cu evoluțiile din plan economic, social sau politic. Și din acest punct de vedere România este întârziată, primul recensământ al populației având loc abia în anul 1930, cu o întârziere de un secol față de statele europene dezvoltate.

Integrarea României în circuitul economic european, conform prevederilor Tratatului de la Adrianopol, ce a liberalizat exportul produselor agricole românești spre vestul Europei (cu predilecție în Anglia), a determinat o creștere rapidă a populației în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea (Bărbulescu et al., 1998, 362); populația acestora a crescut cu aproximativ 25%, ajungând, în 1859, la 1.463.927 locuitori în Moldova (comparativ cu 1.115.325 în anul 1826), iar în Țara Românească la 2.400.000 în 1860, față de 1.920.590 locuitori în 1831. Conform autorilor citați, creșterea s-a datorat mai multor cauze, putând fi enumerate: lipsa unor conflicte militare pe teritoriul celor două provincii, îmbunătățirea situației de sănătate și igienă a populației, creșterii speranței de viață, migrației de populație dinspre alte țări din regiune spre țara noastră (cea mai importantă ca efect economic și social fiind cea a evreilor, mai ales din zona Galiției, din Imperiul Habsburgic). Consecința negativă a creșterii populației, în lipsa dezvoltării sectorului industrial după modelul statelor vest-

europene, a fost o presiune suplimentară asupra economiei agrare românești; terenurile disponibile pentru atragerea în circuitul agricol au devenit mai puține, în condițiile în care cererea internă și externă de produse agricole erau în creștere, toate acestea determinând, paradoxal, o scădere a nivelului de trai al populației rurale.

Populația Vechiului Regat a continuat să crească și în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, ajungând în anul 1899 la aproape 6.000.000 locuitori, iar la nivelul anului 1912 la 7.904.104 locuitori, ceea ce însemna o dublare a populației pe un interval istoric de 50 de ani. Creșterea era uniform distribuită între mediul urban și rural, și, cu toate că orașele mari au crescut spectaculos, ele nu au putut devansa creșterea din mediul rural.

România a fost unul dintre statele ce au beneficiat semnificativ de pe urma Primului Război Mondial, atât în ceea ce privește mărimea teritoriilor alipite, precum și în ceea ce privește creșterea populației: teritoriul românesc devine al zecelea din Europa (în condițiile în care se ia în calcul și partea europeană a U.R.S.S.), iar populația ocupa poziția a opta la nivelul continentului. În baza *Recensământului general al populației din 29 decembrie 1930*, populația României număra 18.052.896 locuitori, pe o suprafață de 295.049 km^2, cu o densitate medie a populației de 61,2 locuitori pe km^2, ceea ce situa țara noastră pe un loc fruntaș, cu mult peste media europeană, situată, în anul 1930, la 44,3 locuitori pe km^2 (Madgearu, 1940, 25-26). Același autor arăta că această densitate mare a populației situa România, la acel moment, între primele 20 de state de pe glob, în timp ce, în rândul statelor danubiene, ne situam pe poziția a doua, după Ungaria (ce avea o densitate a populației de 93,4 locuitori pe km^2).

Ceea ce este evident pentru analiștii societății românești interbelice este faptul că țara noastră a avut un excedent important de populație, în mod special în mediul rural. Analiza densității populației relevă faptul că, în timp ce în statele dezvoltate din vestul continentului populația era concentrată în mediul urban, densitatea populației din mediul rural fiind una redusă, în zona centrală și răsăriteană a continentului avem de-a face cu o densitate mare a populației în mediul rural. Suprapopularea mediului rural este cea care determină o serie de consecințe negative în plan economic, social și politic: caracter extensiv al agriculturii, fărâmițarea suprafețelor de teren, recolte slabe, utilizarea ineficientă a timpului de lucru al populației rurale, sărăcie, nivel redus de educație, etc., fenomene ale căror consecințe se fac simțite și în prezent.

Creșterea populației a fost, deci, una dintre caracteristicile demografice ale perioadei de o sută de ani de la înființarea statului român, populația României ajungând, în preajma Primului Război Mondial (1940) la 20 de milioane de locuitori, cu 4,5 milioane mai mult decât în 1920. Conform previziunilor specialiștilor din epocă (Madgearu, 1940, 51-52) creșterea populației era una de lungă durată: predicțiile arătau că populația României va depăși 23 de milioane de locuitori în anul 1960. Evoluția ascendentă a fost întreruptă de izbucnirea celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial și de instaurarea regimului comunist, astfel încât populația României a rămas constantă în jurul a 20 de milioane de locuitori.

O a doua caracteristică a populației României în perioada istorică pe care am analizat-o era aceea că avea un procent ridicat al populației active și tinere (70% din populația activă

se situa în intervalul de vârstă 15-39 de ani). Această structură a populației a rămas relativ constantă și în perioada comunistă, ce a început în deceniul al șaptelea o politică de creștere a natalității în condițiile industrializării și urbanizării forțate. Politicile demografice au făcut ca populația României să depășească 23 milioane de locuitori, având în continuare un procent ridicat al populației tinere. Această structură a populației a început să sufere modificări profunde după anul 1989, atunci când au apărut trenduri demografice noi, determinate de evoluțiile prin care a trecut România în plan economic și social.

Reducerea populației după 1989 și efectele sale sociale

Una dintre diferențierile ce trebuie introduse atunci când vorbim de populația unui stat este aceea între populația legală (formată din toți locuitorii ce au domiciliul legal și sunt cetățeni într-un anumit stat) și populația rezidentă (populația ce locuiește în mod curent în statul respectiv). În cazul României de după 1989, populația stabilă (legală), așa cum apare aceasta de la nivelul datelor statistice ale Institutului Național de Statistică, a scăzut de la 23.211.395 persoane la 1 ianuarie 1990 la 19.759.968 la 1 ianuarie 2016. Diferența între cele două cifre (de aproape 3,5 milioane de locuitori) pune în evidență ce s-a întâmplat în cei 25 de ani ce au trecut din 1989 cu populația acestei țări: o parte semnificativă a reducerii populației este rezultatul, așa cum vom vedea în continuare, sporului natural negativ ce a marcat evoluția populației în intervalul istoric la care facem referire; a doua cauză semnificativă a reducerii populației se găsește în migrația unei părți a populației pentru a munci în alte state europene, deși numărul acestor persoane este mult mai greu de estimat; această migrație face ca populația rezidentă să fie mult mai mică. Chiar dacă această situație nu creează probleme economice la acest moment, creșterea economică a României va determina o nevoie suplimentară de forță de muncă, ceea ce va aduce în atenție aceste aspecte ale populației noastre.

Scăderea fertilității, cauze și consecințe

Scăderea fertilității, dar și alte fenomene sociale ce afectează populațiile contemporane (modificări la nivelul familiei, creșterea numărului de copii născuți în afara căsătoriei, apariția unor forme alternative la căsătorie, creșterea vârstei tinerilor ce se căsătoresc și a vârstei la care apare primul copil, etc.) sunt fenomene ce au afectat toate statele dezvoltate economic ale lumii, generând ceea ce a fost numit de unii politologi „marea ruptură” (Fukuyama, 2011), modificări profunde ce au marcat trecerea de la societățile industriale la cele post-industriale.

Așa cum se poate vedea în cifrele ce prezintă evoluția populației României, aceasta a suferit o scădere de aproximativ 14% față de 1990, ceea ce înseamnă o scăderea medie anuală de -0,64%. Scăderea populației în acest ritm constant a determinat pe numeroși demografi români să vorbească de o reducerea semnificativă a populației României, dacă acest trend

negativ se va menține pe termen mai lung: astfel, într-un studiu dedicat acestei tendințe, Traian Rotariu (Rotariu, 2015, p. 163) consideră că el va duce la înjumătățirea populației până la sfârșitul acestui secol, ceea ce ne-ar apropia de nivelurile populației existente la formarea statului român din 1859. Un alt demograf român important, prof. Vasile Gheţău, directorul Centrului de Cercetări Demografice al Academiei Române, prezintă de asemenea o viziune pesimistă în ceea ce privește viitorul populației până la mijlocul secolului al XXI-lea, preconizând o scădere la 16 milioane de locuitori a populației României.

Scăderea cea mai importantă ce determină reducerea pe termen lung a populației a avut loc în rata totală de fertilitate (RTF), ce măsoară numărul de copii pe care îi naște o femeie într-un an calendaristic. Din punctul de vedere al acestui indicator, pentru menținerea unei populații constante în cazul unei țări, este necesar un număr de 2-2,2 copii/femeie, astfel încât să se asigure viabilitatea pe termen lung a respectivei populații. În condițiile economice precare de la începutul secolului al XX-lea, RTF-ul în cazul României era situată undeva la 4 copii/femeie, dar acest indicator a ajuns la 1,9 copii/femeie la nivelul anilor șaizeci (Rotariu, 2015, p. 167). Cu toate politicile de susținere a natalității din perioada comunistă acest indicator s-a menținut în jurul a 2 copii/femeie, iar după 1990 a cunoscut o scădere dramatică, ajungând la 1,3 copii în 1995. În consecință, nivelul de înlocuire a generațiilor este unul foarte scăzut, determinând, pe lângă scăderea populației, îmbătrânirea acesteia. Conform datelor Eurostat, țara noastră se plasează în plutonul statelor cu fertilitate redusă de la nivelul Europei, alături de state ca Grecia, Spania, Ungaria, Polonia, Portugalia și Slovacia, etc.

Fenomenul scăderii numărului de copii din statele dezvoltate ale lumii, dar și din alte state în curs de dezvoltare, cum ar fi și cazul României, este asociat cu alte fenomene observabile în ceea ce se numește a doua tranziție demografică (creșterea vârstei căsătoriei, creșterea vârstei la care apare primul copil, folosirea pe scară largă a mijloacelor contraceptive, schimbarea rolului femeii pe piața forței de muncă, etc.).

Vârsta medie la care femeile din România au copii a crescut de la 26 de ani la peste 27,2 ani. În ceea ce privește primul fenomen, acesta este vizibil atunci când analizăm vârsta medie la care populația se căsătorește, vârstă care a cunoscut o creștere constantă, fiind aproape dublă în statele dezvoltate față de realitatea de acum un secol: astfel, în Italia, Franța și Germania aceasta se situează la 33-34 de ani pentru bărbați și 30-31 de ani pentru femei.

Un alt aspect al acestei schimbări este numărul copiilor născuți în afara căsătoriei: din acest punct de vedere Islanda este campioana Europei, cu 2/3 dintre copii aflați în această situație. Fenomenul este foarte răspândit în toate statele dezvoltate, explicațiile acestui fenomen variind de la rolul din ce în ce mai important la femeii pe piața muncii până la schimbări ale valorilor culturale legate de căsătorie. Explozia numărului de copii născuți în afara căsătoriei este considerată un semn al societăților moderne: în societățile tradiționale, bărbații susțineau economic familia, femeile fiind dependente de aceștia. Odată cu includerea femeilor pe piața muncii a avut loc creșterea nivelul de câștig al acestora, îmbunătățirea nivelului de educație și, în consecință, scăderea dependenței femeii de bărbat. În cazul țării noastre, numărul copiilor născuți în afara căsătoriei este situat undeva în jurul a 30%, dar acest procent nu reflectă, conform specialiștilor (Rotariu, 2015, p.172) un semn de

modernitate, ci unul de tradiționalism, în condițiile în care fenomenul afectează femeile cu un nivel redus de educație sau analfabete, cu vârsta scăzută, ce rămân însărcinate fără voia lor. Astfel, conform datelor prezentate de autorul menționat, procentele sunt mai ridicate în mediul rural și la nivelul anumitor etnii: peste 60% din femeile cu educație primară sau lipsite de educație, comparativ cu 17% în cazul absolventelor de liceu sau 7% în cazul celor ce au absolvit o școală post-liceală sau universitatea. Fenomenul afectează mai ales persoanele de etnie romă, procentul nașterilor copiilor în afara căsătoriei fiind de peste 72% în cazul acestei etnii.

Migrația externă, costuri și beneficii

Dificultățile economice ce au afectat economia României în primul deceniu de după 1989 (scăderea dramatică uneori a produsului intern brut, restrângerea ramurilor industriale viabile economic, șomajul în creștere, pierderea unor piețe externe tradiționale, etc.) au determinat un număr semnificativ de români să părăsească țara în căutarea unui loc de muncă. Datele statistice sunt relativ puține, dar ele pun în evidență acest fenomen imigrationist de a afectat populația României după 1989, fenomen ce a cunoscut o explozie mai ales după aderarea României la Uniunea Europeană și creșterea posibilităților de mobilitate în căutarea unui loc de muncă.

Fenomenul migrației populației europene dinspre statele în curs de dezvoltare spre statele mai dezvoltate ale continentului, nu este unul nou; primul val de migrație a fost din zona sudică a Europei spre zona nordică aflată în plină dezvoltare economică după 1960. Dezvoltarea economică rapidă și generală a statelor din Comunitatea Economică Europeană și ulterior din Uniunea Europeană, au determinat noi valuri migratorii, fie din zona răsăriteană a continentului după căderea comunismului, fie ale populațiilor din Africa, Orientul Mijlociu sau Asia, multe dintre statele de aici fiind afectate de sărăcie, foamete sau război. Această migrație este rezultatul globalizării, ce a determinat schimbări economice, politice și culturale la nivel mondial; astfel, se estimează că aproximativ 3% din populația globului (aproximativ 175 de milioane de persoane) locuiesc într-o altă țară decât cea în care s-au născut.

Migrația a jucat un rol foarte important în compensarea scăderilor de populație ce au afectat statele dezvoltate economic începând cu sfârșitul deceniului al șaptelea. Conform datelor statistice existente la nivel european (The EU in the world. 2015 edition), 6,7% din populația ce trăia în Uniunea Europeană în anul 2013, era născută în alte țări. Acest procent este mult mai semnificativ în alte state dezvoltate, cum ar fi Statele Unite ale Americii (14,3%), Canada (20,7%) sau Australia (27,7%). Conform aceleiași surse, populația Uniunii Europene va suferi modificări minore până la nivelul anului 2060 (creșterea populației va fi de la 506 milioane în 2013 la 523,5 milioane în 2040 și 480 milioane în 2060), în timp ce prognoza pentru alte state dezvoltate este că acestea vor continua să fie pe un trend ascendent al populației (SUA vor avea o creștere a populației de la 316 milioane în 2013 la 383,2 milioane în 2040 și 417,8 milioane în 2060; Canada, de la 35,2 milioane în 2013, la 43 milioane în 2040 și 47,1 milioane în 2060). Prognoza este una pesimistă și în ceea ce privește

alte state ce vor continua să piardă, la rândul lor, populație: prognoza în cazul Rusiei prevede o scădere a populației de la 143,5 milioane în anul 2013 la 127 milioane în 2040 și 115 milioane în 2060, iar Japonia va ajunge de la 127,3 milioane în 2013 la 102,5 milioane în 2060.

Cu toate efectele pozitive generate de migrația populației din zonele sărace ale lumii către statele dezvoltate economice, prin compensarea deficitului de forță de muncă, există în mod evident și unele efecte negative. În luna mai 2015, Comisia Europeană a prezentat *European agenda on migration,* document prin care sunt prezentate măsurile pentru gestionarea fluxurilor de imigranți din zona mediteraneeană și a Orientului Mijlociu, agendă ce are patru niveluri de intervenție: o nouă politică privind migrația, inclusiv modificări în ceea ce privește modernizarea sistemului *blue card* pentru persoanele cu grad ridicat de educație; reducerea migrației ilegale prin crearea Frontex; crearea unui sistem de azil european și gestionarea în comun a granițelor.

Fenomenul migrației populației spre statele dezvoltate din vestul continentului ce oferă oportunitatea găsirii unui loc de muncă mult mai bine plătit a afectat și populația României, mai ales după integrarea europeană din anul 2007 și liberalizarea accesului pe piața forței de muncă. Conform datelor statistice un număr de aproape 3 milioane de români trăiesc și muncesc în afara țării, mai ales în Italia (peste 1 milion) și Spania (aproximativ 800.000 de persoane). Migrația forței de muncă din estul continentului a suplinit, pe teren scurt, necesarul de forță de muncă din statele vest-europene, însă pe termen lung, populațiile în scădere din fostele state comuniste din estul Europei, nu vor mai putea juca acest rol, ceea ce va crea o problemă pe termen lung pentru creșterea sustenabilă a economiei europene.

Efectele pe termen scurt ale acestei migrații au fost unele pozitive, în condițiile în care persoanele ce muncesc în vestul continentului au șansa unor venituri ridicate, o parte importantă a acestora fiind trimise în statele de origine, contribuind astfel la finanțarea creșterii economice din acestea.

În mod evident, efectele migrației sunt și negative: este suficient să ne uităm la numărul în creștere al familiilor ce suferă de pe urma separării, la ratele în creștere ale abandonului școlar, mai ales din mediul rural (unde lipsa părinților constituie una dintre cauzele importante, alături de sărăcie, în justificarea abandonului școlar). Efectele negative vor putea fi observate pe termen lung, cu efecte asupra sistemului sanitar și al asigurărilor de sănătate, în condițiile în care aceste persoane vor reveni în România la sfârșitul perioadei active a vieții, devenind beneficiari ai acestor servicii, cu impact asupra nivelului veniturilor persoanelor active din acel moment.

„Încărunțirea populației". Consecințele pentru România

Creșterea speranței de viață a populației a fost constantă pe parcursul secolului al XX-lea, chiar și pentru acele zone ale globului în care dezvoltarea economică și socială au fost mai lente. Fenomenul acesta a fost unul relativ nou în istoria omenirii și a generat dezbateri intense în ceea ce privește consecințele pe termen lung. Giddens (Giddens, 2010), spre

exemplu, oferă date comparative de la anul 1850 încoace pentru populația Marii Britanii, arătând că ponderea populației peste 65 de ani s-a menținut constantă (în jurul procentului de 5% din totalul populației) până la începutul secolului al XX-lea, când a început să crească vertiginos, în prezent ea ajungând la 15% din populația totală. O altă dovadă a faptului că populația cu vârste înaintate continuă să crească este și faptul că, în Anglia, în 1952, regina trimitea 273 de telegrame de aniversare pentru persoane ce împlineau centenarul, în timp ce astăzi numărul acestora depășește 3.000 de astfel de telegrame.

Conform United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), în 1998, populația cu vârsta de peste 65 ani, la nivel global, era de 9 milioane de persoane, iar în 2050 va ajunge la 21 de milioane. Procesul este mult mai accentuat în statele dezvoltate, aici cifra fiind de 8% din totalul populației în 1950 și preconizându-se să ajungă la 25% din totalul populației în 2050. Creșterea ponderii populației bătrâne în totalul populației va crea o sarcină greu de gestionat asupra sistemelor de protecție socială, deci implicit asupra persoanelor angajate, cu consecințe în resentimentele acestora față de populația bătrână, mai ales în condițiile în care va apărea ceea ce se numește familia 4-2-1, în care un tânăr are grijă de cei doi părinți și de cei patru bunici. Conform acelorași estimări, media de viață la nivel global va crește la șaptezeci și unu de ani în 2025, față de patruzeci și șase de ani în 1950. La aceea dată, la nivel global vor fi peste 800 de milioane de persoane cu vârsta peste șaizeci și cinci de ani, o creștere de aproape trei ori față de 1990.

Îmbătrânirea populației este rezultatul a două fenomene majore: primul este scăderea fertilității, despre care am vorbit deja, iar cel de-al doilea este creșterea speranței de viață. Explicația creșterii speranței de viață și deci a ponderii populației cu vârstă înaintată se bazează pe factori multipli, cum ar fi dezvoltarea agriculturii moderne, a sistemelor sanitare, progresele în domeniul medicinei și combaterea unor epidemii și boli anterior incurabile, etc. Astfel, am asistat la ceea ce sociologii numesc ’încărunțirea populației’ și ’rata dependenței’, adică raportul dintre numărul de copii și pensionari pe de o parte și cel al persoanelor active pe de altă parte. În toate statele europene povara persoanelor ce sunt întreținute prin programele sociale asupra salariaților este în creștere, România nefăcând excepție din acest punct de vedere. Mai mult chiar, în cazul țării noastre, cifrele arată o deteriorare dramatică în anii de după 1990.

Speranța de viață a cunoscut o creștere și în cazul României, cu toate că ne plasăm pe unul dintre ultimele locuri la nivelul Uniunii Europene: media europeană este de 80,3 ani, în timp ce media noastră este de 74 de ani pentru ambele sexe. La bărbați media este de 70 de ani, față de o medie de 77 de ani la nivel european și de valorile maxime de aproape 80 de ani în cazul unor state europene mai dezvoltate economic (Spania, Suedia, Italia). Diferența este mai mică în cazul femeilor, unde media din România este de 78 de ani față de 83 de ani media europeană, cu un maxim de 85,5 ani în cazul Franței.

Evoluția structurii populației României

Îmbătrânirea populației a afectat mai ales mediul rural (care, așa cum am văzut a constituit o lungă perioadă bazinul de creștere al populației României), dar și anumite regiuni ale țării: astfel, conform datelor prezentate într-un studiu asupra evoluțiilor populației din mediul rural (Mihalache, 2015, pp. 201-203), scăderile cele mai importante ale populației au avut loc în județele din Oltenia, Moldova și în cele din Muntenia, județe ce au o populație rurală semnificativă (uneori de aproape 2/3 în cazul județului Teleorman, spre exemplu). Una dintre explicațiile posibile în ceea ce privește reducerea natalității în aceste zone ale țării este aceea că migrația forței de muncă spre țările din vestul continentului are loc tocmai din aceste zone ale țării, cele mai puternic afectate economic de transformările de după 1990.

Mai mult, o privire asupra PIB-ului acestor regiuni ne arată că acestea sunt cele mai sărace regiuni ale României, dar și ale Uniunii Europene. Astfel, pe lista celor mai sărace 20 de regiuni din Europa, România se înscrie cu șase zone, ce acoperă aproape toată țara (exceptând Regiunea București-Ilfov). În România și Bulgaria, PIB-ul pe locuitor (exprimat la paritatea puterii de cumpărare standard) a fost, în anul 2010, cu aproximativ 55% mai mic față de PIB-ul mediu pe locuitor din Uniunea Europeană (Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2015). În anul 2008, cea mai săracă regiune din UE era Severozapaden, din Bulgaria, cu un PIB pe locuitor de 28% din PIB-ul mediu european pe locuitor. Pe locul al doilea era regiunea Nord-Est (ce cuprinde județele Suceava, Botoșani, Neamț, Iași, Bacău și Vaslui), unde puterea de cumpărare era de 29% din PIB-ul mediu pe locuitor al UE. După încă trei regiuni aparținând Bulgariei, pe locul al șaselea se plasa regiunea Sud-Vest Oltenia, cu județele Dolj, Gorj, Mehedinți, Olt și Vâlcea, unde puterea de cumpărare era de 36% din PIB-ul mediu pe locuitor din Uniunea Europeană. În anul 2011, Oltenia a urcat în topul regiunilor sărace din Europa, puterea de cumpărare devenind acolo mai scăzută decât în regiunea bulgară Severoiztochen. Regiunea Sud-Est a României (Brăila, Buzău, Constanța, Galați, Tulcea și Vrancea) se situa pe locul opt. De asemenea, cea mai săracă zona din Polonia, aflată pe locul al nouălea, cu 39% din puterea de cumpărare medie a țărilor UE, a fost devansată de regiunea Sud-Muntenia din România, care include județele Argeș, Călărași, Dâmbovița, Giurgiu, Ialomița, Prahova și Teleorman.

Tabloul este cu atât mai sumbru pentru anumite localități din mediul rural cu cât acestea tind să dispară realmente ca urmare a scăderii populației (Mihalache, 2015, pp. 235-236). Astfel, multe localități din mediul rural românesc vor deveni din ce în ce mai puțin capabile să susțină cheltuielile ocazionate de funcționarea instituțiilor locale, neavând nici cea mai mică șansă de dezvoltare economică prin atragerea unor investiții.

Concluzii

Analiza evoluției populației din ultimul sfert de secol ne arată că țara noastră a suferit un declin puternic, ce nu va putea fi suplinit în deceniile următoare. Chiar dacă fenomene similare pot fi observate în toate statele continentului european, acest lucru nu este menit să

înlăture îngrijorările specialiștilor: scăderea populației României, în condițiile creșterii economice prezente și viitoare, constituie un factor cu un impact semnificativ asupra perspectivelor economice. În mod evident, și țara noastră poate apela, după modelul statelor dezvoltate, la forță de muncă din exterior, dar aceasta va ridica probleme de integrare, așa cum se poate vedea în cazul statelor din vestul Europei.

Impactul economic și social asimilat îmbătrânirii populației României este unul multiplu: ratele scăzute ale fertilității determină reducerea populației școlare, cu efecte negative asupra sistemului educațional, dar și asupra pieței forței de muncă ce va fi și ea afectată de reducerea populației active. Unul dintre cele mai importante dezechilibre ale reducerii forței de muncă este acela că sistemele de pensii și cele de protecție socială vor fi supuse unui efort din ce în ce mai mare, atât datorită lipsei creșterii în domeniul contribuțiilor, cât și celui al creșterii numărului de persoane ce utilizează respectivele servicii (creșterea ponderii populației în vârstă nu afectează numai sistemul de pensii, dar și pe cel de sănătate, persoanele în vârstă fiind cele mai expuse riscului îmbolnăvirilor). Toate aceste modificări afectează mai ales zonele urbane mici și pe cele rurale; dimensiunea teritorială a schimbărilor demografice vizează un efect est-vest, în care zonele mai sărace din estul României sunt mult mai afectate de migrația populației decât cele din vestul țării, mult mai dezvoltate economic, dar și un decalaj rural-urban (zonele urbane continuând să crească în detrimentul celor rurale), un decalaj al zonelor din jurul capitalei comparativ cu restul țării (a se vedea nivelul de dezvoltare economică a Regiunii București-Ilfov).

Mai mult, dezechilibrele demografice se fac simțite și în rândul diferitelor minorități ale României, unele afectate de o scădere dramatică (cum este cazul minorității maghiare), iar altele aflate pe un trend ascendent (cum este cazul minorității rome). Aceste dezechilibre constituie un factor de risc, putând determina o serie de fenomene sociale negative (deja pot fi observate anumite forme de enclavizare în cazul localităților cu un procent ridicat al populației rome, creșterea intoleranței populației majoritare, etc.).

Pentru contracararea acestor evoluții negative ale populației României este nevoie ca guvernele viitoare să elaboreze o strategie pe termen lung pentru stoparea declinului populației, strategie ce va implica în mod necesar resurse financiare consistente, atât pentru stimularea fertilității, cât și pentru îmbunătățirea sistemelor de educație și de sănătate. Succesul unei astfel de strategii poate determina inversarea trendului negativ din prezent ce face să existe riscul ca România să se întoarcă sub aspectul populației la începutul secolului al XX-lea, ceea ce ar însemna blocarea oricărei șansă de recuperare a decalajelor față de statele dezvoltate.

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INTEGRATING STRUCTURE AND AGENCY: THE CULTURAL THEORY OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU

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Abstract: In cultural studies, the transition from poststructuralist theories that emphasized structure and the role of supraindividual machines in the constitution of identity to contemporary theories of human and non-human agency was accomplished by works that focused on practice as the field that merged structure and agency. Among such works are the cultural theory of Raymond Williams and the sociology of Paul Bourdieu, both of whom offered dynamic models of culture and society, models that allowed for a dialectic of structure and agency. This paper is going to highlight the ways in which both thinkers conceive agency, identifying a common propensity to think of agency as social rather than individual, thus locating the possibility of change either at the level of culture or community.

Keywords: structure, agency, cultural materialism, practice

1.Introduction

A key difference between the poststructuralist theories that emphasize structure and the role of supraindividual machines in the constitution of identity and the work of thinkers such as cultural theorist Raymond Williams and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is the understanding of practice as a major area of re-conceptualizing the relationship between structure and agency. Although in many respects both Williams' and Bourdieu's theories of cultural and social practice highlight the difficulty to change existing patterns, their interactional models of culture and society allow for dynamism and a dialectic of structure and agency. A common feature of their thought is their propensity to conceive agency as social rather than individual, locating the possibility of change either in culture or community. Thus their work constitutes a conceptual transition from poststructuralism and feminism to contemporary theories of agency such as Bruno Latour's 'actor-network' theory.

2.Raymond Williams and the Emergent 'Structures of Feeling'

Raymond Williams was one of the pioneers of Marxist literary and cultural studies. He coined the phrase "cultural materialism" and developed what is now a major orientation in British cultural and literary studies in a series of influential books: *Culture and Society* (1958), *The Long Revolution* (1961) and *Marxism and Literature* (1977). Along with Stuart

Hall, on whom he had a profound influence, he is considered the founder of the British Cultural Studies school of thought associated with the University of Birmingham.

Williams reinterpreted classical Marxism, which analyzed literature and all cultural phenomena as a 'superstructure' grafted and dependent on the material 'base'. Drawing on Gramsci's argument that the relationship between economics and ideology was not to be understood in a one way direction (the base determines the superstructure, and so economy determines ideology and culture-the latter seen as an embodiment of the ideology of a particular class) but rather as a mutual exchange between economics (which determines the social position of the proletariat) and ideology (which determines the consciousness of the same), Williams stressed that literature was just another mode of production. Culture and cultural practices like literature were conceived as processes which create different ways of life. At the same time, the practices of signification and meaning-creation are seen as practical and material activities, not as secondary to economic practice and dependent on it. Consciousness, which for Marx was the reflection of the economic position of a class, was given the active role of a mode of social being. Terry Eagleton sums up Williams' reinterpretation of Marxism in his definition of cultural materialism as

a form of analysis which examined culture less as a set of isolated artistic monuments than as a material formation, complete with its own mode of production, power effects, social relations, identifiable audiences, historically conditioned thought forms.[…] It could be seen either as an enrichment and a dilution of classical Marxism: enrichment, because it carried materialism boldly through to the "spiritual" itself; dilution, because in doing so it blurred the distinction, vital to orthodox Marxism, between the economic and the cultural. The method was, so Williams himself announced, 'compatible' with Marxism, but it took issue with the kind of Marxism which had relegated culture to secondary, 'superstructural 'status (*Literary Theory* 198-99)

In *Marxism and Literature*, Williams outlines a Marxist theory of power relations, arguing that a cultural system shouldn't be defined only through its dominant features. By dominant cultural system he understands bourgeois modern culture - going back to Marx's observation that the bourgeois class conceives its specific conditions of existence as universal and characteristic of all humankind, and imposes its ideology on the proletariat, whose conditions of existence are different. Williams makes a distinction between the dominant features of a cultural system (given by the dominant class) and the tendencies apparent in the whole cultural system, which have very little to do with the dominant social group. He calls remnants from previous cultural systems still active in the present one residual elements of a culture (for example, feudal relations still persistent in capitalism) and he advances the claim that in every cultural system there may be tendencies indicative of new cultural systems. These new tendencies make up the emergent element in culture, which is where Williams locates both resistance to domination and the possibility of change. It is important to stress that change is experienced at the social, not personal level, as Williams strives to emphasize both the social nature of change and the fact that it is not the direct result of transformations in the economic structure:

The methodological consequence of such a definition, however, is that the specific qualitative changes are not *assumed* to be epiphenomena of changed institutions, formations, and beliefs, or merely secondary evidence of changed social and economic relations between and within classes. At the same time they are from the beginning taken as *social* experience, rather than as 'personal' experience or as the merely superficial or incidental 'small change of society'. They are social in two ways that distinguish them from reduced senses of the social such as the institutional and the formal: first, in that they are *changes of presence* (while they are being lived this is obvious; when they have been lived it still remains their substantial characteristic); second, in that although they are emergent or pre-emergent, they do not have to await definition, classification, or rationalization before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and on action. (131)

Williams simultaneously transcends the boundaries of orthodox Marxism by imagining cultural change as independent of economic change and class relations as well and distances himself from anti-humanist theories of social constructivism which posit the equivalence of the social and the institutional while at the same time rejecting any notion that the individual or society could be conceived in terms of a metaphysics of presence. Agency resides in the emergent elements of a new culture, yet how exactly can we identify the emergent remains a moot point. Furthermore, Williams argues, emergent forms are constantly threatened with inclusion into the dominant cultural system, which dramatically reduces their potential for resistance and subversion. In spite of the difficulty to detect the emergent and the danger of its being incorporated into the dominant, Williams stresses that the dominant culture is never omnipotent:

no mode of production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy and human intention. This is not merely a negative proposition, allowing us to account for significant things which happen outside or against the dominant mode. On the contrary it is a fact about the modes of domination, that they select from and consequently exclude the full range of human practice. (125)

In *The Long Revolution*, Raymond Williams attempts to sketch a model of cultural interaction. Following the Marxist tradition (greatly indebted to Hegel in this respect) he builds both structure and agency into this model, insisting on a dialectical relationship between them. Mutual determinism arises whenever we encounter a binary opposition. There can be no question of what causes which as social structure and agency are defined as one whole composed of different parts with different functions that reflect back on the other. First, the world around us determines how we perceive it; on the other hand, we are endowed with a particular sensory apparatus (different, for instance, from the olfactory apparatus of dogs or the vision of fish) that determines the way we experience the world. Purely objective determinism or purely subjective indeterminism does not exist. What exists instead is an area where subjectivity tries to construct logically objective models. We all look at the same world through the same senses, so it is no surprise that we see similar things. However, we as individuals have various perspectives and the conclusions we reach, though to a large extent

matching each other, differ to a smaller or larger extent (according to our distance from one another, both in time and space). The generation gap is explained through the historically different perceptions of individuals. This is how Williams arrives at the concept of "structures of feelings". They comprise the ways in which an individual is affected by, and responds to his/her culture. Structures of feeling are, as the term implies, both systematic and subjective. Because they are structures, they are culturally determined, they are organized formally and hierarchically; at the same time, Williams chooses to call them feelings, and not ideology, in order to emphasize that the rules that govern these structures are of a highly subjective nature and cannot be subsumed under rigid academic concepts such as ideology.

The structures of feeling that have governed previous historical epochs are mostly inaccessible to us. They can become visible in the artifacts and works of art of that particular period, yet the fact that we experience the objects of a lost world through our own structures of feeling means that we are not wholly capable of understanding them. We organize these cultural artifacts according to a selective tradition, where the selection is always based on our own values and beliefs. That is why the study of historical periods, Williams argues, does not yield a representative image of a particular period, but it is more a study of ourselves. Because structures of feeling are not universal, they can differ not only in time, but in space as well. Cultural affiliation could be defined as the sharing, by a certain number of people, of a specific structure of feeling. If the population is more or less heterogeneous, they tend to share the same structures of feeling. If, on the other hand, the population is greatly divided along lines of class, ethnicity or race (as happens in multiracial societies and most postcolonial countries), people living very close to each other may not share the same structures.

3. Pierre Bourdieu: Practice, Habitus and Fields

In an anthology edited by the University of California, *Key Contemporary Thinkers*, Loic Wacquant defines Pierre Bourdieu's oeuvre as "a *science of human practice* in its most diverse manifestations and a *critique of domination* in both the Kantian and the Marxian senses of the term" (3). Bourdieu's scientific and political project is summarized along the following lines:

Bourdieu's sociology is critical first of inherited categories and accepted ways of thinking and of the subtle forms of rule wielded by technocrats and intellectuals in the name of culture and rationality. Next, it is critical of established patterns of power and privilege as well as of the politics that supports them. Underlying this double critique is an explanatory account of the manifold processes used by the social order to mask its arbitrariness and perpetuate itself by extorting from the subordinate the practical acceptance of, if not the willed consent to its existing hierarchies. This account of *symbolic violence* - the subtle impositions of systems of meaning that legitimize and thus solidify structures of inequality - simultaneously points to the social conditions under which these hierarchies can be challenged, transformed, or overturned.(3)

That Bourdieu is a scientist of practice and a critic of domination may be explained by the influence that both Marxism and structuralism have exerted on his thinking and his

subsequent work. His books tackle a wide array of themes, ranging from early ethnological studies on kinship and ritual (inspired by his experience in Algeria during his mandatory military service), to the sociology of art, intellectuals and schools (where he developed the theory of reproduction), and in the last decades of his life concentrating on symbolic goods and the critique of social suffering, masculine domination, the bureaucratic state and neo-liberalism.

As Wacquant stresses in the chapter dedicated to Bourdieu, his conception of social structure and agency is resolutely "monist or anti-dualistic"(4). If Raymond Williams tried to dissolve the oppositions between structure and agency in the realm of cultural practice, Bourdieu strives to do the same in the area of social practice, reconciling binaries that used to generate intense debate in social studies: the objectivist and the subjectivist strands of theory, the material and the symbolic extensions of human experience, the micro and macro analytic perspectives (4).

Before focusing on the concepts of habitus, capital and field, which Bourdieu elaborated in order to bridge the antinomy between subjectivist and objectivist theoretical stances, I want to dwell a moment on his early notion of "strategies", defined in a study entitled *In Other Words* and refined later as the "logic of practice" in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* and *The Logic of Practice*. Distancing himself from structuralism, he elaborated the concept of strategy/practice as something which was neither totally unconscious nor a direct result of rational calculation. Bourdieu compared the logic of practice with our reaction when immersed in a game. During play we are both free and determined, limited by the moves of others and yet free to exercise control when our turn comes. Because we have to adapt to endlessly variable circumstances, games require permanent invention on the part of the player. We have to play by the rules of the game, yet concomitantly we can bend them to our advantage. Our freedom to improvise gives birth to an endless number of moves allowed by the games, but it is subjected to the same restrictions as the game itself.

This relationship between a subjective outlook and objective possibilities was central to Bourdieu's concept of the habitus. The French sociologist forged a conceptual apparatus of habitus, capital and field in order to overcome the opposition, prevalent in social as well as cultural studies, between the objectivist and subjectivist stands. Objectivism (the line that Durkheim initiated in sociology) holds that society is produced by forces and relations that act upon agents irrespective of their conscious will. Sociology's aim is to uncover these hidden forces that determine individual behavior and representations. Subjectivism asserts the opposite: social reality is the result of the numerous individual acts through which social meaning is constructed. The social world can be thus read in two ways: a structuralist one that attempts to identify the invisible forces that manipulate subjects and a constructivist one which emphasizes the crucial role of individual agents in the weaving of social reality.

Bourdieu combines the two perspectives by elaborating three major concepts: habitus, capital and field. The habitus is described as a system of "durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures" (*Outline* 72) These durable and transposable dispositions are schemata through which subjects perceive, judge

and react to the surrounding world. They are acquired as a result of the subject's immersion in the social world and its exposure to particular historical and local circumstances. Like Raymond Williams' "structures of feeling" they tend to be shared by people with similar backgrounds, even if each of us has a unique individual version of the shared matrix. Habitus describes the way present influences of the social world are internalized by subjects within an area delimitated by previous experience. It is simultaneously a structure, being produced by social forces and influenced by the social milieu (school, family, church, work), and a structuring: the dispositions acquired by the subject in the past provide orientation in present practice. It is important to note that in Bourdieu's theory habitus accounts both for continuity and discontinuity in a subject's life: it gives continuity because it transposes larger social forces into the individual, while at the same time allowing for discontinuity and innovation, as new dispositions can be acquired and integrated.

The subjects' position in society is determined by the capital they possess. There are three major types of capital: economic (money, property), cultural (education, skills, academic titles) and social (family, friends, acquaintances, a person's social network). A fourth type, symbolic capital, refers to the effect that any of the three forms of capital may have on other people when they are misrecognized or misrepresented - for instance, when we believe that someone possessing economic capital is also well-educated. These types of capital are not strictly separated: economic capital can be transformed into cultural (by paying for higher education) or social (making friends by doing financial favours to people).

The social space in which subjects increase their capital by competing for different positions is called a field. The different compartments of life, science, economy, the law, politics, religion, literature and the arts form distinct universes, each with its own rules and regulations and systems of authority. Fields have two characteristics: first, they are structured spaces, hierarchies organized according to certain principles; second, they are agonistic - spaces of struggle, where agents and structures fight in order to maintain or to overturn the current distribution of capital. This means that fields are not stagnant structures: their hierarchy may change throughout the course of history. Their capacity to protect themselves from outside intrusion is defined by Bourdieu as autonomy. An autonomous field is able to preserve its constitutive principles, values and criteria, although there is a permanent battle between fields to influence and subordinate one another. Politicians, for example, always want to impose their views on the media and the education system that try to preserve their autonomy.

If habitus is used to explain practice from the perspective of subjects, the concept of field is employed to elucidate the ways actions are structured from the outside: each existing field offers a subject a certain set of possible moves, strategies that it can adopt along with the list of both profits and liabilities. The position they occupy in a field predisposes agents towards different ways of thinking and behaving: those already at the top will pursue a strategy of conservation (preserving the current distribution of capital), while those in subordinate positions will opt for strategies of subversion.

4.Conclusion

While poststructuralist and feminist theories remained anchored in conceptualizing identity as the product of supra-individual machines, Raymond Williams in cultural studies and Pierre Bourdieu in sociology tried to overcome the dichotomy structure/agency: the first through his concept of emergence and emergent cultures and the second through his conceptual triad: habitus, capital and field. However, none of them conceived agency as individual, but as located at the level of either cultural or social systems.

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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES

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Abstract. In the last two decades, the most important enemy of the occidental democracy became the Islamist ideology. The fall of some authoritarian regimes and in many cases the democratic elections have brought Islamist regimes in power in some countries from Africa or other parts of the world. The Islamist ideas are sometimes appropriated by some parties or organization from democratic or authoritarian countries with an Islamic population. The Islamist or fundamentalist regimes are characterized by the violation of human rights and intolerance. Until now the occidental countries accepted that state of facts from economic or diplomatic reasons. In this paper, the author analyzes the conflict of values between Islamic and occidental civilizations and argue that the passivity of Occident in front of the violation of democratic values is a treason and a menace to democracy.

Keywords: Democracy, Islamism, Fundamentalism, Human Rights, Cultural Differences.

Atentatele teroriste din 11 septembrie 2001, au avut ca rezultat declanșarea unui "război împotriva terorismului". Șefii de state care au participat la eforturile de anihilare a organizației al-Queda au declarat de fiecare dată că această organizație, chiar dacă susține că își fundamentează doctrina pe învățăturile musulmane, nu are nimic de-a face cu islamul. "Islamul este o religie a păcii" a devenit un slogan al reprezentanților organizațiilor religioase islamice și a șefilor de stat din statele islamice. Cei care atrăgeau atenția asupra tendințelor anti-occidentale, care puteau fi observate cu ușurință în statele arabe sau alte state islamice, erau calificați drept "islamofobi". Criticile împotriva încălcării drepturilor omului în unele state islamice și împotriva pedepselor barbare practicate în aceste regiuni erau amuțite invocându-se "diferențele culturale" care trebuiesc să genereze nu critici ci toleranță față de aceste obiceiuri. Escaladarea conflictului dintre Occident și organizațiile teroriste islamiste face ca această poziție să pară nu numai o expresie a orbirii, cauzată de interese economice sau diplomatice, ci și o dovadă a naivității politicienilor din statele democratice care la început au ignorat iar apoi au subestimat pericolul pe care îl reprezintă islamismul.

Organizațiile teroriste islamice nu sunt un fenomen izolat ci mai degrabă un rezultat direct al unor tendințe și politici care se manifestă de mai multe decenii în lumea musulmană. Aceste tendințe, care au fost până acum două decenii minoritare, au fost resuscitate de războiul din Golf și de căderea dictaturilor din statele arabe. Aceste evenimente au provocat un vid de putere în regiune și un val de resentimente împotriva puterilor occidentale care, în încercarea de a înlătura dictaturile ostile și de a introduce democrația în aceste zone, au provocat mari suferințe populației afectată de război, de anarhie și distrugeri ale infrastructurii și industriei locale.

Conflictul dintre civilizația islamică și cea occidentală a fost anticipat de către Samuel Huntington[1]. El nu este însă, așa cum considera autorul, un război între civilizația creștină și cea islamică ci mai degrabă între democrație și islamism. Creștinismul a încetat să influențeze hotărâtor politica din statele care au o populație creștină datorită faptului că nu numai ideologia liberală preconizează separarea bisericii de stat ca fundament al vieții politice ci și religia creștină trage o linie de separație categorică între viața religioasă și cea a cetății[2]. Chiar dacă în Evul Mediu reprezentanții bisericii au încercat să influențeze viața politică și să impună cu forța respectarea canonului creștin (perioada Inchiziției fiind un episod detestabil în istoria creștinismului) la începutul epocii moderne autoritățile religioase au acceptat faptul că biserica nu are autoritate în domeniul politic iar principiile morale creștine nu pot fi impuse prin constrângere. Expansiunea europeană și crearea coloniilor a fost acompaniată de un efort de convertire a populațiilor ”păgâne” la creștinism însă violența nu este o caracteristică a religiei creștine ci dimpotrivă. Tendințele violente din Vechiul Testament au fost anulate de Noul Testament care promova toleranța morală și pacifismul[3].

Spre deosebire de creștinism, care a apărut și s-a răspândit în rândurile populației sărace, neavând nimic în comun cu autoritățile statale, islamul a fost promovat de un profet care era în același timp și lider politic al statului întemeiat de el. Mohomed era conducătorul unui stat aflat în expansiune care se războia cu triburile vecine cărora încerca să le impună noua credință. Tocmai din această cauză Coranul prevede în mai multe versete obligația musulmanilor de a lupta până când religia musulmană își va impune dominația în toată lumea. În Coran[4] există mai mult de 150 de versete care îndeamnă la violență în numele lui Alah însă pe parcursul său găsim și numeroase îndemnuri la compasiune față de alții. Deseori sunt citate de jihadiști versetele 190-191 din Sura 2 (Surat al-Baquara): 190. ”Luptați pe calea lui Allah împotriva acelora care se luptă cu voi, dar nu începeți voi lupta, căci Allah nu-i iubește pe cei care încep lupte”. 191. Omorâți-i unde-i prindeți și alungați-i de acolo de unde v-au alungat! Iar schisma e mai rea decât omorul. Dar nu luptați împotriva lor aproape de Moscheea Al-Haram, doar dacă ei se luptă cu voi în ea. Iar dacă luptă împotriva voastră, omorâți-i căci aceasta este răsplata celor fără de credință!”. În unele versete lupta împotriva nemusulmanilor este prezentată ca o obligație: ”Luptați împotriva acelora care nu cred în Allah și nici în Ziua de Apoi și nu opresc ceea ce Allah și Trimisul Său au oprit și nu împărtășesc religia Adevărului, dintre aceia cărora li s-a dat Cartea[5] până ce ei nu vor plăti tributul cu mâna lor, fiind ei supuși legilor!”. Îndemnurile la jihah, la război sfânt împotriva necredincioșilor au fost

[1] Huntington, Samuel P., ***The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order***, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
[2] Marcu 12:17 ”Și răspunzând Isus le-a zis: ”Dați dar Cezarului ce este al Cezarului și lui Dumnezeu ce este al lui Dumnezeu”. Aceeași recomandare apare și la Matei 22:21. Aceste pasaje și unele asemănătoare l-au inspirat pe Sfântul Augustin atunci când a scris ”Cetatea lui Dumnezeu” sau pe adepții separației dintre biserică și stat.
[3] În ”Predica de pe munte” Isus transmite mesajul pacifist care anulează principiile din Vechiul Testatment și care va stea la baza religiei creștine: ”Ați auzit că s-a zis: <Ochi pentru ochi și dinte pentru dinte>. Dar eu vă spun: Să nu vă împotriviți celui care vă face rău, ci, oricui te lovește peste obrazul drept, întoarce-i și pe celălalt” (Matei 5:38,39). Iar puțin mai jos acest mesaj este reiterat: ”Ați auzit că s-a zis <Să iubești pe aproapele tău și să urăști pe vrăjmașul tău>. Dar Eu vă spun: iubiți pe vrăjmașii voștri, binecuvântați pe cei care vă blestemă, faceți bine celor care vă urăsc și rugați-vă pentru cei care vă insultă și vă prigonesc” (Matei 5: 43,44). Chiar dacă aceste recomandări nu au fost respectate în lumea creștină este greu să justifici un război sau acte de violență plecând de la Noul Testament care în esență transmite principii contrare.
[4] Versetele invocate au fost preluate din versiunea românească a Coranului: ***Traducerea sensurilor Coranului cel Sfânt în limba română***, Ed. a 4-a, rev., București: Editura Islam, 2006.
[5] Cei cărora li s-a dat cartea sunt creștinii și evreii care sunt acceptați ca populație de rangul al 2-lea cu condiția să plătească o taxă pe când adepții altor religii vor fi exterminați dacă nu acceptă să se convertească la Islam.

folosite pentru justificarea războaielor care au dus la extinderea imperiului arab iar apoi la expansiunea otomană în Asia și Europa. La fel ca alte texte religioase, Coranul cuprinde și un corpus de prevederi moral-legislative care sunt completate de Hadith, povestirile despre viața lui Mahomed. Acestea au fost interpretate de diverse școli de jurisprudență (fiqh) și alcătuiesc Șaria (sau Shari'a) - dreptul islamic, practicat în țările fundamentaliste.

Sistemul dreptului islamic constituie o structură ce nu poate fi înnoită și modificată dar poate fi completată prin analogii atunci când nu cuprinde prevederi cu privire la o situație anume. Șaria este un sistem legislativ cu caracteristici medievale care prevede pedepse barbare precum sunt decapitarea, biciuirea, tăierea mâinii sau piciorului, etc, și instituie inegalitatea între bărbați și femei și între musulmani și nemusulmani. Acest sistem este în vigoare în mai multe țări islamice precum sunt Arabia Saudită, Iran, Pakistan, Emiratele Arabe Unite, Yemen, Sudan, etc.

Expansiunea puterilor europene la sfârșitul secolului XIX și începutul secolului XX, precum și prăbușirea Imperiului Otoman după Primul Război Mondial, a făcut ca sistemul legislativ din țările islamice să fie înlocuit în cazul Turciei și al altor state de un sistem mai modern, laic, iar în țările arabe devenite colonii de sistemul legislativ al metropolei. Din păcate modernizarea a fost însoțită de exploatarea resurselor naturale ale coloniilor și de transformarea populației în cetățeni de rangul doi, inferiori coloniștilor. Sfârșitul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial a avut ca rezultat secundar, în deceniile care au urmat, pierderea coloniilor de către puterile europene slăbite de război care nu mai puteau să-și mențină dominația. Treptat, în aceste țări s-au instalat dictaturi de diferite coloraturi ideologice. În multe cazuri regimurile politice erau influențate de doctrina marxistă sau erau dictaturi militare.

În cadrul mișcărilor naționaliste și anticolonialiste au apărut primele elemente ale islamismului. O parte dintre cei care luptau pentru emancipare identificau democrația cu puterile de ocupație. Situația economică a fostelor colonii nu s-a schimbat substanțial după eliberare, exploatarea colonială fiind înlocuită de administrarea ineficientă sau coruptă a noilor regimuri. Din această cauză soluția preconizată de unii autori sau activiști politici era reîntoarcerea la epoca de aur a califatului. Succesul fostelor imperii arabe și a celui Otoman era atribuit forței unificatoare și mobilizatoare a religiei islamice. Democrația era considerată nu numai un regim corupt ci și imoral. Din această cauză islamiștii considerau că statele islamice trebuie să adopte din nou sistemul juridic Șaria care ar garanta sănătatea morală a națiunii.

Cel mai important ideolog al islamismului a fost Sayyid Qutb, unul dintre membrii organizației ”Frăția musulmană”. Frăția musulmană avea drept scop instaurarea în țările musulmane a legii Șaria și înlocuirea constituțiilor cu Coranul. Frăția a fost una dintre primele organizații islamice care promova pan-islamismul, adică unirea tuturor țărilor musulmane într-un Califat și jihadul, războiul sfânt, ca instrument de impunere a acestui țel. Diverșii ideologi ai mișcării considerau că organizațiile islamice trebuie să încerce prin orice metode, de la propagandă și prozelitism până la război sau terorism, să extindă zona de influență a islamului. Ei justificau acest scop prin trimiteri la diverse versete ale Coranului care pretindeau același lucru de la musulmani. Decăderea lumii islamice era văzută ca un rezultat al abandonării jihadului și a acceptării valorilor occidentale.

În încercarea de a reconstitui Califatul, Frăția Musulmană a înființat filiale în mai multe țări islamice. Acest tip de organizație și ideologia care stătea la baza ei a fost modelul pentru mai multe

organizații islamiste care au apărut în ultimele decenii ale secolului XX și la începutul secolului XXI. Până la căderea sistemului comunist organizațiile islamiste au avut un impact insignifiant în viața politică a tărilor islamice. Prăbușirea sistemului comunist a oferit câteva oportunități de nesperat pentru islamiști, care le-au exploatat cu iscusință.

Lupta împotriva sistemului comunist a făcut ca Statele Unite și puterile occidentale să accepte ca parteneri organizațiile islamiste care aveau drept scop înlocuirea dictaturilor aflate în sfera de influență sovietică cu regimuri islamice. Chiar dacă islamiștii erau dușmani ai democrației păreau a fi relativ ușor de controlat. Credința că ei vor fi doar un pion în jocul de șah împotriva comunismului a făcut ca S.U.A. să sprijine și să finanțeze organizații islamiste atunci când acestea se aflau în conflict cu state aflate sub influență sovietică. Cea mai evidentă greșeală de acest tip a fost sprijinirea organizației al-Qaeda[6] care, infiltrată în Afghanistan, lupta alături de organizațiile islamiste locale, cunoscute sub denumirea de talibani, împotriva regimului socialist instaurat de sovietici. În perioada presovietică Afghanistanul trecuse printr-un proces de modernizare. Regimul taliban avea să instaureze în această țară legea Șaria și să declanșeze un proces de exterminare a tuturor personalităților care li s-ar fi putut opune. Acest regim a reușit să influențeze și grupări antiguvernamentale din țara vecină, Pakistan, exportând islamismul și amenințând democrația șubredă din această țară. Aliatul cel mai important al S.U.A. în Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden, prezentat în mass-media americană drept un erou al luptei anticomuniste, a devenit în scurt timp, împreună cu organizația sa, sponsorizată până atunci și de S.U.A., principalul adversar al americanilor. La fel ca alte organizații islamice și al-Qaeda se inspira din ideologia creată de Sayyid Qutb și discipolii săi.

Al-Qaeda, și majoritatea organizațiilor islamiste erau finanțate și de alt ”prieten” și aliat strategic al S.U.A., Arabia Saudită. Arabia Saudită a devenit un aliat al S.U.A. datorită rezervelor de petrol deținute și a faptului că era un stat cu puternice tendințe anticomuniste. Acest stat este o monarhie absolutistă cu puternice tendințe totalitare, bazată pe o formă ultraconservatoare a religiei islamice denumită salafism sau wahabism. Arabia Saudită desfășoară o acctivitate susținută de misionariat, trimițând în toate zonele cu populație musulmană preoți care să propage wahabismul și sistemul Șaria. Chiar dacă nu există legături directe între oficialii saudiți și organizațiile teroriste, s-a dovedit că personalități saudite au finanțat atât al-Queda cât și alte organizații islamiste. Wahabismul a devenit varianta de religia islamică adoptată de I.S.I.S. și de diferitele organizații islamiste din țările occidentale. El a pătruns și în fostele țări comuniste cu populație islamică având un succes considerabil în Bosnia și Cecenia.

Succesul recent al islamismului a fost potențat de evenimentele cunoscute drept ”primăvara arabă” și de căderea unor regimuri autoritare din nordul și Africii. Aceste regimuri autoritare făcuseră parte din sfera de influență a U.R.S.S. iar dictatorii erau ostili S.U.A. și puterilor europene. Această ostilitate nu ducea însă, de cele mai multe ori, și la sprijinirea unor organizații teroriste. Excepție face Libia care după ce a fost ținta unor represalii americane a renunțat la aceste activități. Speranța occidentalilor era că după prăbușirea dictaturilor arabe alegerile libere vor duce la

[6] A se vedea pentru detalii Byman, Daniel, ***Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know***, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 6-10.

instaurarea democrației în aceste țări, care vor deveni aliate ale S.U.A., așa cum se întâmplase înainte cu țările ex-comuniste din Europa de Est.

Alegerile din fostele dictaturi arabe aveau să aibă ca rezultat nu instaurarea democrației ci succesul unor partide și organizații islamiste, animate de salafism și de dorința de a instaura Șaria în aceste țări. Eșecul demersurilor occidentale se datorează subaprecierii influenței islamiste în regiune. Situația din țările arabe se deosebește radical de cea a țărilor est-europene. În afară de proximitatea geografică cu democrațiile occidentale țările est-europene se caracterizează printr-o cultură asemănătoare și un nivel de dezvoltare comparabil cu cel al țărilor occidentale. Spre deosebire de ele dictaturile arabe au fost țări cu un nivel de trai redus și un nivel mare al analfabetismului. De exemplu în anul 2010 Institutul Pentru Statistici al UNESCO estima că rata analfabetismului în rândurile adulților din Egipt era de 25%. În Afghanistan, țară în care islamismul a avut un succes atât de mare rata analfabetismului în rândurile adulților era de 69%[7]. Majoritatea populației din aceste țări nu avea acces la mijloace de mass-media alternative și datorită gradului ridicat de religiozitate era influențată puternic de autoritățile religioase care de multe ori erau sponsorizate cu fonduri saudite sau, în cazul zonelor cu populație șiită, cu fonduri primite din Iranul fundamentalist care încearcă să obțină influență în zonă.

Atitudinea Occidentului față de islamism se datorează confuziei dintre religia islamică și islamism. De cele mai multe ori islamiștii folosesc o tactică propagandistică diversionistă, descriind atacurile împotriva lor drept atacuri împotriva religiei islamice și implicit împotriva celor peste 1 miliard cinci sute de milioane de musulmani. Criticile împotriva regimului pe care încearcă sau au reușit să-l instaureze sunt etichetate drept ”islamofobie” iar încălcările drepturilor omului sunt apărate ca ținând de caracteristicile religiei și deci apărate de dreptul privind libertatea religioasă. În realitate islamismul nu este o religie propriu-zisă ci mai degrabă o ideologie iar modelul de stat promovat, deși este o teocrație, seamănă mai mult cu modelul totalitar decât cu cel al statelor islamice premoderne.

Pentru a avea o imagine corectă asupra fenomenului islamist trebuie să facem deosebirea între câteva noțiuni folosite în relație cu el. În primul rând trebuie subliniat faptul că islamismul sau diferitele forme de extremism religios nu trebuiesc confundate cu religia islamică. Majoritatea musulmanilor nu doresc să aplice literal toate prevederile Coranului la fel cum majoritatea creștinilor nu preiau fără discernământ tot ce scrie în Biblie. Doar o mică parte dintre creștini sunt de pildă creaționiști și majoritatea musulmanilor nu consideră, de pildă, că adulterul trebuie pedepsit prin lapidare iar furtul prin tăierea unei mâini. Totuși este de necontestat faptul că numărul musulmanilor care doresc să aplice literal prevederile din Coran este substanțial. Cei care fac parte din această categorie sunt denumiți fundamentaliști. Nu toți fundamentaliștii islamici doresc să impună credința celor din jur. Aplicat la nivelul statului fundamentalismul duce la instaurarea unei teocrații. In multe cazuri în statele teocratice clericii musulmani se mulțumesc să cenzureze unele decizii politice sau să sprijine unii candidați fără să se implice direct în viața politică.

Islamismul este o mișcare politică ce se folosește de religie, care joacă rolul unei ideologii[8]. Diverse precepte religioase sunt interpretate în așa fel încât să servească scopurile organizației sau

[7] Unesco Institute for Statistics, ***National adult literacy rates (15+)***, consultat la http://data.uis.unesco.org/?ReportId=210
[8] Vezi în acest sens argumentele dezvoltate în Tibi, Bassam, ***Islamism and Islam***, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012, pp. 1-30.

partidului respectiv. ISIS, Frăția Musulmană, Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, sunt organizații islamiste care doresc să obțină puterea în zonele respective. Curentul islamist nu este caracterizat întotdeauna de violență. Unele partide sau organizații islamiste doresc să ajungă la putere sau să își atingă scopurile pe căi democratice. Un exemplu deseori citat este cel al Partidului Dezvoltării și Dreaptății (AKP) din Turcia care are drept obiectiv islamizarea acestei țări și o face prin măsuri graduale. Un alt exemplu este cel al mișcării islamiste Hizb ut-Tahrir, cu filiale în mai multe țări islamice, care dorește unificarea lumii musulmane într-un Califat prin metode pașnice. Organizațiile islamiste din Marea Britanie și alte țări occidentale doresc instaurarea Șaria in zonele locuite de musulmani și efectuează o activitate susținută de prozelitism religios. Deseori acest tip de organizații mențin contactul cu jihadiștii chiar dacă nu acceptă metodele lor.

O parte dintre islamiști consideră însă că datoria lor este să folosească mijloace violente pentru a forța o trecere rapidă la islamism. Războiul, terorismul și asasinatele sunt considerate metode optime de atingere a acestui scop. Cei care adoptă aceste metode se numesc jihadiști.

Regimurile politice instalate în unele țări sunt atât de asemănătoare celor din statele totalitare încât mulți analiști consideră că islamismul este o nouă formă de totalitarism. În ce ne privește suntem de acord cu această apreciere din motive pe care le vom enunța în continuare.

Conceptul de totalitarism a început să fie folosit după cel de-al doilea război mondial pentru a desemna regimul comunist și cel nazist, între care existau un mare număr de similitudini. Prima operă notabilă care încerca să descrie fenomenul totalitar a fost ”Originile totalitarismului” scrisă de Hannah Arendt[9]. Caracteristicile fundamentale ale totalitarismului au fost sistematizate de către politologii americani Friedrich și Brzezinski[10]. Acestea sunt: o ideologie care devine dogmă, un partid unic în fruntea căruia se găsește de obicei un singur om, o poliție care împrăștie teroarea, un monopol al mijloacelor de comunicare în masă, un monopol al forțelor armate și o economie centralizată. Aceste caracteristici se regăsesc într-o mare măsură în regimurile islamiste și în unele state islamice fundamentaliste.

Ideologia în cauză este islamismul. Ca și în cazul regimurilor comunist și nazist, în statele islamiste nu sunt acceptate alte partide politice decât cel purtător al acestei ideologii. Teroarea este metoda favorită prin care este controlată populația. Teroarea se manifestă de obicei prin eliminarea rapidă a oricărei opoziții și prin execuții publice prin metode medievale a oponenților. Islamiștii îi depășesc în cruzime pe naziști și comuniști recurgând la tortură și mutilări înainte de executarea victimelor. Pedeapsa capitală este aplicată pentru un număr mare de abateri, cele politice aflându-se pe primul loc.

La fel ca în cazul terorii și controlul asupra mijloacelor de comunicare în masă este mai sever decât în regimurile totalitare clasice. Islamiștii nu se mulțumesc să controleze televiziunea (în unele cazuri inexistentă), radioul și ziarele ci elimină tot ce are nu are de-a face cu religia islamică. În unele state sunt interzise cărțile, filmele și muzica nereligioasă considerate surse de contagiune și de răspândire a ideilor decadente occidentale. Deseori islamiștii distrug monumente istorice și închid muzee pentru a elimina orice nu ține de doctrina oficială. Nefrecventarea moscheii și lipsa de fervoare religioasă se soldează cu diverse pedepse. Monopolul asupra armelor și forțelor armate se

[9] Arendt, Hannah, ***The Origins of Totalitarianism***, New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951.
[10] Friedrich, Carl J.; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ***Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy***, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956.

regăsește și în cazul statelor islamiste iar economia este controlată de guvern și în ultimă instanță de partidul sau organizația islamistă.

O altă caracteristică a statelor totalitare este încălcarea flagrantă a drepturilor omului. Spre deosebire de regimurile totalitare care, deși încălcau unele drepturi ale omului, le aveau menționate în constituție, și negau aceste încălcări, în statele islamiste aceste drepturi sunt negate pe față. Încălcările drepturilor omului sunt justificate prin trimiteri la versete din Coran care le prevăd sau prin invocarea unor interpretări și extrapolări ale acestora. Încălcările drepturilor omului în statele islamiste depășesc abuzurile din statele totalitare pentru că au drept model instituții medievale.

Cea mai flagrantă este încălcarea drepturilor femeii, care este deseori întemnițată în propria casă neputând să se deplaseze în afara ei decât însoțită de o rudă de sex masculin și purtând haine care îi acoperă fața și corpul. Legislația Șaria consacră inegalitatea dintre sexe în mai toate domeniile dreptului. Bărbatul are dreptul să maltrateze femeia prin exercitarea violenței. În cazul succesiunii fiicele au dreptul doar la jumătatea din partea pe care o primesc fiii decedatului iar în cadrul proceselor mărturia unui bărbat poate fi contestată doar de mărturia a două femei. În unele state islamiste controlul asupra femeii se extinde și asupra sexualității, femeilor fiindu-le extirpat clitorisul pentru a nu mai simți plăcerea. De cele mai multe ori cel care decide cu cine se va căsători femeia este tatăl său care o predă soțului ce va exercita o putere totală asupra sa. Situația femeii din țările islamiste este astfel similară unei forme de sclavie. Aceste abuzuri sunt constatate și în cazul unor minorități etnice, religioase sau a homosexualilor.

Libertatea de exprimare și libertatea religioasă sunt și ele încălcate. Exprimarea unor critici la adresa guvernului sau la adresa unor norme morale inspirate de religie se soldează cu pedepse severe. În majoritatea statelor islamiste și in unele state islamice care aplică legislația Șaria ateismul, apartenența la o altă religie decât cea islamică, creștină sau mozaică și apostazia (renunțarea la religia islamică) sunt pedepsite cu pedeapsa capitală.

Drepturile politice și alte drepturi civile sunt și ele încălcate în statele islamiste. De fapt islamiștii se declară pe față împotriva democrației pe care o consideră un sistem corupt.

Îngrijorător este faptul că guvernele occidentale, care criticau încălcarea drepturilor omului în țările comuniste tolerează aceste încălcări în statele islamice. Cei care au încercat să aducă în discuți încălcarea drepturilor femeii s-au confruntat cu proteste din partea țărilor islamice. Atunci când ministrul de externe suedez Margot Wallström a criticat încălcarea drepturilor femeii și pedepsele medievale aplicate în Arabia Saudită, Liga Arabă și Organizația de Cooperare Islamică ce reprezintă 57 de state musulmane au protestat vehement împotriva acestei declarații[11]. Criticile aduse împotriva retezării mâinii, biciuirilor și decapitărilor publice precum și cele privind condiția femeii au fost calificate drept insulte aduse profetului Mahomed pentru că ele sunt prevăzute de Coran. Politicienii occidentali au preferat să o abandoneze pe Wallström, care a fost nevoită să își ceară scuze. Această tactică a fost folosită de fiecare dată de țările islamice și are drept rezultat faptul că islamiștii pot să critice regimul democratic fără opreliști, pentru că acesta se bazează pe principii laice pe când cei din democrațiile occidentale nu pot critica nici o măsură sau politică islamistă pentru că astfel se fac vinovați de atacarea Coranului și religiei islamice.

[11] A se vedea pentru detalii Carlqvist, Ingrid; Hedegaard, Lars, ***Sweden's Foreign Minister Reviled as an Enemy of the Prophet***, consultat la https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5423/sweden-saudi-arabia-wallstrom consulta în 10.10.2016.

Lipsa de reacție a Occidentului precum și intensa activitate de misionariat salafist a determinat o distanțare a musulmanilor din multe țări de valorile democratice. Studiile sociologice efectuate de Centrul de Cercetări Pew demonstrează că deși un număr foarte mic de musulmani susțin activitățile teroriste sau manifestă simpatie față de ISIS, peste 50% dintre ei doresc instaurarea legii Șaria în țara lor[12].

Eșecul Occidentului se poate observa de pildă din faptul că 99% dintre musulmanii din Afghanistan doresc instaurarea Șariei. Acest fapt demonstrează că ocupația americană și guvernul instalat după înfrângerea temporară a talibanilor au devenit extrem de impopulare. Timiditatea occidentală în fața propagandei islamiste a determinat creștera simpatiei față de islamism chiar și în țările Europei. Un studiu recent arăta că 23% dintre musulmanii din Marea Britanie consideră că în zonele locuite de ei ar trebui introdusă Șaria[13]. Același studiu arăta că 4% dintre cei 3 milioane de musulmani (adică în jur de 100.000 de persoane) din Marea Britanie manifestă simpatie față de islamiștii care comit atentate teroriste și sunt de acord cu ei.

Această situație, creată datorită pasivității Occidentului și a lipsei de voință politică de a apăra valorile democratice se dovedește păguboasă pentru democrație. Singura soluție, care se impune în momentul de față cu pregnanță, este modificarea atitudinii față de ascensiunea islamismului. Nu războiul este soluția optimă ci manifestarea deschisă a dezaprobării față de încălcările drepturilor omului din țările islamice și adoptarea acelorași măsuri și sancțiuni care au fost aplicate cu câteva decenii mai înainte împotriva țărilor comuniste. Sancțiunile și atitudinea fermă trebuie completate de o propagandă susținută în favoarea valorilor democratice.

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[12] Vezi studiul efectuat în anul 2013: ***The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society*** consultat la http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/ care arată că 84% dintre musulmanii din Asia de Sud, 77% dintre musulmanii din Asia de Sud-Est, 74% dintre musulmanii din centrul și Nord-Estul Africii, 64% dintre musulmanii din Africa Sud Sahariană, 18% dintre musulmanii din Sud-Estul Europei și 12% dintre musulmanii din Asia Centrală doresc instaurarea legii Șaria în țările lor.

[13] Kern, Soeren, ***UK: What British Muslims Really Think*** consultat la https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7861/british-muslims-survey

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WASTE MANAGEMENT IN ROMANIA AFTER THE EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION

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Abstract: In Romania, the development strategies of the national environmental policy in the pre-accession and post-accession period were shaped by the priorities of Romania's accession to the European Union and the needs and national priorities. The waste management activity refers to the education for collection, transport, treatment, recycling and disposal of waste, the Ministry of Environment and the National Environmental Protection Agency are responsible for it and it is based on Law 211/2011, which implements a number of the European Council Directives. The collection, recycling and treatment of solid, liquid, gaseous and, especially, radioactive waste which requires specific treatment methods, are a priority and are also found in the commitments that Romania has undertaken towards the European Union. In 2007, in Romania were marketed approximately 1,300,000 tons of packaging, of these, half were included in the "Green Point" system, the recorded recycling rate being of around 36%. The National Agency for Environmental Protection has established as targets, a recycling rate of municipal waste of 35% by 2008, 40% by 2011 and, in accordance with the European legislation, Romania had, until 2013, to recycle 55% of the generated in 2013. The stage 2007 - 2017 is the period in which the expansion of selective collection should be done nationally, and, from 2017 until 2022, the implementation of selective collection in more difficult areas such as dispersed rural and mountain areas will be achieved.
Achieving an efficient management of waste at national level helps to ensure environmental protection and conservation of natural resources, in accordance with the requirements of sustainable economic and social development, as well as increasing population education and awareness on achieving these goals.

Keywords: management, waste, strategy, environment, resources.

Introduction

Waste management in the European Union is a very important issue and EU policies in this regard aim to reduce the impact of waste on the environment and health and to improve resource efficiency in the EU. In the long term, the objective of these policies is to reduce the amount of waste generated, and, when waste generation is unavoidable, to promote their use as a resource and achieve high levels of recycling and disposing in safe conditions.

If until recently the waste that people produced did not represent an important problem because the population was predominantly rural and used most of the waste they produced (organic waste was composted and used in agriculture, certain packaging was reused very often, the objects created by man were composed of degradable material such as straw, wood, textile from plants or fibers of animal origine), nowadays this waste is a significant and serious problem, generated mainly by their long life. Thus, some wastes require hundreds or even thousands of years to decompose completely and to reintegrate in nature.

According to statistics, the top "producers" of household waste are the United States with more than 700 kg / inhabitant / year, due to the contribution of packaging and, for the European countries one can not make a correlation between the level of civilization or concern for the environment and quantities produced. If the Czech Republic and Greece have the lowest level and Finland the highest, Romania stands at an average of 400 / kg / person / year. This figure is however questionable, since only two urban landfills (Bucharest and Timisoara) have weighing scales for garbage trucks. The decrease of the amount of waste produced is not the sole solution though, because as important is the percentage in which these are recycled.

At this moment, there is no nation and no citizen who can ignore the fact that, resembling landforms, the mountains of waste increase by several meters each year and transform landscapes, pollute water, air and soils, while significantly reducing the resources of raw material. The waste is now a symbol of a society that unjustifiably wastes the natural resources, is an enormous waste of both material and energy resources, and in addition, the management and disposal of waste can have a serious impact on the environment. For example, garbage disposal pits occupy land and may cause pollution of air, water or soil, while their incineration may generate hazardous air pollutant emissions, if not properly regulated.

In the EU, waste management is based on three principles:

- waste production prevention (use of cleaner technologies, ecological design, more efficient production and consumption patterns);
- recycling and reuse;
- improving final disposal and monitoring.

Waste management

Both in the Accession Treaty of Romania to the European Union signed on 25 April 2005 and in the additional Protocols are provided the commitments that Romania has undertaken for the implementation of the acquis communautaire and the deferments on the implementation of certain environmental liabilities:

- until 2015 for industrial plants with high and complex pollution;
- until July 16, 2017 for municipal waste;

- by 2018 , for theexpansion of urban systems for potable water and wastewater treatment.

The collection, recycling, and waste treatment constitute a priority for Romania and are also to be found in cthe ommitments to the European Union. Law 27 of 2007 is the normative act which requires Romanians to sort waste, all local authorities having the obligation to establish, as quickly as possible, a sorted waste collection system where people could deposit household waste.

Using data recorded in 2004, official statistics show that in Romania were generated about 363.315 million tons of waste, of which 99.4% represented non-hazardous waste and 0.6% hazardous wastes. Of these, 94.0% resulted from the mining industry, followed by manufacturing and the greatest impact on the population had the municipal waste, which in 2004, accounted for 380 kilograms per capita.

The Eurostat statistics for the 28 Member States displays the following quantities of waste produced in Romania from 2004 until 2012 from economic activities and households:

- in the year 2004 363.315 million tons;
- in the year 2008- 242.700 million tons;
- in the year 2010- 246. 000 million tons;
- in the year 2012 – 266.975 million tons.

By analyzing the amount of waste during this period of 8 years, one may see (graph no.1) that the difference between 2004 and 2012 is quite high, this decreasing by 96 340 million tons.

Graph no.1 The quantities of waste produced in Romania during 2004-2012



Source :Eurostat-Statistics

One of the priorities of the National Development Plan 2007-2013 has been to protect and improve environmental quality and life standards based on ensuring public services and utilities, particularly regarding water and waste management.[1]

In Romania, 1.3 million tonnes of packaging were introduced on the market in 2007 and half of them were included in the "Green Point"[2] system and recorded a recycling rate of around 36%.

In the "Green Point" system are involved all those who have responsibilities in the packaging circuit (producers, importers, bottlers, local authorities and citizens), the companies being able to transfer, by means of contracts, the recovery and recycling responsibility of packaging waste to the Eco- Rom packaging SA organization, which, in turn, creates partnerships with local authorities, private companies or municipal sanitation and companies which, subsequently, recover or recycle the collected and sorted packaging.

At the end of 2007, ECO-ROM PACKAGING SA, the representant of the "Der Grüne Punkt " mark - The Green Point, incorporated 917 companies that have marketed 661,000 tonnes of packaging, with the following structure: 19.4% glass, 30.9% plastic, 25.2% paper, 4.6% metal and 19.8% wood. The amount of recovered packaging by ECO-ROM PACKAGING S.A. for the members of the system was about 240,000 tons. All system development efforts targeted the year 2008, when traders were supposed to face, according to the legislation, the largest increase recycling targets for each type of material recorded until

[1] *The National Sustainable Development Strategy of Romania- Horizons 2013.2020, 2030.*
[2] *The Green Point appeared in 1995, when the German organization Duales System Deutschland AG decided to transfer its right to use its registered trade mark to an European organization, Packaging Recovery Organisation Europe sprl (PRO Europe).*

2013. The year 2008 was marked by a 300% growth of the recycling target in paper and metal, and 50% in glass and wood.

Since April 2007, Romania has had a new tool to reduce environmental pollution, improve public health and to promote sustainable development (PRGD). These plans came into force with the publication in the Official Gazette, Romania having eight regional plans for waste management, every plan being drawn up for a development region of the country, they are updated regularly to a maximum of five years and promote the cooperation between regional and local authorities, as well as citizens and businesses. This cooperation creates the necessary foundation for the developed regions to meet the requirements on obtaining grants from the EU structural funds. In Romania, the implementing organization for Green Point system is EcoRom Ambalaje, member of PRO Europe since 2004. The role of Green Point is of asociation which profit is being reinvested for developing the system.

The National Environmental Protection Agency has set as its objective, 35% of municipal waste recycling rate in 2008 and 40% by 2011.

According to EU directives, the new Member States had to reach by 2012 at least 55% recycling, except: Latvia has the highest exemption, ie until 2015, Poland and Bulgaria - 2014 and Romania and Malta - up 2013.

According to the European legislation, Romania had, in 2008, to recycle 33% of the generated packaging waste and 55% of those generated in 2013.

According to Eurostat- Statistics sources (Graph no. 2), in Romania of 2012, the total waste generated by economic activities and households was in amount of 266 976 (thousand tons), consisting of:

1. mining and quarring-223. 293 (mii tone) ;
2. manufacturing- 6. 029 (mii tone);
3. energy – 9 .043 (mii tone) ;
4. construction and demolition-1 .325(mii tone) ;
5. other economic activites – 22 .638(mii tone)
6. households-4.647(mii tone)

Figure no.1 The quantities of waste generated in Romania in 2012 by types of economic sectors and households



Source :Eurostat-Statistics

According to the market study conducted by Paper Plus :

- 65% of Romanians would be willing to consume less paper or reuse plastic bags;
- however very few people would plant trees or shrubs;
- the proportion of those who would collect paper for recycling is virtually zero.

The 2007 - 2017 period is characterized by nationwide expansion of selective collection and, in the 2017- 2022 interval, the implementation of selective collection in more difficult areas such as dispersed rural and inaccessible mountainous areas will be achieved.

As each Romanian generates about 5 kilograms of waste per week every year, Romania must effectively manage, on average, 36.7 million tons of waste, approximately 100,000 tons of waste per day, this amount placing Romania in a middle position, if one relates to the EU member states.

According to statements of the Environment Minister at the time, László Borbély, 71% of the total waste resulted from production activities, while the remaining 29% was municipal waste and, according to estimates, the figure would grow in the coming years, at least in the case of the municipal waste. According to him, the National Waste Management Plan estimates an average increase of 0.8% per year in the amount of these types of waste, generated by 2013. Of the total municipal waste, around 40% was composed of recyclable materials out of which approximately 20% could be recovered, not being contaminated.

Following the selective collection through pilot projects, only 2% of the total recyclable materials generated are recovered at present in Romania[3] from the 5 kilos of waste per week:

[3] *Statistical study published on the website www.paperplus.ro*

- half of them (2.5 kg / week) are biodegradable waste;
- half a kilogram is glass;
- half a kilogram, paper and cartons;
- the remaining almost two kilograms is divided on other types of waste, of which textiles are about 250 grams per week, plastics.

In recent years, private companies have initiated intensive actions of collecting cardboard and PET, and in some localities were placed collection centers where individuals have the possibility to bring (with or without remuneration) wastepaper, cardboard, glass, plastic.

In Romania, the institutions of the glass, paper, cardboard and plastics industry are licensed and have started to take these wastes to collection centers for recycling and / or recovery, in other words, things started to move in this sector, although much more needs to be done.

For example, that growth is expected due to the economic development of the country, we have to find solutions for waste from construction and demolition.

There is still no adequate system of waste recovery from construction and demolition, but an internal reuse in their own household or trade on an undeclared market. Regional waste management strategies should present solutions to target this category of waste, given the fact that they are turning into a pressing problem.

The study released on January 29, 2016 in Brussels by the European Commission with the objective "evaluation of selective collection schemes in 28 capitals of the EU (2015)" should show the current situation of systems implemented in the European capitals, as well as examples of good practices that can constitute the basis for improving the systems in the European states.

The separate collection of municipal waste is a legal obligation on all member states of the European Union and this study launched at the end of January in Brussels was designed to objectively assess and correct the situation in 28 European capitals on separate waste collection in the context of launching a new legislative package on Circular Economy.

The ultimate goal of this study is that, the whole of Europe must know where they stand in terms of collection, recycling and revaluation of waste or if it is prepared to transform waste into valuable secondary raw material, at the quotas imposed by legislation. Partial results showed that two of the top three countries in selective collection (at capital city level) are in Central and Eastern Europe (Slovenia and Estonia, Ljubljana and Tallinn, alongside Helsinki-Finland), lead in the ranking of European capitals, with a selective collection rate of 55.4%, 42.2% and respectively 38.6%, Europe having a selective collection rate averaging 19%.

At the capital and country level, data concerning Romania are but gratifying, Romania still having much work to be done.

Also, as a member country of the European Union, Romania has an obligation to collect and recycle every year 80 000 tonnes of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). First, the organized collection actions were initiated in 2007 by the Ministry of Environment through the National Campaign for the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment known as the "Great disposal". This action provided that the citizens take out in front of the house or building inoperable equipment, then sanitation companies picked them up and carried them to the collection centers, for there to be taken over by collective organizations authorized to transport to recyclers . Thus, within this campaign were collected annually 569 tons of waste and, since then,campaingns for the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment are organized.

One must not forget that human activities result in an enormous amount of waste, of which 40% are just waste paper, all this amount of paper waste can be reused / recycled to produce other paper products. The natural substance that underlies the paper production is pulp, and this is the basic element of all plant cell walls. All plants contain tissues that, properly processed, will produce cellulose. Raw cotton contains approx. 91% natural cellulose in its purest form. Other sources for producing paper are hemp (77%), softwood or hardwood (57% to 65%). In order to produce one tonne of ordinary paper, between 2 and 3.5 tons of wood are used,this meaning that about 20 trees are cut. Paper is obtained from wood cellulose fibers, resulting from a chemical boiling process. By recycling one ton of paper 17 trees are saved..

In terms of environmental pollution and energy consumption, recycled paper is more advantageous than regular paper because, by recycling one ton of waste paper, 30,000 liters of water are saved, it is used between 28% and 80% less electricity and air pollution is reduced by 95%.

These are the reasons why recycling is the method aimed at two important aspects: resource efficiency and environmental impact, waste representing thus an important source for secondary resources. Thus, the replacement of primary resources with the use of waste materials, but recycling itself involves a series of previous activities: collection, transport waste, intermediate processing that involves sorting, shredding and compacting etc.

Conclusions

As a result of general economic growth and progress in all areas of economic and social life, humanity has the technical means available today so improved that it consumes huge amounts of both renewable and non-renewable natural resources. Acting more and more on environmental factors and changing nature in a fast pace and without adequate control and aware of his actions, the man leaves the door open to the harshness of economic imbalances, with very negative impacts on the quality of his life and the evolution of the biosphere.

Therefore, it becomes increasingly clear that in a heavily degraded and polluted environment, a high standard of life loses all meaning, not taking into account the negative impact of this environment on the perspective evolution in natural and biological phenomena . The overall objective of sustainable development is to find an optimal interaction of the four systems: economic, human, environmental and technological.

The EU sustainable development strategy adopted by the EU Council in 2006, aims to find, based on maximum compatibility, the most appropriate criteria for the optimization of the needs - resources ratio, objectives to be achieved and necessary means. Taking into onsideration this document designed in a unified and coherent strategic vision, with an overall goal to continuously improve the quality of life for present and future generations, member states must comply with and act accordingly.

In conclusion, it must be remembered that, due to lack of facilities and poor exploitation, landfills may be among the recognized causes of impact and risk to the environment and public health. The main impact forms and risks caused by urban and industrial landfills, in the order they are perceived by the population, are: changes in landscape and visual discomfort; the air pollution; pollution of surface waters; changes in soil fertility.

By analyzing the risks of mismanagement, one can assert that waste management requires specific measures, tailored to each phase of waste disposal into the environment and, the compliance with those measures must be the object of the monitoring activity of the environmental factors affected by the waste presence.

In Romania, local authorities should ensure separate collection of packaging waste by public sanitation services, and by setting up appropriate facilities and location of trash containers for differentiated garbage.

In Romania there are economic operators who recycle waste (paper and cardboard, plastics, glass, wood, ferrous and nonferrous materials) by taking it from the authorized collectors.

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THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNANCE FROM THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY POINT OF VIEW

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Abstract:The concepts of government and governance are up to date and they will always remain such. One cannot approach a debate on this topic as long as the history of these two notions is known and also the manner laws were enforced throughout history. This paper's objective is to approach the two concepts from the political philosophy point of view, starting from the ideal state imagined by Plato and Aristotle, but also considering the principles postulated by philosophers such as Rousseau or Montesquieu.

Keywords: Political philosophy, government, governance, laws, diachrony

Prima întrebare care se pune ar fi: „Ce este guvernământul”? În *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române* se precizează că „guvernământul” este „o formă de conducere politică a unui stat” dar și o „unitate teritorial-administrativă condusă de un împuternicit al șefului statului”[1]. Termenul de „guvernare” este explicat aici astfel: „acțiunea de *a guverna;* cârmuire, conducere, diriguire, domnie, stăpânire”[2].

Este absolut necesar să clarificăm anumite probleme legate de acest concept. În primul rând se impune să precizăm că el trebuie clarificat, atât din perspectiva dreptului constituțional, cât și a filosofiei. Dreptul constituțional definește guvernul și guvernământul strict din perspectiva dreptului constituţional, pe când definițiile guvernelor din perspective filosofice sunt mult mai complexe. Din perspectiva dreptului constituțional, noțiunea de „guvern” are mai multe sensuri. În accepțiunea cea mai generală, prin guvern înțelegem totalitatea autorităților statului, inclusiv parlamentul și instanțele judecătorești. Noțiunea de guvern a fost definită în Declarația de Independență din 4 iulie 1776 astfel: „Noi considerăm (...) că pentru a asigura aceste drepturi, guvernele au fost instituite printre oameni (...) dobândindu-și puterile lor legitime din consimțământul guvernanților”[3]. Tot din punct de vedere juridic, dar, într-un sens mai restrâns, această noțiune vizează doar executivul, adică șeful statului împreună cu miniștrii. În accepțiunea cea mai strictă, guvernul este organul colegial, alcătuit din prim-ministru, miniștri și alți membri stabiliți de Constituție sau de lege, exclusiv șeful statului. În cazul republicilor prezidențiale cu un executiv monocefal, ultimele două accepțiuni se confundă, dat fiind faptul că șeful guvernului este chiar șeful statului[4].

1 *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române (DEX),* https://dexonline.ro/definitie/guvernământ. Tot de aici aflăm că acest termen provine în limba română din limba franceză, de la *gouvernement*.
2 *Ibidem*; https://dexonline.ro/definitie/guvernare.
3 Această accepțiune o întâlnim în *Declarația americană de independență* din 4 iulie 1776.
4 F. Oprea, Dr. Constituțional-Guvern, http://facultate.regielive.ro/referate/stiinte_politice.

Omul politic şi legiuitorul au în vedere numai statul în toate lucrările lor; iar guvernământul nu este decât o oarecare organizare impusă tuturor membrilor statului.

Din perspectivă filosofică, prezenta lucrare își propune o trecere în revistă a principiilor fundamentale referitoare la *guvernare* și *guvernământ* la Platon și Aristotel, precum și ale unor gânditori, precum J.-J. Rousseau și Montesquieu.

Guvernământul îmbracă forme diferite. Platon a fost cel care a demonstrat în dialogul său *Republica* că a guverna nu înseamnă a acţiona conform legilor, ci a exercita arta conducerii[5]. În concepția gânditorului grec "filosofii trebuie să domnească", dar conducătorii cetății trebuie sa fie filosofi adevărați și "nu iubitori de opinie", căci doar ei au acces la adevăr și știință. Apoi, într-o cetate bună filosofia reprezintă principala ocupație iar filosofii vor picta cetatea într-un mod ideal. Filosofii conducătorii trebuie să aibă o educație aleasă, și trebuie să posede „cunoașterea supremă"[6].

De asemenea, doar conducătorii-filosofi, preluând cetatea și caracterele oamenilor, mai întâi le vor curăța. Ei vor avea în vedere valori precum dreptatea, frumosul și cumpătarea și vor fi capabili să picteze anumite aspecte pentru a obține caractere umane, pe cât posibil, asemănătoare cu zeii [7].

Cu alte cuvinte, nu poţi guverna, dacă nu deţii puterea, după cum, dacă o deţii, trebuie să ştii cum să o utilizezi într-un mod eficient și să cunoști filosofia.

Într-o altă ordine de idei, Platon susține că guvernanții trebuie să fie cei mai aspri paznici ai legilor. „Dacă paznicii legilor și cetății nu ar mai fi paznici decât în aparență, ar ruina cetatea de sus până jos, în timp ce, pe alta parte, numai ei au puterea de a o administra bine și de a o face fericită"[8]. Platon precizează însă că „filosofii sunt cei care trebuie puși drept paznicii cei mai autentici"[9] ai cetăților.

Referitor la separația atribuţiilor într-o cetate, Platon este adeptul teoriei prin care fiecare om dintr-o cetate face doar ceea ce este în priceperea sa.

„Platon pare să accepte un principiu prescriptiv: fiecare membru al *kallipolis*-ului trebuie să practice de-a lungul vieții numai acea îndeletnicire unică pentru care are o aptitudine naturală. Acesta este principiul specializării, care, fiind atât de contraintuitiv și constrângător, îi deranjează în mod invariabil pe cititorii Republicii"[10]. Platon instituie filosofia ca pe *o disciplină de drept divin*, „(...) pentru că zeiţa era deopotrivă iubitoare de războaie şi de înţelepciune (...)"[11].

Imitarea modelului spartiat este pusă, cu dibăcie, pe seama zeiţei Atena. Breasla războinicilor este privilegiată ca statut juridic, dar Platon preconizează şi *separarea totală a breslelor între ele*, fără posibilitatea migraţiei individuale intercategoriale, asemănătoare cu situaţia periecilor spartiaţi. Chiar dacă oamenii ştiu şi singuri, când vor, să vieţuiască în comun, Platon contestă aceasta, deşi intuieşte fenomenul, *din considerente strategice*. Dar, în acelaşi timp, forma sa de guvernare preferată este limitată de principiul tacit, tradiţional şi chiar nescris, al opiniei

5 Platon, *Republica*, Editura Antet, București, 2002.
6 Vezi Andrei Cornea, *Lămuriri preliminare*, în Platon, *Republica*, vol. I, Ed. Teora, București, 1998, p. 23.
7 Platon, *Republica*, 497b-502c; 501b-c.
8Platon, *Republica*, Editura Antet, București, 2002, p. 111.
9 Platon, *Republica*, 503b-c.
10D. Boucher, P. Kelly, *Mari gânditori politici de la Socrate până astăzi,* Editura All, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 58.
11Platon, *Omul politic*, 291d-292a, pp. 152-153.

generale: „(...) atâta vreme cât au legi statornicite, să nu întreprindă nimic dincolo de legile scrise şi de obiceiurile străbune”[12]. Iată că Platon, în cercetările sale, a fost preocupat permanent ca forma de guvernare să nu fie viciată de nicio cauză. De aceea susține că

„trebuie să încercăm să descoperim și să demonstrăm care viciu interior împiedică cetățile existente să fie organizate așa cum am arătat, și care este cea mai mica transformare posibilă care le-ar conduce la forma noastră de guvernământ: de preferința, una singură, dacă nu, două, cele mai puțin numeroase și importante posibil”[13].

În această teorie, Platon este susținătorul formei de guvernământ monarhice, adică a celei a conducătorilor unici, fără a lua în considerare conducerea celor mulți și tocmai de aceea a fost criticul democrației ateniene din perioada respectivă.

Putem concluziona astfel, că în *Republica*, Platon este susținătorul teoriei regilor filosofi:

„Atâta vreme cât filosofii nu vor fi regi în cetăți, sau cei care se numesc astăzi regi și suverani nu vor fi într-adevăr și serios filosofi; atâta vreme cât puterea politică și filosofia nu se vor întâlni asupra aceluiași subiect; atâta vreme cât oamenii care urmăresc astăzi unul sau altul dintre aceste scopuri după firile lor nu vor fi puși în imposibilitatea de a acționa astfel, vor exista în continuare...”[14].

De asemenea, în concepția lui Platon, „filosoful, conducătorul cetății ideale, nu poate avea calități similare unei ființe normale. El este văzut ca un om excepțional care, pe lângă standardele sale de gândire, mai face din acestea și o necesitate[15]”.

Aristotel identifică trei forme de guvernământ: democrația, monarhia și aristocrația[16]. Din perspectiva dreptului constituțional, forma de guvernământ reprezintă modul în care sunt constituite și funcționează organele supreme ale statului.

Pentru a înțelege pe deplin statul ca instituție politică, trebuie studiată și problema formelor de stat. Esența statului, adică tipul de stat respectiv, se manifestă prin mai multe forme în raport cu condițiile concrete ale epocii și țării respective. Forma de stat are în vedere modul de organizare a puterii de stat și, în special, structura și funcționarea organelor supreme de conducere. Rezultă că forma de stat, indiferent de esență, este dată de trei elemente: forma de guvernământ, structura statului și regimul politic.

Forma de guvernământ este un raport între organele de stat în procesul de constituire și funcționare a organelor supreme[17]. Dacă ne referim la statele existente astăzi în lume, din punctul de vedere al formei de guvernământ, există: monarhii absolute, constituționale și parlamentare, republici parlamentare și republici prezidențiale[18].

Indiferent de esența statului, care poate fi democratică sau dictatorială, forma de guvernământ poate să fie una din cele de mai sus. Aceasta nu înseamnă că între esența statului și forma de guvernământ nu există legături.

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12 *Idem*.
13Platon, *Republica*, Editura Antet, București, 2002, p. 172.
14*Idem.* Spre deosebire de *Republica*, „în *Legile* se renunță la domnia filosofilor care este înlocuită cu domnia legii”, precizează Șt. Bezdechi. Vezi *Introducere* în Platon, *Legile*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic Gold, București, 2010, p. 24.
15I. Dunca, *Politică și metapolitică la Platon*, Editura Lumen, Iași, 2009, p. 34.
16 Platon, *Republica*, Ed. Antet, București, 2002, p. 82.
17Gh. Uglean, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice*, vol. I, Editura Fundației România de Mâine, 2005, p. 312.
18*Ibidem*, pp. 312-313.

În Grecia Antică statul avea componentele enumerate mai sus, însă Aristotel plasa populaţia alcătuită din cetăţeni pe un loc important în ceea ce priveşte elementele statului. Tot el explică faptul că unora le revine calitatea de cetăţean, iar altora nu şi stabileşte clar în ce contexte poţi avea/dobândi această calitate în Grecia Antică. O altă chestiune care urmează a fi discutată este cea referitoare la existenţa Constituţiei politice. Constituţia politică este ceea ce determină în stat organizarea sistematică a tuturor puterilor, dar mai ales a puterii suverane; iar suveranul cetăţii, în toate locurile, este guvernământul. Guvernământul este însăşi Constituţia. Spre exemplu, în democraţii, poporul este suveranul; în oligarhii, din contră, este minoritatea compusă din bogaţi. Însă acest lucru nu înseamnă că nu-i reuneşte şi folosul comun, deoarece din firea sa omul este o fiinţa socială şi doreşte perfecţionarea şi înfrumuseţarea vieţii sale. Este evident, totuşi, că toate constituţiile care au în vedere folosul obştesc sunt pure, pentru că sunt conforme dreptului absolut iar cele care au în vedere numai folosul guvernanţilor sunt defectuoase şi numai nişte forme corupte ale constituţiilor bune, căci sunt despotice (adică tratează pe guvernaţi asemenea sclavilor), pe câtă vreme cetatea este o asociaţie de oameni liberi.

Aristotel, în cartea sa *Politica*, tratează mai întâi numărul şi natura constituţiilor pure, afirmând că o dată acestea determinate, este lesne de recunoscut şi constituţiile corupte.

După cele constatate, constituţia şi guvernământul sunt lucruri identice, iar guvernământul este puterea suverană a cetăţii, trebuie în chip necondiţionat că această putere să se compună ori dintr-un singur individ sau dintr-o minoritate ori, în sfârşit, din masa cetăţenilor. Când unul singur, minoritatea sau majoritatea guvernează în interesul general, constituţia este în mod necesar pură; când ei guvernează în interesul lor propriu sau în interesul unuia sau în interesul minorităţii, constituţia este deviată de la scopul său, astfel: ori membrii asociaţiei nu sunt într-adevăr cetăţeni, ori, dacă sunt, ei trebuie să aibă partea lor din folosul obştesc.

Statul ideal aristotelic stă mai aproape de realitate decât acela al lui Platon, el nerecunoscând comunismul utopic platonic. Aristotel cere ca fiecare cetăţean, potrivit cu vârsta şi capacităţile sale, să împlinească o slujbă politică în stat, sub conducerea celor mai virtuoşi, care alcătuiesc o aristocraţie morală şi intelectuală. „Cetăţeanul" trebuie să fie eliberat de grija materială, şi de aceea lucrul manual este lăsat pe seama robilor, care, după Aristotel, ca şi după toţi gânditorii antici, şi chiar pentru creştini, sunt o necesitate socială atâta vreme, zice Aristotel, cât nu există maşini care să facă singure munca sclavilor. De asemenea, după Aristotel, numai oamenii liberi primesc o educaţie, sub formă de ştiinţe sau arte. Educația oamenilor trebuie făcută în mai multe forme, dar și educația conducătorilor trebuie făcută la fel. De aici, rezultă întrebarea „Cine ar trebui să conducă"? Rezolvarea pe care o dă Aristotel la această problemă se bazează pe două argumente distincte. Primul se concentrează asupra celui care conduce şi a întrebării privind ale cui interese sunt promovate de un anumit sistem de guvernare. În toate comunităţile, spune el, conducerea este realizată „fie de un singur individ, fie de către cei puţini, fie de către mai mulţi"[19]. Iar guvernarea poate viza fie „interesul comun", fie „interesul particular" al celor care conduc[20]. Dacă am combina aceste două principii, spune Aristotel, este clar că vom avea numai şase tipuri *pure* de constituţie deşi, în practică, acestea pot fi combinate în diferite feluri, producând astfel diverse tipuri de

19Aristotel, *Politica*, 1279a; 1278b.
20*Ibidem*,1279a.

„constituţii mixte". Primele trei tipuri pure sunt constituţiile în care un singur individ, cei puţini sau cei mulţi guvernează în vederea interesului tuturor, guvernarea fiind, prin urmare, dreaptă. Aristotel denumeşte aceste tipuri „regalitatea", „aristocrația" şi „regimul constituţional". Celelalte trei tipuri pure, pe care Aristotel le numeşte „tiranie", „oligarhie" şi „democraţie" sunt constituţii în care conducătorul unic, cei puţini sau cei mulţi conduc în virtutea interesului particular, guvernarea fiind, prin urmare, nedreaptă[21]. Aristotel le numeşte pe acestea din urmă constituţii corupte sau deviante[22].

Cel de-al doilea argument al lui Aristotel este puţin diferit. El se concentrează asupra problemei standardului care ar trebui folosit pentru distribuirea puterii politice, atât în rândul cetăţenilor, cât şi în rândul locuitorilor unui *polis.* Există, spune Aristotel, trei standarde ce ar putea fi folosite în distribuirea puterii, şi anume averea, cetăţenia, şi virtutea morală sau bunătatea[23]. În toate cele şase tipuri de constituţii, unii oameni deţin mai multă putere politică decât alţii, dar justificarea pentru acest fapt diferă de la un caz la altul. De exemplu, într-o oligarhie, standardul de distribuţie este averea. Cei bogaţi au mai multă putere decât cei mai puţin bogaţi. În plus, acest lucru este considerat drept, deoarece distribuţia inegală a puterii este direct proporţională cu distribuţia inegală a averii. Într-o democraţie, standardul după care se face distribuţia este cetăţenia. Aici, Aristotel presupune că puterea nu este împărţită doar între cetăţenii unui *polis,* ci între adulţii de sex masculin care sunt locuitori ai *polis-ului,* şi că locuitorii care au statutul de cetăţeni vor primi o parte mai mare din acest bun decât cei care nu îl au. Totuşi, în acest caz, deoarece toţi cetăţenii deţin în egală măsură statutul de cetăţean, ar fi drept ca puterea politică să fie distribuită între ei conform principiului egalităţii numerice stricte[24]. Aristotel notează din nou că, într-o democraţie, acest model de distribuţie este considerat a fi drept pentru că se conformează cerinţelor principiului echităţii[25].

Pe scurt, statul aristotelic este o îmbinare de aristocraţie, monarhie şi democraţie, cele trei forme de guvernământ, căci la câteşitrei scopul este interesul obştesc, urmărit fie de un conducător (monarhie), fie de mai mulţi (aristocraţie), fie de tot poporul (democraţie). Acestora le opune trei forme vicioase, în care fie un singur conducător (tiranie), care este forma cea mai rea, fie câţiva (oligarhie), fie toţi (timocraţie) pun interesul statului în slujba intereselor egoiste. În fond, Aristotel este şi el ostil democraţiei ateniene pe care a studiat-o migălos şi a constatat unele nereguli. Aşadar din concepţia filosofului reies trei mari forme de guvernare: democraţie, oligarhie, aristocraţie şi monarhie.

În Cartea a III-a, capitolul I al lucrării *Contractul social,* J.-J. Rousseau tratează pe larg conceptul de „*guvernământ*"[26]. Astfel, în viziunea gânditorului francez, *guvernământul* este: „un corp intermediar, plasat între supuși și suveran pentru legătura lor reciprocă și însărcinat cu aplicarea legilor și menținerea libertății, atât civile, cât și politice. Membrii acestui corp se numesc *magistraţi* sau *regi,* adică *guvernatori,* iar corpul întreg poartă numele de *principe.* Aşadar, au multă dreptate cei care susţin că actul prin care un popor se supune unor șefi nu este un contract. Nu este decât o însărcinare, o slujbă, în care, ca simpli slujitori ai suveranului, ei exercită în numele lui

21*Ibidem,*1279 a-b.
22 Aristotel, *Etica Nicomahică,*1160 a-b; *Politica,* 1275b, 1279a, 1282b, 1283a.
23Aristotel, *Politica,* 1282 b-1283 a, 1294 a.
24*Ibidem,* 1317b, l318a.
25*Ibidem,* 1280 a, l301a.
26J.-J. Rousseau, *Contractul social sau principiile dreptului politic,* Editura Antet, București, 2013, p. 52.

puterea pe care le-a încredințat-o și pe care el o poate limita, modifica și lua înapoi când dorește, înstrăinarea unui astfel de drept fiind incompatibilă cu natura corpului social și potrivnică scopului asociației"[27].

Filosoful francez explică în continuare: „Vom numi, deci, guvernământ sau administrație supremă exercitarea legitimă a puterii executive..."[28].

Filosoful și-a fundamentat concepția democratică asupra deținerii și exercitării puterii pe sintagma „suveranitate a poporului". În lucrarea intitulată *Contractul social*, J.-J. Rousseau a considerat că la realizarea suveranității poporului se poate ajunge prin „contractul social", prin care omul, odată intrat în societatea civilă, renunță la „libertatea sa naturală", dar numai pentru a dobândi adevărata libertate, care constă în supunerea față de lege și care poartă denumirea de acțiunea liberă.

Specificitatea concepției filosofului francez cu privire la contractul social constă în asigurarea, prin egalitate, a libertății tuturor cetățenilor care își cedează toate drepturile comunității.

Voința generală este sursa suveranității, iar legile, care sunt emanația acestei suveranități, vizează realizarea binelui general. Rousseau susține că: „Putem deosebi în persoana magistratului trei voinţe esenţiale deosebite: mai întâi, voinţa proprie a individului, care nu tinde decât spre folosul său particular; în al doilea rând, voinţa comună a magistraţilor, care se referă exclusiv la avantajul principelui[29] şi pe care o putem numi voinţă de corp; ea este generală faţă de guvernământ şi particulară faţă de stat, din care face parte guvernământul; în al treilea rând, voinţa poporului sau voinţa suverană, care este generală, atât faţă de stat, considerat ca întreg, cât şi faţă de guvernământ, considerat ca o parte din întreg"30.

Prin fundamentarea ideii potrivit căreia adevăratul subiect al suveranității, care legitimează puterea, este poporul, el s-a afirmat ca fiind cel mai mare teoretician al egalității în epoca modernă. Spiritul operei sale s-a regăsit, astfel, în toate programele revoluției burgheze franceze, începând cu *Declaraţia drepturilor omului şi ale cetăţeanului*.

Montesquieu identifică și el trei forme: guvernământul republican, monarhic și cel despotic. În politologia modernă, prin guvernământ se desemnează uneori organizațiile executive ale statului, respectiv șeful statului și guvernul, parlamentul constituind doar un corp de cenzură a guvernului și reprezentând intermedierea în raportul guvernanți – corp electoral.

Cercetările lui Montesquieu au fost orientate de problema condiţiilor de existenţă ale libertăţii politice31 prin teoria împărţirii guvernămintelor în moderate şi despotice32. În urma numeroaselor cercetări, Montesquieu oferă, după un studiu asiduu asupra operei lui Aristotel pe care l-a urmat, trei tipuri de guvernământ, potrivit „naturii" acestora: republican, monarhic şi despotic33. În concepția lui Montesquieu, republica poate fi o democraţie sau o oligarhie şi este o formă de guvernământ în care întreg poporul, sau numai o parte a lui, deţine puterea supremă34.

27*Ibidem*, p. 53.
28*Idem.*
29 Adică a ansamblului guvernământului: voinţa sa este generală faţă de guvernământ, adică faţă de fiecare dintre membrii guvernământului.
30J.-J. Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
31 D. Boucher, P. Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
32*Idem.*
33*Idem.*
34*Idem*.

Filosoful s-a preocupat, în mod special, de studierea principiului separației puterilor în stat, considerat ca element fundamental pentru prevenirea abuzului de putere.

Monarhia este aceea în care conduce o singură persoană, prin reguli fixe şi dinainte stabilite, iar un guvernământ despotic este unul în care un singur om conduce fără legi, ghidat doar de voinţa şi de capriciile sale35.

Montesquieu dezvoltă această perspectivă aristotelică prin adăugarea unui „principiu" al fiecărei forme de organizare de stat, rearanjând astfel clasificarea lui Aristotel. Fiecare formă de guvernământ îşi are propriul „principiu" propria dispoziţie sau „pasiune" al oamenilor care o pun în mişcare. În cazul republicii, principiul este „virtutea", în cel al monarhiei este „onoarea", iar într-un guvernământ despotic, „teama". Este clar că Montesquieu nu a înţeles prin „principiu" virtutea fiecărei forme de guvernământ, deoarece „teama" nu poate fi considerată o virtute într-un sens relevant. În schimb, el se referă la principiul care animă oamenii şi îi determină să acţioneze în fiecare regim, iar acest principiu poate fi unul moral în sensul tradiţional sau, dacă vorbim de teamă, o pasiune mai primitivă.

Categoria importantă a guvernământului despotic devine creuzetul tuturor relelor şi formelor de corupţie pe care Montesquieu le asociase în scrierile sale anterioare cu politica. Printre acestea se numără dominaţia violentă lipsită de lege, structura simplă şi omogenă a puterilor, pedepsele crude şi neobişnuite şi corupţia răspândită de la conducător către supuşi. Teama este principiul despotismului. Odată ce oamenii reuşesc să vadă dincolo de prezenţa imediată a fricii, mulţumirea lor faţă de această formă de guvernământ începe să dispară. Aşa cum frumos spunea Montesquieu, puterea despotică este precum un torent care „prăpădeşte totul pe un mal, dar lasă neatinsă pe celălalt mal câmpia, unde ochiul zăreşte de departe câteva livezi"36.

Modelele lui Montesquieu de republici democratice sunt vechiul *polis* grecesc şi Roma republicană.

Pornind de la aceste orientări, regimurile politice moderne pot fi clasificate în regimuri politice democratice și regimuri politice dictatoriale sau totalitare.

Un stat democratic se poate mai bine realiza printr-o formă de guvernământ ca republică parlamentară sau prezidențială, în care toate organele sunt alese, decât prin monarhie constituțională, în care șeful statului, monarhul, nu este ales. Rămâne, totuși, ca o realitate dovedită de experiența istorică faptul că esența statului, democratică sau dictatorială, nu depinde hotărâtor de forma de guvernământ, întrucât viața a arătat că pot exista dictaturi, în cazul unor republici, după cum există democrații în cadrul unor monarhii.

În accepţiune modernă, statul reprezintă teritoriul şi populaţia asupra cărora îşi exercită autoritatea o anumită organizaţie. De asemenea, el mai poate fi definit ca instituţie politico-administrativă a societăţii în frunte cu un guvern şi cu organele acestuia, cu ajutorul cărora se asigură funcţionarea vieţii sociale pe un anumit teritoriu.

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ISSUES OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING CENTRAL AND WESTERN AFRICA (1971-1974)

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Abstract: Romania's foreign policy in Central and West Africa during the communist period was very little analyzed by Romanian specialists, although there is a huge archive documentary fund unexplored. This paper aims to analyze the main aspects of the subject during 1971-1974 because, in our opinion, then, Romania became known among the states in those areas. This was due to Ceausescu's policy who was seeking to cooperate with as many African countries in all areas. On the diplomatic level, Romania became known in Africa especially after the tournament conducted by the presidential couple in March 1972 which included eight countries from that continent, including three from the areas studied in this paper (RP Congo, Zaire and Central African Republic). Another Ceausescu's land on African soil was recorded in 1974, when he visited Guinea and Liberia. Also, during 1971-1974 there were also many visits by African leaders in Romania. Economically the proposed period Romanian specialists have developed several cooperation projects evidenced by numerous mutual visits made by Romanian officials and Africans. The highlight was the establishment at Romania's proposal, joint ventures cooperation in several economic fields with countries such as Central African Republic, Guinea and Nigeria.

Keywords: diplomatic relations, economic relations, cultural relations, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romanian Communist Party

Primele contacte dintre România și statele din Africa Ecuatorială și de Vest au fost consemnate în momentul obținerii independenței acestora din urmă de la începutul anilor ’60. În acel moment, statul român s-a conformat politicii externe sovietice, stabilind relații diplomatice doar cu statele din cele două regiuni agreate de URSS, precum Ghana, Guineea sau Mali. Această situație a durat până la moartea lui Gheorghe Gheorghiu- Dej, din anul 1965. În perioada menționată, cooperarea României cu aceste țări nu a fost una intensă ci, oficialii români s-au orientat spre o politică de ajutorare a acestora datorită situației critice în care ajunseseră în urma retragerii fostelor metropole. Domeniile în care România a ajutat aceste state au fost învățământul, cultura și într-o mică măsură câteva ramuri ale economiei. Modul în care se realiza acest lucru era prin trimiterea unor profesori și specialiști români în Africa, acordarea unor burse de studiu în universitățile românești pentru tinerii africani și prin oferirea la prețuri reduse a diferitelor produse românești.

Odată cu preluarea puterii de către Ceaușescu, din anul 1966, situația s-a schimbat radical, statul român începând să se distanțeze de linia politicii externe sovietice în Africa. În acest sens, nu s-a mai ținut cont de orientarea politică a statelor africane, fiind stabilite relații bilaterale și cu state aflate sub influența Franței sau a SUA, precum RP Congo, Republica Africa centrală sau RD Congo

(Zair). De altfel, aceasta a fost principala caracteristică a politicii externe românești referitoare la continentul negru în timpul lui Nicolae Ceaușescu, acesta lăudându-se deseori cu faptul că avea relații bune cu toate statele africane, indiferent de orientarea lor politică.

În intervalul 1966-1970 s-au întețit vizitele delegațiilor africane în România și viceversa, tot atunci fiind semnate și foarte multe documente care consfințeau cooperarea statului român cu aceste țări.

Prestigiul României în statele din Africa Ecuatorială și de Vest a crescut odată cu poziția lui Ceaușescu față de evenimentele din Cehoslovacia din august 1968. Un puternic impact au avut și vizitele efectuate în România de președintele Franței, Charles de Gaulle din 1968, și de cel al SUA, Richard Nixon, în 1969.

În acest context s-au desfășurat și vizitele unor președinți africani în România, aceștia fiind Alphonse Massamba-Debat din RP Congo în 1968, Joseph-Desiree Mobutu din RD Congo și Jean Bedel Bokassa din Republica Africa Centrală în anul 1970.

Din partea statului român cea mai importantă acțiune de a-și consolida imaginea pe continentul african a fost turneul efectuat de ministrul de externe, Corneliu Mănescu, în mai multe state din acea regiune. Acesta a vizitat opt state din Africa dintre care cinci situate în partea centrală și de vest acestui continent. Conform fostului diplomat Ovidiu Popescu, care a făcut parte din delegația oficială, inițial se stabilise ca delegația să ajungă în șase state în care existau misiuni diplomatice. Ulterior, pe canale diplomatice, a apărut posibilitatea ca Mănescu să viziteze și Gabonul și Camerunul, țări cu care România nu avea relații diplomatice.[1] Același autor mai afirmă că vizita ministrului Corneliu Mănescu a fost prima acțiune politică de anvergură pe continentul african și avea ca scop negocierea unor activități de cooperare economică și fiind un fel de pregătire pentru turneul în opt state africane efectuat de Nicolae Ceaușescu în 1972.[2]

Începând cu anul 1971 România a devenit din ce în ce mai cunoscută în Africa, în acest sens având loc nenumărate vizite ale unor delegații românești pe continentul negru și viceversa.

De asemenea, au fost stabilite relații diplomatice, economice și culturale cu tot mai multe state din acel spațiu, cele mai intense și mai stabile fiind cu RP Congo, RD Congo (Zair din 1972) și Republica Africa Centrală. O situație aparte a fost vizibilă în cazul Republicii Guineea, statul cu care românia avusese cele mai constante relații până atunci. La începutul perioadei analizate acestea au cunoscut o anumită scădere, cauza principală fiind criza econoimcă în care intrase acest stat,însă au revenit la normal începând cu anul 1973.

Pe plan economic anul 1971 a adus înființarea primei comisii mixte de cooperare economică și tehnico-științifică dintre România și un stat din zona studiată, în speță Republica Africa Centrală.

Putem afirma că din acel moment conducătorii statului român au început realizeze importanța potențialului resurselor naturale aflate în aceste state începând să importe din acestea produse precum bumbac, diamante, fier și alte minereuri.

În aceste context la ședința Prezidiului Permanent al CC al PCR din data de 6 septembrie 1971 a fost adoptat Programul privind dezvoltarea relațiilor economice ale României cu țările din Africa. La începutul acelui document a fost realizată o analiză a aspectelor pozitive și negative a

[1] Ovidiu Popescu, *Diplomat pe trei continente*, Editura România în lume, București, 2007, p.162
[2] *Ibidem*,f. 164.

relațiilor comerciale ale statului român cu țările din acea zonă. Cea mai bună cooperare se realiza cu statele din Africa de Nord, motivul principal fiind apropierea geografică față de România. Pe planul secund se aflau țările care aveau ieșire la Oceanul Atlantic. Principalele dezavantaje ale cooperării cu acestea erau dependența economică de fostele metropole și condițiile de livrare mai dificile ale unor produse. Conform documentului, cele mai importante state cu care se colabora pe plan economic erau Nigeria, RP Congo, RD Congo, Ghana, Guineea și Liberia, oficialii români dorind se exporte acolo mașini, utilaje și obiective industriale, cu plata în mărfuri tradiționale ale acestora.[3]Cele mai defavorizate state din acest punct de vedere erau cele din interiorul continetului cum ar fi Niger, Mali, Ciad, Republica Africa Centrală. Principala cauză a slabelor contacte era legată de lipsa căilor de comunicații suficiente, care nu le permitea nici acestora să-și valorifice bogățiile subsolului.[4]

Pentru dezvoltarea relațiilor economice cu statele africane specialiștii români au elaborat mai multe propuneri, care nu puteau fi aplicate decât prin eliminarea unor obstacole. În acest sens se afirma: „ *Independent de resursele și amplasara geografică a țărilor africane, schimburile noastre comerciale cu aceste țări impun rezolvarea unor probleme legate de specificul acestor piețe; comenzi pentru cantitîți mai mici într-o gamă largă de sortimente; vânzări pe credit negarantat; lipsă de mână de lucru locală calificată, condiții climatice dificile pentru finisajul produselor industriale; lipsa experienței exportatorilor români de produse pe piețele africane; insificiența relațiilor în domeniul bancar sau posibilitățile reduse de finanțare sau garantare a unor acțiuni locale.*”[5]

Ținând cont de aceste probleme autorii raportului au stabilit 11 puncte pe care România trebuia să le realizeze pentru a-și dezvolta relațiile economice cu țările din Africa. Primele dintre acestea stabileau creșterea numărului de vizite reciproce pe partea de delegații economice, negocierea și încheierea a unor acorduri comerciale cu statele cu care nu exista o cooperare economică. Domeniile în care se urmărea cooperarea erau minier, petrolier, construcții industriale și cel al construcțiilor de mașini, fiind recomandată și înființarea unor societăți mixte de cooperare în aceste domenii.[6] Alte directive erau legate de înființarea unei rute comerciale maritime Constanța-Coasta de Vest a Africii, trimiterea unor tehnicieni români în anumite state africane unde să ocupe funcțiile de consilieri guvernamentali și sporirea burselor acordate studenților proveniți din statele africane. [7]

În plan politic, cel mai important an în relațiile României cu țările din zonă, a fost 1972, deoarece atunci cuplul prezidențial român a efectuat un turneu diplomatic ce a cuprins vizitarea a opt state africane. În regiunile studiate în lucrarea de față, delegația română a trecut prin RP Congo, Republica Africa Centrală și Zair. În cazul ultimelor două state a fost consemnată și o premieră, Ceaușescu fiind primul șef al unui stat comunist care a ajuns pe acele meleaguri.

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[3] ANIC,Fond CC al PCR- Secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 99/1971, f. 16.
[4] *Ibidem.*
[5] *Ibidem,* f. 17.
[6] *Ibidem,* f. 18
[7] *Ibidem,* f. 19.

Evenimentul a fost amplu analizat de presa română, relatările trimișilor speciali arătând primirile călduroase de care s-a bucurat cuplul prezidențial român din partea conducătorilor africani.

Aceste vizite s-au încheiat cu unele rezultate concrete, în sensul că au fost semnate mai multe înțelegeri și acorduri interguvernamentale care vizau extinderea relațiilor comerciale și a cooperării economice în mai multe domenii. Declarațiile Comune semnate la sfârșitul fiecărei vizite au reflectat dorințele șefilor de stat de a dezvolta raporturile de colaborare pe diverse planuri, inclusiv în cadrul Organizației Națiunilor Unite și în alte foruri internaționale.[8]

La întoarcerea în țară Ceaușescu era prezentat ca un erou, iar presa a speculat propagandistic acest eveniment. Articolele publicate la începutul lunii aprilie lăsau chiar impresia că liderul român a devenit recunoscut la nivel mondial, iar poporul îl sprijină în orice condiții. În acest sens ziarul *Scânteia* a publicat în intervalul 10-13 aprilie 1972 mai multe telegrame în care foarte multe organizații de partid și de stat îl elogiau pe Ceaușescu pentru rezultatele turneului din Africa.[9] Prin acest lucuru se urmărea evidențierea impactului pe care acest eveniment l-a avut în ochii populației, care trebuia să aibă impresia că România devenise o mare putere mondială, mascându-se astfel problemele cotidiene cu care se confruntau oamenii de rând în viața de zi cu zi.

Rezultatele acelui turneu au făcut obiectul unor discuții și decizii în ședința din 7 aprilie a Prezidiului Permanent al CC al PCR. După ce a fost prezentată o informare cu privire la desfășurarea vizitelor, conducerea PCR a stabilit un set extins de măsuri destinate să contribuie la dezvoltarea relațiilor bilaterale ale României cu statele africane.

Primul pas pentru realizarea acestor obiective era înființarea unei comisii unice alcătuite din reprezentanții tuturor ministerelor implicate, scopul acesteia fiind acela de a coordona și a răspunde de toate problemele legate de cooperarea cu țările din Africa. Cele mai importante erau considerate acordarea de asistență tehnică, selecționarea, pregătirea și trimiterea unor specialiști și acordarea unui număr cât mai mare de burse studenților africani.

Alte directive trasate erau verificarea delegațiilor care urmau să viziteze țările africane de Direcția Relațiilor Externe a CC al PCR și acordarea de sprijin organizațiilor și partidelor din statele africane care doreau să colaboreze cu PCR.[10]

Legat de acest ultim aspect trebuie spus că tot în acea perioadă au fost stabilite relații între PCR și mai multe partide africane, chiar dacă unele dintre acestea nu îmbrățișau ideologia comunistă. Cele mai importante dintre acestea, cu care au avut loc și schimburi de delegații, au fost Mișcarea Evoluției Sociale din Africa Neagră, care se afla la conducerea Republicii Africa Centrală, Mișcarea Populară a Revoluției din Zair și Partidul Congolez al Muncii din RP Congo. Cel din urmă era cel mai apropiat de PCR din punct de vedere ideologic, partidul lui Marien Ngouabi, președintele congolez din acea perioadă, afirmând de nenumărate ori că avea o orientare marxistă.

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[8] Valeriu Tudor, *România în „Descoperirea" Africii. Dezvoltarea relațiilor cu țările africane-obiectiv major al politicii externe românești,* în Nicolae Ecobescu (coord)., *România. Supraviețuire și afirmare prin diplomație în anii Războiului Rece,* volumul III, Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2014, p. 581.

[9] Pentru toate telegramele apărute a se vedea pagina 3 a numerelor din ziarul *Scânteia* publicate în zilele de 10, 11, 12 și 13 aprilie

[10] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR- Secția Cancelarie, dosar nr. 31/1972, ff. 3-6. Documentul a fost publicat și în Valeriu Tudor, *op. cit.*, pp. 585-586.

De altfel, în timpul vizitei lui Ceaușescu în acel stat, conducătorul român a fost invitat să susțină o prelegere la Plenarea CC al PCM din acea perioadă.[11]

În schimb, asocierea cu celelalte partide era surprinzătoare deoarece, conducătorii celor două state, Mobutu și Bokassa, se aflau în acea perioadă în sfera de influență a americanilor, respectiv a francezilor. O posibilă explicație ar putea fi faptul că în timpul convorbirilor oficiale din cadrul vizitelor reciproce din anii 1970 și 1972, conducătorii acestor țări și-au dat seama că aveau multe lucruri în comun cu național-comunismul promovat de Ceaușescu în acea perioadă, stabilind astfel să colaboreze și în acest domeniu.

La sfârșitul aceluiași an, Ceaușescu a decis să realizeze mai multe schimbări la nivelul Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, cea mai importantă fiind înlocuirea ministrului Corneliu Mănescu, aflat în funcție din 1961, cu unul din adjuncții săi, George Macovescu. Această decizie nu a fost luată pe moment ci, se pare că, fostul ministru intrase în dizgrația lui Ceaușescu încă din anul 1970, principalul motiv fiind costul ridicat al turneului de vizite efectuat de Mănescu în mai multe state africane. Un alt incident între cei doi s-a petrecut în timpul vizitei lui Ceaușescu în Zair din anul 1972. În timpul convorbirilor oficiale, președinte zairez l-a certat pe Ceaușescu mai în glumă, mai în serios, pentru faptul că a ales să stea doar două zile în țara sa, în timp ce în Algeria a stat cinci. Conducătorul român s-a scuzat pentru acest inconvenient aruncând vina pe Mănescu, cel care a realizat programul vizitei și despre care a afirmat că: „ *...deși a avut timp 30 de zile să facă acest lucru, se pare că nu a știut să împartă bine.*”[12]

Anul 1973 a fost exact opusul celui anterior în sensul că atunci a venit rândul mai multor conducători ai unor state africane să viziteze România. Primul dintre aceștia a fost președintele Republicii Volta Superioară (astăzi Burkina Fasso), generalul Sangoule Lamizana, care a fost în România între 11-16 iunie. Acesta a purtat mai multe runde de discuții cu liderul român Nicolae Ceaușescu și a vizitat mai multe obiective din București, Argeș și Brașov. O impresie plăcută i-a lăsat liderului african hidrocentrala de pe râul Argeș de la Vidraru pe care a defintit-o ca fiind „ *o operă de artă a tehnicii românești.*”[13]

În perioada 10-12 iulie 1973 a venit rândul președintelui RP Congo, comandantul Marien Ngouabi, să viziteze România. Deși promovat cu mult fast, acest eveniment nu s-a finalizat cu foarte multe înțelegeri concrete între cele două părți, fiind semnate doar Declarația solemnă comună a RS România și a RP Congo, Comunicatul Comun al vizitei și un Aide-Memoire cu privire la cooperarea economică între cele două state.

Ultimul eveniment de acest fel din anul 1973 a fost reprezentat de vizita neoficială a președintelui Republicii Africa Centrală, mareșalul Jean Bedel Bokassa, în România. Aceasta reprezenta de fapt concediul de odihnă al președintelui Republicii Africa Centrală, pe care a ales să și-l petreacă în România la invitația lui Ceaușescu. Conform fișei analitice a vizitei, delegația centrafricană a vizitat orașele Predeal, Brașov, Constanța, Tulcea și Sulina, dar și alte stațiuni de pe litoralul Mării Negre. Deplasarea oaspeților între aceste obiective s-a realizat cu automobilul și cu

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[11] Pentru cuvântarea lui Ceaușescu de la acel eveniment a se vedea Nicolae Ceaușescu, *România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate*, vol. 7, Editura Politică, București, 1973, pp. 94-106.
[12] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR-Secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 22/1972, f. 6.
[13] *Scânteia,* an XLII, nr. 9538, 13 iunie 1973, p. 3. Pentru mai multe informații despre această vizită a se vedea numerele ziarului *Scânteia* din intervalul 11-16 iunie 1973.

elicopterul.[14] Această vizită nu a fost doar un simplu concediu de odihnă pentru Bokassa, în timpul acesteia desfășurându-se mai multe runde de negocieri între reprezentanții celor două țări. Acestea s-au materializat prin semnarea a patru acorduri de cooperare în mai multe domenii între România și Republica Africa Centrală. Cel mai important dintre acestea a fost Acordul General de Colaborare între Republica Socialistă România și Republica Africa Centrală, semnat de cei doi președinți. Acesta cuprindea opt articole și a fost publicat integral în ziarul *Scânteia* din 28 iulie. Se prevedea printre altele extinderea cooperării dintre cele două state în mai multe domenii economice și tehnico-științifice, iar România se obliga să ajute logistic statul african pentru a ajunge la un nivel optim al dezvoltării. În ultimul articol al Acordului era menționat faptul că acesta urma să aibă o valabilitate de 10 ani.[15] De asemenea au mai fost semnate două acorduri între cele două guverne privind înființarea unor societăți mixte româno-centrafricane privind exploatarea, industrializarea și comercializarea lemnului și a unei societăți mixte pentru producția agricolă. Ultimul document semnat între cele două părți era un acord privind cooperarea pentru exploatarea și valorificarea zăcămintelor de minereuri, hidrocarburi și diamante de pe teritoriul Republicii Africa Centrală.[16]

În schimb Ceaușescu a efectuat o vizită neoficială în Senegal, în data de 21 septembrie 1973, acesta fiind de fapt o escală în capitala Dakar la întoarcerea dintr-un turneu care a cuprins vizita în mai multe state din America Latină. La sosirea pe aeroportul din capitala senegaleză delegația română a fost întâmpinată de președintele Leopold Sedar Senghor și alți oficiali din conducerea țării. Pe durata celor câteva ore petrecute în acea locație, cei doi conducători au avut o rundă de convorbiri, la sfârșitul cărora Ceaușescu a acordat un interviu trimisului celui mai important post de radio din Senegal.[17]

Pe plan economic s-a încercat aplicarea directivelor trasate în cadrul Prezidiului Permanent al CC al PCR din 7 aprilie 1972, fiind realizate proiectele unor societăți mixte între România și mai multe state africane în diferite domenii. Acestea urmau a se înființa pe teritoriul respectivelor state, care dețineau și 51% din activele lor. Conform înelegerilor negociate între părți statul român trebuia să asigure utilajele și specialiștii, în timp ce țările africane concesionau terenurile care urmau să fie exploatate și aduceau forța de muncă. Statele deschise cel mai mult spre o astfel de cooperare în perioada studiată au fost Republica Africa Centrală, RP Congo și Nigeria. Domeniile de funcționare a societăților mixte erau prelucrarea lemnului și agricultura în cazul tuturor acestor state dar și extragerea diamantelor în cazul Republicii Africa Centrală. Trebuie spus că Ceaușescu a reușit să-l convingă și pe Mobutu să înființeze o societate mixtă româno- zaireză în domeniul agricol deși legea acelui stat nu permitea acest lucru. Proiectul a fost realizat de partea română însă până în 1974 nu a fost pus în aplicare. Modul în care s-a negociat înființarea acestora și cum au fost puse în aplicare proiectele vor fi analizate pe larg în capitolele referitoare la relațiile României cu fiecare stat în parte.

Ca punct terminus al acestei lucrări am hotărât să ne oprim la anul 1974, acesta fiind momentul în care relațiile României cu statele din Africa Subsahariană în general și părțile centrale și de vest ale acesteia în particular, au ajuns la apogeu. În cadrul discuțiilor cu diversele delegații

[14] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe- Vizite Interne, dosar nr. 6/1973, f. 126
[15] *Scânteia,* an XLII, nr. 9583, 28 iulie 1973, p. 3
[16] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe- Vizite Interne, dosar nr. 6/1973, f. 98
[17] *Scânteia,* an XLIII, nr. 9638, 22 septembrie 1973, p. 1.

africane sosite în România Ceaușescu dorea să lase impresia că era cel mai mare susținător al acelor state în lupta lor împotriva „imperialismului" politic și economic. Nu de puține ori, conducătorul român se lăuda cu faptul că avea relații excelente cu toate statele de pe continentul negru, indiferent de regimurile politice existente. Singurele state excluse din acea ecuație erau Africa de Sud și Rhodesia, pe care le eticheta ca având regimuri politice rasiste.

Spre deosebire de anii precedenți, conducătorul român s-a axat în anul 1974 pe consolidarea relațiilor cu statele din partea de vest a Africii, care fuseseră neglijate. Pe plan diplomatic primul pas în acest sens a fost realizarea unui nou turneu de vizite pe continentul negru în luna martie. Țările în care a ajuns cuplul prezidențial român au fost Liberia și Guineea, între cele două fiind efectuată o vizită și în Argentina.

Primul stat aflat pe lista delegației române a fost Liberia, unul din primele teriorii independente din Africa și cunoscut pentru apropierea de SUA. Ceaușescu și însoțitorii sau au stat aici 2 zile, în perioada 3-5 martie. Ceaușescu și însoțitorii sau au stat aici 2 zile, în perioada 3-5 martie. Pe durata ședерii, oaspeții români au vizitat mai multe obiective economice și culturale, au avut loc mai multe runde de convorbiri între cei doi șefi de stat și au fost semnate mai multe acorduri economice. Același scenariu a fost și în timpul vizitei din Guineea, efectuată între 9-11 martie, cu mențiunea că președintele Sekou Toure a organizat mai multe festivități în onoarea lui Ceaușescu.

Până la momentul plecării, cei doi șefi de stat au semnat și o serie de documente care marcau bunele relații bileterale dintre cele două state. Cel mai important dintre acestea a fost Tratatul de prietenie și cooperare între Republica Socialistă România și Republica Guineea. Acesta era alcătuit din douăsprezece articole care aveau ca scop relglementarea principiilor după urma să se realizeze cooperarea dintre cele două state începând cu acel moment și în toate domeniile. Cel mai important fundament prezent în tratat era aplicarea principiului egalității în toate domeniile în care existau relații bilaterale.[18]

Un alt document semnat în urma negocierilor a fost Comunicatul Comun al vizitei. Aici a fost prezentată toată activitatea delegației române în Guineea, atât obiectivele vizitate cât și rezultatele negocierilor dintre cele două părți, punându-se accentul pe similitudinile din poziția față de anumite evenimente internaționale dar și pe cooperarea dintre cele două state.[19]

Un alt succes al negocierilor dintre cele două delegații a fost înființarea Comisiei Mixte de Cooperare Economică și Tehnică între România și Guineea. Tot atunci a avut loc și prima sesiune a acesteia, partea română fiind condusă de Ion Pățan, iar cea guineeză de Moussa Diakite. În același timp au mai fost semnate și alte acorduri și tratate precum: Acordul pentru exploatarea și transformarea în alumină și aluminiu a bauxitei, dar și pentru exploatarea minereului de fier din zona Boke din Guineea; Acordul privind deschiderea nei linii de credit; protocolul privind schimburile de mărfuri pe anul 1974; Acordul de cooperare în domeniul sănătății publice și Convenția sanitară-veterinară.[20]

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[18] *Scânteia,* an XLIII, nr. 9807, 12 martie 1974, p. 2.
[19] *Ibidem,* p. 3.
[20] Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), *Politica externă a României-dicționar cronologic,* Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1986, p. 309.

Rezultatele acestui turneu au fost prezentate de Ceaușescu în ședința Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din data de 15 martie 1974. Despre Liberia conducătorul român considera că exista o bună oportunitate de colaborare în domeniile extracției minereului de fier, în agricultură, domeniul piscicol și executarea unor lucrări de explorare a petrolului și a aaltor minerale.[21] Referitor la perioada petrecută în Guineea se afirma că întâlnirea dintre conducătorii celor două țări și înțelegerile semnate cu această ocazie reprezentau un moment deosebit de important în dezvoltarea raporturilor de prietenie și solidaritate militantă dintre cele două partide, state și popoare.[22]

Tot în cadrul acelei ședințe Ceaușescu a expus motivele pentru care dorea să colaboreze cu statele africane în domeniul prelucrării lemnului. În acest sens, conform stenogramele oficiale, Ceaușescu afirma: „*...În domeniul lemnului am tăiat destul din păduri,trebuie chiar să reducem puțin exploatarea tocmai pentru a putea să refacem pădurile. De fapt, ne-ar trebui vreo 10 ani să mergem sub cota planificată și va trebui să ajungem acolo, realizând aceste cooperări largi,mergând până la 1 milion de hectare, dacă nu mai mult, ca să putem diminua tăierile la noi ca să refacem patrimoniul nostru care a suferit mult și care are influență negativă și asupra climei și a întregului sistem național. Așa că, din acest punct de vedere, aceste cooperări au o importanță foarte mare pentru dezvoltarea noastră, în afară de aspectul politic, de faptul că toate aceste cooperări noi le așezăm pe o bază nouă, ceea ce ajută și aceste țări în a acționa și în relațiile cu alte țări, chiar cu țări socialiste care nu prea agreează ideea dezvoltării și industrializării acestora și merg tot pe vechile practici să ia tot ce pot de acolo.*”[23]

În vara și începutul toamnei aceluiași an a venit rândul câtorva președinți ai unor state din Africa de Vest să viziteze România. Primul dintre aceștia a fost conducătorul Republicii Islamice Mauretania, Moktar Ould Daddah Care a petrecut cinci zile în statul român în perioada 20-25 iunie 1974. Pe durata vizitei, oaspeții africani au avut mai multe runde de convorbiri oficiale cu înalții demnitari români, au vizitat mai multe obiective din București, Prahova și Galați, petrecând și două zile de odihnă pe litoralul Mării Negre. Acest eveniment s-a dovedit a fi, teoretic, un adevărat succes, fiind semnate nu mai puțin de nouă documente care reglementau direcțiile relațiilor dintre cele două țări. Cele mai multe erau reprezentate de Acorduri de cooperare și colaborare în diferite domenii economice (cinci la număr). Alte documente semnate au mai fost Comunicatul și Declarația solemnă comună, o Convenție sanitar-veterinară și un Program de schimburi în domeniile învățământului, științei și culturii pentru anii 1974-1978 dintre cele două state.[24]

Următorul lider african care a ajuns pe meleaguri românești în 1974 a fost președintele Republicii Sierra Leone, dr. Siaka Probyn Stevens, în perioada 19-24 iulie 1974. Pe durata șederii în România, liderul african a avut întâlniri oficiale cu Ceaușescu și alți oficiali români și a vizitat mai multe obiective economice și cartiere de locuințe din București. O bună parte a timpului în care s-a aflat în România a fost petrecut de Stevens pe litoralul Mării Negre, unde a vizitat toate stațiunile turistice. Înainte de plecare, cei doi șefi de stat au semnat și o serie de documente care consfințeau cooperarea dintre statele lor. Cele mai multe dintre acestea era Acorduri economice

[21] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR- Secția Cancelarie, dosar nr. 19/1974, f. 217.
[22] *Ibidem,* f. 229.
[23] *Ibidem,* f. 221.
[24] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR- Secția Relații Externe- Vizite interne, dosar nr. 4/1974, f. 155.

generale și în mai multe domenii, în special de explorare și exploatare a mai multor bogății ale subsolului din Sierra Leone.[25]

Ultima vizită din această serie a fost cea a președintelui Liberiei, dr. William R. Tolbert jr. Din periada 10-30 septembrie 1974. Aceasta era, de fapt, răspunsul conducătorului liberian la vizita lui Ceaușescu în țara sa din luna martie a aceluiași an. Trebuie menționat faptul că Tolbert jr. nu se afla penrtru prima dată în România, el mai petrecând câteva zile la București în perioada 11-16 august 1969, în calitate de președinte al Alianței Baptiste Mondiale la invitația reprezentanților acestui cult din România.[26] Revenind la evenimentul din anul 1974, președintele liberian a vizitat mai multe obiective din București și județele Constanța, Prahova și Brașov. Referitor la rezultatele vizitei, acestea nu au fost prea concludente, deoarece principalul scop pentru care Tolbert jr. sosise în România era petrecerea concediului de odihnă și mai puțin treburile de stat. Cu toate acestea, la părăsirea României de către delegația liberiană au fost semnate câteva înțelegeri de cooperare în domeniul agriculturii.[27]

Pe lângă aceste evenimente, în anul 1974 au fost înființate oficial și primele societăți mixte de cooperare dintre România și unele state africane. Cele mai importante care au apărut atunci au fost realizate în parteneriat cu Republica Africa Centrală. Prima dintre acestea se numea Scaromines și funcționa în domeniul exploatării unei mine de diamante de pe teritoriul statului african. Celelalte două funcționau în domeniul prelucrării lemnului, având în exploatare perimetre de pădure afalate tot în statul centrafrican. Începuturile acestora vor fi analizate pe larg în ultimul capitol, care este dedicat relațiilor dintre România și Republica Africa Centrală.

Ultimul eveniment din anul 1974 în care au fost implicați și reprezentanți ai statelor africane a fost Congresul al XI-lea al Partidului Comunist Român desfășurat între 25-28 noiembrie. Așa cum se obișnuia, la aceste evenimente erau invitate delegații ale tuturor partidelor ale unor state de pe diferite continente cu care PCR avea relații. Dacă la precedentele Congrese participarea partidelor din Africa Subsahariană a fost limitată, singurul prezent la cele din 1965 și 1969 fiind Partidul Democrat din Guineea, cel din 1974 a cunoscut o afluență de delegații ale statelor din toate colțurile continentului african, inclusiv cele care se aflau sub influența SUA și a fostelor imperii coloniale precum Liberia sau Senegalul. La Congres au participat în total 139 de reprezentanți ai partidelor comuniste, socialiste, social-democrate, de guvernământ și mișcări de eliberare națională din 104 țări ale lumii.[28] Acest lucru a evidențiat megalomania din ce în ce mai excesivă a lui Ceaușescu, care dorea să arate faptul că, atât el cât și PCR, se bucurau de o recunoaștere la nivel mondial, iar modul în care acest eveniment a fost prezentat în presa română dădea impresia că Bucureștiul acelor zile devenise capitala lumii.

În concluzie, politica externă a României în Africa Subsahariană s-a bazat la început pe ajutorarea noilor state apărute, mai ales Guineea, relațiile economice fiind încă într-un stadiu incipient, iar apogeul acestora s-a consemnat după anul 1970. În perioada studiată au avut loc foarte multe vizite reciproce ale unor delegații românești și ale statelor din acea parte a Africii. Cele mai

[25] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR- Secția Relații Externe- Vizite interne, dosar nr. 7/1974, f. 115.
[26] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR- Secția Administrativ Politică, dosar nr. 10/1969, ff. 2-3.
[27] ANIC, Fond CC al PCR- Secția Relații Externe- Vizite interne, dosar nr. 11/ 1974, f. 199
[28] Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), *op. cit.*, p.315.

importante momente au fost reprezentate de viziele lui Ceaușescu în unele din aceste state din anii 1972 și 1974. De asemenea, mai mulți lideri africani au vizitat România. În cadrul acestor evenimente au fost discutate foarte multe proiecte de cooperare în mai multe domenii, însă foarte puține au fost puse în practică. Cauzele pentru nerealizarea lor au fost mai multe și țineau mai ales de particularitățile statelor africane, care se confruntau în acea perioadă cu instabilitate politcă și crize economice.

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EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY FOR THE DANUBE REGION - OPPORTUNITIES FOR TOURISM DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMANIAN DANUBE GORGE

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Abstract: The European Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) promotes culture and tourism. For Romania, an area of interest in the field of biodiversity conservation and tourism development is the Danube Gorge area from the Iron Gates. Iron Gates Natural Park is a protected area established as a territory where the remarkable beauty of the landscape and the biological diversity. This protected area constitutes a space with a real tourism potential given the existence of some natural and cultural values of national and European importance.

Keywords: EUSDR, tourism, Danube gorge, protected area, Iron Gates Natural Park, tourism resources

In 2008, Romania, together with Austria, initiates the European Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR). The European Council has endorsed on 24 June 2011 the Danube Strategy. The Danube Strategy is a project of the European Union to which non-EU countries from the Danube basin are also invited to participate. At the Danube Strategy fourteen countries participate: nine EU Member States (Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany – as federal also through Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria Lands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary) and five non-EU countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine). Each objective of the strategy corresponds to a specific area of action, grouped into 11 priority areas, each priority area being coordinated by 2 states / lands in the region.

In this framework formed by EUSDR, opportunities for collaboration are created and some projects aimed at developing the areas covered in the Danube basin are implemented. (Ágh, Kaiser, Koller, 2010)

An area of interest, especially for Romania, in the field of biodiversity conservation and tourism development, is the Danube Gorge area from the Iron Gates. The region of the gorge forms the Iron Gates Natural Park (Porta Ferea in Latin, Danje Djerdap in Serbian, Vaskapuin in Hungarian, Demir-kapi in Turkish, Porţile de Fier in Romanian). (Manea, Matei, 2009)

Iron Gates Natural Park is a protected area established as a territory where the remarkable beauty of the landscape and the biological diversity can be harnessed while preserving unaltered the

traditions and improving the quality of life of the communities to be the result of the economic activities of the residents, conducted in harmony with nature. (Matei et al., 2011)

Iron Gates Natural Park is located in the south-west of Romania, at the border with Serbia, with an area of 115,655 ha, partially occupying the territories belonging to Caraş-Severin and Mehedinţi Counties, in the southern part of Locvei and Almăjului Mountains and in the south-west of Mehedinţi Plateau.

Iron Gates Natural Park stretches between 21º 21' and 22º 36' east longitude and between 44º 51' and 44º 28' 30" north latitude. The main access points are in the vicinity of Drobeta Turnu Severin and Orşova cities in Mehedinţi County as well as Socol and Naidaş localities in Caraş Severin County. The territory of the Iron Gates Natural Park overlaps on the territory of 15 administrative units from the category of localities.

In accordance with Law no. 5/2000, Order no. 552/2003 of M.A.P.A.M., G.D. no. 2151/2004 and GEO 57/2007, in the Iron Gates Natural Park are included a total of 18 protected areas (reservations). Also, in accordance with G.D. 1284/2007, on the territory of the Iron Gates Natural Park two avifaunistic special protection areas were declared, as part of the European ecological network NATURA 2000 in Romania, namely: ROSPA0026 Danube Course-Baziaş-Iron Gates (10,124.4 ha) and ROSPA0080 Almăjului Mountains-Locvei Mountains (118,141.6 ha). According to Order 1964/2007 of the Minister of Environment and Sustainable Development it was declared as a Site of Community Importance, ROSCI0206 Iron Gates (124,293.0 hectares), part of the European ecological network NATURA 2000.

1. Nera Puddle – Danube

The importance of the reservation (10 ha) is given by the wetland area with specific hydrophilic and hygrophile vegetation (*Typha sp*., *Phragmites sp*., *Carex sp*., *Salix sp*.), with a rich aquatic fauna: the small egret (*Egretta garzetta*), the grey heron (*Ardea cinerea*), the pygmy cormorant (*Phalacrocorax pygmaeus*) etc.

2. Baziaș Natural Reservation

It is a mixed type reservation, it has a forestry profile and protects the vegetal associations of *Fraxinus ornus*, *Cornus mas*, *Tilia tomentosa*, *Quercus cerris* with the Banat peony in the herbaceous layer (*Paeonia officinalis var. banatica, Paeonia mascula*) on a surface of 170.9 ha. Among the protected fauna are included Hermann's tortoise (*Testudo hermanni*), the dragon (*Coluber caspius*) etc.

3. Avifaunistic special protection area – Calinovăţ wetland area

The area has a surface of 24 ha and includes Calinovăţ Island located on the Danube River, including the bordering water surface of the island to a depth of 2 m. The composition of the fauna and flora is similar to that of Moldova Veche Isle. On Calinovăţ Island there is a fully consistent forest having *Salix alba* as predominant specie.

4. The Ravine with martins

The mixed type reservation was established on an area of 5 ha for protecting the nests and colonies of martins (*Riparia riparia*) constructed in the slopes formed in the Quaternary loess deposits.

5. Divici – Pojejena avifaunistic special protection area

The area has a surface of 498 ha and the fauna and flora composition is similar to that of the other two avifaunistic special protection areas. Locally, rare clusters of *Salix alba* and *Populus alba* appear.

6. Great Valley Natural Reservation

The floristic importance of the reservation (1179 ha) is given by the high number of *Daphne laureola* (great ivy) specie, tertiary relic. The beech forests, descending along the valleys up to lower altitudes of 150-200 m, occupy an area of about 400 ha. Alongside the beech (*Fagus sylvatica*), the hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*), the silver linden (*Tilia tomentosa*), the small-leaved linden (*Tilia cordata*), the cherry (*Cerasus avium*), the maple (*Acer pseudoplatanus*), the horn (*Cornus mas*), the hawthorn (*Craetegus monogyna*) and here and there the oriental hornbeam (*Carpinus orientalis*), the ivy (*Hedera helix*), the shrub (*Ruscus hypoglossum*), the thorn (*Ruscus aculeatus*), the broom (*Genista ovata*), the woodruff (*Asperula taurine*), the tendril (*Clematis vitalba*) etc. vegetates. The steep limestone vegetation is very diverse, with specific formations of thermophilic shrubs ("şibleac"). The hedges are made up mostly of lilac (*Syringa vulgaris*), sumac (*Cotinus coggygria*), manna (*Fraxinus ornus*), Turkish cherry (*Padus mahaleb*) etc. The limestone walls and beams are covered with *Sesleria filifolia* bushes or sweet Williams (*Dianthus kitaibelii*, *Dianthus banaticus*), with the Carpathian endemisms *Erysium saxosum*, *Draba lasiocarpa*, accompanied by feather grass bushes (*Stipa eriocaulis*), *Centaurea atropurpurea* etc. Suitable life conditions find as well a series of Mediterranean and Balkan plant species, such as: *Acanthus longifolius*, *Allium petraeum*, *Bupleurum praealtum*, *Calamintha officinalis*, *Echinops banaticus*. The geomorphological importance is due to the complex relief developed on limestone (ditches, sinkholes, roof valleys, intermittent springs, whirlpools, gorges, caves, potholes) met on the Great Valley or its tributaries (Mudavița Seacă, Ogașul Rău, Ogașul Tisa, Ogașul Greci, Valea Apele Albe). In the Great Valley's basin there are known 45 caves and potholes, among them Gaura Haiducească (1370 m long) and Avenul Roșu (149 m level difference).

7. The Water Cave from Polevii Valley

The reservation has an area of 3.2 ha and contains the cave as well as a land area of 3.2 hectares with forest, located on the outside - The faces of the Danube, Moldova New Forest District.

8. Ostrovul Moldova Veche

The avifaunistic special protection area, the wetland area Ostrov - Moldova Veche has an area of 1,627 ha of which 345 ha are occupied by the island itself. On the island there have been identified 72 bird species belonging to 30 families of 14 orders. Of their total, 28 species are included in the Directive on the conservation of wild birds, among which may be cited: *Phalacrocorax pygmaeus*, *Phalacrocorax carbo sinensis*, *Ardea purpurea*, *Nycticorax nycticorax*, *Egretta garzetta*, *Oenanthe hispanica*, *Anas strepera*, *Anas platyrhynchos*, *Larus argentatus* etc. Among the rare species of fish the following stand out: *Lota lota* and *Umbra krameri*. The flora is represented by arboreal elements such as *Salix alba*, *Populus alba*, *Salix purpurea* and herbaceous such as *Salvinia natans*, *Elodea canadensis*, *Phragmites australis*, *Butomus umbellatus*, *Iris pseudacorus* etc.

9. Șvinița fossil place

It is a famous reservation in Europe, with ammonites from the average Jurassic (Dogger). Strong red ferruginous fossil limestones with cephalopods are found in the facies of Klauss and outcrop over a length of 5 km, containing over 60 types of ammonites, belemnites, brachiopods, molluscs (including *Oppelia aspidoides*, *Lytoceras adeloides*, *Macrocephalites macrocephalus*, *Holcophyloceras mediterra*neum etc.). It is one of the most important Mesozoic fossil points in the Carpathians.

10. Great and Small Gorges

The Natural Reservation Great and Small Gorges has an area of 215 ha. In this area the Danube crosses the narrowest and the most grandiose area of the Danube Gorge, Great Gorges being separated by from the Small Gorges by the Dubova bassinet. Through Great and Small Danube Gorges it is understood the area of the gorge comprised between Plavișevița and Ogradena, forming an well individualized geomorphological unit. The Miocene Basin from Dubova divides Great and Small Danube Gorges into two distinct parts: Great and Small Gorges. Great Gorges are situated between Dubovei Bassinet and Plavișevița. With a length of 3.8 km and a width of 200-350 m, they are made of Dealul Ciucaru Mare (318 m), whose steep walls border the left side of the river and Dealul Știrbățul Mare (768 m) located on the right side. Small Gorges are situated between Dubovei Bassinet and Ogradena, having 3.6 km in length and 150-350 meters width. They are made of Dealul Ciucaru Mic (313 m) and Dealul Știrbățul Mic (626 m). The flora from the Gorges area contains many Mediterranean elements mixed with the central Europe ones. At the base of the steep there are found European beech arboretums (*Fagus sylvatica*), Crimea Beech (*Fagus taurica*), oriental beech (*Fagus orientalis*), Oriental hornbeam (*Carpinus orientalis*), manna (*Fraxinus ornus*), Montpellier maple or trilobated maple (*Acer monspessulanum*), Turkish hazel (*Corylus colurna*). In the sunniest areas grows the Turkey oak (*Quercus cerris*), together with the downy oak (*Quercus pubescens*), the durmast (*Quercus dalechampii*, *Q. polycarpa*), the wild lilac (*Syringa vulgaris*). In the shaded areas, at only 120 m altitude, grows the yew (*Taxus baccata*), tertiary relic and natural monument. Other plant species protected in the reservation: gorges tulip (*Tulipa hungarica var. Undulatifolia*), the rock iris (*Iris reichenbachii*), gorges bells (*Campanula crassipes*), *Cephalarea laevigata*, *Saponaria glutinosa*, *Cerastium banaticum*, the feather grass (*Stipa Aristel*, *Stipa danubialis*) etc. The karstic relief is well represented by forms of surface (clints and fields of clints - especially specific to the Small Gorges, sinkholes and uvala - giving the keynote of the Great Gorges) as well as of depth (there have been identified seven caves with a total length of 2,155 m, of which the most important is the Ponicova cave). Upon entering Ponicova cave, the creek by the same name creates some short and wild keys and a natural bridge of about 25 m long and 6-8 m high. This cave has a total length of 1,666 m, crossing Ciucaru Mare and going out into the Danube.

11. Bahna fossil place

The paleontological reservation (10 ha) is one of the best known and most interesting fossil points from Romania, with a high scientific value. It is described a rich fauna of marine invertebrates, dominated by bivalves (Ostreid), corals and gastropods. There are two points of interest: one at Ilovița, where limestone and clay marl deposits contain numerous mollusks, echinoids and fossil foraminiferas, belonging to the Sarmatian and another to the northwest of the

town of Bahna, at Curchia, where the reef limestones contain numerous coral, gastropods, bivalves, echinoids, brachiopods, etc.

12. Duhovnei Hill

The forest type reservation covers an area of 50 hectares and has as object of protection the secular forests of Turkish hazel (*Corylus colurna*) mixed with durmast (*Quercus petraea*) – forests of dry trees.

13. Gura Văii – Vârciorova Natural Reservation

The floristic and forestry reservation (305 ha) is located in the eastern extremity of the Park. Within it, the forests with a very diverse floristic composition, with many rare species in Romania are protected. In their composition falls the golden durmast (*Quercus dalechampii*), the Hungatrian oak (*Quercus frainetto*), the Turkish cherry (*Padus mahaleb*), Turkish hazel (*Corylus colurna*); in the bushes and subshrub are found the black hawthorn (*Crataegus Pentaginul, Craetegus nigra*), the royal purple (*Cotinus coggygria*), the fig (*Ficus carica*), and in the herbaceous one – the Rustyback (*Ceterach officinarum*), *Asplenium cuneifolium*, *Cheilathes marantae*, *Tunica Saxifraga*, *Dianthus banaticus*, *Dianthus varciorovensis*, the rock violets (*Viola rupestris, Viola luteola*), the Iron Gates dill (*Cachrys ferulacea*), *Verbascum varciorovae* etc.

14. Fața Virului

Due to the extremely varied landscape within the reservation (6ha) exceptionally beautiful small waterfalls and gorges were formed. On the background of a varied climate as well (Central European and sub-Mediterranean), a characteristic flora is protected, with *Cacrhys ferulacea*, *Minuartia cataractarum, Rubus severinensis* endemites, and many species of trees – *Quercus virgiliana*, *Corylus colurna*, *Celtis australis* etc. The tertiary relict association of nettletree with walnut presents a special value (*Celto – juglandetum regiae*).

15. Cracul Crucii

It is a floristic reservation with an area of 2 ha, located next to the dam at the Iron Gates I hydroenegetic resort, for preserving the grassland of a rare landscape value with *Minuartia capillacea*, *Cacrhys ferulacea* and *Cheilanthes maranthae*.

16. Valea Oglănicului

The reservation has an area of 150 ha, having similar flora, the area is home to a unique species in Romania – *Gladiolus illyricus* as well as other endemic species such as *Tulipa hungarica var. undulatifolia* (endemic for the Iron Gates area), *Paeonia dahurica, Stipa eriocaulis* (*Stipa pulcherima ssp. mediteranea*).

17. Cracul Găioara

The floristic reservation located in the eastern end of the Park protects on an area of 5 ha the *Ephedra distachya* tertiary relics (tendril), *Scorzonera lanata*, and the *Stipa danubialis*, *Cephalaria uralensis var. Multifida* endemites.

18. Văranic Hill

Mixed reservation having an area of 350 ha, it protects the habitats of European importance developed on limestone – sub-Mediterranean bushes formations (şibleac) with Oriental hornbeam (Carpinus orientalis), wild lilac (Syringa vulgaris), manna (*Fraxinus ornus*). Among the protected

fauna there are Hermann's tortoise (*Testudo hermanni boettgeri*), the horned viper (*Vipera ammodytes*), etc.

Iron Gates Natural Park distinguishes by the unique features with a high degree of interest in tourism, (Ţigu, Andreeva, Nica, 2010) which can be classified into the following resource categories:

A. Landscape resources resulting from combining the environmental elements and the human existence ever since the Paleolithic and Epipaleolithic in the area of the Iron Gates. (Mitroi, Mazilu, 2014)

B. The natural resources, respectively:

- the variety of the geological and geomorphological features imposed by variety of petrographic and geomorphological processes;
- the existence of the largest gorge in Europe and on the course of the Danube (134 km);
- the presence of some unique paleontological sites through their composition and diversity;
- the large number of superior plants (1,668), of which a large number of endemism, rare plants at national level, but also many species of Community interest;
- the high number of animal species (more than 5,200 faunal elements), many of national and Community importance;
- the presence of some wetland areas which constitute important habitats for worldwide protected bird species;
- the appreciable surface occupied by forestry areas, some sheltering species of particular value from the scientific point of view;
- the high diversity of the habitats, in this area being identified 171 habitats, of which 26 are unique to Romania and 21 of Community interest.

C. Cultural and human resources, respectively:

- traces of settlements from the Paleolithic, Mesolithic and Neolithic period;
- testimonies attesting the habitation history: castles, monasteries, churches, buildings with special architectural features: houses, water mills unique from the point of view of the operating system, stone furnishing, etc.;
- the existence of some ethnic diversity raised with various customs and traditions (Romanians, Serbians, Czechs, Swabians, Gypsies, Hungarians), without ethnic conflicts;
- the presence of the largest hydrotechnical facility in Romania and the Danube basin (Iron Gates I Hydro-Energetic and Navigation System).

D. Scientific resources, respectively:

- plant and animal species of national and Community importance;
- habitats of national and Community importance;
- outstanding geological and geomorphological values;
- cultural and human values;
- existing research stations in this region.

E. Educational resources, respectively:

- natural and cultural objectives from Iron Gates Natural Park;
- Documentation and Information Centers and the information point.

F. Other resources of the area:

- the low population density, as well as the high degree of naturalness increases the importance of the Iron Gate Natural Park for recreational activities.
- the dominance of the forest and the high degree of isolation from the urban influences contribute to increasing the attractiveness of the Iron Gates Natural Park.

In the park there are 15 marked tourist trails of varying degrees of difficulty, which provide opportunities for tourism industry:

1) Stariște-Trescovăț. It is a route that crosses Turkey oak, the Hungarian oak, beech forests and meadows, with a medium degree of difficulty, which is covered in about 6 hours. The main point of attraction is Trescovăț volcano's neck.

2) Șvinița-Tricule. It is a route that has an average degree of difficulty and it is covered in about 5 hours having as points of attractions: the accumulation lake, the Șvinița town, the remains of the traditional houses and of the church from the old village, as well as the ruins of the medieval fortress from Trikule. Trikule Fortress was represented by three towers arranged in a triangle along the Danube riverbank. The whole fortress was flooded after the development of Iron Gate I accumulation lake, on the surface being visible only two towers.

3) Cioaca Cremeneasca-Rudina Route. Route of average difficulty, it can be covered in 4 hours, many contrasting landscapes being along it such as abandoned dumps, the serpentinite of Tișovița and Plavișevița, the traditional architecture represented by bi-cellular houses.

4) Liubotina Valley-Rudina. It's a fairly long route, of medium difficulty, which is covered in about 6 hours. It is a scenic route, along Liubotina Valley where a series of waterfalls can be found and on Rudima plateau a wonderful overview towards the Danube opens.

5) Great Gorges. The route is of medium difficulty and is covered in about 2 hours.

6) Small Gorges. It is a route of medium difficulty and is covered in about 1 hour. It is one of the most beautiful routes in the park, with numerous panoramic view points that open towards the Great Gorges and the Serbian side of the Danube.

7) Orșova-Alion Hill. It is a route that is covered in 2.30-3 hours and has an average degree of difficulty. Along the route one can find numerous panoramic view points offering an impressive view over the Cerna Bay, Iron Gates hydropower plant and Kladovo village on the Serbian side.

8) Orșova-Tarovăț. It's a route with medium degree of difficulty that can be covered in 5 hours and crosses wooded, hilly areas, without steep slopes. The terminus of the route is the confluence of the Danube with Bahna River.

9) Racovăț-Boldovin. It is a medium difficulty route and can be traversed in 5 hours. The main attraction is one of the 3 places that make Bahna Fossil Reservation – the first paleontological reservation from Romania.

10) Vodiţei Valley-Duhovna Hill. It is a medium difficulty route that can be traversed in 5 hours and climbs on Duhovnei Hill where a view over Bahna-Orsova Depression can be admired.

11) Dubova-Great Gorges. The route is of medium difficulty, it can be crossed in 2 hours and offers a number of panoramic view points from where one can admire the Great Gorges, as well as the Serbian side of the Danube.

12) Balta Nera - Ostrov Moldova Veche. The route presents medium difficulty, it can be covered in about 8-10 hours by bicycle and crosses a number of reservations and avifaunistic special protection areas.

13) The Water Mills Valley. It has 4 secondary options (one in Gornea town, one in Șicheviț, one on Gramensca Valley and the fourth on Zăsloane), it presents medium difficulty and can be covered in 6 hours by bicycle.

14) Gura Văii-Dealul Crucii (St. Peter's Cross). It is a medium difficulty route that can be covered in 3 hours and offers a magnificent view over the entire Iron Gate I Hydropower and Navigation System.

15) Dubova-Small Gorges. The route is of medium difficulty and can be crossed in 4 hours. Here are found numerous panoramic view points offering great images over the Great Gorges and the Serbian bank of the Danube.

Based on the valuble resources for the tourism activity, (Andrei, 2010) through the natural and ethno-cultural heritage it holds, through the special tourist routes, this space offers the possibility of developing all the main forms of tourism:

Scientific tourism has emerged as a result of discovering on the territory of several localities from the region, on both sides of the Danube Gorge, numerous sites with geological structures or with fossil fauna that have intrigued geologists and paleontologists, living elements of endemic or rare flora and fauna entered the sphere of attention of botanists, entomologists, zoologists, traces of prehistoric, ancient or feudal habitation, which have attracted historians and archaeologists in the area.

Cultural tourism is a form of tourism that addresses a wider spheres of tourists and is achieved by sightseeing the historical heritage (archaeological remains, monuments, religious buildings, ethnographic museums and popular technique sites), visiting museums, attending cultural events (folk music performances, dance, traditional festivals, exhibitions). Thus, one can visit the archaeological sites from the ancient period (the Dacian fortresses from Divici and Liubcova Rock, the Roman fort and the foot of Apollodorus of Damascus' Bridge), the Middle Ages (the ruins of St. Ladislau, Drencova and Tricule fortresses) and the modern history (Veterani Cave, Navigation and Iron Gate I Hydropower and Navigation System). The territory holds also important monuments for the Romanian national identity (Tabula Traiana, the bust of King Decebal). (Mazilu, Andrei, Dumitrescu, 2012)

Ecumenical or monastic tourism has existed ever since the Middle Ages and has developed very strongly in the modern times. The pilgrimage to settlements such as St. Ana Monastery, Vodița Monastery, the Catholic Cathedral from Orsova, etc. led to the construction of roads and settlements, made trade and industries flourish, has popularized their cultural aspects.

Tourism for rest and recreation. The natural environment of the area offers favorable conditions for developing this form of tourism, especially since this form of tourism is the least costly, virtually addressing to all categories of tourists. Depending on how is done, the characteristics of this type of tourism, are the hike and the health tourism. The most spectacular scenery throughout the course of the Danube is that of Great and Small Gorges.

Rural tourism is defined by spending the holidays in rural areas. To be favorable to agritourism, rural localities must be located in an environment free of pollutants, to hold cultural, ethnographic and folk values, and rural traditions, with a rich historical past or other tourism resources that allow for diversified and personalized offers.

Ecotourism represents visiting an area relatively unaffected by human activities, with a reduced environmental impact, which has an important educational component and provides a direct economic benefit to the local economy and the population.

Birdwatching is a form of tourism that addresses those passionate about photographing and tracking the feeding, the nesting and flight behavior of the bird species. This form of tourism can be practiced in the wetlands areas within the parks from the both sides of the Danube, where there are two bird observatories equipped in this regard.

Forestry tourism is a form of tourism that highlights the beauty of forests' landscapes, with the well-known variety of structures, forms and coloring. Forestry tourism is practiced having as basis the forest lodges and cantons specially designed for this purpose. Forestry tourism has as related forms tourism for hunting and fishing.

Speotourism is one of the forms of tourism that can harness the geological, speofaunistic, speopeisagistic potential of this area. The most famous and visited caves are: Ponicova, Gaura cu Muscă, Peştera cu Apă din Valea Polevii, Zamoniţa, Veterani, each of them with their own legends about fantastic animals, outlaws or battles between those who ruled these lands.

Cyclotourism is an increasingly common form of active tourism which may bring great benefits with minimal investment efforts and is also an activity with low environmental impact.

Mountain biking is a form of sport tourism related to cyclotourism but which is applied on special, mountain routes, with bikes properly equipped. In the parks from the banks of the Danube, this form of sport tourism can already be practiced on many tracks.

Nautical tourism is one of the forms of tourism with the greatest impact because of the existence of the Iron Gate I accumulation lake, lake that enables the development of all forms of sport and leisure tourism.

Iron Gates Natural Park constitutes a space with a real tourism potential given the existence of some natural and cultural values of national and European importance. Remoteness from population centers and the frontier regime, as well as the shortcomings to the ways of communication (low density, precarious state, insufficient coverage etc.) have determined a very slow and unconvincing development of tourism. Tourism remains, however, one of the alternatives for developing the Iron Gates Natural Park, which can be developed in a variety of forms as mentioned above. The development of this sector cannot become a certainty without improving the tourism infrastructure, which covers accommodation, recreation spaces, access roads, sanitary facilities. The natural potential of Iron Gates Natural Park can only a temporary attraction factor for the tourist flow, given that the technical facilities are lacking or insufficient.

Rural tourism is not yet a viable alternative for this space due to the low living standards of the region, the reduced volume of agricultural products, the reduced number of shopping centers and their scarce supplying. This however can be an important source of income in the future given that investments in educating people and improving domestic facilities will be made.

The delimitation, marking and media coverage of the tourist routs will help increase the popularity of this area, with possible implications for increasing tourist flow, the activity of the qualified staff being a guarantee of increasing the quality of tourism services promoted in the Iron Gates Natural Park.

Promoting tourism in the Iron Gates Natural Park cannot be achieved without increasing opportunities for these. In order to promote tourism in the Natural Park Iron Gate area is necessary to improve the infrastructure for receiving tourists and promoting their services. A priority for the Iron Gates Natural Park is represented by the consolidation of the tourists receiving infrastructure and the construction of a visiting center. The tourist offer can create alternatives for the development of this space and possibilities of routing the tourism activities to avoid direct or indirect prejudices brought to natural and social environments in order to promote especially tourism scientific (flora, fauna, geological, ethnographic and folk, speological).

Development of tourism and tourist flow orientation must take into account the support capacity of the environment, aiming to avoid degrading natural and cultural values. Tourism should not become a stress factor for natural environments nor for the human communities in this space. (Andrei, Păun-Manolache, 2013) Iron Gate Natural Park Administration must intervene and take measures, within its powers, whenever tourist activities tend to put pressure on the natural and social environments. Therefore, a tourism strategy based on knowledge of the park's exploitable heritage through tourism and directed towards the implementation of a controlled tourism, according to the priority directions of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region must be made.

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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND BRANDING IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

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Abstract:In the context of globalization, the issue of governance is becoming more challenging. Decades ago governance was mainly the attribute of national state but now, new actors are pouring into the scene: regions and local actors; towns, communities and groups of localities; integrated unions of national states, like European Union; macro-economic regions, like Danube Region; multinationals.
How these new players interact to ensure efficient governance is subject of intensive research. In the case of Romania, which is coming in the short historical time from communist experience with the powerful national state, controlling everything, adapting to these new realities which acts like a moving target is a challenging situation. .
Our research is based on the assumption that Romanian regions will align to the EU regional policies. Considering these facts, our paper is trying to identify the strategic options for the Romanian regions in order to build and communicate a new identity.

Keywords: EU policies, branding, identity, Romanian regions, regional development

1. Regionalization in Europe and in Romania

In an era of globalization, the concept of regional development bears multiple aspects, related to the systemic, interaction and interdependence relationship that establishes in the territorial hierarchies. (Andrei, 2009) Relating to the territorial principles, the term "region" involves the practices relating to the demarcation of territories, competences and attribution as organized structures, with resources and responsibilities, specific procedures and actions, limited by territorial boundaries. (Van Houtum, Kramsch, Zierhofer, 2006) These may overlap with the state borders or may have an independent character forming a supra or subnational framework. Regions have emerged also as a response to globalization, this phenomenon that weakens the national capacity to influence the economic performance. (Andrei, 2008a) Thus, the region develops rising status properties and takes over the role of supporting competitiveness through the cooperation capacity, while creating new strategic and democratic governance structures. The region, as a territorial entity that has resources and is endowed with responsibilities, has the ability to manage economic and social development, education, space organization and environmental issues through: strategic capacity (by

expanding economic cohesion, specialization and identity), institutional capacity (through the ability to represent the interest groups and identity to obtain a high level of democratic legitimacy), administrative capacity (through the bottom-up and top-down processes that are creating powerful governance concepts that sit at the basis of a network between political and administrative structures). Consequently, the region comes into prominence through sustainability and identity. (Andrei, 2007)

In the European context, the functioning of a European Union type megastructures has imposed the creation and implementation of some regional policies to govern the emergence, the development and the activity of the regions. The most important concept regarding regions and regional development is territorial cohesion. This concept considers the territorial harmonization by removing the economic and social disparities in the EU and the increase of the cooperation among the integrated states. Thus, development strategies which regulate joint action have been created. These strategies involve both supranational regions involving transnational cooperation (between member states or member states and non-member, neighbour states), of the macro-regions type (Baltic Region, Danube's Region, Alpine Region etc.) or cross-border cooperation (Euroregions, e.g., the Danubius Euroregion, the Upper Prut Euroregion), and subnational regions, known at European hierarchical level as NUTS. In line with the European policies, in Romania there are three NUTS[1] levels: NUTS I – national level (Romania), NUTS II (the development regions), NUTS III (the counties and Bucharest).

Supralocal and subnational regions with purely territorial coordination character are known in Romania as economic development regions. After 1990, Romania had to adapt the EU policies. Thus, as far as the territorial policy is concerned, in order to adjust to the EU standards, it has gone from a policy based on centralization to one based on regionalization. In 1998, in Romania were organized the economic development regions, without territorial-administrative role, but with the purpose of reducing spatial disparities. Based on four criteria: demographic size, surface, cultural identity and functional and spatial relations, there have been delineated 8 development regions: Northeast, Southeast, South, Southwest, West, Northwest, Centre and Bucharest-Ilfov. This process has been also a consequence of the changes in the national economy.

At the beginning of the post-revolutionary period, in Romania there was a low level of the territorial disparities, but following the economic mutations, the decline and the economic crisis, these disparities have widened, imposing the need for a regional approach. Among the development regions from Romania there are differences resulting from the historical, geographical, economic and cultural conditions. The poorest regions are those predominantly rural, heavily dependent on agriculture, with a lack of the young population of working age, with a poor economic development resulting from the dependence on a single economic sector, poor territorial planning, urban planning without vision and with local development strategies that do not highlight the local characteristic, a low level of attractiveness of cities, insufficient technical and urban facilities, accessibility and infrastructure, etc. On the other

[1] Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics

hand, the regions with strong cities, with economic development centres, particularly industrial, have a high degree of development, a greater attractiveness for investment, for innovation and smart specialization and a high degree of competitiveness. Unlike developed regions those less developed do not know to cooperate among actors, to develop smart specializations and to make them known. Territorial differences and disparities exist not only among development regions, but also inside them. (Andrei, Vartolomei, Gherasim, 2015)

In short, regarding the level of development of the regions, it can be said that the biggest development occurs in Bucharest-Ilfov Region as a direct consequence of capital's urban hypertrophy, which polarizes the national economy and is the most important economic growth pole. Taking advantage of the proximity to the markets from Western Europe, the Northwest, West and Central Regions have a high degree of development, being attractive to domestic and foreign investment, a fact which contributes to increasing the regional competitiveness. On an intermediate level is the Southeast Region with high economic potential given by the existence of the Danube Delta and the Black Sea, with multiple possibilities for economic growth, but insufficiently capitalized. With a relatively low degree of development are the South and Southwest Regions, through the agricultural predominance of the space, a factor of economic growth insufficiently exploited, even in the favourable framework created by the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, is the Danube River with a large navigable, commercial and touristic potential. The last place is occupied by the Northeast Region through its dependence on agriculture and the strong migration, especially abroad, of the young population of working age.

In order to increase the territorial cohesion and diminishing the regional disparities, in order to increase the regional competitiveness and harmonious development, a Regional Operational Programme with six axes of sustainable development has been established at national administrative level: to support the sustainable development of the urban growth poles, to enhance the regional and local transport infrastructure, to support growth of the regional and local business environment, the sustainable development and the tourism promotion, technical assistance. (Danciu, 2012)

In conclusion, a developed urban network, with economic growth poles, with a favourable business environment, based on innovation and smart specialization, are the fundamental elements of a high quality sustained regional development. That is why, a strategy for cities' development is the basis of the regional development. A good regional development strategy is based on: initial assessment, formulating a vision, SWOT analysis, strategic thrusts, awareness building, and implementation. (Andrei, 2008b)

A successful economic development depends on the existence of a business environment that gets involved and sustains competitiveness. (Jula, Jula, 2000) Regional competitiveness is the ability of a region, measured by comparison with other regions, to form and to provide an economic and social environment to support the accelerated creation of added value, to obtain a high productivity based on an innovative use of human, financial and material resources, to create value for increasingly sophisticated and intelligent consumers willing to pay higher prices for the higher value they perceive. The factors supporting regional

competitiveness are: structure of the economic activity, scale of innovative activities, regional accessibility (degree of peripherality), skills and labour force qualification. (Andrei, 2008c) Regional competitiveness is directly related to growth theories, the basic element being the presence of companies, entrepreneurs, capable of generating knowledge and innovation, evolution markets, new jobs, to the extent that conditions are ensured for the emergence of competition in the chosen markets. Regional competitiveness relates both to the micro and macroeconomic level. At the microeconomic level, there must be a favourable climate for the development and promotion of the value-added producing companies. (Epure et al., 2008)It is worth mentioning that, within a region there are both competitive and uncompetitive companies, but there are common features at the regional level which affect the competitiveness of all the companies located there. In this case, businesses' success, eliminating disadvantages and increasing competitiveness are provided by clusters, which materialize as a turntable, an interface and an efficient solution in relation to the competition. At the macroeconomic level, a region competes with other region, causing qualitative expansion and growth at the microeconomic level. The macroeconomic level is the one that supports and strengthens competitiveness, meaning that the region is obliged to maintain and improve its strengths, identity, and brand.

A fundamental element of the concept of regional competitiveness is represented by the direct connection amongst local entrepreneurship, knowledge and innovation, growth potential. (Popa, 2015) The central element dynamically influencing regional competitiveness is the innovation capability. The determinant elements of innovation capacity are: innovation-research and IT infrastructure, performance of the labour force, business environment, efficiency of education and training institutions, technologic transfer, good governance, finding new funding sources for the creative potential. The potential spread of innovation is encouraged by the fact that it takes place and is developed within networks, interposing in the cooperation activities of different entities, taking into account regional capacities. The most effective networks of this type are the clusters, which play a key role in the regional competitiveness.

2. Clusters – strategic tool for competitiveness and innovation at the regional level

The deepening of the globalization phenomenon as well as the increase of competitiveness on national, European and international markets has made membership to a cluster become a real advantage for SMEs. The advantage comes as a result of the quick and easy access to research findings to be implemented in production and lead to the development of innovative products, using advanced technologies. (Porter, 2008)

The European Union assigns clusters the role of "engine" of the economic development, innovation and jobs creation, which leads to business development, collaboration among companies, universities, research institutes, economic operators who conduct activities in the same geographical (local, regional, national, transnational) area.

The importance of clusters is emphasized in the new European growth strategy that relies on clusters as well, EU member states orienting themselves towards policies that aim to increase their competitiveness and innovation.

The cluster policy at Romanian level, part of the industrial policy, indicates a total of 84 cluster initiatives. Among these, 8 ESCA (European Secretariat for Cluster Analysis) silver medal clusters have been declared as cluster structures recognized at European level, which position Romania on the second place at European level, 27 ESCA bronze medal clusters for excellence in management cluster.

Cluster Association in Romania, the representative body of the clusters in Romania at national, European and international level is composed of 33 clusters, of which 13 on bio-economy. Regarding competitiveness, according to the quantitative analysis conducted by the association, it results that nationally the automotive sector comes first, followed by electronics, software, textiles, metallurgy, wood and furniture, agro-food and construction. These are considered the main engines of competitiveness at the national level. The regionalization of clusters highlights their tendency to agglomerate around the most developed cities economically speaking. (Lianu, 2015)

According to the strategic orientations of the European Commission, clusters are among the most important vectors of smart specialization at the regional and macro-regional level. In this context, the development of clusters capacity to be competitive in the international competition but also their ability to cooperate in clusters network turns into decisive factors of development.

Thus, clusters will play a central role in the development of some regional eco-systems of innovation and their connection to the macro-regional level towards smart specialization targets.

It is becoming increasingly accepted at the European level that these targets are heading towards the following mega areas: agro-food industry, energy, industrial modernization. The force of clusters will be given in the future by the ability of clusters' managers to redesign together with the local business environment regional and macro-regional value chains. The ability to think these value chains and to connect competencies for markets' development is a critical success factor in regional and macro-regional specialization.

These new capabilities target for cluster managers the development of practice communities, of actions of testing and piloting of new products, of making available some of innovation infrastructure facilities, learning and connection aspects.

From the perspective of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, the thematic area of smart specialization in which the clusters will assume an essential role is bio-economy. Breaking the value chains of the old economy based on the unsustainable use of resources and on the environmental pollution and the creation of some value chains of the circular economy will be the essential element of the collaborative platforms among the clusters in the Danube macro-region.

Specific to the Romanian clusters but also to those located in less developed countries of the macro-region are the following aspects: bordering the companies' business on the underside of the processing value chains these being particularly modest processors and innovators, limited managerial skills regarding the understanding of bio-economy's value chains, low degree of cohesion of the clusters' members. Thus, the case study Bio Danubius indicates these realities. (Andrei, Lianu, Gudei, 2016)

3. Branding regions

Our research indicates that stake holders at regional level are the most important players of these new challenges and that regional development will be the key element of economic growth in the new paradigm of globalization. Therefore the way the players will govern the regions will be essential. Capacity of collaboration between cities, clusters, megacities and local authorities in the region will be essential. Evidence shows also that regions in which actor succeed to cooperate at regional level for a strong competitive identity of the region are more advanced. Their solution is developing and communication trough branding their opportunities. Smart specialization may be the essence of the best practices.

Therefore building competitive advantage for the region is only one part of the equation. Another issue is image management and branding.

Regions are competing increasingly as a strategic response to globalization. Applying principle of marketing to places has been a major research issue and territorial marketing bacame a new discipline of study (Kotler, Keller, 2008) and an important body of lliterature and reseach emerged after that. Regions, cities, communities, clusters worldwide are applying now this new knowledge. Territorial marketing is strongly connected, on our opinion on the following factors: competitive identity of the regions; territorial marketing of the region; creation and promotion of a brand of the region, as the image of its competitive identity. (Epure, Lianu, Epure, 2009) Brand of a region is a sum and a combination of the images of different market entities of the region (Lianu, 2010) as per the scheme below (fig. 1):



Fig. 1. Competitive identity – brand

The scheme above (Lianu, 2010) is trying to decode complex interaction between products, services, symbols, brand images of this symbols in the minds of image consumers at regional level. What a region may try to sell to its buyers is leading to a composite brand (Bcc) which is not a simple sum of all the regional brand. Even more Bcc may be formed by accident if a regional branding strategy is not in place, or by strategic process. If a strategic process is in place the value addition is given by Sc (symbol of the region) and Mc (content of the messages sent in the brand strategy) Gi is designating Geographical Indications and Spis nominating other perceptions related to the region, under the formula:

$$Bcc=\sum Bp1..Bpn +\sum Bs1..Bsn + \sum Pb1..Pbn+\sum Lb1..Lbn +Sc + SM+ Sp + Gi$$

where Bp is the family of brands of products, Bs is the family of brands of services and Pb is the family of products produced by the region and Lp is the family of towns and localities. One think which has to be understood is the fact regional brands exist even if there is no branding strategy in place. As a result, the image of a region can be formed by accident, in an uncontrolled manner or by design based on a regional branding strategy. In the last scenario the most difficult task is to form a managerial unit to be responsible for this development, so called MU, managerial unit of the regional brand. This paper is strongly suggesting that: the MU has to be a private public partnership; the MU for branding the region

has to be formed by same critical mass of stakeholder which will elaborate the competitiveness strategy of the region, since branding strategy should be part of an unique strategic process; smart specialization and collaboration between town, localities, clusters, and the innovation eco-system is an essential part of the strategy. Therefore, the MU has to comprise companies, public authority representatives, clusters managers, business associations, public institutions, regional decision makers.

4. The image of the place of origin of a good perceived at the place of consumption and the effect of the place of origin. The brands of the places

In a phenomenological approach, images are those targeting of the consciousness on some things, on the sensitive reality that takes a variety of forms related to being's mode of expression. Implicitly, the image of us is an extension of our being, a mental projection not only of the way in which we perceive ourselves but, more importantly, of the way in which we wish to be perceived. So, our projection about us will also take into account the way in which we believe we will be perceived by others when we build an image. It appears thus, in the vast world of images, a realm of the continuous assessments on our own perceptions about the way in which others perceive us. Moreover, these perceptions lead to practical action, to what we often call branding or image building and this applies to individuals, companies, local communities and countries.

In the case of some communities there are two major categories of perception about the productive and competitive identity, respectively:

1. inwardly focused image of what we think we are as competitive identity without comparing ourselves to others, seeking to support this identity in front of own consumers. In this case, the image building, the branding will focus on creating a favourable consumption effect for the products from our own country or community;
2. outwardly focused image for the consumers in other countries or communities.

In this case, own country image as competitive identity, if limit only to "what we believe we are" not compared to the perceptions from the consumption country, cannot be edifying. In order to know how others perceive us, and how we wish to be perceived, it is important to understand the image of the country or place of origin perceived by the own consumers of the respective place, respectively perception no. 1, as well as the way in which different socio-cultural attitudes and behaviours about abroad and various foreign countries may influence the competitive identity described in the previous section.

Basically, a country brand building, or in general, building the competitive identity of some places has to go from what I think about myself as competitive identity towards what I think the consumer from the country where the product is sold thinks about my product.

In the case of country or place of origin A, the branding processes from this country, starting from the perception types 1 and 2 described above, can be schematically presented according to the figure below (fig. 2):


Outward branding processes
Origin place A
The image of national, regional, local competitive identity of A community
Outward consumers focus
The aggregate effect of the origin place A reflected in consumer behavior in consumption places C1-Cn
Consumption place C1-Cn
The image of competitive identity of A community in the country/consumer communities C1-Cn
Inward branding processes
Inward consumers focus from place A
Inward focus to their own consumers in countries

Fig. 2. The interaction of the origin place A in several consumption places from other countries

According to the scheme, the consumers of a place of origin focus both on their own products and on the products from outside, thereby generating the purchasing behaviours. Both focuses create market opportunities, of brand building which target changing the behaviour in consumption towards own national or regional products or towards products coming from other places. As a result of globalization and liberalization we are currently witnessing simultaneous processes, of competitive type, of branding that aim the capitalization of these effects of the place of origin. Moreover, the capitalization of these behavioural effects combines with other demands imposed by the consumer (the need for quality, durability, safety, and comfort, differentiation from others, but also belonging to a certain lifestyle, impulse towards novelty or excitement) in branding strategies increasingly more elaborated and which involve a more efficient methodology. (Veith, Lianu, 2013)

In modern consumer's behaviour manifests an dual nature of the human being intensively capitalized by the modern branding strategies, respectively the need for individuality, differentiation from others and that of association, of belonging to a lifestyle, to a fashion, to a group of consumers (Ridderstrale, Nordstrom, 2007). Branding as the conscious strategic process does not attempt to exploit only this duality, but the entire range of psychiatric manifestations, of feelings and representations, beliefs, myths or beliefs with which man consolidates his everyday existential comfort. One of the most constant beliefs is also that of the importance of product's origin on consumption safety. In this regard, the

origin acts as a provider of certainties that the human mind always needs in the process of assigning into classes or degrees of satisfaction the products or, more precisely, the image of these products. From this perspective, the place of origin of the product overlaps with the place that dictates or maintains a fashion or cultural-behavioural model, that launches a lifestyle, a type of consumption, which can be called the effect of belonging to a certain lifestyle that gives you the faith of an integral affirmation.

5. Conclusions

Regional development is entering a new economic paradigm dominated by collaborative structures among territorial concentrations of urban and rural companies. These structures develop dense network more or less performant of ecosystems of innovation in which clusters networks identify and develop smart specializations.

At the macro-regional level, the regions, countries interconnect via these ecosystems and are turning to the substance content of the new economic paradigm, namely bio-economy.

Regional competitive identities developed by these structures, in which the authorities, business environment and universities are essential factors, create and recreate in a highly accelerated dynamism, causing the stagnant regions to virtually get out of the competition to a peripheral area that can perpetuate their underdevelopment.

Moreover, the regional branding can accelerate regional disparities favouring those who have the ability and strategic vision to introduce change and disfavouring the passive ones.

From the perspective of the Romanian regions, our research indicates what the empirical data have also confirmed, respectively the economic divergence compared to the advanced regions. We believe that this phenomenon can be mitigated and reversed if we strategically approach regional development and regional branding in European context, but especially macro-regional, Danubian.

The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region is in this context a very important element of the regional development in Romania.

The regions in Romania will need to be actively involved in the macro-regional smart specialization tendencies and position itself on the future macro-regional value chains at the highest level in terms of value added.

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ASPECTS REGARDING THE LIFE OF THE FIRST ROMANIANS IN THE NORTH OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REFLECTED IN NEWSPAPERS FROM SIBIU

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Abstract: This paper tries to present some facts about the recent establishment of the first Romanians in the United States, and while pointing out the traits peculiar to them, aims particularly to show the process of assimilation under the pressure of the American environment. Their economic adaptation to the environment is of great interest as their social assimilation, because 80% of the Romanian immigrants were farm laborers and only a small part of them belong to the professional class. The causes underlying the emigration of the peasants from Transylvania are more complex: psychological motives, influenced by social and economic circumstances, there is also important to mention the tense political situation in which they lived. In the United States the Romanians are engaged in the heaviest jobs, as is the custom with the newly arrived immigrants, who are always at the bottom of the occupational scale, carrying on the roughest work, which is disliked by the others. In this paper I will give examples about such situations reflected in some of the newspapers from that time ,where the Romanians sent letters in order to inform the others about the "New World".

Keywords:Romanian immigrants, The New World, Assimilation, peasants, economic and social status

Lucrarea de faţă îşi propune să prezinte aspecte privind viaţa economică şi socială a românilor transilvăneni, emigraţi în Nordul Statelor Unite la sfârşitul secolului al XIX-lea şi începutul secolului al XX-lea, reflectate în presa sibiană. Publicațiile prezintă situaţia lor economică înaintea emigrării în Nordul Statelor Unite, căutarea unui loc de muncă, condiţiile şi standardele de viaţă ale românilor-americani. De asemenea, sunt înfățișate şi aspecte privitoare la viaţa lor economică, socială şi religioasă. În acelaşi timp, sunt prezentate procesele de asimilare şi adaptare prin care au trecut românii sub presiunea mediului socio-economic şi socio-profesional american.

Pentru această cercetare am folosit texte publicate în presa sibiană. „*Emigrarea în America*", scrisă de Ion Iosif, publicată la Editura Asociaţiunii, în anul 1914, este o lucrare care are forma unui manifest impotriva emigrării în America şi în care sunt prezentate varii argumente în acest sens. „*Românii din America*", autor Ioan Podea, vorbeşte despre începuturile emigrării, despre locurile de muncă ale românilor-americani, despre locuinţele acestora, despre viaţa lor socială, cât şi despre organizarea lor comunitară la o distanţa atât de mare de vechea patrie.

Periodicele parcurse: *Foaia Poporului, Telegraful Român* şi *Tribuna* oferă exemple despre acomodarea cu noul mediu și despre legatura dintre cei plecaţi în căutarea unui trai mai bun şi cei de acasă, care aşteptau veşti si bani de la ei.

Informaţiile pe care le voi aduce în această lucrare păstrează marturia acelor momente de început, foarte grele, în care emigrantul român, abia ajuns pe tărâmul american, fără sprijin, fără cunoscuţi şi fără a cunoaşte limba ţării, este silit să îşi câştige existenţa în minele de cărbuni, în oţelării, în fabrici sau la căile ferate, prestând unele dintre cele mai periculoase şi prost plătite munci. Dar, în acelaşi timp, este uluitoare repeziciunea cu care românii s-au adaptat şi organizat, asociindu-se şi întemeindu-şi instituţii care să le ofere sprijin moral şi financiar, în cazuri de nevoie.

Ion Iosif, în lucrarea „Emigrarea în America", menţionează că, începând cu anul 1900, satele româneşti din Ardeal se golesc tot mai mult de braţele muncitoare, iar peste Ocean începe o nouă viaţă a românilor-americani.[1]

Fără îndoială că principala cauză a fost situaţia economică din fosta împărăţie austro-ungară și din provincile româneşti de peste Carpaţi, de unde proveneau 90% dintre cei care plecau.[2] Pe lângă persecuţiile, judecăţile şi închisorile suferite de aceştia, românii din Transilvania, Banat şi Crişana nu îşi mai puteau agonisi nici cele necesare traiului zilnic, deoarece marea majoritate a pământurilor erau stăpânite de nobilimea maghiară, o mică parte aveau proprietăţi mici, iar majoritatea nimic. Tăranii români erau nevoiţi să lucreze pentru nobilul ungur, dar doar în timpul lunilor de vară, la secerat şi la treierat. Fiindcă la cel mai mic protest erau aruncaţi în închisoare, sau pedepsiţi aspru, mulţi români au hotărât să îşi caute un trăi mai bun prin emigrare în America.

În „Foaia Poporului" din anul 1902, un articol atagea atenţia asupra cauzelor emigrării în America: „De câţiva ani încoace, observăm la poporul român din Ardeal şi Ţară Ungurească ceva neobicinuit. De unde până bine de curând românul numai cu mare greu se despărţea de vatra lui, îl vedem acum plecând nu numai spre România (...), dar chiar înspre America. Care sunt cauzele? Sunt mai multe. La unii e sărăcia şi datoriile. Dările cele multe deoparte, îngreunarea traiului, luxul şi cârciumă de altă parte, i-a făcut pe mulţi să ieie această hotărâre, nădăjduind că mergând în acele ţări depărtate vor face uşor bani mulţi cu cari să se poată curăţi de necazurile de acasă şi apoi, reintorcandu-se să poată începe o viaţă nouă"[3]

În acelaşi periodic, în numărul din luna noiembrie, apare informaţia că s-au eliberat 5.744 paşapoarte, dintre acestea 1601 pentru America, pe comitate: Braşov (638), Sibiu (430), Maramureş (177), Făgăraş (172), Alba de Jos (131).[4]

În faţa multelor îndemnuri venite din toate părţile, sărăcia de acasă şi vorbele amăgitoare ale celor deja plecaţi, emigranţii români s-au confruntat şi cu câteva măsuri care interziceau emigrarea, dar acestea au fost zadarnice deoarece, oricât ar fi fost de aspre, nu îi puteau împiedica să îşi caute un trăi mai bun.

Cu câtă jale în sufletul celor care se hotărau să meargă în America, ei se rupeau de familie, de satul lor, plini de speranţă şi iluzii. Când porneau la drum, întreg satul ieşea să-i petreacă, luându-şi rămas bun de la cei ce plecau, de parcă îi însoţeau la groapă şi nu la tren: plânsete, suspine şi jale! Se gândeau dacă se vor mai vedea vreodată.

Emigranţii obosiţi şi zdrobiţi de lunga călătorie (de răul de mare, de care scăpau doar puţini, de traiul rău de pe vapor) se apropiau de New York cu speranţă, zăreau clădirile americane

[1] Ion Iosif, *Emigrarea în America. De ce să nu mergem în America*?, Editura „Asociaţiunii", Sibiu, 1914, p. 13.
[2] Serban Drutzu, *Românii din America*, Editura Cartea Românească, Bucureşti, 1926, p. 10.
[3] *Foaia Poporului*, *Emigrările*, 17 Febr/2 Martie, Nr. 8, 1902, pp. 1-2.
[4] *Ibidem*, *Emigrarile*, anul X, Nr. 2, 6/19 ian. 1902, p. 22.

impozante, trecând pe lângă statuia Libertăţii şi intrau apoi în port. Călătorii din clasa întâi şi a doua coboară pe pământ american îndată ce s-a oprit vaporul, iar cei din clasa a treia trec cu vaporaşe mai mici pe Insula Ellis, unde se află o vama numită „Castle Garden". Ellis Island a fost principalul centru de primire a emigranţilor din anul 1892 şi până în 1943[5]. Ajunşi aici, emigranţii trec printr-un examen medical şi sunt supuşi unui interogatoriu; cei ce lăsau de dorit din punct de vedere al igienei corporale erau trimişi din nou pe vapor, pentru a fi dezinfectaţi. Cei care sufereau de vreo boală contagioasă sau aveau handicapuri fizice sau mentale şi nu erau capabili să muncească erau excluşi şi întorşi spre casă. Cei care treceau peste toate vizitele acestea ajungeau în sala de aşteptare, unde îşi schimbau banii şi-şi scoteau biletul de tren până în oraşul unde aveau să călătorească.

La început a fost greu ca românul să se adapteze într-o lume nouă, dar a fost suficient ca primii plecaţi să înceapă să trimită bani celor lăsaţi acasă şi să le scrie că le merge bine ca exemplul lor să fie urmat şi de alţii. Plata ce li se oferea era relativ redusă, dar aveau avantajul că odată ajunşi în America puteau găsi oricând de lucru, pe un preţ, care nu numai că le dădea posibilitatea să trăiască cel puţin mai bine ca acasă, dar mai ales să agonisească (în acele vremuri, dolarul american era aproape de cinci ori mai mare decât coroana austro-ungară.)[6] Din economiile făcute, românii trimiteau bani celor de acasă, pentru a le uşura traiul, și pentru a cumpără pământ pentru ridicarea de case. Din registrele oficiului poştal din Bratfeld s-a constatat că pe calea acelui oficiu au sosit de la emigranţii din America, pentru familiile rămase acasă, în anul 1888, suma de 91.936 fl., prin epistole şi mandate poştale. Acest lucru era îmbucurător, deoarece se putea constata că emigranţilor le meregea bine, aveau grijă de familiile rămase acasă, dar era, pe de altă parte, și îngrijorător, deoarece emigrarea este stimulată.[7]

Mulţi dintre cei care emigrau în America erau ademeniţi de companiile de emigrare, care îi înduplecau să plece de acasă promiţându-le locuri de muncă, ţinând cont de ascensiunea industriei americane, de dezvoltarea mineritului, a investiţiilor feroviare şi rutiere şi de faptul că americanul nu era amator de asemene ocupaţii, profesând altele mai uşoare şi mai bine plătite. Toate acestea i-au făcut pe americani să recruteze uşor, dintre emigranţi, braţe de lucru ieftine. Pe emigranţi i-a atras oferta, întrucât, deşi plata era mică (în general nu trecea de 25 de dolari pe săptămână), însemna o suma importantă când o transformau în moneda ţării lor. Pentru a putea lucre nu trebuiau să ştie foarte multă engleză, sau să fi învăţat vreo meserie, deoarece muncă fizică găseau în toate regiunile unde erau fabrici.

În scrisorile trimise acasă, românii-americani îşi exprimau durerea că şi-au părăsit ţară natală. Regretau că viaţă în lumea cea nouă este plină de greutăţi şi necazuri, după ce călătoria ce s-a făcut cu mari cheltuieli. Cei care nu şi-au găsit de lucru s-ar întoarce acasă, dar nu au bani de drum. Dorul de casă, de soţie, de copii, de părinţi şi de rude îi deprimă în mod deosebit. De aceea le spun celor care încă mai pot suporta necazurile din ţară să nu plece, iar pe cei care se hotărăsc a lua drumul pribegiei îi sfătuiesc să îşi pună „toată nădejdea, credinţa şi iubirea în atotputernicul Dumnezeu şi în Maica Domnului"[8], căci numai cu ajutorul acestora vor putea suporta greutăţile şi necazurile pe care le vor întâmpina.

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[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ellis_Island.
[6] Foaia Poporului, *Din păţănile emigranţilor*, Nr.15, 1900 , p. 11.
[7] *Tribuna*, *Nu e tocmai rău în America*, Nr.70, 1890, p. 279.
[8] *Foaia Poporului*, *De la Românii din America*, 1903, Nr.48, p. 3

În ciuda originii rurale a majorităţii imigranţilor români, opţiunea lor în S.U.A. este predominant urbană: numai 9% dintre ei s-au aşezat în districte rurale. Un total de 94% dintre ei se stabilesc în 12 dintre statele americane: New York - 39%, Pennsylvania - 10,9%, Michigan - 6,2%, Illinois - 6,1%, New Jersey - 4,4%, Indiana - 2,7%, California - 2,3%, Minnesota - 2,3%, North Dakota - 1,8%, Montana - 1,6%, Massachusetts - 1,4 %[9].

Principalele domenii în care lucrează imigranţii români sunt construcţia de drumuri, căi ferate şi lucrări portuare, industria fierului şi a oţelului (în Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois şi Indiana), minele de cărbuni (Pennsylvania şi West Virginia), industria automobilului (Dodge Brother Motor Company, Detroit, Buick Motor Company şi Chevrolet Motor Company, Ford Motor Company în Highland Park) şi industria cărnii în abatoare din Chicago, St. Louis Missouri, Ohio, Kansas City, la construcţia de drumuri şi căi ferate şi în păstoritul turmelor. În toate aceste industrii, românii sunt angajaţi în muncile cele mai grele şi mai prost plătite. Românii din California, stabiliţi în Los Angeles şi imprejurimi, lucrează în grădinărit, la strânsul recoltelor sau în industria conservelor de fructe.

În „Foaia Poporului", din anul 1903, găsim o scrisoare a lui Ilie Martin, preşedintele Societăţii „Vulturul" din Pittsburg, care menţiona că numărul românilor din Pittsburg şi din zonă era de 500-600, aceştia „lucrează în fabrici de fier, oţel, tinichea, turnătorii, cărămidă, la construirea de linii ferate şi canale, în fabrici de maşini şi multe specii industriale, ear unii lucrează în mine de cărbuni."[10]

Mulţi dintre emigranţii români au venit în America având un singur bun de vânzare: forţa proprie şi puterea de a presta muncile grele şi obositoare. Calităţile care i-au ajutat să se impună, să fie apreciaţi, constau în faptul că românii erau extrem de harnici, nepretenţioşi, liniştiţi şi se mulţumeau cu o plată mai mică decât americanii. Îi găsim pe foştii plugari români în fabrici, unde se fac maşini unelte, maşini agricole, locomotive, cărând cu roabele piesele mai mici, ce nu sunt ridicate de macarale, îi vedem cum aranjează în grămezi regulate piesele turnate în cantităţi mari, cum ridică şine, ţevi şi alte greutăţi.[11] În marile turnătorii, precum Carnegie Steel Company, românii sunt întrebuinţaţi la muncile grele, în văpaia flăcărilor arzătoare ale oţelului topit, la încărcatul şi alimentarea cuptoarelor cu cărbuni şi la curăţitul cenuşei şi zgurei. Cei care şi-au găsit ocupaţii în industria forestieră, a cherestelei erau norocoşi, deoarece erau în elementul lor, utilizându-şi dibăcia câştigată în pădurile din munţii de acasă.

Un număr mare de emigranţi şi-au găsit de lucru în minele de cărbuni. Ţăranii obişnuiţi acasă cu muncile la camp, în arşiţa soarelui, s-au calificat în America ca mineri, lucrând la sute de metri sub pământ, pentru a scoate cărbuni şi minereul feros la suprafaţă. Emigrantul român şi-a schimbat căciula cu o caschetă de miner, prevăzută cu un bec mic electric în faţă, care-i luminează calea prin galeriile subterane, întortocheate, umede şi neaerisite. Deseori sfredelește cu dalta şi ciocanul o gaură unde aşează încărcătură de explozibil. Accidentele erau frecvente, fiecare riscându-şi, practic, zilnic viaţa. O dovadă a acestui lucru este şi scrisoarea unui abonat din Cleveland, publicată în „Foia Poporului": „Am perdut din tovarăşii cu cari am venit odată, pe Nicolae Stoica, din Viştea

[9] Christine Avghi Galitzi, Christine Avghi Galitzi, *A Study of Assimilation Among the Roumanians of United States*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1929 pp. p. 66.
[10] *Foaia Poporului, Din America*, Anul XI, Nr. 40, 28 sept./11 oct. 1903, p. 473.
[11] Victor Crăciun, Ghe. Zbuchea, *O istorie a românilor de pretutindeni*, Semne, 2006, p. 256

Superioară, tată a 9 copii. El s-a dus să lucreze în canalul ce se face sub lacul Erie, acolo e plata de 3 dolari/8 ore, a lucrat acolo 4 ore şi a ieşit bolnav şi după 4 ore a murit. Aşa e soarta lucrătorilor."[12] „Am perdut în Sharon, America un român. În fabrica de fer unde lucra a explodat un cazan de fer topit, care l-a stropit. 6 zile a chinuit, apoi şi-a dat sufletul."[13]

Cel mai greu este pentru muncitorii de la căile ferate, care locuiesc înghesuiți în vagoane, ca animalele, după cum reiese din relatarea lui Ioan Podea, în lucrarea „Românii din America": „Muncitorii de la drumurile de fer dumineca vin la oraş de îşi cumpără de mâncare şi mai cu samă wiskey că să aibă pe o săptămâna. Locuesc câte 40-50 de inşi într-un vagon, în care se adăpostesc în timp de ploaie, peste zi, mănâncă, beau, petrec şi dorm unii peste alţii, ca vitele. Toamna când lucrările de afară sunt isprăvite, năpădesc asupra oraşelor mai mari cu sutele şi cu miile, şi ţi-e mai mare milă, când îi vezi atât de sdrenţoşi şi murdari."[14]

Emigranţii care au plecat în America cu familia au avantajul de a fi ajutaţi de soţie şi de copiii mai mari. Femeile lucrează în industria tutunului (Philadelphia), a îmbrăcămintei (Chicago, Philadelphia, New York), în curăţătorii (Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit), în manufacturile de dantelă sau lână (Philadelphia, Trenton-New Jersey, Woonsocket-Rhode Island), în fabrici de cutii de carton, la maşinile automate din diferitele secţii ale marilor uzine sau conduc pensiuni (boarding houses) pentru nefamiliştii veniţi la lucru în Statele Unite.

Există însă şi emigranţi care reuşesc, cu perseverenţă, să urce pe scara ierarhică şi să devină oameni importanţi, în poziţii sociale mai înalte, care pot fi de ajutor şi pentru conaţionalii lor. Un astfel de exemplu îl găsim publicat în „Foaia Poporului": „Am onoarea de a va aduce la cunoştinţă, onorat public român, atât din America cât şi din patria veche, că am trecut din funcţiunea mea de la banca „The Colonial Trust Co" din South-Sharon, ca comptabil la banca „The Cleveland Trust Co. St. Clair Are Branche", Cleveland, care e una din cele mai mari bănci ale statului cu capital şi surplus de 2.800.000,00 dolari. Şi pe viitor ca şi în trecut voi sta cu plăcere la dispoziţia confraţilor mei …"[15]

Asemănările de relief ale statului Montana cu Transilvania, condiţiile destul de apropiate cu cele de acasă, din Mărginimea Sibiului, au făcut ca un număr de ciobani din acea zonă, care au emigrat în Statele Unite, să se angajeze ca păstori ai marilor turme de oi din statul respectiv. Pionier în zona menţionată a fost Nicolae Tarcea, care ajuns în Helena, a fost printre primii români atraşi de păstorit în Montana.[16] Acesta a văzut numărul mare de turme de acolo, precum şi faptul a ciobanii sunt bine remuneraţi, cam 40-45 de dolari pe luna, şi mâncare. Acesta scrie cunoscuţilor de acasă şi, în martie 1906, sosesc primii chemaţi. În perioada martie 1906 şi ianuarie 1908 în Montana sosesc 76 de ciobani români, cei mai mulţi din România, dar şi alţii, emigraţi deja, care nu aveau loc de muncă sau nu se puteau adapta în oraşele din estul Statelor Unite. Nicolae Tarcea susţinea că: „toţi românii angajaţi ca ciobani sunt mulţumiţi cu *serviciul,* sunt sănătoşi şi fac parale frumoase, fiecărui cioban rămânându-i (pe an) cam 400 de dolari (afară de cheltuieli)."[17] Acesta menţionează şi faptul că în fabrici sau pe şantiere se pot câştiga bani mai mulţi, dar în oraşe cheltuiala era mai mare, aşadar mai

[12]Foaia Poporului, *Nenorociri*, 13/26 Oct. 1902, Nr. 42, p. 9.
[13] Ibidem, *Mort în America*, Nr. 35, p. 10.
[14] Ioan Podea, *Românii din America*, Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, Sibiu, 1912, p. 29.
[15] Foaia Poporului, *Avis din America*, Nr 30, 1908, p. 409.
[16] Gelu Neamţu, Gelu Neamţu, *Ciobanii români în Montana, Statele Unite ale Americii 1907-1913*, Editura Dragoş Vodă, Cluj -Napoca, 2002 *p. 25.*
[17] *Ibidem, p. 26.*

greu de economisit, însă la păstorit, viaţa era mai sănătoasă şi aerul mai curat decât în fabrici. Tarcea se pricepea să facă şi reclamă: „cei care stau toată vara la oi îşi păstrează locuinţele şi peste iarnă… cei de la oi toţi au fost sănătoşi şi cu bani mulţi[18]".

În „Gazeta Transilvaniei", din anul 1893, se publică scrisoarea lui Ioan Manciu, plugar român, bănăţean din comuna Petrilova, comitatul Caraş-Severin. Acesta a plecat în Statele Unite în 1890, la 32 de ani, după doisprezece ani petrecuţi ca lucrător la „fabrică de fier" din Reşiţa. În scrisoare, el vorbeşte despre climă, economie şi despre dificultăţile traiului de zi cu zi în America (plata unui „ziuaş" în diferite State). În aceeaşi scrisoare este reprodusă opinia unui polonez care spunea: „mai bun pământ şi ţară de trăit ca în România nu-i aici în America, şi traiul vieţii e mai lesne în România, ca aici". În trei ani, autorul nu a putut găsi „undeva alţi români", veniţi la lucru peste Ocean. „Să nu creadă cineva, când aude sau citeşte de America, că aceasta ar fi o ţară aşa de frumoasă ca şi numele ei. Cine ar crede, amar s-ar înşela. „California e în fundul Americii, de acolo începe Oceanul Pacific şi-i gata cu pământu." Scrisoarea este datată 6 iunie 1893, East Chicago. [19]

Primii imigranţi români, veniţi în America între anii 1890-1900, nu au avut niciun sprijin, nu aveau cunoscuţi, nu ştiau limba ţării şi nu ştiau ce înseamnă economia americană. La început, grupurile de imigranţi se constituie organic în funcţie de rudenie şi de locul (judeţul sau regiunea) de origine. În perioada de început, factorul psihologic al vechii culturi avea o influenţă puternică asupra fiecărui individ, astfel că influenţa culturii originare, a limbii, a credinţei şi a tradiţiei comune au fost factori importanţi care i-au făcut să reziste în „Lumea Nouă". Toate acestea i-au ajutat pe români să înţeleagă că interesele lor vor fi mai bine reprezentate dacă sunt constituiţi în comunităţi care să le reprezinte interesele. Astfel, imigrantul român, odată ce a început a se obişnui cu noul mediu în care se stabilise, a observat că cei de alte naţii, care veniseră cu ani buni înaintea lui, aveau societăţi care erau acceptate de americani. Românii ştiau că, la ei acasă, dacă ar fi făcut aşa ceva, regimul austro-ungar i-ar fi dus pe toţi la temniţă, pe când în America, nu le spunea nimeni nimic. Luând contact cu „Lumea Nouă" şi cu celelalte naţiuni, imigrantul român şi-a dat seama că este supus unor grele încercări, în urma cărora familia lui ar putea rămâne fără ajutor. După ce s-au sfătuit în „prânzitoarele borturilor", românii au reuşit să se adune şi să înfiinţeze instituţiile care le-au oferit sprijin moral şi material, la nevoie.

Societăţiile fraternale ale românilor au avut, încă de la început, un dublu rol: acela de a asigura sprijin material celui aflat în vreo nenorocire, sau chiar urmaşilor lui, în cazul unei morţi năpraznice, dar şi pe acela de a promova activităţi culturale şi o viaţă socială organizată şi decentă. Principala importanţă a acestor societăţi a constat în faptul că ele au fost mijloacele prin care românii-americani s-au integrat în „Lumea Nouă", păstrându-şi identitatea distinctă şi modelul românesc de înţelegere a vieţii. Astfel, după spusele lui Alexandru Nemoianu şi după relatările din presa vremii, primele societăţi fraternale româneşti din America au fost înfiinţate în anul 1902: „Carpatina", din Cleveland, Ohio, la 2 nov şi „Vulturul", din Homestead, Pennsylvania[20].

Acelaşi lucru îl putem afla şi dintr-o scrisoare primită de la românii din Cleveland, publicată în „*Foaia Poporului*", care, din nevoia de a avea un conducător, să le stea în ajutor cu sfaturi, au înfiinţat societăţi de ajutor:

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[18] *Ibidem*, p. 27.
[19] Gazeta Transilvaniei, *De la un plugar român din America*, anul LVI, nr. 135, 20 iun./2 iul. 1893, pp. 3-4.
[20] Alexandru Nemoianu, *Cuvinte despre românii-americani*, vol.I, Editura Clusium, 1997 p. 33.

Cleveland (Ohio), 5 NOV 1902

„Cu bucurie vin a vă aduce la cunoştinţă şi o probă de viaţă şi de iubire de neam care au îndeplinit spre înaintarea lor românii din Cleveland.

Suntem vreo 4-500 români între alte neamuri şi am trăit lucrând printre alţii ca nişte necunoscuţi. De mult fierbea dorinţa celor mai inteligenţi de a face ceva, dar nu au avut cu cine, fiind cei mai mulţi oameni fără cunoştinţe, ba şi egoişti, cari urmăreau scopul lor singur.(...) Acum s-a născut dorinţa fierbinte în câţiva mai inteligenţi, ca să facă cu toate puterile cât de puţini o reuniune de ajutorare pentru bolnavi(care) s-a numit România Carpatină, reuniune de ajutorare în cazuri de moarte, cu sediu la Cleveland.(...) În statute, sunt prezentate şi alte scopuri: de a face bibliotecă pentru români, sală de lectură şi instrucţie în limba engleză, de care românul are cea mai neapărată lipsă când vine aici."[21]

Românii din America îndurau aproape orice fel de condiţii numai pentru a putea agonisi banii cu care să-şi asigure un trai mai bun la înapoierea acasă. Banii strânşi îi depuneau în bancă, mai ales de când s-au convins că, dacă ţineau banii în geamantanele de sub pat, riscau să fie prăduiţi. Le-a fost greu românilor până când s-au obişnuit să depună banii la bancă. La început, ei nu se duceau la băncile mari, ci doar la casele de schimb deţinute de oameni fără scrupule şi care, pentru a-i atrage pe români, foloseau un agent de schimb (care putea fi şi el român şi care le ştia limba) şi care îl asigura pe bietul imigrant că e zilnic în legătură cu banca din târgul de lângă locul natal al acestuia. Atras de cuvintele amăgitoare ale agentului de schimb, românul se lăsa înduplecat şi îşi scotea din chimir economiile lui, încredinţându-le agentului convingător. Un astfel de exemplu putem găsi într-o scrisorea trimisă de românii din America şi publicată în „Foaia Poporului": „Sunt de aceia nenumăraţi, agenţi nesiguri numiţi. Dar' durere că românul nu se ştie a se păzi de astfel de lighioane, care le cânta şi le descântă fel şi fel de minciuni şi oamenii se încred în ei... câţi români nu au fost înşelaţi de agenţi (bancari internaţionali nesiguri) fără un cent capital... sunt bănci americane cari au garanţie şi stau sub controla statului, acolo e banul omului asigurat şi se trimite sigur la destinaţie; la astfel de locuri să alerge românul, nu la şarlatani de agenţi nesiguri."[22] De asemenea, ministerul de Interne reînoieşte rugămintea adresată tuturor celor interesaţi de a expedia bani din America numai prin mandat poştal, „şi nu prin scrisori sau prin bancheri americani."[23] Datorită faptului că mulţi români au fost înşelaţi de agenţii de schimb, în Telegraful Român găsim aceeaşi rugăminte, de a nu mai trimite bani prin agenţii misterioase. Se arată faptul că românii, descurcăreţi din fire, au deschis o casă de schimb şi o agenţie a bisericii ortodoxe, în Indiana Harbor: „Casa de schimb expediază bani în România, vinde bilete de vapor şi legalizează diferite documente."[24]

Românii din Cleveland înfiinţează o bancă românească cu capital de 20.000 de dolari, biserica Greco-catolică română fiind cea care a subscris jumătate din numărul acţiunilor[25].

Pe lângă muncile prestate de români în fabrici, la drumuri şi în mine, mai existau şi alte căi de a câştigă bani. Exemple de acest fel le aflăm într-o scrisoare sosită la redacţia „Foii Poporului": „Un harnic român, dl. Petru Tecău din Sebeşul-săsesc, a început o lăptărie în anul 1904 cu 2 vaci, în

[21] Foaia Poporului, *Americanii nostri*, Nr. 48, 1902, pp. 1-2.
[22] Foaia Poporului, *Din America*, r 45, 1905, pp. 6-7.
[23]Foaia Poporului, *Banii din America*, anul XIX, nr. 12,20 mart. /2 apr. 1911, p. 8.
[24] Telegraful român, *De la fraţii din America*, anul LVIII, nr. 62, 12 iun. 1910, pp. 2-3.
[25] Foaia Poporului, *Bancă românească în America*, Nr.44, 1908, p. 490.

Joungstown, Ohio, din cari în anul acesta (1905) a ajuns la 25 vaci, căruţe de lapte cu cai scumpi şi altele. Nu de mult şi-a cumpărat o proprietate (farm) prevăzută cu case elegante, grajduri mari, maşini economice, pământ semănat din abundenţă, păşune s.a trebuincioase unui econom, cu preţul de 5.500 dolari, (27.500 cor)"[26].

Românii care au ajuns pe tărâm american au vrut să se facă remarcaţi datorită hărniciei şi consecvenţei lor, aşa că, încă de la începutul sosirii lor în America, au încercat să se organizeze pe toate planurile, au colectat bani pentru biserici şi şcoli, au întemeiat societăţi de întrajutorare şi chiar „bănci române cu bani din America, pe cum e de pildă «Olteana» din Viştea Inferioară, ba multe chiar şi-au urcat capitalul tot numai cu bani din America de Nord." [27] Toate aceste lucruri scot în evidenţă faptul că românul, oriunde s-ar afla nu-şi uită patria şi pe ai săi, iar când vede omul în necaz şi în mizerie îl ajută.

În general, americani din România care intră în afaceri se limitează la activităţi de amploare redusă, orientate cu precădere spre servicii destinate membrilor comunităţii – magazine şi restaurante cu specific românesc, agenţii imobiliare, de transport sau de expediere a coletelor în România, cabinete de medicină, de avocatură etc. În ultima vreme, se remarcă, totuşi, din ce în ce mai mult, prezenţa unor specialişti de origine română în funcţii importante, în cadrul unor mari companii americane.

Există un număr important de organizaţii româneşti locale, cu profil cultural, care îşi propun să contribuie la păstrarea identităţii membrilor comunităţii române prin organizarea de evenimente cultural-artistice. Astfel de centre sau asociaţii culturale îşi desfăşoară activitatea în zone de concentrare a românilor americani, cum sunt New York, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Atlanta, Florida[28]. Activitatea lor este inegală şi se datorează, de regulă, pasiunii şi devotamentului unui grup foarte restrâns de persoane, iar frecvenţa evenimentelor organizate variază foarte mult. Unele dintre ele au înfiinţat ansambluri folclorice, mici muzee de artă populară şi de istorie a comunităţii locale. Deseori, ele participă la evenimente multi-etnice locale. În multe cazuri, însă, în jurul lor se dezvoltă sentimente de invidie şi de rivalităţi personale, obstrucţionări şi acţiuni de discreditare din partea unor membri ai comunităţii[29].

Activităţile sociale şi distracţiile primilor imigranţi români în America erau simple. Momentele plăcute le petreceau cântâd doine nostalgice, uneori improvizate, sau alte cântece de acasă. Sâmbătă seară sau duminică se strângeau în casa unuia dintre ei sau într-o odaie mai spaţioasă dintr-o pensiune, unde se distrau cântând sau dansând. Unul dintre ei cânta la fluier sau la vioară, altul citea câte un fragment dintr-o carte românească. Scrisorilor din ţară li se rezervau momente deosebite, solemne. Acestea erau citite şi ascultate de toţi. Cei care ştiau să scrie se ofereau să scrie pentru cei care nu o puteau face. Unii mai beau că să-şi uite singurătatea, dar o făceau cu moderaţie, căci trebuiau să economisească banii agonisiţi cu atâta trudă cât mai chibzuit, ca să poată trimite cât mai mult celor de acasă. Pentru a exemplifica cele mai importante aspecte din viaţa socială a românilor în America, vom expune, mai jos, un fragment dintr-o scrisoare tipărită în paginile „Foii

[26] Foaia Poporului, *Din America*, Nr. 45, 1905, pp. 5-6.
[27] Ibidem, *De preste Ocean*, nr.33, 1905, p. 3.

[28] http://www.cluj-napoca.com/article.php/20090207024922640/print
[29] http://www.romanii.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99:america-de-nord&catid=36:diaspora&Itemid=60

Poporului" din anul 1897: „... la 22 octomvrie a.c. s-a dat acolo (New York) un concert urmat de un bal românesc, la care şi-au dat întâlnire toţi românii aflători în New York al căror număr este destul de însemnat. La bal s-a vorbit numai româneşte, s-au jucat hore, sârbe, ba s-a ţinut şi un discurs în dulcea limba românească. A fost o petrecere plină de veselie, cum rară se pomeneşte. Acum se fac pregătiri pentru aranjarea unui bal costumat românesc."[30].

Singura bucurie a muncitorilor români era *pedia*, adică ziua de plată pentru două săptămâni, care era considerată a fi zi de sărbătoare, pentru că îşi primeau plata pentru săptămânile trecute. Unii dintrei ei, cei mai serioşi, îşi desfac plicul în care au primit banii, îi numără, apoi îşi fac socoteala cum să-i împartă, să le ajungă pentru cheltuieli şi să mai rămână şi ceva pentru cei de acasă. Cei cuminţi şi harnici sunt puţini, spunea Ion Iosif, în lucrarea „*Emigrarea în America*", „cea mai mare parte îşi cheltuiesc tot câştigul de două săptămâni, fac pe urmă datorie şi când mai vine o *pedie,* pleacă cu bani cu tot, fără a-şi plăti datoriile, în alt oraş, în altă fabrică... alţii îşi plătesc datoriile, cheltuindu-şi tot câştigul fără a pune măcar un ban la o parte"[31]. „Din epistolele primite din Canton, aflăm că se află unii români slabi, cari s-au dat beţiei şi mai bucuros îşi cheltuie banii pe nimicuri, decât să se gândească la asigurarea viitorului lor şi al familiilor"[32].

După înfiinţarea societăţilor de ajutor şi de cultură, viaţă socială a românilor-americani s-a îmbunătăţit, deoarece societatea organiza „serbări populare", în cadrul cărora participau la evenimente plăcute pentru centrul românesc din acea localitate: se cântau cântece naţionale, se jucau jocuri naţionale, se ţineau cuvântări cu caracter religios, cultural sau naţional şi de multe ori, cei mai pricepuţi şi ştiutori de carte, jucau piese de teatru pe scene improvizate. Aceste serbări, care de obicei aveau loc diminica, se terminau cu o petrecere. Ele aveau, în acelaşi timp, şi rolul de a strânge bani pentru viitorul societăţii, cât şi pentru ajutorarea celor care se aflau în neputinţă. Într-o scrisoare primită pe adresa „Foii Poporului" vedem cum românii din Youngston, Ohio, se bucurau la petrecerile organizate de Societatea Unirea Română: „Pe tramvaiele electrice vedeai români cu feţe vesele şi în haine de sărbătoare, ear' pe piepturile lor luciau mândre cocarzile cu tricolorul nostru...tineri şi bătrâni, pe feţele carora puteai ceti lămurit bucuria, că au venit să-şi mai facă o seară bună, pe pământul libertăţii, toţi având dorul de a juca şi de a-şi petrece după datinile noastre moştenite de la moşi strămoşi... cu un Deşteaptă-te române, intonat de musicanţi şi cântat de public, începe petrecerea... jucau învârtite, chiuind fel de fel de strigături frumoase, apoi hore, sârbe, ...cântecele naţionale au dat petrecerii un colorit curat românesc, înduioşind inima fiecăruia... ne despărţirăm cu inima plină de bucurie şi de amintiri placate"[33]. Se observă că cei plecaţi îşi amintesc cu drag de cele sfinte, îşi păstrează tradiţiile şi respectă cu sfinţenie tot ce are legătură cu datina strămoşească.

Grupurile de români sosiţi ulterior au fost primite cu căldură şi bucurie de către imigranţi, care încercau să le uşureze puţin acomodarea în „nouă patrie". Unii dintre tineri scriau acasă, în căutare de viitoare soţii, care să meargă în America, sau alţii îşi rugau părinţii să le găsească o soţie, pentru care trimiteau biletul de călătorie şi banii de drum. Dacă, după sosirea tinerei căsătoria nu avea loc din diferite motive, de obicei fata consideră că este obligaţia ei să returneze costul călătoriei. O

[30] Foaia Poporului, *Viaţa socială românească în America!*, Nr. 49, 1897, p. 586.
[31] Ion Iosif, *Op.cit*.p. 44.
[32] Foia Poporului, *Din America*, Nr. 12, 1903 p. 3.
[33] *Ibidem*, Nr 46, 1904, pp. 3-4.

tânăra romîncă nu rămânea necăsătorită mult timp, de obicei erau 15-20 de tineri pentru fiecare fată[34].

Românii ajunşi pe tărâm american s-au implicat în multe activități, deși necunoașterea limbii engleze era o problemă: „De un timp încoace se aud din America diferite ştiri, nu prea de laudă cu privire la viaţa din Lumea Nouă. Dar până acum nimenea nu a scris adevărată cauza a greutăţilor.... Limba engleză e prima greutate.... de multe ori stau fără lucru şi aceasta din cauza că nu se ştie limba vorbită aici.[35]"

În anul 1903, se anunţă în „*Foaia Poporului*" tipărirea unei cărţi care să le uşureze românilor din America viaţa în Lumea Nouă. Cartea se adresează tuturor, indiferent de meseria şi de locul de muncă pe care îl au, şi garantează învăţarea limbii engleze în 3 săptămâni[36]. În acelaşi an, găsim, în aceeaşi publicaţie, o scrisoare trimisă de românii din America, care spuneau că beneficiază de o mică biblioteca, „vreo 350 de numere de diferite cuprinsuri trimise de cititorii „Foii Poporului" din Sibiu[37]", la care se mai anunţau alte numere de la cititorii „Gazetei de Braşov". Acest lucru vine să confirme, încă o dată, că românii din America doresc să fie într-o continuă legătură cu tot ceea ce se petrece în patria lor. În ajutorul lor vin mai mulţi intelectuali români, care se oferă să doneze cărţi Societăţii „Vulturul" din Pittsburg."[38].

Majoritatea bisericilor românilor din America au deschis şcoli parohiale situate în cadrul sau pe lângă parohii. Aceste instituţii au fost stabilite, iniţial, pentru învăţarea şi păstrarea religiei, a limbii şi a culturii celei de a două generaţii de români-americani, dar nu puteau concura cu şcolile publice americane. Făcând parte integrantă din viaţă parohiilor, şcolile româneşti erau patronate de biserică, dascăli fiind, în cele mai multe cazuri, preoţii parohi. În anul 1913, pe lângă biserica din Youngstown funcţiona o şcoală condusă de preotul Ilie Pop, cu 30 de elevi, iar în 1915 exista şi o şcoală în Gary, Indiana[39]. La cursurile acestor şcoli, care erau ţinute de câteva ori pe săptămâna, după masă, copiilor emigranţilor români li se predau lecţii de gramatică, literatură, istorie şi geografie românească şi religie.

Şcoala românească a fost o instituţie organizată pentru a educa pe copiii românilor imigranţi. Aceste şcoli nu erau menite să înlocuiască şcoala publică americană, ci erau, mai degrabă, şcoli suplimentare, după încheierea cursurilor la şcolile publice. Şcoala, ca şi biserica şi societăţile sociale, au servit la menţinerea şi perpetuarea culturii şi tradiţiilor celor veniţi în Statele Unite. Pe lângă şcoli şi biserici, cărţile sau gazetele erau de un real ajutor pentru românii-americani, deoarece îi ajutau pe aceştia să îşi aline dorul de ţară şi de naţie, fiind în contact cu tot ceea ce se întâmpla acasă. De aceea, s-au abonat la „Foaia Poporului" şi mai doreau şi alte cărţi: „Deşi cetesc şi foi germane, totuşi dorul de patrie şi naţie nu mă lasă să nu-mi aduc ceva şi de acolo. Şi vă rog a-mi trimite şi Istoria lui Ştefan cel Mare, eşită de sub tipar, şi dacă vor ajunge banii, şi a lui Avram Iancu, căci vreau să fiu cel care să le poarte numele acestor mari eroi pe acest pământ strein"[40].

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[34]http://www.observatorul.com/articles_main.asp?r=13.7234531680164&svr=05&lang=en_us&action=articleviewdetail&ID=46
[35] Foaia Poporului, *Din America*, 5/18 Mai, 1902, Nr.19, p. 3.
[36] Ibidem, *Carte engleză si românească* nr 15, 1903, p. 34.
[37] Ibidem, *Românii în America*, Nr.40, p. 437.
[38] Ibidem, *Pentru Societatea Română Vulturul din Pittsburgh*, Nr.12, 1903, p. 141.
[39] Pr. Prof. Dr. Aurel Jivi, *Inceputurile vietii bisericeşti la românii ortodocşi din America*, în, *Revista Teologică*, Anul VI, Nr. 1-2, 1996, Editura Mitropoloiei Ardealului, Sibiu, p. 289.
[40] *Telegraful Român*, Nr. 30, 1904, p. 367.

Şcolile în limba română, menite să asigure tinerei generaţii o educaţie suplimentară faţă de şcolile americane (unde se învaţă cititul, scrisul, istoria şi geografia în limba română), au fost înlocuite de alte instituţii, unde se foloseşte limba engleză. Se poate spune că şcolile româneşti în America au transmis cunoştinţe, valori şi tradiţii importante pentru menţinerea conştiinţei etnice. Ele au constituit o experienţă educaţională rară şi specială. Cei din generaţia a doua şi a treia, care acum realizează valoarea şi foloasele unei astfel de educaţii, se gândesc cu nostalgie la experienţa lor în şcoala românească. Primii imigranţii s-au străduit să-şi păstreze limba şi cultura prin crearea unei prese, prin organizarea şcolii româneşti, prin promovarea unor activităţi sociale şi culturale proprii.

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THE ROMANIAN- BRITISH CULTURAL RELATIONS DURING TIME

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Abstract:Anglia se impune tot mai mult ca putere industrială, comercială şi militară de primă mână, fascinând în acelaşi timp prin sistemul său parlamentar şi structura vieţii sociale, polarizând interesul tuturor ţărilor europene. Călători şi bursieri români străbat la începutul sec. XIX Anglia, atraşi de avântul ei economic sau fascinaţi de caracterul exemplar al instituţiilor engleze. Despre „minunăţiile tehnice" văzute scrie primul bursier român în Anglia - Petrache Poenaru, urmat de Dimitrie Sturza.
Abia în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea creşte semnificativ numărul cunoscătorilor de limbă engleză. O situaţie privilegiată găsim în Transilvania unde, în colegiile de la Aiud şi Alba lulia, se predau cursuri de limbă engleză şi unde a fost tipărită prima traducere a unei cărţi engleze în limba română.

Keywords:cultura,limba engleza,traducatori,presa interbelica,dezvoltare economica

Abstract: England becomes the most important commercial, industrial and economic power, impressing in the same time both due to its parliamentary system and the social life structure, being an example for all European countries. Scholarship students and Romanian travellers visit England at the beginning of nineteenth century being impressed by its economic growth and the exemplary character of English institutions. The first Romanian scholarship students who wrote about the technical wonders were Petrache Poenaru and Dimitrie Sturza.
The number of English speakers has a significant growth only in the half part of the nineteenth century. A different situation is in Transylvania where students learn English in the colleges from Aiud and Alba Iulia and where it was printed the first book translated from English into Romanian.

Keywords: culture, English, translators, inter-war press, economic growth

Istoria relaţiilor româno-engleze s-a bucurat de interesul cercetătorilor români, încă din 1917,în toiul primului război mondial, în timpul refugiului la Iaşi, N. Iorga tipărea: *Histoire des Relations Anglo-Roumaines.* în 1921, la Cluj, George Moroianu publică: *Lăgăturile noastre cu Anglia . Scurtă privire asupra legăturilor anglo-române şi asupra propagandei noastre în Englitera din. trecutul îndepărtat până astăzi.* Mai aproape de zilele noastre, e citată ades documentata lucrare a istoricilor Ludovic Demeny şi Paul Cemovodeanu: *Relaţiile politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Ţara Românească şi Transilvania în sec. XVI-XVHI,* Bucureşti, 1974.

Atunci când se încearcă situarea noastră în lume, se recurge de obicei la o sintagmă ce marchează „pendularea între Orient şi Occident". Sub acest semn îşi aşează demersul şi istoricul

Neagu Djuvara, care într-o incitantă şi documentată lucrare, conturează imaginea ţărilor române la începutul epocii modeme.

După ce fanarioţii iau locul domnilor pământeni se accentuează influenţa orientală - noii stăpâni aducând nu doar moda, dar şi obiceiurile din capitala otomană. Tot lor Ii se datorează însă şi un prim lustru de cultură franceză, odată cu operele şi ideile „secolului luminilor", precum şi introducerea studiului limbii franceze în „academiile" domneşti de la Iaşi"şi Bucureşti. Mulţi dintre domnitorii fanarioţi erau oameni cultivaţi. Nicolae Mavrocordat - de pildă - era poliglot şi biblioteca lui era vestită în Europa.

Războaiele austro-ruso-turce aduc destule necazuri ţărilor române, în primejdie de a deveni „monedă" de schimb din cauza rivalităţii dintre cele trei mari puteri.

Din Franţa sosesc „luminile" şi purtările alese, odată cu ecoul revoluţiei. Cu o . grabă specifică unui spaţiu, silit mereu să „sară etapele", într-o singură generaţie, boierimea şi burgheziace abia se ivea, adoptă cu. elan îmbrăcămintea, purtările şi ideile Occidentului. îmbrăcămintea occidentală, „îmbrăcămintea egalităţii", cum i. s-a spus, ia locul celei; orientale, nu prin „ucaz" de sus, ca-n Rusia:lui Petru cel Mare, ci din iniţiativa celor dornici să scape de işlic, giubea şi bărbi. În saloane se vorbeşte franţuzeşte, sunt repede învăţate dansurile occidentale. Valurile de emigrări, de după revoluţie, aduc din Franţa profesori pentru odraslele boierilor, la Iaşi se deschide pensionul lui Cuenim, la Bucureşti cel al lui Vaillant. Boierii citesc gazete franţuzeşti sau nemţeşti, aduse cu mare cheltuială. Creşte semnificativ numărul studenţilor români la Pans. in Transilvania „modelul german"; predomina într-un spaţiu aflat sub stăpânire habsburgica, dar şi aici pătrunde cultura franceză.

Primele contacte româno-engleze politice şi economice datează din sec.al XVI-lea: domnitorii români căutau sprijin la Poarta otomană prin trimişii englezi, iar curtea engleză urmărea să obţină privilegii comerciale în ţările române.Petru Şchiopu acorda în 1588 ambasadorului englez William Harbore privilegii comerciale pentru compania Levantului. Tot în acest secol există ştiri despre peregrinările engleze ale unor pretendenţi la tron, fie în Moldova, fie în Ţara Românească. Astfel în 1580, Petru Cercel se afla la curtea engleză. Ioan Bogdan, pretins frate al lui loan Vodă cei Viteaz, cerea şi el, în 1591, sprijin reginei Elisabeta I.

Pe de altă parte, documentele consemnează numele multor trimişi ai coroanei engleze care, în drum spre Orient, treceau prin Ţările Române şi îşi consemnau impresiile fie în acte diplomatice, fie în însemnări de călătorie, toate reprezentând, peste timp, o oglindă subiectivă, e drept, pentru realităţile româneşti, în acelaşi timp, tot mai mulţi români le vor cunoaşte la faţa locului pe cele britanice. Umanistul bănăţean Mihail Halici se afla la Londra în 1694 şi acolo şi-a petrecut Ultimii ani ai vieţii. Eustaţiu Placidus, medic la curtea lui Constantin Brâncoveanu, studiase la Oxford, iar, la începutul veacului al XVIII-lea, iluministul Paul Iorgoviei a petrecut un an la Londra. în lucrarea sa de excepţie, Carmen Andraş, Consemnează înregistrarea în 1562 la Universitatea din Cambridge, a unui student la medicină John Voulpe, care, deşi e trecut ca fiind "hungarus", nu putea fi, după cum o arată numele - Ion Vulpe decât român transilvănean. El va muri la Londra în 1590, după ce fusese un timp medicul contelui'de Sussex.

Urmârindu-şi propriile interese, marile puteri văd în ţările române fie un spaţiu „tampon", fie o monedă de schimb. Napoleon - de pildă - înştiinţase cabinetul de la Londra, prin consulul

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Wilkinson, că ar putea ceda Austriei Moldova şi Valahia pentru a pune stavilă expansionismului imperial rus. în 1800, Rusia, în război cu Poarta, ocupă Principatele şi Anglia protestează. în anii revoluţiei de la 1848, scrie Clara Liliana Dragoş, sintetizând situaţia noastră grea, „românii din Principate se găseau presaţi într-un triunghi critic: imperiul otoman le era, suveran, imperiul rus le era protector, iar cel austriac îşi făcea continuu simţită presiunea.

In aceşti ani hotărâtori pentru istoria modernă a României, Parisul, apoi Londra devin centre de acţiune ale exilaţilor noştri.

Legăturile oficiale anglo-române se consolidează semnificativ la începutul veacului al XlX-lea. Acum ia fiinţă primul consulat britanic pentru Moldova (la Iaşi), apoi şi pentru Muntenia (la Bucureşti). Evenimentele se succed rapid: bătălia pentru „Unirea Mică" şi pentru recunoaşterea ei, câştigarea independenţei şi apoi anii de chinuită neutralitate până la intrarea României în război. Legăturile cu Anglia sunt tot mai semnificative.

Anglia se impune tot mai mult ca putere industrială, comercială şi militară de primă mână, fascinând în acelaşi timp prin sistemul său parlamentar şi structura vieţii sociale, polarizând interesul tuturor ţărilor europene. Călători şi bursieri români străbat la începutul sec. XIX Anglia, atraşi de avântul ei economic sau fascinaţi de caracterul exemplar al instituţiilor engleze.

Călător pe aceleaşi meleaguri în 1852, Odobescu îşi va nota la rându-i impresiile de călătorie ce vor fi publicate în 1915 în paginile revistei „Convorbiri literare". în 1882, Vasile Alecsandri, venit în Anglia ca să-şi întâlnească amicul,pe Ion Ghica, scrie entuziast despre Anglia, după ce cu ani înainte îşi sfătuia fiica, aflată la Londra, să-şi perfecţioneze cunoştinţele de limbă. Şi aici atingem una dintre cauzele întârzierii contactului direct cu marea cultură britanică: necunoaşterea limbii. în amplul său studiu publicat în „Dacoromania" din 1923, Petre Grimm scria: „Dacă însă călătorii români în Anglia au fost rari şi mai puţini, firește, au fost aceia care şi-au dat osteneala să înveţe Jimba engleză. Pe la 1837, o notă adresată de guvernul englez Ministerului Afacerilor Străine din Bucureşti a fost înapoiată cu cererea ca astfel de comunicări să fie însoţite de traducere în limba franceză deoarece nu era nimeni în tot ministerul care să înţeleagă limba engleză. 1

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Revenind în Principate după ce în familiile avute se recurge tot mai frecvent la institutori şi guvernante engleze trebuie să arătam ca după 1880, limba engleză începe să fie studiată în licee, la început doar facultativ şi adesea cu profesori autodidacţi. Treptat odată cu dezvoltarea reţelei de şcoli, acestea îşi vor aduce contribuţia importantă la sporirea cunoştinţelor despre Anglia şi la creşterea cunoscătorilor de limbă engleză, într-un metodic „inventar" al traducerilor din literatura engleză în limba română (1780-1850) Carmen Andraş notează traducerea unor cărţi cu caracter religios, a unora de călătorie, dar şi a unor eseuri literare. Cât despre roman, sunt notate traducerile din cel iluminist cum ar fi *(Robinson Crusoe*, tradus de L. Teodorovici în 1816, prin intermediar sârb, în 1835, a pöi în traducerea serdanului Vasile Drăghici, prin intermediar german, şi, în sfârşit,

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o traducere rămasă în manuscris, datorată lui Scriban; *Călătoriile: lui Gulliver în ţări îndepărtate,* mult citită şi prelucrată traducere a lui I.D. Neguliei (confruntată cu originalul englez, prin intermediar francez, de M. Angheleseu, apre în 1848)

O altă categorie de romane - cele cu teme istorice - domină prima jumătate a secolului XIX. între ele amintim:

Bătrânul Duncan, tradus de Heliade din Walter Scott, prin intermediar francez (1831)

Lucia de Lamermoore - în traducerea lui G.A. Baronzi, prin intermediar italian (1845)

Din romanul şi povestirile sentimentale - atât de căutate - sunt notate traducerile:

Moartea beţivului, tradus de Iosif Many (1844) *Vicarul de la Wakefield* de Oliver Goldsmith - traducere din limba engleză de M. Anghelescu (1852)

Dintre traducerile timpului merită consemnate:

Diariulu mixerului Vicariu din Wiltschire (fragment tradus de Ion Codru Drăguşanu (1848) după acelaşi O. Goldsmith *Ultimele zile ale Pompeiului,* după Edward Bulwer-Lytton, tradus de Heliade (1836)*şi Ultimele zile ale Pompeiului,* tradus de Teodoru Avinianul (1843) *Connor O'Mata* (nuvelă irlandeză) tradusă de acelşi losif Many (1844)

Eremitul (Pustnicul), tradus de losif Many (1845)

Ammorven şi Zallida, tradus de Alecu Beldiman, prin intermediar francez (1802)

Adelson şi Salvibi, poveste englezească, tradusă de Gr. Balş (1806)

Istoria lui Sandford şi Merton, după Thomas Gray, publicată de Zaharia Carcalechi (1821)

Memoirs of Woman of pleasure de J. Cleland, adoptată de C. Negruzzi (ms.1826)

Un rol tot mai important în difuzarea şi receptarea literaturii engleze va reveni presei, la început cea străină - cu o destul de limitată circulaţie în spaţiul românesc - apoi, după 1829, şi cea românească.

Astfel, pe la 1777 Grigore Ghica era abonat, printre altele, la „Gazeta de Londra". La începutul sec. al XlX-lea, Preparandia din Arad solicita abonamente la "The Courier", "The Morning Chronicle", "The Times" (1819). Abonamente, desigur, au existat şi la numeroasele colegii calviniste din Transilvania, chiar daca, datorită marii întârzieri cu care ziarele britanice puteau ajunge la destinatari, erau preferate ziarele franţuzeşti sau germane.

In periodicele ce marchează începutul prozei româneşti apar traduceri din proza şi dramaturgia engleză, multe adaptări, imitaţii, menite să popularizeze opere celebre şi să deschidă gustul public pentru literatura Engliterei.

Deşi efemeră - consemnând clipa - presa oferă cercetătorului o imagine atotcuprinzătoare asupra felului în care contemporanii acelui ceas al istoriei au receptat romanul englez, clasic sau modern. Chiar şi numai la o grăbită răsfoire, se conturează atmosfera în care s-au format şi s-au afrirmat importanţi romancieri români într-o epocă în care, paradoxal, înflorea romanul modem, dar se vorbea insistent de "criza" lui. Cel ce va întreprinde o analiză aprofundată asupra influenţei romanului englez asupra celui român nu se poate dispensa de cercetarea temeinică a presei timpului.

In perioada interbelică, în presa timpului, s-au auzit mereu Voci care cereau imperativ statului să se implice: să instituie "o cenzură a bunului gust", să susţină edituri specializate, cu traducători autorizaţi care să-şi asume răspunderea demersului lor şi, nu în ultimul rând, să fie tipărite ediţii accesibile, ca preţ, celor mulţi. Dezideratele acestea se vor realiza abia după 1945. În

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privinţa romanului englez numai între 1945-1978 au fost traduse şi publicate în volum 138 de autori, ritmul traducerilor crescând de la an la an.

De asemenea au apărut numeroase studii monografice. Faptul că după al doilea război mondial a existat o masă de cititori avizi care a absorbit tirajele atâtor ediţii, însumând în ani milioane de exemplare, epuizate cu repeziciune, reprezintă fără îndoială şi o consecinţă a introducerii limbii engleze în şcoală, de unde fusese alungată de limba rusă, dar, desigur, e şi rodul străduinţelor presei interbelice care a facilitat accesul la romanul englez al cititorilor săi.

Desele referinţe la literatura engleză, întâlnite în presă, dovedesc că această literatură devenise un domeniu familiar, nu doar pentru specialişti. Şcoala românească de anglistică formată în epoca interbelică a pregătit terenul dezvoltării generaţiei de prestigiu a specialiştilor - îndrumători şi formatori - la rândul lor pentru noua pleiadă de cercetători ai fenomenului literar britanic de astăzi...

În concluzie, am putea spune că în privinţa receptării romanului englez în România, au existat trei mari perioade: una preliminară cuprinzînd ultimele decenii ale sec. XIX, primele decenii ale sec. XX - perioadă în care apar traduceri - destul de modeste, şi în presă primele comentarii de calitate;

o perioadă de tranziţie - ce acoperă perioada interbelică în care pentru prima oară la noi s-a realizat o cuprinzătoare deschidere spre orizontul romanului insular. Această deschidere n-ar fi avut o anvergură considerabilă dacă n-ar fi existat o presă de largă audienţă care să-şi deschidă paginile traducerilor şi mai ales comentariilor. Această presă s-a dovedit a fi un veritabil agent modelator, deopotrivă informativ şi formativ.

În sfârşit, perioada postbelică cu marile ei realizări în materie de traducere şi comentare a literaturii engleze, cu traduceri eveniment precum:

-***Balade engleze,*** tradus de Leon D. Levitchi (1970)

-***Povestirile din Canterbury*** de Geoffrey Chaucer - tradus de Dan Duţescu (1964)

Principalele romane ale lui J. Conrad, traduse de Ticu Arhip, Andrei Ion Deleanu, Petre Solomon, Ana Popescu

Din James Joyce, ***Portret al artistului în tinereţe,*** tradus de Frida Papadache, ca şi ***Oamenii din Dublin*** şi culminând cu traducerea romanului ***Ulise*** realizată de Mircea Ivanescii.

Şi lista ar putea continua cu zeci şi zeci de titluri şi de traducători de prestigiu.

Fără a părăsi vechea sa dragoste, literatura franceză, dar trecând tot mai mult pe prim plan limba şi literatura engleză, România a încetat de mult să fie o „colonie a culturii franceze”.

Perioada interbelică a pus la îndemâna cititorului român mai toate romanele lui Walter Scott şi Dickens, dar şi pe cele ale lui Hardy, Cronin, G. Wells, Galsworthy, Lawrence, Huxley, Joyce, V. Woolf. Romanul englez a contribuit, tematic şi formal, la înnoirea şi modernizarea romanului românesc, oferindu-i numeroase sugestii, tematice şi stilistice, moduri şi modalităţi romaneşti, pe care scriitorul român le-a fructificat în mare masura.

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INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND APPLIED APPROACHES IN INVESTIGATING INEQUALITIES ON THE LEVEL OF TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS FROM ROMANIA

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Abstract: The technical high schools provide upward social mobility, or reproduce the existing social inequalities, inside the scene of Romanian educational system? The problem is complex and rises a series of inter-, and multidisciplinary questions. The research observes, measures and analyzes the elements and their intersections, inside emerging educational inequalities in the frame of different social science disciplines such as sociology, psychology and pedagogy, as well as communication sciences, to develop a functional explanatory model. Testing the multilevel statistical predicting model, the research contributes to better understanding of the phenomenon of school success, and the perspectives of furthering education and career. The findings, refer to education, and assessment of the upward mobility of students. By focusing on educational sociology terms and methods, the results recommend the alteration of the existing practices, with introduction of new and effective educational and organizational policies in Romanian technical high school systems.

Keywords: interdisciplinarity, upward social mobility, reproducing social inequalities, technical high school education, explanatory model

The study considers the fact that studying learning is an interdisciplinary activity. It looks at economy, pedagogy, psychology and sociology for explanations. The economic perspective in modernity's narrative (Andorka, 2006) is also a social expectation, as the youth is expected to get as many high level diplomas and technical training as possible. Getting the institutionalized knowledge doesn't mean just the lexical knowledge taught in schools that are valued by the educational system but also it means that those with degrees get a knowledge that is scientifically correct and also means that they can communicate easily with those who got the same education as theirs. They have to learn social and behavioral patterns and values that will help them to enter the work force but also to help them to further study. This knowledge helps them to try out and volunteer in many job descriptions and also helps them to be more adapt to challenges of the careers they choose.

Those who acquired higher educational degrees have heterogeneous competencies and they perform better in economically innovative environments while those who have lower educational

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status their knowledge is useful only at local level and their knowledge is limited to specific work environments and mainly linked to worn out technologies that became available to them. This competency gap shows through the strategies of "Europe 2020", which says that those individuals, who study at college or university level, basically became interchangeable with anybody else in the work place (COM, 2015). The psychological and sociopsychological viewpoints of the study look at the continued learning through the question of motivation and it studies it through their perspective theories. Motivation is a psychological term and points at those forces, urges and/ or activating activities, attitudes and decisions which can have life altering consequences but mostly they act though careers and the lives of individuals. The different motivational theories are showing us many dimensions, levels and facets that are contributing significantly to the learning achievements, to the career-path choices, to the aspirations and to the imaginary of the future. The empirical and psychological studies at one hand look at the mechanisms of choice in the light of institutional atmosphere and environment when young individuals consider joining learning institutions. When considering the institutional atmosphere and environment and their effects, than many sociopsychological hypotheses, research and theories come out regarding the motivation in the learning habits of the youth population. The most well known are: Cyril O. Houle's (1961) sociopsychological theory on the three motivators for continuing adult learners; and also Clark and Trow (1966), Erdmann (1983), Sevier (1987), Taylor (1944), Campbell (1977), Huston (1981), Hossler (1989), Kallio (1995) and others. Byrne and his coauthors (2012) write about the fact that those young individuals who are *study-oriented* join higher education because they find satisfaction in continued learning, and they want their knowledge to be widened and they want to observe intellectual development. The *dedicated* ones pursue higher education because they think that learning gives them the right knowledge for the right professional results. The *activity-oriented* ones are motivated by extra-curricular factors, like meeting new individuals, getting into new situations, etc. There's also a binominal look at the motivation. There are internal and external motivators. But there are also factors of the career choices which are dominating in the motivational field. This means that the environment, the familial background, the schools institutional atmosphere, the pressures of the peer group, etc can have major influences on one hand the motivation to pursue higher education (Lepper, 1988; Kuntsen, 2011) and on the other hand to point out more general sociological points of view regarding the higher educational demand (Vieira and Vieira, 2011; Pope and Pope, 2006).

Between the many important factors are not just the prices of the scholarly success but also chances for equal equity for having those communication and verbal skills that schools are requiring from their students in the curricula but also in the hidden curriculum. These are not accessible equally to all the students with different backgrounds. Those who come from lower social classes, from rural areas and have lower cultural capital in the family, or their mother tongue is not the one used as the lingua franca while teaching the curricula – those students will have limited language competency. They will be disadvantaged next to those who bring language competency from home, where they use it since childhood and practice it in their own community (Bernstein, 1996).

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The sociological point of view of the paper looks at mobility, reproduction of the social system and social mobility and interprets continued education as status acquisition, and also values it as converting and reconverting processes of social capital. Because of this the individual's social background comes into focus, and concentrates on the change (or possible change) that can happen because of education, and results in social status change, but also raises the invested social and familial capital and their change.

One of the questions of the research is that participating in the education system what kind of possibilities and mobility path are open or closed in front of the youth and how it contributes to their positive status change after finishing higher education? Of the existence of the social inequities in education and their reproduction Bourdieu (1978) wrote a theory that lasts time. His ideas are based on the distinctions that the existence of different capitals and their nature raise. According to these ideas capital is every resource that we can invest and has or we hope we have a return. Next to the economic capital Bourdieu (1986) considers social and cultural capitals as resources. These can help in learning, acquiring knowledge and getting diplomas. Social capital is used by Bourdieu but also by James Coleman (1988) as theoretically strategic concept. Coleman links the normative social action – where the social actors are acting on social values and rules, but also on prescriptions and expected obligations - with individual actions made by economic reasons. The concept of actions made by economic reasons is built on the utility of possibilities and maximization of the gains by the social actions. The functions of the social capital are double structured. One of them is social structure, and the other is a possibility given to the individual to act in the confinement of the structure (Coleman, 1988). Thus the social capital is diverse and some of the actions that are useful in case can be ineffective or harmful in others. The social capital consists of relationship networks and exchange conditions and their utilitarian functions that forms between individuals and help the actions and generates gain. Education in Coleman's case (1988) means investing in human capital. He points out that individuals exchange their social capital to human capital with the mediation of the educational system. (He disregards the reproduction of inequalities; he talks about it as a general fact) But Bourdieu introduces class considerations regarding the understanding of the supply of social capital in the social structure. This supply of social capital works by investing economic and social capitals and exchanging it to cultural capital, but also re-convert it to social and cultural capitals (Bourdieu, 1986; Pusztai, 2009).

Testing the prediction at a technical high school

(*Preliminary history*) In 2012 in Romania, Roth et al., has studied 3509 graduating class adolescent students' transition into young adulthood. In the 2nd wave of the research, in 2014, with online questionnaire process, young people who were asked in the first round were asked again about their intent in continued learning. From the 3509 young people asked at national level there were 1348 students who graduated technical high school. In total, 478 of us young people out of the technical high school then filled out the questionnaire.

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The present study examined a population of 478 technical high schoolers. In our study, we used data from both waves of the research in order to understand and get more explanation about the technical high school student's inequalities and their further education opportunities. The questions in the questionnaire grouped around eight issues. These are: personal data, the family origin, education, the labor market, health, mental health and personality characteristics, intimate relationships, social environment, the future, the hobby, volunteering and other activities. The research question was that within the current Romanian educational system technical high school in the secondary education especially in the prevailing social conditions (class system or structure) is aiding the reproduction of inequalities, or serves mostly the intergenerational social mobility? The aim was to explain with the help of a logistic regression model, the continued education of technical high school students who finished secondary education. This model came with prediction too. This model helps to predict the chances of a successful Baccalaureate examination and chances for continued learning. "The social integration success is largely influenced by the value system along which forms the adolescent personality" (Albert Lorincz, 2007). Thus the focus is on family background, which is a major factor both for school success and failure, as well as for career choice that constitutes a huge problem in adolescence.

Using factor analysis and logistic regression, we found that for the studied population (N = 478 technical high schoolers): further education opportunities are best enhance by factors like having urban residence, also helps if the parents have higher education, and if the students have continued learning intentions. To a lesser extent, but chances increase if the student is female, if the student's family fairs better economically and the attitudes of the teachers are positive towards their students (teachers care about their students, they listen to their talking, if it is important for the teachers that the students attend school, if the students get encouragements from teachers, if counts for the teachers how students are valued, if they recognized the good qualities in their students).

Table 1. *The increased chances of continued education in the logistic regression models*

Independent variables	**The higher code meaning**	**Odds ratio Exp(B)**	**Explanatory power (Nagelkerke)**
Want to learn more.	Yes	+86%	47,8%
Gender	Boy	–63%	
Residence	City	+184%	
The parent(s education)	Higher education	+127%	
Financial situation of the family	Better financial conditions	+49%	
The perception of teachers' attitudes	Positive reviews	+5%	

The introduction of further variables into the model will no longer improve the explanatory power, and does not improve the predictive powers of the model.

71.96% of the students who graduated from technical high school graduated with success, from a total

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of 478 students[1]. 68.41% of the students who graduated from technical high school continued their studies, and only for 6 of them the explanatory and prediction model is not valid to explain their continued education choices. In their case, the calculated chances are less than 0,500. This data is *predilectly* shown for those students who choose not to pursue continued learning. The data demonstrate the predictive validity of the model, since for 97.6% of the cases the prediction is valid (N = 478). The prediction, as all projected probabilities do not apply to each individual case, since a successful examination has lots of conjectural factors, starting with the selection of examination problems, up to the examiners and correctors attitudes, etc, which cannot be predicted.

In April 2016, we tested our prediction at Bányai János Technical High School[2]. We surveyed online those 12 graders, who participated at the Matura exam simulation. Our questionnaires were filled out online. The results (N = 31) showed that eight students are having chances for a successful graduation exam. At the summer and autumn graduation (in 2016, at the examined technical high school), eight youngsters managed to graduate[3] from between all the seniors graduates. The predictive validity of our measurements was 100%.

The measurements were conducted on four dimensions, to assess the student's potential success at graduation examination. According to our prediction model: 1) the parents' educational level, the family's level of cultural capital, 2) the family's financial, economic, as social capital, the economic adequacy and 3) the perception of care from teachers, that is the effect of the school, and 4) the intention of continued education were taken into account.

Then, the test results were compared to the results achieved in the final examination. In our survey, a total of 20 girls and 11 boys participated. According to their spatial origin 16 of them came from small towns, 3 of them came from parishes, and 12 of them were villagers. The students living in rural areas solve the school visitation by commute or living in a boarding school.

1) For the parents education we received the following results

Table 2. *The education of parents (N=31)*

N=31	**Father**	**Mother**
Elementary School (Class V.-VIII.)	3	4
Lyceum (Class X.)	4	4
Technical School	9	3
Lyceum (Class XII-XIII.)	10	15
Lyceum + Master training	1	4

[1] There's a distortion here, because in the same year, in 2012 in Romania from those who participated at Matura exams 66.41% were successful. The Ministry of Education published data on all students while our data was collected in a way that students could chose not to disclose all data or to disclose it partially, because there's a social desirability to report only the positive and adequate data. (Rotariu, Iluț, 2001)

[2] In Hargita County, in the town of Székelyudvarhely the Bányai János Technical High School it is regarded to be one of the biggest educational institution. The institution comprises 500 students and focuses on textile and woodworking industries. From three classes, each having 28 students, in total 31 students participated at Baccalaureate exam simulation.

[3] Official data from the ministry of education regarding Matura exams (2016) http://bacalaureat.edu.ro/

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Post secondary training	1	0
University	1	1
I don`t know	2	0

From the second table data shows that mothers are more educated than fathers. The differences however are not relevant to the cases. And from both parents only one have a university degree.

2) Taking in consideration the total income of the families, they group as follows

Table 3. *The total income of the family (N=31)*

Financial situation of the family	**N=31**
At most 500 RON	3
500-1000 RON	6
1001-1200 RON	9
1201-2000 RON	2
2001-3000 RON	7
3001-5000 RON	1
10001 RON and above	1
I don`t know.	2

The size of family income calculated does not show the factual material, financial or social situation. The table shows that the family of the students declared income is very low, they are around the guaranteed income. Most of the students come from a family of four, and as Table 3 shows, more than half of the student's family's income is smaller than the minimal income per capita set forth by the government[4].

To complete this information we add that, about half of the students who got into the sample pay 250 Ron for the first month for their boarding school (dormitory), which seems to be expensive, compared to the family's income. Similar high expenses are associated with commuting for those who do not move into school boarding's. Expenses related to schooling multiply in families where more than one child is at school age. Measuring the students' own perceptions and assessment of the financial situation of their families, we found that if measured on a scale from 1 to 10, then - and this is reflected in the data relative to the economic environment and perceived financial situation that they are in - the evaluations conforms to a regular Gaussian curve, with the left side being limited by the grade 3, and the right side is bordered by the grade 8. In the case of having material goods, we found that most of the families cannot afford even a one-week vacation (21 families), cars are only in 23 families, and air-conditioning is reported by only five students.

3) The influences of factors outside schools on success and then to the continued education and career choices:

The results show that student's appreciation is low regarding the influence of the school. The following table contains information on how the students appreciate their teacher's attention.

Table 4. *Appreciation of teacher's attention. (N=31)*

[4] Since 1st of May, 2016, Romania, the minimal income per capita set forth by the government is 1250 RON, http://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2016/04/29/nagyot-emelkedik-a-minimalber-romaniaban/

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N=31	**Not at all**	**A bit**	**A lot**	**Very much**
	1	***2***	***3***	***4***
His teachers care about him.	3	19	8	1
Teachers are listening when the student is saying something.	9	7	14	1
For the teachers is important if the student is on the school or not.	6	2	7	9
The student is receiving a lot of encouragement from his teachers.	7	12	9	3
The teachers are appreciating the students efforts.	8	18	5	0
The teachers know the students best qualities.	8	17	5	1
The teachers are praising the students if they are working hardly.	6	11	11	3
It matters to the teachers what grades their students get.	12	12	5	2

When compared (based on Table 4.) the teacher's attentions positive and negative appreciations, turns out that most of them are appreciating it negatively. The proportions are as follows: negative range (1 and 2) 159 evaluations, the positive range (3 and 4) are only 84 evaluations. The importance of the issue is given by the teacher's positive influence, which strengthens the motivational forces of the school. In our case, this indicates a lack of motivation, and shows a desire to improve teacher's attitudes towards motivation at least in the perception of the students who were surveyed.

4) Questions for continued education

The answers show that the desire for continued education is low (7 people want to continue education - 20% of the respondents). The primary motivation since enrolment of the students from technical high school is to learn a trade. Just those require Matura exams who want continued education, while others are looking for jobs for rapid returns as a conversion and reconversion strategy.

In this case, only seven students answered that they would like continued education. This also indicates with approximation that how many students have the necessary grit for tackling Matura exams with successful motivation.

The peer group is not a positive influence for continued education motivation. There's no competition for achieving successful Matura exams. This is essentially secondary or even lower objective to be reached.

Predictability and real results

Table 5. *Prediction and the Matura exam results in the Bányai János Technical High School. (N=31)*

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No.	Gender	Prediction result/ Baccalaureate result	(Class IX.) Entrance exam results	Romanian language and literature class result (Class XII.)	Hungarian language and literature class result (Class XII.)	Mathematics class result (Class XII.)
1	2	0.33	6.00	8	9.5	9.5
2	1	0.54/5.56	5.7	9	7	5.5
3	1	0.04	5.55	5	6	8.5
4	1	0.14	4.06	5	5	5
5	1	0.47	5.26	6.5	8	8
6	2	0.26	3.65	8	6.5	8
7	2	0.10	4.63	5	6.5	7
8	1	0.21	4.26	5	5	6
9	1	0.04	4.11	5.5	7	7
10	2	0.46	4.16	5	5.5	6.5
11	2	0.53/6	3.13	5	6.5	6.5
12	2	0.34	3.70	5.5	7	6.5
13	2	0.06	3.93	5	5	5.5
14	2	0.21	4.00	5	5	5.5
15	2	0.03	3.78	6.5	5	5.5
16	2	0.07	4.00	7	8	6.5
17	2	0.07	4.81	5	5	5.5
18	2	0.72	4.35	6.5	5.5	5.3
19	1	0.63/6.1	5.03	5	5.5	5
20	2	0.85/6.3	3.30	7.5	8	7
21	1	0.87/6.41	5.75	6	7	5
22	2	0.18	3.90	5.5	6.5	5
23	2	0.09	4.33	5	6.5	5
24	2	0.15	5.28	5.5	5	5
25	2	0.25	4.98	6	6.5	5
26	1	0.69/6.65	3.91	5.5	5.5	5
27	1	0.85/7.16	4.71	5	6.5	5
28	2	0.46	3.68	5	7	5
29	1	0.50/6.53	7.84	9.5	7	6.5
30	2	0.11	4.18	5	6	5
31	2	0.04	5.33	7	6.5	5

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The prediction values calculated - simplistically - shows that in the studied population (N = 31) what is the likelihood of a successful Matura examination conditioned with those factors taken into account which were highlighted in our analysis. If some individual's reported value is higher than the value of 0,500, than predictably it will be successful, or at least will have increased chances for a successful Matura examination (over 75% the likelihood of success is certain), while below the value of 0,500 the failure likely probable. In the studied technical high schools from the predicted eight 12th grade students at the summer session of the Matura exams only one had been successful, while at the fall session of the Matura exams the other 7 also took the exams successfully. Taken all this results into account the predictions were 100% correct.

Conclusions

The study examined four interrelated dimensions: success in school, continued education opportunities, the motivational effects of inequalities and their reproduction with various backgrounds taken into consideration. The technical high school students continued education is a complex phenomenon, which can be approached with holistic overview. Such a multi-level and interdisciplinary approach was used and it is recommended for further research. We focused on the various contextual influences (Fenyes-Pusztai, 2004, Fenyes 2008) and how they participate in the decision on continued education, or how they influence school success and how they influence inequality reproduction (Bourdieu, 1978).

On social statistical analysis made on survey results from Romanian technical high schools was found that vertical mobility was an intergenerational life strategy (Cârtână, 2000). However, the background of origin of students influenced greatly their life outcomes (Csata, 2004, Veres et al., 1998). The students from the lower social classes, mostly from rural areas, and with parents urging to fallow short-term educational strategies, with lower aspiration levels, etc, - coming from this kind of environment, the student's (Veres-Papp Z, 2015 Dávid Kacsó et al. 2014) background-origin, and their contextual effects determine to a greater extent the choices for learning than for the theoretical high schools students. As the multi-factorial test scores, described in the essay, show that the students results from the technical high schools can be tested with success, following by the analysis of the factors of their familial background, which indicates that the school's effect is slightly contributing to the success of Matura exams (see Table 5.).

Though there is needed further research in every social science discipline, still some authoritative conclusions are emerging for education policy. The first step should be the elimination of the situation which puts 14 or 15 years old students to take decisive decisions which impacts there whole life path and career choices with exams on their skills and after that with enrollment into further education based on those exam evaluations. The technical high schools training it is inclusive, that is, the education should be transformed so that to help readjustment and to further education opportunities in a manner conducive to provide an opportunity for a higher level of technical courses in furthering education. There's a need for increased academic performances from teachers, as the informal effects of the school are added to the values of pedagogical knowledge. On

one hand low and on the other hand, the outdated technology and knowledge transfer grants just locally affordable and usable working and labor force.

However, these markets are very volatile and should be a fundamental responsibility of the schools to re-training and to give lifelong learning possible and to make it desirable to learn and to encourage graduates to do so. Problems with the lack of equal opportunities are many and complex, but the "education policy must be flexible to follow the changes" (Albert Lorincz, 2004), it has to create opportunities for vertical mobility, progressing towards knowledge society. "The social integration cannot be interpreted by itself alone. It always depends on a given social problem generating political, economical and interest related values" (Albert Lorincz, 2004).

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THE RESULTS OF THE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN HARGHITA COUNTY, 5TH JUNE 2016

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Abstract: The article intends to present the territorial distribution of the people's electoral choices at the 2016 Local Elections. Based on the official statistical data from the Central Electoral Bureau, we analysed the electoral decisions for mayors, local and county councillors. In Harghita, the people elected 67 mayors, with the following affiliations: DUHR (47), SDP (7), HCP (5), independents (5), the HCP-HPPT (2), and NLP (1). Out of the 837 local council seats most went to DUHR (530), followed by HCP (77), HPPT (68), SDP (53), NLP and the HCP-HPPT alliance with 33 mandates each, IC (24), LDEP (8), NDP and POL (2 mandates each), while GRP, GP, HPP-LS, CDNPP, PMP, RP-PE, DARP won one seat each. Harghita County Council is currently comprised of 30 councillors (18 DUHR representatives, 4 HCP, 3 SDP, 3 HPPT, and 2 NLP) and its president (Borboly Csaba), member of the DUHR.

Keywords: mayors, local councillors, county councillors, DUHR

1. Introduction

In the last decades, Romanian geographic research focused on studies regarding the population electoral behaviour. Following said trend, the geographic school of Cluj-Napoca created three doctoral theses based on this theme, one of which focusing inclusively on the County of Harghita (*Etnie, confesiune and comportament electoral în Transilvania. Studiu geografic*, V. Bodocan, 2001). Furthermore, for our endeavour, we used as models papers written by V. Bodocan (1997); Gr. P. Pop & V. Bodocan (2009); G. B. Tofan (2013); G. B. Tofan & Cristina Timariu (2014); G. B. Tofan (2014), as well as a postdoctoral research project (*Etnie, confesiune and comportament electoral în judeţele Harghita, Covasna and Mureş. Studiu geografic (2008-2014)*, G. B. Tofan, 2015).

The 21st Electoral Precinct – Harghita County is comprised of 67 smaller electoral precincts, with 290 voting stations (18 stations more than in 2012). The county saw a number of 2 648 full candidacies for mayor, county and local councillor (463 being women).

For the 2016-2020 mayoral mandate, there were 153 de candidates (145 men and 8 women), for the local councils 2 271 (1 859 men and 412 women), while, for county councilllors, there were 224 candidacies (181 men and 43 women). As for the age groups of the candidates, most fit in the 40-50 year age group (890 people, out of which 734 men and 156 women), followed by the 30-40

age group (757 people, out of which 612 men and 145 women), the 50-60 year group (483, out of which 411 M and 72 F), 60-70 year group - 247 people (214 M and 33 F), 20-30 year group - 245 (190 M and 55 F), 70-80 year group, with 25 candidates (23 M and 2 F), and lastly one male candidate from the 10-20 year group (19 years of age).

Moreover, 23 of the 58 communes in the county had only one candidate for the position of mayor. These communes were: Atid, Avrămeşti, Brădeşti, Cârţa, Ciucsîngeorgiu, Dăneşti, Dârjiu, Dealu, Ditrău, Leliceni, Lupeni, Mereşti, Ocland, Porumbeni, Remetea, Sâncrăieni, Sânmartin, Sântimbru, Satu Mare, Siculeni, Tomeşti, Ulieş, and Zetea (table 2).

2. Methodology

Based on the official statistical data obtained from the Central Electoral Bureau, we created a table comprised of the following indicators for each administrative-territorial unit: *total number of people with right to vote; total number of valid votes; name and surname of candidate who won the mayor seat; political affiliation of said candidate; number and percentage of valid votes obtained by candidate,* as well as the *number of voting stations*. Following data editing and interpretation, we designed a map containing the territorial distribution of mayors for the 67 administrative-territorial units that make up Harghita County, according to their political affiliation.

The novel element of these elections is the fact that the president of the county council was no longer elected by popular vote, but was designated through an indirect vote, from the ranks of the county councillors. Moreover, a few months prior to these elections, attempts were made to alter the Electoral Code in order to return to two voting rounds instead of just one, but these requests were not validated by the Romanian Constitutional Court.

For a full understanding of the geographical-political aspects, we also went through several documents issued by the *Permanent Electoral Authority* regarding the organisation and development of these elections. Therefore, according to Government's Decision nr. 51/2016, the local elections took place on Sunday, 5th June 2016. In a similar fashion to 2012, for each candidate, the political parties and the independents candidates submitted a list containing at least 100 supporters in the case of communes, at least 500 signatures in the case of tier II and III urban settlements and at least 1 000 for counties, the Municipality of Bucureşti, the sectors of Bucureşti, and tier I cities.

Mayors would also be elected using the single round method (with the exception of equal scores), the only difference being that county council presidents were not elected by directly the population, but were elected by secret vote from the ranks of the county councillors.

In 2016, the Permanent Electoral Authority began implementing *The Voter Turnout and Illegal Vote Prevention Informational System*, which enables voter identification data processing, signalling multiple and thus illegal voting, as well as the possibility to view voter turnout on-line and in real time.

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3. Mayor and local councillor distribution, based on political affiliation

According to the official results provided by the Central Electoral Bureau, from its online data bank (http://www.2016bec.ro/rezultate), Harghita County registered a lower turnout than the national average (48.27%), meaning that, at 9 p.m., voter turnout reached 43.48% of the total number of voters – 270 485 (38.19% in urban areas and 47.85% in rural areas). Therefore, this territorial unit, alongside Timiș, Iasi, Covasna, and Sibiu, had one of the lowest turnouts in the entire country.

The total number of valid votes for mayor was 114 231, *the HCP-HPPT electoral alliance* obtaining 7 884 votes (6.90% in the precinct and 2.98% of mandates), *the Hungarian People's Party of Transilvania*, 5 460 votes (4.77%), *Liberal and Democrat Party Alliance*, 233 votes (0.20%), *Hungarian Civic Party*, 10 003 votes (8.75% and 7.46% of the mandates), *People's Movement Party*, 159 votes (0.13%), *National Democratic Party*, 199 votes (0.17%), *National Liberal Party*, 5 170 votes (4.52% and 1.5% of the mandates), *Free People's Party*, 801 votes (0.70%), *Humanist Power Party* (*Social-Liberal*), 132 votes (0.11%), *Greater Romania Party*, 119 votes (0.10%), *Social Democratic Party*, 7 091 votes (6.2% and 10.45% of the mandates), *the Green Party*, 129 votes (0.11%), *Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania*, 60 741 votes (53.17% and 70.15% of the mandates), and independent candidates – 16 110 votes (14.1% and 7.46% of mandates).

Fig. 1. Territorial distribution of mayors, based on political affiliation, in Harghita County, at the 2016 local elections.



The high concentration of Hungarian ethnics in the county (85.2%, 257 707 out of 302 435 inhabitants, according to the 2011 Census) led to large portion of the mandate pool to be won by DUHR. Thus, as one can see in table 1 as well as in figure 1, the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania won 47 mayor seats (70.15%), SDP seven (10.45%), independent candidates and the Hungarian Civic Party five each (7.46%), the HCP-HPPT alliance two (2.98%), while the

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National Liberal Party one (1.5%).

Three urban areas were won by DUHR: Miercurea-Ciuc (65.87%, 11687 total votes), Borsec (77.42%, 1 258), and Cristuru Secuiesc (61.47%, 3 320); two by HCP: Gheorgheni (83.01%, 5 564 total votes), and Băile Tușnad (65.75%, 657); two other mandates by the HCP-HPPT alliance: Odorheiu Secuiesc (42.13%, 13 229) and Vlăhița (51.49%, 3 152), while in Topliţa, with a Romanian majority, the mayor's seat was won by the NLP representative, *Platon Stelu*, with 60.36% of the votes (2 892 votes) out of a total of 4791 votes.

The independent candidate *Iojiban Gheorghe* won the town of Bălan, with 43.68% (906 votes) out of 2 074 votes.

In rural areas, out of a total of 58 rural communes, DUHR again obtained the highest number of seats (44), followed by SDP with seven, won in communes with a strong Romanian presence (Bilbor, Corbu, Tulgheș, Gălăuțaș, Sărmaș, Subcetate, and Voșlăbeni), independent candidates four (Lăzarea, Tușnad, Lueta and Merești), and HCP with three (Căpâlnița, Ciceu, and Suseni).

Compared to 2012, the SDP won more seats (+ 5), in Corbu, Tulgheș, Gălăuțaș, Sărmaș, and Subcetate, but one must take into consideration that, during the last elections, this party was part of the Social Democratic Union, a political alliance comprised of the *Center-Left Alliance:* National Union for the Progress of Romania and Social Democratic Party, and the *Center-Right Alliance:* National Liberal Party and Conservative Party. In two municipalities (Bilbor and Gălăuțaș), each party of the above mentioned alliance supported their own candidate, while in Topliţa, Subcetate, and Voșlăbeni there were SLU candidates. HCP also perfomed better than in 2012 (+1), while the DUHR-HPPT alliance won two additional seats. Division among the Hungarian population led to fewer seats won by the DUHR (-4), and by independents (-1).

Table 1. Valid votes and mandates at the 2016 local elections, Harghita County

Party	**Votes**		**Seats**	
	Nr.	***% in the county***		***%***
DUHR	60741	*53.17*	47	*70.15*
IC	16110	*14.10*	5 (Lăzarea, Tușnad, Bălan, Lueta, Merești)	*7.46*
HCP	10003	*8.75*	5 (Gheorgheni, Băile Tușnad, Căpâlnița, Ciceu, Suseni)	*7.46*
HCP-HPPT	7884	*6.90*	2 (Odorheiu Secuiesc, Vlăhița)	*2.98*
SDP	7091	*6.20*	7 (Bilbor, Corbu, Tulgheș, Gălăuțaș, Sărmaș, Subcetate, Voșlăbeni)	*10.45*
NLP	5170	*4.52*	1 (Topliţa)	*1.50*
Total	**106999**	***93.64***	**67**	***100,0***

Source: processed data from the Central Electoral Bureau.

DUHR = Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania; **IC** = Independent candidate; **HCP** = Hungarian Civic Party; **HCP-PPMT electoral alliance** = the electoral alliance between the Hungarian Civic Party and the Hungarian People's Party of Transilvania; **SDP** = Social Democratic Party; **NLP** = National Liberal Party;

In terms of local councillors, in Harghita, out of a total of 2 271 candidates, 837 were elected (two more seats compared to 2012), the total number of valid votes being 111 448.

Most seats were won by the Hungarian Democratic Union, 530 (63.32%), followed by HCP - 77 seats (9.20%), Hungarian People's Party of Transilvania - 68 (8.12%), SDP - 53 (6.33%), NLP - 33 (3.94%), DUHR-PPMT alliance - 33 seats (3.94%), 24 seats were won by independents (2.86%), Liberal and Democrat Alliance Party - 8 seats (0.95%), Free People's Party and the National Democratic Party with two seats each (0.23%). One seat was won by each of the following political organisations: „Pro Europa" Gypsy Party, Gypsy Democratic Alliance Party, People's Movement Party, National Christian Democratic Party, Greater Romania Party, Humanist Power Party (Social-Liberal), and the Green Party.

4. Electoral behaviour in county councillor voting

There were 224 candidates for county councillor seats (181 men and 43 women), but only 31 seats, the number of valid votes being 109 815. The results were as follows: DUHR - 19 seats (61.29%), HCP - 4 seats (12.90%), SDP and HPPT - 3 seats each (9.67%), and NLP - 2 seats (6.45%). The validation meeting for the new county council was held on 23rd June 2016.

Table 2. Mayor voting in Harghita County, Romania, 5th June 2016

No. crt.	City, town, commune	Total number of voters	Total no. of valid votes	Name of candidate	Political affiliation	Valid votes	%	Number of voting stations
1	Miercurea-Ciuc	34900	11687	Ráduly Róbert-Kálmán	DUHR	7699	*65.87*	23
2	Gheorgheni	16640	5564	Nagy Zoltán	HCP	4619	*83.01*	10
3	Toplița	13209	4791	Platon Stelu	NLP	2892	*60.36*	11
4	Odorheiu-Secuiesc	31831	13229	Gálfi Árpad	HCP-HPPT	5574	*42.13*	22
5	Băile Tușnad	1390	657	Albert Tibor	HCP	432	*65.75*	1
6	Bălan	6623	2074	Iojiban Gheorghe	IC	906	*43.68*	5
7	Borsec	2326	1258	Mik Jozsef	DUHR	974	*77.42*	2
8	Cristuru-Secuiesc	8922	3320	Rafai Emil	DUHR	2041	*61.47*	7
9	Vlăhița	6148	3152	Molnár Tibor	DUHR-HPPT	1623	*51.49*	5
10	Atid	2201	521	Szőcs László	DUHR	521	*100.00*	5
11	Avrămești	2157	606	Simó Dezső-Szabolcs	DUHR	606	*100.00*	4

12	Bilbor	2274	1238	Trif Ilie	SDP	647	*52.26*	2
13	Brădești	1611	767	Bokor Botond	DUHR	767	*100.00*	2
14	Căpâlnița	1621	968	Benedek László	DUHR	685	*70.76*	2
15	Cârța	2289	787	Gábor Tibor	DUHR	787	*100.00*	2
16	Ciceu	2251	1310	Péter Lukács	DUHR	596	*45.49*	2
17	Ciucsîngeorgiu	3839	1164	György József	DUHR	1164	*100.00*	7
18	Ciumani	3692	1883	Márton László-Szilárd	DUHR	1239	*65.79*	3
19	Corbu	1166	730	Țepeș-Focșa Romeo	SDP	413	*56.57*	2
20	Corund	4921	2525	Katona Mihály	DUHR	1939	*76.79*	6
21	Cozmeni	1628	948	Szántó László	DUHR	775	*81.75*	2
22	Dănești	1865	820	Bőjte Csongor-Ernő	DUHR	820	*100.00*	2
23	Dârjiu	832	399	Istvan Adrian	DUHR	399	*100.00*	2
24	Dealu	3173	1019	Bálint Elemér-Imre	DUHR	1019	*100.00*	3
25	Ditrău	4863	1428	Puskás Elemér	DUHR	1428	*100.00*	5
26	Feliceni	2680	1592	Sándor Jozsef	DUHR	905	*56.84*	6
27	Frumoasa	2964	1142	Ferencz Tibor	DUHR	916	*80.21*	3
28	Gălăuțaș	2045	985	Țăran Radu	SDP	637	*64.67*	3
29	Joseni	4822	2006	Gáll Szabolcs	DUHR	1688	*84.14*	4
30	Lăzarea	2949	1590	Danguly Ervin	IC	941	*59.18*	3
31	Leliceni	1637	587	Keresztes Balázs	DUHR	587	*100.00*	3
32	Lueta	3061	1180	Mihály Dénes	IC	614	*52.03*	2
33	Lunca de Jos	4274	1890	Gergely Karoly	DUHR	1246	*65.92*	5
34	Lunca de Sus	2701	1317	Pap Imre	DUHR	707	*53.68*	4
35	Lupeni	3750	1972	Kovács Lehel	DUHR	1972	*100.00*	6
36	Mădăraș	1805	1082	Biró László	DUHR	645	*59.61*	2
37	Mărtiniș	2361	1438	Jakab Attila	DUHR	649	*45.13*	10
38	Merești	1121	362	Tikosi László	IC	362	*100.00*	1
39	Mihăileni	2208	1124	Izsák-Székely Lóránt	DUHR	645	*57.38*	4
40	Mugeni	2870	1587	Farkas Mozes	DUHR	1281	*80.71*	8
41	Ocland	1005	367	Cseke Miklós	DUHR	367	*100.00*	2
42	Păuleni-Ciuc	1509	750	Ferencz Csaba	DUHR	447	*59.60*	3
43	Plăieșii de Jos	2119	1056	András Zoltán	DUHR	791	*74.90*	4
44	Porumbeni	1397	787	Gyerkó Levente	DUHR	787	*100.00*	2
45	Praid	5491	2854	Bokor Alexandru	DUHR	1501	*52.59*	5
46	Racu	1294	723	Császár Attila	DUHR	581	*80.35*	2
47	Remetea	5152	3137	Laczkó-Albert Elemér	DUHR	3137	*100.00*	4
48	Săcel	952	475	Nagy Lajos	DUHR	328	*69.05*	4
49	Sâncrăieni	2082	854	Székely Ernő	DUHR	854	*100.00*	2
50	Sândominic	5232	2086	Karda Róbert	DUHR	1749	*83.84*	4
51	Sânmartin	1830	598	Gergely András	DUHR	598	*100.00*	2
52	Sânsimion	2742	1623	Kozma Istvan-Florin	DUHR	1063	*65.49*	3
53	Sântimbru	1686	779	Kencse Előd	DUHR	779	*100.00*	2
54	Sărmaș	3341	1585	Mândru Valentin	SDP	1154	*72.80*	4
55	Satu Mare	1613	604	Kovács Imre	DUHR	604	*100.00*	2
56	Secuieni	2236	976	Balló Zoltán	DUHR	537	*55.02*	3
57	Siculeni	2306	991	Szentes Csaba	DUHR	991	*100.00*	2
58	Șimonești	3105	1578	Péter Zoltán	DUHR	1139	*72.11*	8
59	Subcetate	1542	841	Rizea Ion	SDP	247	*29.36*	1
60	Suseni	4271	1964	Egyed József	DUHR	784	*39.91*	6
61	Tomești	2172	670	Kedves Róbert	DUHR	670	*100.00*	2
62	Tulgheș	2655	1508	Vancu Marcel	SDP	1333	*88.39*	4
63	Tușnad	1723	1040	György József	IC	633	*60.86*	3
64	Ulieș	911	265	György Sándor	DUHR	265	*100.00*	5
65	Vârșag	1301	735	Tamás Ernő	DUHR	572	*77.82*	2

66	Voșlăbeni	1662	998	Tinca Mihail-Dumitru	SDP	580	*58.11*	2
67	Zetea	4785	1688	Nagy Attila	DUHR	1688	*100.00*	6

Source: Central Electoral Bureau.

DUHR = Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania; **HCP** = Hungarian Civic Party; **HCP-HPPT electoral alliance** = the electoral alliance between Hungarian Civic Party and Hungarian People's Party of Transilvania; **NLP** = National Liberal Party; **SDP** = Social Democratic Party; **IC** = Independent candidate.

The president of Harghita County Council is currently held by *Borboly Csaba*, now in his third term, and the vicepresidents are *Barti Tihamér* and *Biró Barna Botond*, the entire council presidential structure being comprised of DUHR representatives.

5. Conclusions

Romanians are a majority in most areas of Romania, but the situation in Harghita County is rather peculiar, as Romanians are only a minority. For instance, in 2011, they numbered solely 13.0% (39 196 people). From an electoral standpoint, this means that the most important political party is the Democratic Union of Hungarians, who won absolute majority on all levels of the local administration, with 19 county councillor seats (61.29%), 530 local councillor seats (63.32%), and 47 mayor seats (70.15%). In the areas with a Romanian majority located in the northern part of the county, SDP representatives obtained 7 mayor seats, 53 seats in local councils and three in the county council, while NLP obtained one mayor seat, in Toplița, 33 seats in local councils and only two in the county council.

Another important aspect involves voter turnout. At the local elections held on 5th June 2016, at 9 p.m., Harghita County placed last in terms of voter turnout in rural areas (47.85%) and 39 (43.48%) in urban areas, ahead of Iași and Timiș counties, and the Municipality of Bucureşti.

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BEHIND EVERY JOKE THERE IS A LITTLE…?

FEMALE ROLES BEYOND HUMOR[1]

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Abstract: The world of humour has always been a space for criticism, sarcasm, irony, sometimes for helplessness, indignation, anger. Often apropos of a current social fact, social phenomenon or habit. The caricature offers a way for a visual humour, a short and funny cartoon with a strong and obvious message. The understanding of this message depends on the collective sense, collective conscious. Our analysis is based on caricatures: we choose to analyse those cartoons created by the graphic artist István Para in the Harghita Népe daily newspaper's column in the last 12 month. Those will be the selected caricatures on which actually appears a female character or there is an obvious indication on a female person. Our research question are: How does appear the Woman in this cartoons? What kind of female roles can be identified in this cartoons? What are the rational and emotional domain for "understanding" the humour?
As we know, a caricature usually highlights something in an exaggerated way. But beyond the joke and the social sarcasm there can be found social beliefs, social habits, idealized relations, gender expectations. We would like to find some of these by analysing almost 200 cartoon.

Keywords: gender role, gender stereotype, caricature, cartoon, humour

1. Theoretical frame

Humor is a universal phenomenon, in every culture there appears a form of it. But every community and every context may vary in what frames humor, in which context can it be accepted (Sen 2012: 1). Social norms have an influence even on what might be the responses to a joke, what kind of tease is fair. Humor first and foremost consists of verbal or written jokes and actions which induce laughter or provoke mirth. (Critchley, 2002; Ritchie, 2004, cit.: Sen 2012: 1). Humor is a an amusing communication process, (1.) which generates a positive cognitive or affective response from listeners (readers) (Crawford 1994: 57); (2.) or produces positive "emotions and cognitions in the individual, group or organization" (Romero and Cruthirds 2006: 59). According to Radcliffe-Brown (1940), humor can even be an imperative, a must: between two persons it may be permitted, or even required – by custom – to make fun of the other (Radcliffe–Brown, 1940: 196). The "joking relationship" labels this kind of relation between two persons in which one can (or should) tease the other, who is not supposed to take in (Radcliffe–Brown, 1940: 196). This joking relationship can be

[1] The first paper of this research was published in Bakó, R. – Horváth, G. (eds.) (2016) *Mens sana. Rethinking the role of emotions* (see Gergely 2016).

symmetrical (each of the two persons teases or makes fun of the other) or asymmetrical (one jokes at the expense of the other one, who accepts it without retaliating or only with minor response (Radcliffe–Brown, 1940: 196). Gender appears through a diversity of self-presentational strategies, not to forget the attire, the nonverbal behavior, and of course the role enactment. All these helps in success because they fit the others' pre-existing expectations (Kessler and McKenna, 1978, cit. Crawford 2003). The power of conversational humor in constructing and presenting a self is related to its flexibility, indirectness, and ambiguity (Mulkay, 1988, cit. Crawford 2003). According to Biró (1997), our region has a traditionally coded custom as to who with whom and how one can joke. This is neither "fair," nor symmetrical; it is asymmetrical regarding mainly the female population and partly the younger generation. Only a man is allowed to tease somebody: a younger, married man is in the best "potential teaser situation," and a younger boy, a young and married woman who is a relative, a very old man are in the worst situation (Biró 1997: 29). Those who are being teased cannot respond in the same way, they usually have to put up with it. Especially those who have made an unfortunate mistake, no matter how long ago (Biró 1997: 67). These people are the subject of collective entertainment.

As we know, qualitative research in the social sciences is characterized by an important dependence on data that are word-based: humor analysis has potential as an investigative qualitative research tool (Sen 2012: 2). Through humor we can get a more subtle picture about the norms and rules that dominate contemporary society, actual social practices. Caricatures, as a well-devised satire, should be analyzed more deeply (Kutch 2012:141). The world of caricatures, especially the world of political caricatures, is dominated by men: the artists are men, it is about men, and male values rule over it (Argejó 2003). Women are present too, but they are only extras, supporting cast, as in the Hungarian political life of the nineties as well (Argejó 2003). Most visual arts tend to represent the world as it is, especially in the context of the press, which uses footage or photos. The reader who interprets them does not have to be attentive to subtleties and hidden metaphors in messages (Dan et.at. 2009: 15). The cartoons in contrarily, involves a degree of abstraction: amplification through simplification (El Rafaie, 2009). Cartoons works on two levels: (1) they tell an imaginary story which take place in a fictional world, and in the same time (2) refer to events and real people (El Rafaie, 2009).

According to Bota (2007), the humorous commercial radio spots' humor – by reflecting on everyday life situations of people living in the Szekler region, customs, language use, values, mentality – is basically built on self-recognition, on the self eureka-effect. Through these humorous spots everyday people get into the media publicity. But not as an apropos of an exceptional life event or incident, but through an everyday life situation. These radio spots ("pamphlets") are built on the assumption that people can laugh at the expense of others, especially if they feel that the situation is or could be about them as well (Bota 2007: 74). These spots and their humor are not meant to indicate how stupid the people from the region are, but how they think and how they express themselves. Even if these humorous situations are exaggerated, it is important that radio listeners (receiver) feel that even he or his neighbor would have said that phrase. Everyday language use, language situations and life situations inspire the creators of the spots, their characters do not say more "stupid" things than what one would hear or might have heard in the street (Bota 2007:

74). We assume that our caricatures have the same source of inspiration and their popularity have the same key: since we can laugh, it means that we understand what the joke is about, we know somebody in that very situation, we have heard about something just like that. And it is funny, because it is impersonal: the jokes'character is somebody just like me and you, but he is not me or you.

Studies show that men prefer that mock women and vice versa (Gruner 1997; Herzog 1999, cit: Billig 2005: 158). However the context in which it is told the joke is an important factor in the meaning of a joke: the interpretation of the joke depends on the other people. If we are among "similar type of people", people interpret the humour similarly. It could be that men and women enjoy similar types of joke but only when they are among people who are thinking the same, will not interpret the humour stereotipical to their own gender (Billig 2005: 158). And men and women seems to prefer to tell sexually tendentious jokes to members of their own sex (Lampert and Ervint-Tripp 1998). In cartoons as well the sexually topics are popular, and behind this drawings we can identify also beliefs, even stereotypes and prejudices about marriage, relationships, division of housework, gender roles, social expectations. By means of a newspaper we may encounter the myth of the ideal woman (Sütő-Egeressy 2007). Or – in the case of caricatures – the satirical myth of the non-ideal woman.

2. Methodology

The designer of these caricatures is Para István[2], a graphic artist who has drawn caricatures for the *Hargita Népe* newspaper for twenty two years. His caricatures are very popular among the population of all ages, even among the younger people who do not usually read the newspaper but are interested in Para István's humor. We have chosen his caricatures to be analysed. Since there is a very large[3] stock of drawings, we have not analyzed all of them. We have selected those that have been available on-line on the newspaper's website[4] for the last twelve months. We have looked systematically at all of them and have chosen for analysis those in which there appears a main female character or the subject of communication between the male characters is a female person. We have found 175 caricatures (out of 230) in which the presence of a female character or a topic about a female person can be defined. First we compiled a database in which we tried to label and classify each caricature along some aspects. Then we tried, by using this database, to find similarities and differences. We used the content analysis in several steps: analyzing the joke (the sense of the verbal phrase), analyzing the characters, and analyzing the communication process.

3. Data

In only 20% of these 175 caricatures there is no female character (but even here the communication is about or is related to a female person). We can say that mainly in these

[2] Para István is a well-known and very popular caricaturist in Transylvania, especially in Miercurea Ciuc and Harghita County. He has already drawn caricatures for more than 50 newspapers and magazines, but he also designs book covers, posters, flyers, creates T-shirts, illustrates books. Since 1994 he has been the employee of the first and main important daily newspaper of Harghita County, the "Hargita Népe." (www.parapista.com and https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Para_István)

[3] Every week there appear 5 caricatures (one every weekday). There are 260 caricatures for every year of the newspaper, so more than 5720 caricatures in 22 years. Since 90% of them are not digitally purchasable, for the readers' "comfort" we have done this first analysis by using those caricatures which are reachable on-line.

[4] The caricatures were downloaded from here: http://hargitanepe.eu/para/#prettyPhoto

caricatures there appear a man and a woman (51%). Regarding to the communication, there are are formal communication situations, e.g. at the doctor's, on the street, at the grocer's. However, representations of informal relations (husband-wife, parent-child, friends, neighbour, etc.) dominate these pieces. The most frequent is a short communication between strangers (30.7% of the analysed caricatures). The second most frequent is a dialogue between married couples: every fifth caricature's humour is based on a communication between a husband and a wife.

Table 1. The actors of the communication process

		%
Husband – wife	39	22.3
Parent – child	17	9.7
Daughter in law/Son in law – Mother in law	4	2.3
Friends	28	16.0
Neighbours, acquaintances	19	10.9
Strangers – Formal communication (ex. Doctor – patient) or informal	54	30.9
Other	14	8.0
Total	**175**	**100.00**

4. Visual appearance

The female characters that appear in these caricatures are very feminine, the visual portrayal emphasizes their femininity. They have long hair, rotund shapes, mellow breasts, expressive eyes, full lips. Almost all the women who appear in these caricatures wear high heels and mostly mini dresses, sometimes carrying a handbag or reticule. Rarely can we see rural, older women wearing kerchief, Hungarian national dress. They smile or speak, sometimes yell. Their mouth is always big. Their emotions are easier to face read than the male characters'. Regarding age: female characters are ageless, or middle-aged. They are not very skinny, and only very seldom plump.

Picture 1. Man about women

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– Make-up, artificial nails, silicone breast ... And you want a real man?!

5. Characteristics

The main characteristics of the caricatures' female character is that she is a dictator – dominates her husband, her children, her family, everybody is afraid of her. Also she speaks too much, is very indecisive, she is not very good at driving, she is a wicked witch, she likes to be pretty and to get compliments, she is cheating on her husband, or she is too naïve to realize that her husband is cheating on her, she is not so clever, she works as a secretary (if she has a job).

We have tried to identify the main characteristic of the female character on the basis of the caricature's text. We have analysed and have grouped 17 characteristic categories. If we look at the categories, we realize that the female characters are not very likeable. They are better only in the "mother thing." As a wife, she is a virago, a dictator, or cheats on her husband. She is too naïve or too greedy. She likes to gossip, to shop, to spend money, she is superficial, she speaks too much and cannot drive a car or park a car (see Table 3).

Picture 2. Father and son talk

– Son! Your mother says you do not hear when she speaks to you!

– *Well, Dad,…*
– *– Don't apologize, son! Please tell me how you do it!!!???*

Female characters are nameless, anonymous. The male character's name is often Jenő, the young boy's name is Kázmérka, but women have no specific name.

Table 2: Main characteristic of the caricatures' female character

		%			%
virago, dictator[5]	36	20.6	bad driver	4	2.3
silly, clumsy, weak-headed[6]	27	15.4	overweight	4	2.3
adulteress	18	10.3	rule violator	3	1.6
greedy[7], materialistic	11	6.3	superficial	3	1.6
naïve, credulous[8]	11	6.3	speaks too much[9]	3	1.6
good mother/good wife	10	5.6	very indecisive	2	1.1
evil witch	6	3.4	ugly[10]	2	1.1
ironic, gossipy	6	3.4	other	12	6.8
money spender[11], compulsive shopper[12]	4	2.3	no obvious characteristic[13]	14	8

The characteristics are not always self-evident: sometimes they are drawn as opposite to men's characteristics: there is no indication as to how a woman really is, but rather how a man is, and woman is not like man, so her characteristics are the opposite of man's. In a lot of cases the male character is not really a likeable character (for example he drinks too much, spends a lot of money on liquor, arrives home dead drunk, his wife is frolicking with her lover in bed, etc.), but the wife is so "cruel," she is yelling and quarrelling, so, after all, drinking and cheating are minor problems for the virago wife.

Table 3.: Stereotypes

Women are…	**Examples from caricatures**

[5] Dad, what is the echo? - Well, it is the only thing witch dare to answer back to your mother.
[6] – What is a lottery? – You need to hit 5 numbers. – I understand. And from how far?
[7] It's not fair! Before we got married, you used to buy me a lot of jewellery! –Have you ever seen a fisherman who feeds the fish once caught?
[8] Even the Post Office isn't trustworthy anymore! – Why? –Imagine, my husband is in Sovata for healing, and his postal card has a stamp from Paris!
[9] - My dear husband, this landscape leaves me speechless! - Great! Let's camp here!
[10] - Honestly, Mr. Szabo, your wife does not look good... – Yes, I think the same. But how rich his father is…
[11] Doctor, I think I have problems with my eyes! – Why do you think that? – Well, since I got married, I haven't seen a dime in the house ...
[12] Officer, how did you realize that he was the wanted man, when he was dressed like a woman? -Because he did not stop in front of any shop window.
[13] It wasn't possible in every case (8% of the analysed caricatures) to identify a characteristic: when the female character is only a listener, or the joke is not related to the gender issue.

spend a lot of money	*You know darling, today I drove through the red light five times, but I never got caught. So I saved a lot of money! And bought a nice dress!*
cheat their husbands	*– Amalia, I am going to die today and I would like to know if you have ever cheating on me?* *– Oh, Moses, I'd tell ... but if won't die?*
having child with another man, other than their husband	*– My dear wife, if our baby will look like you, she will be miraculous!* *– And if she will look like you, it will be a miracle…*
hysterical	*– How is your wife?* *– She's sick.* *– Dangerous?* *– No, only when she's healthy.*
materialist	*When I got married, my wife got my name. When we divorced, she got my car and my house, too!*
bad driver	*– You, men, you would rather die than ask for the right direction! We have gone crazy for two hours. We've been driving in the wrong direction for hours!* *– It could be so, but we men make up for lost time with back parking.*
stupid	*– What is the lotto?* *– You must five numbers.* *– I understand. But from how far?*
evil mother-in-laws	*(Drunk husband arrives home, his mother-in-law starts yelling at him in the front door)* *– Mama, do not yell so laud! It's bad enough for me to see two of you!*

5. Female types, female roles

By analysing all the female roles that can be found in the 175 caricatures, we have labelled 27 roles. These are not exclusive roles, for they can be and are indeed cumulated even in some caricatures (for example a woman is mother-in-law in a caricature, but at the same time mother as well, or a pregnant woman is a wife as well). A polarized conclusion would be that woman in these caricatures is a *wife* first of all, and/or *mother*. But everything else only in very few cases. We can see that the female characters' of the caricatures do not work: only very few women have a job. They are either shop vendors, or secretaries, or pedagogues, or medical assistants, or strippers. Only in one case have we identified a prostitute woman and a politician woman.

Table 4: Female roles in caricatures

wife	81	teenage girl	4	stripper	2
mother	23	secretary	4	pregnant	2
friend	14	car driver	4	single woman	1

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mother-in-law	6	pedagogue	3	housekeeper	1
lover	6	bride	3	colleague	1
girlfriend	6	costumer	3	medical assistant	1
shop vendor	5	model	2	politician	1
daughter	4	witch	2	prostitute	1
acquaintance, neighbour	4	daughter in law	2	grandmother	1

As we can see in the caricatures, the *ideal wife* "would be" one who washes the dishes,[14] stays at home, doesn't spend a dime, doesn't have a mother, doesn't yell, doesn't cheat on her husband. She should be good at driving, should never leave her husband, or if she divorces she should leave the house and everything[15] to her husband (except maybe for the children). She should always be nice, and clever, and tolerant, and empathetic. But unfortunately "our" wife is exactly the opposite of all these: she is materialistic,[16] evil, the scariest[17] and worst thing, the destroyer of the husband's (man's) life. Sexuality does not play an important role in the marriage: sexuality almost always[18] comes into the picture only when the wife (three times less than the husband) or the husband is committing adultery. Or in the case of a non married woman, of course.[19]

Even the role of wife can be complex. Mainly the *dictator* role appears. But there are some caricatures in which we will run into the *desperate housewife*, a not so perfect housewife.

Picture 4: Desperate housewife

– Look my darling, I baked this soup all by myself!

[14] – Are you married or you're still washing the dishes alone? – Yes. – Yes what? Yes, I am married and I am still washing the dishes alone
[15] My wife is a virago. But unfortunately it's like a hand grenade. If I take off the ring, my house would fly off.
[16] A wife's duty, my dear daughter, is to spend as much as she can, not to leave to her husband's mistress.
[17] – Dear Sir, are you afraid of the new year's price increase? – Me? After 40 years of marriage, I'm not afraid of anything!
[18] One exception: – We are more and more syncronized with my wife even regarding sex. – Really? – Yes. Yesterday for example, both of us had a headache exactly at the same time.
[19] – Miss, have you lost your virginity yet? – Why? Have you found it?

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Besides the wife as a *dragon* and the *left-handed* wife there is the *cheater*, the wife who misleads her husband and has an affair with another man. There are two main topics regarding the adulterous wife. In the first situation the husband (almost) finds the lover under the bed or in the closet. In the other situation we (the readers) become aware about the affair thanks to the child, who is from the other man, not from her husband. And, of course, the husband has no clue whatsoever about it.[20] In both situations the wife is the negative character and we feel sorry for the husband.

The relationship between husband and wife seems to be in subordination: even if the wife cheats on her husband – fewer times than the man –, the wife has very few occasions when she can make fun of her husband.

Picture 5.: Man talk about women

– *I never win the fight with my wife…*
– *Have you ever tried to start crying first?*

Besides the wife role, the role of *mother-in-law* is very highlighted. Only in two cases is it about the husband's mother, in most of the cases the mother-in-law is the wife's mother. And she is

[20] – Mom, who is this curly-haired, muscular man who hugs you in this old picture? -Kázmérka, he is your dad! – Then who is this fat, bald guy, who lives with us???

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evil and the only purpose in her life is to be viperous with her son-in-law, to make his life miserable and to help her daughter ruin his life. In a few cases this relationship between mother and son in-law, even if conflicting, is also syndetic: woman and man can make fun of each other.[21] We must notice that the role of father-in-law does not appear in the caricatures.

Picture 6. Mother-in-law

– *What a beautiful grey hair your son-in-law has!*
– *– Well ... you see, he owes me even this!*

6. Conlusions

A caricature as well as a comic cartoon or a joke, usually highlights something in an exaggerated way. But beyond the joke and the social sarcasm there can be found social beliefs, social habits, idealized relations, gender expectations. These expectations and stereotypes cannot be attributed to the artist who draws these pictures, since the artist tries to give the readers what they like. In this sense the artist seeks to understand the readers' (the people from the region) field of interest and to find the possible "territory" where the joke finds a recipient. Regarding the female characters, we can say that caricature makes one laugh if it tells a story about an evil and hysterical wife who is only capable of spending money, yelling, having the same virago mother, and totally destroying a man's life. One example: *Every woman needs a husband because there are a lot of things for which you simply cannot blame the government!* – suggesting: wives are cruel and unfair with their partners, they used men to deduct the anger, to make them responsible for each and every little thing. The male-female relations are asymmetrical in the caricatures. The female character appears often in the role of a dictator. And we hardly find a caricature, where the readers are willing to take the wife's side. We can say that there appear a lot of preconceptions and stereotypes about woman in these caricatures. They can often be seen as insults to the female population, but since it is "only a joke," nobody should feel offended. And yes, it should not be forgotten that caricatures

[21] – *Mama! You look great! You could be a model for a Chinese painter!*
– *Why for a Chinese?*
– *Because they paint dragoons ...*

overstate the characteristics, the real "facts." This could be the reason why it is socially accepted. But we must add that the female population is not sensitive enough, or has no courage to be more sensitive. If so, there would be a little bit more symmetry in these caricatures, more jokes at the men's expense as well. And, of course, caricatures are always the manifestation of criticism, a way of highlighting the actual social problems as well. In this sense, we can conclude that the asymmetric expectations regarding men and women, husband and wife, girl and boy are part of the contemporary society as well.

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HEROS AND VILLAINS OF THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY, HETEROTOPIC AND ISOTOPIC RELATIONSHIPS

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Abstract: After the fall of communism in Romania, the law changed to help to usher the private sector towards the global economy and facilitate economic creativity. The first private enterprises that appeared were in the hospitality industry: namely bars, pubs, terraces, restaurants, fast food restaurants, recently hotels, hostels, guest houses and the romanticized rural tourism. This essay draws attention to the changes that occurred especially in the food and beverage related sectors of the hospitality industry. The authority shift facilitated by the changes in law created HEROES and VILLAINS out of individuals who previously had opposite roles. The essay sets up ideas for a larger research into heterotopic and isotopic relationships with the help of Michel Foucault's works and theoretical guidance.

Keywords: Foucault, heterotopic, isotopic, heroes, villains

Premise:

Before I started studying sociology I worked as a cook and then as a chef for couple of years. The experience that I had was a local experience, it was experience from a quite large town but also it was a quintessential Romanian experience at the beginning of the millennium. At the time I was twenty-three years old and I thought what a wonderful choice I made, that I could go in training to be a chef. It never crossed my mind that there would be reasons outside of my control that would chuck me out from the comfort zone of my imagined life.

The first experience that I had was working in a small kitchen, for a midsized restaurant in my hometown. The owner inherited a family house in the town, with a flower garden in the front yard and a back yard with a dilapidated orchard. He transformed all of it into the restaurant. In the house was the kitchen, and couple of tables, in the back yard was built the storage shed, and the front yard was transformed into a terrace.

While the restaurant was operating, the owner used to spend all his time over there supervising and controlling everything. He had his own table where he sat with his friends; he had his own plate, his own glasses and his private eating utensils and his favorite foods. He used to have great dinner parties with his friends, but he also used to have quarrel sessions with employees, at his private table while the restaurant was full with guests. These two events seemed to fallow each other. The owner, while entertaining his friends, used to boost his successes in fighting the state and local administrative authorities. His heroism consisted in having success over the administrative authority which was trying to block him from conducting his legitimate, tradition oriented and

honest business. But when he quarreled with employees he many times called them thieves and bandits who were set up to strip him of everything he worked for, everything he built and everything he agonized for and he had unslept nights for.

Interestingly there were no planed hierarchies in his business. He was the boss of everybody and owner of everything. Every employee, regardless of rank or position was under him, even though he befriended some of the waiters, or he had closer relationships with some of the barmaids. One of the cooking aids he employed was his aunt. The relationship with him was rocky at best. We never knew what to expect. There always were disputes, or giving favors to someone. And from time to time he threw out somebody from the job for different reasons, which always changed and which meant that somebody else was hired. Since there was no hierarchy and we could not advance, thus nobody wanted the emptied position. It was like every other position in the business.

Sometimes he tried to lure well known chefs from other businesses to his own. He seldom succeeded to even have interviews with them. Those guys wanted to hold commanding positions, they wanted salaries as they had – at least - and they wanted to know two things: first of all, what is their schedule, and they wanted to know their job description. As employees we overheard some of these discussions, which took place at the aforementioned private table, and they always ended with departure and respectful but apologetic regrets.

It is noteworthy to mention that the restaurant's menu. At the beginning it was a small one with around 20 items on it. But those who used to come regularly to eat there they rarely ordered from it. They preferred to order foods invented from the ingredients listed under the menu items, they combined them into new items. The owner at first condoned this but then embraced it and fully encouraged it. Thus some of the new products made it into the menu. Thus after a time the restaurant which started as traditional restaurant, began to sell 20 types of pizza, it started to have a large array of salads like at a salad bar, and it started to advertise with a quite long list of kitchen sweets which looked like a menu at a pastry shop, and the restaurant even started doing take outs.

These changes came with a sudden cumber and aggravation of working conditions whiles the kitchen and the bar wasn't equipped for these changes. Information came from the owner in form of an order: that this is our new offer. Also he expected all his employees to just go along with the changes in the service no questions asked, and also without talks about the new job duties, or about the new schedules, or about working the extra time. Off course this was breathing ground for conflict, discrimination and social critique at every turn, at any time, at every level.

At that time I thought that all my problems originated with a boss-owner-manager individual who didn't know a thing of managing business and he also had some psychopathic tendencies. My second experience would almost confirm it and I thought I knew it best.

My second experience was working oversees at a prestigious hotel, also privately managed, but part of a hotel chain and also part of an international company. This hotel was placed on the outskirts of neighborhoods, at the margins of a business district. As a building was a nice architectural peace, it accommodated all the activities and the movements involved. It was built in a way that it was hard to get in and also hard to get out. It was built in a way that facilitated the visitors entrance mostly and the employees movement inside it. And also there were security checks for employees but at occasions even for the visitors.

Admittance into the hotel as an employee was procedural, with interviews, trial periods and courses on procedures and on things to do on different occasions and also to know expectations. For employees also this meant that they had to wear uniforms, name tags, they had to participate on daily instructions, and if it was needed than carry protection kit for different jobs. There was no exception from these rules.

Admittance for guests was a hassle as well. Guests had to log on computers to make reservations and to check confirmations by phone. Or they had to phone in for reservations. Almost with no exception the hotel never admitted guests without reservations. Also for the banqueting halls guests had to have invitations, they had to confirm their intention to be present, they were sometimes checked by security at the entrance to the premises and they had their prearranged places at the tables where they were sited and these places were signaled with name cards placed there. Sometimes there were exception from these rules, and guest could sit around, but these were rare occasions.

The hierarchy at the hotel was clearly explained, and it was quite tall. It offered opportunities to climb it and to feel accomplished, to promote achievement. There were more experienced colleges, who were trusted by the higher ups and newbie's had to listen to them, they were immediate supervisors. They also had to feel in periodically reports about coworkers in order to help their evaluation. Writing these reports was considered a step before promotion, a preparation for more important role at the job. These reports were gathered by department heads and concentrated, and together with the evaluations they sent them to the general manager's office for review.

At this place I saw the first time things that I heard many times but I never saw until than: punch clock, organizational chart and job descriptions. The punch clock was an electronic time keeper operated by a computer, and every time somebody started working, it had to check in by placing next to the clock a magnetic card, and also when leaving the work place it was required to check out with the same method. This helped to calculate time spent at the job, and also to calculate hourly salary. The job descriptions were in accordance of the law, the regulations and the internal prescriptions. Everyone submitted to these. With the job description every employee was assign to a work station. That was also new to me. I had to work mainly one kind of work all day long. This wasn't a place like I was used to, where I had to do from toilet cleaning, preparing – cooking and even serving the food too. At this job the opportunity was to perfect oneself in each and every task they had to do in order to run the kitchen, the restaurant, the hotel.

When I started to work, there was a moment right in the first day, when the head chef came and said that at this kitchen there are things done in a particular way, and he expects me to work as it is needed there and to not be creative unless he asks me to be. I asked him, what exactly does he mean by this? He said that I should forget how I worked on my previous workplace and I should concentrate to learn how things are done at this place.

Actually it wasn't hard to accommodate to this new work environment. Every activity had its own place, and more often its own room. Also the experience working at every station and the stories that came out as a result were seemingly choreographed. Almost every coworker had the same story. This meant that some of the employees in the kitchen were interchangeable between

them. They had the same movement, the same gestures, they read the instructions in the same way, they were thinking in the same way. Even as timing, everything was planned at the minute detail and they could perform the task similarly.

But also guests had similar experiences. They experienced order, discipline, timeliness, cleanliness, promptness. They were also required to conform to control checks, recommendations and guidance. They could count on the fact that things worked like a Swiss watch. In a way their movements, gestures, expressions and their experiences were choreographed too. Thus almost all of them were pleased, and their stories of gratitude were like written in carbon copy.

One of the most striking experiences was the one where I participated in plating food for 2500 person banquet function. This was basically a military operation, where everybody had its place, and function, so much so that at the moment of doing this job people were indispensable and irreplaceable. This lasted almost two hours and required all the food-and-beverage stuff to participate in it: the cooks, the assistants, the dishwashers, the waiters, the servers, the attendance, bosses of different departments. Everything was planned, detailed; they used walky-talkies and permanently checked the status of the operation.

In preparation, there was a 30 meters long table and on both sides were people. On one side there was the kitchen stuff, and on the other side there were people from all the other departments. And on occasions even people from accounting or management got their hands on to do this thing. So the kitchen staff placed items on the plates. Everybody had just one thing to do. Placing items on the plate was mapped out before hand, and kitchen stuff had been shown where to place items on the plate in accordance to a preset diagram. Those who were on the other side of the table also had just one thing to do. Moving the plates one at the time and moving them one person/ station/ food item at the time. This was like a huge conveyor belt, a huge human centipede. At the end of this long table there were individuals who checked places for accurate placement of food items, there were ones who place sauces if there were needed, others cleaned the plates, others cleaned the rims of the plates, and yet others cleaned the underside of the plates. These plates with food on them were covered, numbered, and placed in hot boxes to keep them hot until serving.

Also when it was about serving it, there was a team work, a team effort. There were individuals who took out these hot plates from hot boxes, and placed them on large trays. Every tray held as many plates as persons set at particular tables. Servers had a diagram of the seating arrangements and they served particular two or three tables. Their movements were shown on the diagram, and this path's never interfered with other server's path. There were two man teams. One held the trays with the plates; the other took them and placed them on the table. In this manner 2500 people were served in matter of minutes. Everything worked as a machine.

For things to go smoothly there were cameras placed at key points of the premises. The images were fed to the security booth, and also department heads and the general manager had access to some of the images. Everybody had their place and things to do, so there were no problems.

One of the peculiar things that I found annoying at first was the requirement to use a hand washing station, where employees individually had to go at least every hour, but more often the better. This hand washing station was peculiar because everybody had a personal cod to punch in on

a key board, with the cod of the hand washing station in order to the water to be dispensed for hand washing. I found out that these stations were monitored and individual punches were fallowed on charts. If some employee had not washed his hand it was detectable quite rapidly by the computer program and sent a warning message to the head chef. But also regular checks were held and individuals never new, that luminescence material were placed in the soap or in the sanitizer. Those who made the control had to illuminate black light on the hands of the individuals in order to know they had washed hands or not. After a while everybody get so used to this method to washing hands that became automatism. People went to wash hands even in their time off work, at parties or whatever activities they were doing.

If employees broke the rules, or they didn't fallowed guidelines or recommendations, they were penalized. These penalties were annoyances at best, but if someone amassed couple of them then it became serious and penalties would feel heavy punishments. The other interesting thing it was that employee's drunk coffees and energy drinks at work. I was amazed at the quantities consumed. Every morning almost everybody had coffee and at the change of shifts, those who came for the afternoon, they drunk energy drinks to keep them going.

Interpretation:

These experiences took me to think hard about the conflictual situations in the hospitality industry, particularly to the experiences I had in Romania. The first experience was a heterotopic (Foucault, 2006) experience. There was a founding precedent, transformation, personal authority, looking at the past and renewing the founding precedent periodically. We could saw the non-continuous power, the centralization and redistribution, distinguishing signs, the moving around, the supplement of threats, the heterotopic relationships, the lack of hierarchy, the perpetual differentiation, the lack of connection and articulation with other businesses, the capacity to incorporate everything, the lack of division between normal and abnormal and the lack of reestablishing rules, the all encompassing incorporation and acceptance of everything. Also there were expectations, there was ceremony of branding, and we could observe the information flow from top to bottom, and the lack of personal responsibility. Also there was a belief that without a permanent presence of the owner-boss, the business wouldn't work. And I have to draw attention to the fact that the authority was quite ambiguous. At one hand the authority of the owner was patrimonial and ambitiously traditional, but on the other hand his authority was charismatic. He boosted his heroism fighting the communist state at local and national levels, which wanted to put him in a position of inability to function, and also he fought the villains in-house, the employees who were thieves, robbers, uneducated and ungrateful to him, who offered them a job.

This initial experience in itself was typical at that time because those who started their own businesses promoted the idea that institutionalized businesses which were rule abiding, hierarchical, Benthamian, organized, tactically dispersed and in connection with the state authorities – those were communist type of businesses, state operated businesses, socialist business and their business model was a new model of business, a private business enterprise, where they were required to be creative economically, but also organizationally. That's why they had to force their way into the economy, they had to fight state authority at local and national level, and they had to create

opportunity and space for their new business ventures and they guarded it also from every petty thief and hustler who could endanger it.

To have a clear understanding of the distortion in their discourse there's the second experience presented, which is not in opposition to the first one, but it contrasts it and raises it's elements to clearly show that private business ventures can be rule abiding, hierarchical, Benthamian, organized, tactically dispersed and in connection with state authorities at local and national levels.

The second experience was isotopic (Foucault, 2006) experience. The architecture, the claustration, the power relations, the hierarchy, the admittance procedure, interviews, the existence of confederates, the classifications, tactical disposition and tactical distributions, differentiating diagnoses, the rule of law – rules-and-regulations, the institutional control, confrontation scenes, the "mise-an-scene", the non reciprocity of power relationships, the observed Benthamian elements, the information flow from bottom-to-top, the no-exemption rules, the use of orthopedic apparatuses, the calculated punishments and the use of drugs – showed the existence of a business model which was eradicated in the private sphere of business ventures in Romania, at that time. This type of business venture was considered communist, socialist, harmful, non-productive, non-beneficial and even damaging. The heterotopical type of business venture was considered new, innovative, productive, beneficial to the economy and profitable.

Interestingly these isotopic experiences were experiences about normal operations in the hospitality industry. Conflicts that appeared were considered normal and integral part of these operations. What greatly interest me are the non-normal operations. It seems that non-normal operations were heterotopical in nature. But interestingly non-normal operations happen also when these institutionalized, isotopic businesses had to deal with employees and guest who are somehow not conforming to the mold set to be normal.

It has to be taken into consideration that at the end of the 1980's and beginning of the 1990's there were big political and economical changes in the world. All of the satellite states of the former Soviet Union changed their political system and also started transitioning from centralized economies to liberal-capitalist economies. But also during these times the existing liberal-capitalist economies changed and they brought social changes as well. It was a sudden transition from modernity to post-modernity (Thomas & Walsh, 1998) of the western world. These changes happened fast, and they were all encompassing in the Romanian society. They produced anomy in the society at every level (Merton, 1938). Investors thought that economic innovation and changes in the organizational system was the new way to do business. Thus new types of work relationships were born. These relationships were new to those who experienced it after soviet type centralized and planned economies in state-monopoly-capitalisms (Kautsky, 1983). Investors were the owners of business, but they were also bosses, administrators, economists, contractors, suppliers, HR managers and PR managers. They had a combination of traditional and charismatic authority (Weber, 2015). Foucault (1967) called it heterotopical relationship.

Those who are caught in heterotopical relationships are occupying one of the three possible positions. Individuals *on the apex of the relationship network* are in central position. Compared to them *every other individual's position is in subordinate position* which is perpetually in change and

renegotiation. Those who occupy the top position see themselves as heroes. They are in perpetual contest, they strife for keeping their position, they struggle and battle national, state and local authorities. Also they have engagements with *individuals who are seen as menace, risk, competition and rivalry* for their top position. These individuals, who are perceived as menace and risk, are put in a position where they can't keep their social status, where their social recognition is denied and as a consequence their presence is not tolerated and they are discriminated against. Their loss of status means that their existence is criminalized. Thus name calling designates them and pins them to a role and function as villains. They perceive these heterotopical relationships as damaging and destructive. These individuals perceive the investor-boss-managers as psychopaths. They lack the means to articulate the constant renegotiations of the relationship and to understand their constantly renewed and aggravated working conditions. They don't perceive structural and social changes; they pinpoint all of their misfortune on the criticized investor with new and revolutionary ideas, which seem to lack clarity, vision, uniformity, conformity, order, discipline and structure. This is how the bosses are becoming newbie's to management and uneducated in the imaginary of the vilified individuals.

But as presented in the second, isotopic experience – private economic enterprises can function and can be structured and organized in tactical dispersions; Benthamian elements can be deployed and hierarchically organized management can function with the help of confederates; rules can be enforced, and uniformity and conformity can serve the order and discipline of the disciplinary apparatus to create profit and entitle economic growth. Unfortunately the isotopic types of relationships were associated with state-monopoly-capitalism and not with healthy business practices. As a consequence economic revival meant that heterotopic relationships, which were like islands in a sea of isotopic relationships – would prosper. (Foucault said that isotopic relationships were like island in a sea of heterotopic relationships, but he was talking about pre-modern times)

Those individuals who were vilified in the new economic context were those who criticized the heterotopic experience of the newly formed private economic enterprises. Thus the owner-bosses-managers-investors-benefactors could justify their efforts to reform not just the economy but also the new political system. Those who were vilified were seen as a reminiscent of the communist era, they were seen as successfully converted to the socialist ideas, and they were the typical "new man", the ideal of the communist propaganda. They became the new enemy of the system even though their social critique was oriented towards keeping the positive results and against the total disintegration of the economic system. But the new entrepreneurial classes' efforts to start businesses cleanly on absolutely new grounds were in such a contrast with this social critique that vilification of those who raised their voices was unavoidable. Thus those who held socially acknowledged positions in communist times became villains and those who were socially shunned in communist times because of their novel economic ideas became the new heroes in present times.

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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY – ARE THEY COMPATIBLE?

A DISCUSSION RELATIVE TO CONTEXT

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Abstract: In this article, I will try to discuss not if Islam is compatible with democracy, but how important is the context applied to this question. I will put this question, taking as basic perspective the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau, according to wich there is a tension between moral and pasion in human nature. A brief analisys of the most important opinions that formulates a response to this question, will emphasize the option for one or the other terms of this relationship. No less interesting seems to be the type of analysis and specific response made by some intellectuals who belong to Islam, educated in West or in the spirit of western values - which is clearly a matter of context. Or maybe not?

Key-words: Islam, democracy, context, Morgenthau, western values

Ca gânditor conservator al politicii internaționale, Morgenthau pune la baza concepției sale individul a cărui natură este tensionată de două tendințe – impulsul moral și impulsul de stăpânire, acestea îi domină existența și îi justifică acțiunile. Prin analogie, actorii internaționali sunt asimilați individului – ei sunt proiecții ale grupurilor de indivizi. De aici, realismul politic al lui Morgenthau care promovează ceea ce el a numit „balanța de putere" în care „recunoaștem dezirabilitatea păcii și forța normelor morale, dar în același timp suntem perfect conștienți de neputința de a înfrâna *animus dominandi* altfel decât prin mijloace coercitive"[1]. Reconsiderat ca gânditor racordat la tradiția morală iudeo-creștină, Morgenthau avertizează asupra faptului că normele și principiile după care un stat stabilește relații dincolo de granițele proprii s-ar putea să nu fie agreate de celelalte state. Mai mult, unul dintre principiile realismului politic este acela de a refuza identificarea aspirațiilor morale ale unei națiuni individuale cu legile care guvernează universul. Mai mult, Morgenthau întărește că „este o mare diferență între credința că toate națiunile sunt supuse judecății Domnului, de neînțeles pentru mintea umană, și convingerea blasfemiatoare că Dumnezeu ține tot timpul cu tine și că ceea ce dorești tu nu se poate să nu vrea și Dumnezeu".

Plecând de la acest context teoretic, în acest articol îmi propun să evaluez importanța contextului atunci când se pune întrebarea referitoare la compatibilitatea dintre Islam și democrație, luând ca reper temporal nu atât evenimentele din 11 septembrie 2001, cât unele considerații emise planul analizelor internaționale asupra Islamului ca spațiu politico-economic, cultural și religios.

[1] Andrei Miroiu, „Cum să-l citim pe Morgenthau", în Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, p. 12.

Înainte de aceasta, însă, nu putem ignora faptul că, tot în acest plan și înainte de 9/11, fusese deja creat un alt context teoretic care a contribuit în mod decisiv la însăși receptarea acestor evenimente; aș putea spune că acest context teoretic a creat această receptare. Este vorba despre teoria referitoare la ciocnirea civilizațiilor pe care Samuel Huntington o lansase în dezbaterea publică internațională cu câțiva ani înainte[2]. În contextul în care Statele Unite și Europa trebuie să facă față la două provocări (amenințarea securității naționale în interior și în exterior; amenințarea democrației și a societății deschise), Islamul reapare ca un puternic idiom politic și este perceput ca unul dintre rivalele ideologice ale Occidentului[3].

În plus, pe fondul de-creștinării Europei occidentale și a expansiunii altor religii, în special a Islamului[4], unii intelectuali moderați musulmani remarcă faptul că „fie Islamul va fi europenizat, fie Europa va deveni islmizată. Problema nu este dacă majoritatea europenilor va fi islamică, ci mai degrabă care Islam – Islamul Shariei sau Euro-Islamul va domina în Europa”[5]. Or, în viziunea realismului politic, tocmai unul dintre principiile fundamentale ale acțiunii politice – semnificația morală a acestor acțiuni – este suspendat, atunci când indiferența europenilor față de cultura și valorile proprii semanifestă în paralel cu renunțarea la lupta împotriva amenințării islamice, în numele corectitudinii politice și a multiculturalismului. În termenii lui Morgenthau, „nu poate exista moralitate politică fără prudență, adică fără a lua în calcul consecințele politice ale acțiunilor aparent morale. Prin urmare, realismul consideră prudența – cântărirea consecințelor acțiunilor politice alternative – a fi virtutea supremă în politică”[6].

Celălalt cadru teoretic care a legitimat și susținut multe din acțiunile politice ale marilor actori internaționali occidentali a fost furnizat de Francis Fukuyama[7]. Deși contextul vizat era acela al prăbușirii regimurilor comuniste, victoria fără drept de apel a valorilor democratice și a drepturilor omului au constituit principiile principiile de bază conform cărora au fost proiectate relațiile internaționale după căderea Cortinei de Fier. Pe de o parte, cele două eșafodaje teoretice post ’89 reprezintă principala platformă pentru a argumenta în favoarea imaginii unui Occident asediat, aflat „într-o luptă pe viață și pe moarte cu iraționalismul violent și antidemocratic musulman”[8]; pe de altă parte, contribuie la interpretarea în cheie religioasă a unui conflict angajat la nivel global cu Răul universal[9]. Și de o parte, și de cealaltă, Islamul și democrația sunt două sfere care se exclud reciproc, într-o viziune maniheistă care nu poate fi depășită.

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[2] *The Clash of Civilizations?* („Foreign Affairs”, Vara 1993, vol 72, nr. 3, Council on Foreign Relations Inc. 1993); *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, Simion and Shuster, 1996; ed rom. *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, Editura Antet, 1998).
[3] Robin Wright, „Islam, Democracy and the West” (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1992-06-01/islam-democracy-and-west).
[4] Philip Jenkins, *God’s continent. Christianity, Islam and Europe’s Religious Crisis*, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 51-54.
[5] *ibidem*, p. 4 (apud. Natalia Vlas, *Globalizarea și religia la începutul secolului XXI*, Editura Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2008, p. 217).
[6] Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 51-52.
[7] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the last Man*, The Free Press, New York, 1992 (*Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om*, București, Paideia, 1992).
[8] vezi Nicolae-Emanuel Dobrei, „Fundamentalismul religios”, în Mihael Miroiu (editor), *Ideologii politice actuale. Semnificații, evoluții, impact*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2012, p. 431.
[9] Este bine cunoscută retorica occidentală, în special americană, a cruciadei Vestului împotriva unei religii a Răului; de cealaltă parte, civilizația occidentală, în special americană, întruchipează Răul absolut împotriva căruia singura modalitate de luptă o reprezintă jihadul ofensiv, al cărui scop este apărarea musulmanilor.

Pe acest fond teoretic și politic, unii cercetători occidentali au încercat să arate că fundamentalismul islamic nu reprezintă însuși Islamul, dar au sfârșit prin a constata ei înșiși că, în multe ocazii, fundamentalismul islamic devine Islamul normativ; or, nu acesta este Islamul pe care ei îl apără. Dipotrivă, au presupus că Islamul merge într-o altă direcție, în încercarea unei reconcilieri cu valorile moderne și a unor reforme luminate: „And if this is so, then the burgeoning fundamentalist movements cannot be what they seem to be, that is, an atavistic regression. Beneath their rough exterior, then, the work of reform must be underway. And if we cannot see this clearly, it is because of Western prejudice against Islam"[10]. Chiar și atunci când *jihadul* a fost sprijinit și alimentat de armele occidentalilor, înainte de căderea Cortinei de Fier, fundamentaliștii islamici nu s-au considerat parteneri ai Occidentului în Războiul Rece, înțelegând să acționeze doar cu scopul impunerii statelor islamice și a ridicării Islamului la nivelul unei puteri mondiale: „The fundamentalists do not speak in terms of a globally interdependent world. They now fantasize about a new world order very different from the one imagined in the West. In their vision, Islam will indeed sell its oil, provided Muslims would be allowed to invest the proceeds in instruments of war to enable them to reverse the course of modern history. This proliferation will eventually create a new world order based not on American hegemony but on a new balance of power between a reawakened Islam and the West"[11].

În alți termeni, analiștii răspund la întrebarea referitoare la compatibilitatea dintre Islam și democrație, având în vedere emergența modernității europene ca separare între politică și religie. Conceptul acestei separări nu este în nici un fel propriu gândirii islamice, ideea este străină ortodoxiei islamice în întregul ei și, chiar dacă unul sau altul dintre partidele politice ar purta nume seculare, ele nu ar îndrăzni să se lepede de unul din principiile de bază ale Islamului. În opinia lui Alon Ben-Meir, Turcia este țara care ne oferă exemplul perfect al eșecului relației dintre Islam și democrație: în timp ce Erdogan a sprijinit reformele economice, discursurile sale despre libertate au fost anulate de punerea unor jurnaliști în închisoare și a acționat cu scopul de a aduna cât mai multă putere, ceea ce trimite Turcia mai degrabă înspre tradiționalul ethos islamic, decât către principiile democratice[12]. Alți analiști, propun explicații alternative pe baza unor date empirice și susțin că, dimpotrivă, teza referitoare la incompatibilitatea dintre Islam și democrație, susținută de Huntington și Fukuyama, este falsă. Astfel, ca religie, Islamul conține concepte democratice (Shura, Ijtihad), în timp ce musulmanii tind să favorizeze puternic democrația față de orice alt sistem. Unii cercetători au arătat că religia nu este un factor determinant al democrației, în timp ce alții susțin că musulmanii religioși au atitudini pozitive față de sistemele democratice. Din moment ce Islamul susține democrația, iar musulmanii îl favorizează, atunci afirmația lui Huntington că Islamul este rezistent la democrație nu are fundament. Cu toate acestea, există o lipsă de dezvoltare democratică în lumea musulmană și ea este cauzată de mai mulți factori, alții decât religia. Între aceștia, cele mai importante sunt preferințele socio-culturale și regimurile autoritare puternice, ostile. „Democrația a devenit o necesitate pentru majoritatea cetățenilor musulmani care doresc participarea politică,

[10] Martin Kramer, „Where Islam and democracy part ways", în *Democracy in the Middle East: defining the challenge* (editor Yehudah Mirsky, Matt Ahrens), Washington Institute for near East Policy, 1993, p. 33.
[11] *ibidem*, p. 38.
[12] Alon Ben-Meir, *Is Islam compatile with Democracy?* (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/is-islam-compatible-with_b_3562579.html).

drepturi liberale, și un guvern responsabil. Cu o oportunitate de a construi propria lor democrație, societățile lor vor înflori și *ciocnirea civilizațiilor* va înceta să mai existe"[13]. În aceasta logică, unii comentatori consideră că democratizarea societăților islamice este un proces care depinde de mai mulți factori a căror existență duce la apariția societății civile: „The prospect for the emergence of civil society depends on the characteristics of the people who form that society in the first place. The better educated, healthier, wealthier, and more organized the people, and the more broadly these resources are spread, the stronger will the society be in protecting itself from domination by the state"[14]. Aceste resurse permit formarea instituțiilor care acționează în calitate de focalizare a activității în cazul în care diferențele în opiniile și politicile pot fi dezbătute și rezolvate fără a recurge la violență. În opinia lui Abootalebi, instituționalizarea este esențială pentru stabilitatea politică, pentru canalizarea sistematică și ordonată a solicitărilor adresate de elite partidelor politice. Pentru a fi democratice, partidele politice trebuie să funcționeze într-o rețea organizational instituționalizată independent, caz în care deciziile finale sunt luate și duse la îndeplinire fără interferențe constant ale diverselor straturi birocratice ale țării. O democrație „islamică" nu va îmbrățișa toate valorile secular occidentale. Cu toate acestea, odată făcuți primii pași, instituționalizarea va deveni următoarea etapă importantă în acest proces[15].

Unul dintre cei mai cunoscuți susținători ai ideii conform căreia Islamul încurajează și este compatibil cu democrația, este John L. Esposito, autor al multor cărți referitoare la Islam și mișcările islamiste. În opinia sa, democrația are înțelesuri variate și fiecare cultură poate dezvolta un model independent de guvernare democratică[16]; mai mult chiar, că poate fi dezvoltată o democrație religioasă[17]. El argumentează că mișcările islamice au internalizat discursul democratic prin concepte ca *shura* (consultare), *ijma* (consens), *ijtihad* (judecată de interpretare independentă), în ciuda faptul că nu este utilizat conceptul de democrație[18]. În plus, Esposito atrage atenția asupra faptului că Occidentul a monopolizat definiția democrației și sugerează că acest concept și-a schimbat semnificația de-a lungul timpului și în funcție de aria culturală. Totuși, criticii săi constată că o asemenea abordare relativistă a conceptului poate fi populară doar în unele medii, în timp de teoreticienii democrației resping o asemenea perspectivă, căreia nu-i corespund șapte caracteristici fundamentale: libertățile individuale și libertățile civile; domnia legii; suveranitatea poporului; egalitatea cetățenilor în fața legii; responsabilitatea pe verticală și orizontală a funcționarilor guvernamentali; transparența sistemelor de guvernare la cererile cetățenilor; egalitatea de șanse[19] – această definiție a democrației li se pare criticilor lui Esposito mai importantă, deoarece pune în

[13] Fatima Al-Samak, *Islam and Democracy: An Obscure Relationship* (https://www.al-islam.org/articles/islam-and-democracy-an-obscure-relationship-fatima-al-samak).
[14] Ali R. Abootalebi, „Islam, Islamists, and Democracy", în *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 1999), p. 20.
[15] *ibidem*, p. 21.
[16] John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 211-2; John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 18-21.
[17] John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, pp. 211-2; Voll and Esposito, *Islam and Democracy*, pp. 18-21.
[18] John L. Esposito, *What Everybody Needs to Know about Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 159-61; John L. Esposito, "Contemporary Islam," in John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 675-80; Esposito and Piscatory, "Democratization and Islam," p. 440.
[19] Larry Diamond, et. al., eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries* (London: Adamantine Press, 1988), pp. 218-60; Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, "The Quality of Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Oct. 2004; Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub, eds., *The Democracy Sourcebook* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

evidență libertățile civile și drepturile omului, în loc să accentueze asupra mecanismului alegerilor și a funcționării instituțiilor oficiale ale statului[20].

Islamul și democrașia sunt două sisteme politice alternative care conceptualizează în mod diferit ideea de suveranitate: în vreme ce, în sistemul democratic suveranitatea poporului este principiul central al structurării comunității, modelul islamic de suveranitate este în directă legătură cu Dumnezeu. Odată ce diferența dintre cele două puncte de vedere este ignorată de către intelectualii islamici, în mod clar avem de-a face cu o separare fundamentală a celor două căi în procesul conceptualizării guvernării democratice dintre democrațiile liberale și învățăturile islamice[21]. De partea cealaltă, acum aproape trei decenii, jihadistul al-Zawahiri scria un eseu în care condamna Frăția Musulmană pentru abandonul metodelor revoluționare în favoarea politicilor electorale: „Dacă cineva spune că este musulman democrat sau musulman care militează pentru democrație, e ca și cum ar spune că este musulman evreu sau musulman creștin". Singura diferență – o poziție tranșantă, care nu lasă loc de interpretări sau reconsiderări.

Și totuși, în spațiul islamic era în plină desfășurare, acum aproape un deceniu, un alt fel de revoluție, din interior, cu agresori identificați chiar în rândul tinerilor musulmani: videoclipuri după model occidental, hip-hop, rock, fashion, bloguri... Este ceea ce Carmen Gavrilă a numit „contra-revoluția islamică pop", care câștigă teren pe zi ce trece și în care circulă sume cu câte șase zerouri plătite pentru videoclipuri: „Amestecul de ritmuri orientale cu cele moderne occidentale, de mișcări unduitoare din buric cu pași de dans folosiți de vedete americane sau europene este de-a dreptul intoxicant și exercită o fascinație fără drept de apel pentru tinerii din Orient până în Asia"[22]. E drept, mare parte din această mișcare se petrece în underground, pentru că în spațiul public domină același cod de comportament și îmbrăcăminte, printre panouri anti-americane.

Peste toate acestea, poate că e demn de luat în seamă a doua jumătate a subtitlului cărții lui Morgenthau: lupta pentru pace. Cu atât mai mult cu cât administrația Obama este adepta acestei religii seculare care descrie întregul proces diplomatic pentru înstăpânirea păcii în Orientul Mijlociu – o abordare în cheia lui Morgenthau, conform căruia interesul unui stat în relațiile internaționale trebuie dublat de acțiuni morale în relațiile cu celelalte state. Prin analogie cu acțiunile politice, am putea spune că, dacă înaintea ideologiilor și principiilor care despart două sisteme de guvernare, ar fi puse imperativele morale, contextul ar fi cu totul altul, modelat de opțiunile noastre morale și nu de natura dominatoare.

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[22] Carmen Gavrilă, „Contra-revoluția islamică pop", în *Foreign Policy România*, septembrie-octombrie 2008, p. 77.

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"THE COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION AND THE EXTENSION TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE." CASE STUDY: THE PROFILE OF THE ROMANIAN EMIGRANT

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Abstract:Migration heads significant financial resources towards poor countries, it solves the problems of high unemployment and it evens the balances of payment of the states. Also, at the level ofthe families of the immigrants, migration causes the increase of the standard of life and it limits the poverty of the population.
Migration represents an essential aspect for Europe and implicitly for Romania because of the profound movements that modify the geopolitical structure of the old continent. In the actual conditions of globalization, migration cannot be seen an isolated phenomenon anymore, the global footprint of this phenomenon being more and more visible. Taking this aspect into account, after the adherence, the dynamics and the level of migration in Romania DID NOT DEPEND exclusively on factors of internal order as the state policy in the domain, the evolution of the economy and the society in general but the external factors must also be taken into account.
In more trenchant terms, the migration phenomenon from the perspective of the adherence at the European Union can be explained and appreciated only if one takes into account the regional migration phenomena at the level of the European Union and corroborated with what is happening globally because in the context of globalization no aspect can be treated singularly, it all supposes ample and interdisciplinary approaches.

Key words: Migration, globalization, adherence, exodus, diaspora.

INTRODUCTION

After 1990, the external migration becomes a social phenomenon that gains amplitude. In this period, the migration put on multiple forms: strating as migration of reunification of families, then as ethnical migration (of the Roma people that asked for asylum in various countries of Europe and the Hungarians in Hungary), or the migration for business purposes (including the traffic of frontier) and it developed by the increase of the international mobility of the students, the accentuation of *brain-draining* (especially of those from the IT domain) and ending with the migration through work[1].

Starting with 2002 the Romanians' migration gained mass dimenssions. For a few good years, the Romanians' migration was celebrated as an important source of incomes for population, as an outlet that solved the problem of unregistered unemployment from Romania partially and „it

[1] Sabo Helena Maria and Vendelin Glazer, - *The migration process in the context of Romania's accession to the European Union,* 2011, International Conference on Environment and Industrial innovation, IPCBEE vol.12, p. 200-204.

solved" the balance of payment of the Romanian state. The coming of the economic crisis in the countries of the European Union began to break this after-1989 myth.

For a few good years, the migration of the Romanians was celebrated as an important source of incomes for the population, as a vault that partially solved the problem of unregistered unemployment from Romania and „it solved" the equilibrium of the balance of payment of the Romanian state. The coming of the economic crisis in the countries of the European Union began to smash this after-December 1989 myth. The media and the authorities began to understand that the emigrants' commitments were in sudden decrease, that the Romanians once left do not necessarily return in Romania and, finally, that the massive migration has consequences of long term in the Romanian society. The migration of approximatively 2.500.000 persons did not leave the Romanian society unaltered[2].

Migration heads significant financial resources towards poor countries, it solves the problems of high unemployment and it counterposes the balances of payment of the states. Also, at the level of the immigrants' families, migration produces the increase of the standard of living and it limits the poverty of the population. At the same time, migration perpetuates the dependance of the under-developed states and just the commitments themselves are not capable to generate sustainable economic increase or to solve the chronical problems of the countries of origin. This ambivalent relation is also to be found in the Romanian case where in spite of the general favorable context, the European funds and the belonging of the country at the European Union, significant positive effects do not appear. The integration in the European Union brought an immense benefit to the Romanians that could immigrate freely but the mass migration generated new attempts that were often difficult to surpass[3].

A final remark is extremely actual for the Romanian case: in the context of the ambivalent economic effects that I mentioned, the policies of the states are essential in trying to sustain the positive effects of migration and minimize the negative ones.

DISCUSSIONS

Around 2,3 millions of Romanians, over 100.000 each year, decided to leave abroad after 1989, as shown by the data of the National Institute of Statistics. So, the resindential population of the country decreased at the beginning of last year at the level registered in 1969, of approximatively 20 million inhabitants. The most significative "Wave" of migrations registered itself in 2007, once with the adhesion of Romania at the European Union, the main destination at that date being Spain. Presently, most Romanians that left the country for a period of at least 1 year chose Italy. "During 1989-2012 the stable population of Romania reduced itself with 3,1 million inhabitants. More than 77% of the negative rate of residential (stable) population from this period was determined by "immigration" is shown in a release of the Statistics.

If in 2008, most Romanians oriented themselves towards Spain, four years later, the most looked for destination amongst the Romanians that decided to leave the country was Italy (46% of

[2] Horváth, I., Anghel, R.G., 2009. *"Migration and its Consequences for Romania" Südosteuropa* 57(4), p. 386-403.
[3] Portes, A., 2009 '*Migration and Development: Reconciling Opposite Views,*' Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 5-22.

the total number). At the same time, the number of Romanian that left in Germany increase during the years 2008-2012, from 5% of the total immigrants to 7% according to the pieces of information from the report of Statistics. In 2012, Great Britain aroused on the list of states chosen by more and more Romanians and it adjudged 4% of the total immigrants from Romania.

Most of the people that left or intend to leave didi t through informal networks. These channels are used at the expense of the institutions abilitated in handling the migration of the workforce from Romania to work abroad. The institutions abilitated to handle the migration of the workforce from Romania are aimed at rather by men (59%), persons with average studies (48%) and professional school (15%), and they represent only a partial correlation with the profile of those interested to work abroad. The leaving with the help of the informal networks is a clue that a great part of those who leave arrive on the market of work from the country of destination in illegal jobs, and as they work they try to obtain the status of legal immigrant. "The Romanian institutions should handle the putting in practice of the right of free circulation of the European Romanians more efficiently! One needs services to answer the citizens' needs of informing in this domain and a bigger concern towards their problems."

THE IMMIGRANT'S IMAGE / PROFILE

The image of the Romanian immigrant was always visible on the segment of the gross workforce. "The migration of muscles" leadto the apparition of the Romanian "strawberry picker", the person that under the pressure of money leaves forthe Western countries to collect harvest of other countries. Engineeers, qualified workers, teenagers, persons that are prepared or without too much base on studies and professional experience aligned themself at the western border and left, most of all in Spain and Italy. Together with the migration of muscles, another category of Romanians decided to emigrate: professionals, graduates with superior studies and with a high preparation. They were seeking wages that matched their competences and a system in which they could feel appreciated and valued, they put Romania in balance with other opportunities and in the end they packed they stuff, chosing what was better for them. So, they entered the row of almost 3.000.000 Romanians that currently live abroad. Unlike the general priorities of the Romanian workers that go abroad to raise a certain sum of money and then return home, the Romanian professionals migrate for a longer period of time and they take into account the definitive settling in other countries.They point out special situations that must be taken into account, situations that often differ from the „classical" figures of the immigrants that circulate (entrepreneurs, workers recruitedf by the Office for Recruiting Workforce).

A series of hypotheses were formulated regarding *the selective influxes of migration*, according to which the minority ethnical or religious groups present a degree of mobility that is more increased than the majority population that is Orthodox. So, the role of the ethnical, religious channel was demonstrated in the first phases of the circulatory migration, one offering as examples the models of migration towards Germany, Hungary or the traditional support from the host-countries for certain religious categories (as the neo-Protestant population); but also certain *models, cases specific to the various countries of destinatio*n as the German case, the French case or the

Italian case were also outlined[4]. They point aut special situation that must be taken into account, situations that are often different from the „classical" figures of the immigrants that circulate (undertakers, workers recruited through the Office of the Workforces, students, trainees).

"The migration of brains" has impact on the economy, as well as "the migration of muscles" but at different levels. A great number of Romanian specialists that decide to migrate is part of the medical system. In this moment the economic context offers an even greater impulse to go abroad to those who graduated a university of profile at the expense of the employees that work for state. One talked about the exodus of the Romanian doctors even before the reducing of the salaries with 25% but especially after this moment. The value of the Romanian school of medicine is appreciated abroad and the generous offers that come from other countries, with wages that are even 5 times higer than at us, are convincing. For example, in the United Kingdom a nurse can earn up to 2.000 pounds and a doctor has double wage.

CONCLUSION

The Romanian state was and still is a passive actor in the mass migration of the Romanians, indifferent in face of the precarious element of the Romanian migration: the Romanian institutions did not do almost anything to support the Romanians from abroad or to help their relatives in the country. This passivity, indifference and lack of professionalism in approaching migration is at least debatable. The perverted effect is that although Romania is member of the European Union, it will probably have a positive context on medium period, the effects of migration will be the same as in the case of some countries found in a worse structural situation. I find it at least a disputable approach for the least keeping into account the dimensions of the Romanian migration reported at the population.

The role of the Romanian authorities is to contribute at the creation and sustainment of a correct, objective image on the entire Romanian diaspora that can have a valuable infusion at the improvement of the scientific and cultural heritage of the host countries as well as to maintain the connections of the diaspora with the home-country. It is well known that the Romanian diaspora is, unfortunately, divided and it manifests often holdback towards the communication with the Romanian authorities, fed by the suspicions regarding the manipulation of the diaspora for political purposes.

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THE SYRIAN CONFLICT: THE LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY OF R2P

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Abstract: The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty launched the concept of "responsibility to protect", concept that over the years transformed into the new doctrine of humanitarian intervention. However, in Libya and in the Syrian ongoing conflict, the intervention of international community brought into attention the old controversies regarding legitimacy and legality of a military intervention. Hence, our article investigates if the doctrine of responsibility to protect can be used as a legal and legitimate tool in crises management.

Keywords: R2P, human rights, legitimacy, legality, humanitarian intervention, Syria

Introduction

The subject of humanitarian intervention is sensitive, as it calls into question state sovereignty on the one hand and moral, ethical principles on the other hand[1].

The concept of sovereignty has evolved with the changes occurring in the international system architecture. If traditionally, the external interference within a state was not accepted whatever its purpose, the principle of non-intervention being the basis of relations between the great powers, today, sovereignty can be seen as a responsibility[2], a responsibility to defend and support the fundamental human rights.

The concern of the international community regarding the security of civilians is not new, but with the events which occurred since the 90s, (events in Iraq with Kurds, in Somalia 1992-1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1993-1995) it worsened.

Over time, the international community's humanitarian interventions on behalf of human rights have created much controversy; the "right to intervene" underlying the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), emphasizes the responsibility of states.

According to the new doctrine of humanitarian intervention, the doctrine of R2P, while the state does not protect the rights of their own citizens (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity) the international community must act and respond firmly to any mass infringement of fundamental human rights.

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[1] Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocities Crimes Once and For All*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 2008, p. 4.
[2] Francis Deng, "From 'Sovereignty as Responsibility' to the 'Responsibility to Protect", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, Volume 2, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 353 – 370.

However, the humanitarian interventions under the auspices of the new doctrine have produced doubts about their legitimacy and legality. Some experts have condemned the international community and called into question the legality of such interventions. In this context, what legitimizes a humanitarian intervention? To answer this question we divided the work into two parts, in the first part we shall discuss the Syrian crisis, and in the second part we shall analyze the legitimacy and legality of humanitarian intervention under the auspices of R2P.

The Syrian Conflict

The results of the Syrian conflict are devastating. After five years, more than 250,000 civilians are dead and 12 million were forced to leave their own country.[3] The use of Chemical Weapons and the international community's inability to respond promptly questioned the effectiveness of R2P doctrine.

For many, the actions of the international community in Libya through the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represented symbolically, the validation of the new doctrine of R2P, through the Resolution 1970 and later through the Resolution 1973 of the Security Council, which authorized foreign intervention to protect civilians in Libya.

Instead, skeptics see R2P as a dangerous, imperialist doctrine which undermines the sovereignty and political autonomy of weaker states. They believe that R2P represents a threat to state sovereignty.[4]

Alex Bellamy states that the intervention in Libya was absolutely necessary, but admits at the same time, it was problematic, failing to guarantee long-term stability of the region.[5] Thomas Weiss is more prudent, and he believed that in time, the success in Libya has helped to strengthen the R2P doctrine, but the many critics on the intervention merely question the legitimacy of this doctrine.[6]

Although considered a success by the actors who led the intervention, only time will show the results and efficiency of applying R2P doctrine, as it is impossible to know what would have happened if there had been no intervention.

Instead, the conflict in Syria illustrates perhaps the best the inability of the international community to reach a consensus and act in a spirit of shared responsibility. During the five years of conflict, the great powers have misinterpreted the issue of the Syrian crisis.

As Fredereic Pichon was also saying, Syria is different from the rest of the countries in the Middle East.[7] The mix of ethnic and religious elements (Sunni Arabs, Alawites, Christians, Armenians, Kurds) and the divisions created have produced a split of the population. According to Valentin Naumescu "the Alawites would support a secular regime, such as the Arab socialism inspired by the Ba'th Party, while the Sunni fighters in Syria are more inclined to install an Islamist

[3] http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12008.doc.htm, accessed 30.08.2016, 21.25 h.
[4] Noam Chomsky, "Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right", *Monthly Review*, September, 2008.
[5] Alex Bellamy, *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p.7.
[6] T. G. Weiss, "RtoP Alive and Well after Libya", *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2011, p. 287.
[7] Frederic Pichon, *Siria: dece s-a înşelat Occidentul*, Editura Corint, Bucureşti, 2015, p. 15.

revanchist political regime, above all existing the consistent suspicion that among the opposers radical religious or even terrorist groups might also exist."[8]

Unlike Syria, Libya lacked allies in the region, and therefore, the intervention was backed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States. In this context, we should be quite careful when talking about the importance of applying the R2P doctrine. Arguably, the intervention would have had the same purpose without making a statement on the R2P legitimacy?

The fact that an intervention took place in Libya surely is also a result of geopolitical interests. Libya is located on the Mediterranean coast, close to Europe, with potential security implications for countries such as France and Italy.

Bashar al-Assad enjoys strong support on the part of Russia, which supported the supply of refined petroleum products and air defence systems[9], but also on the part of Iran. Thus, the strategic interests seem to prevail, affecting the whole stability of the region and creating tensions between the great international players.

The Legality and Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention under the auspices of R2P

R2P doctrine has emerged in the context of the tragedies that occurred in the early 90s, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda (mass murders of Tutsi population) have determined the need for a paradigm shift in the international community. With the emergence of new realities and challenges, new requirements for action and new standards of behavior in domestic and international affairs also emerged. Thus new constructs have been created, but their capacity has not kept pace with current expectations of the international community.

Basically, the emergence of modern warfare has provided new grounds for the international intervention to maintain its presence and long-term commitment after conflicts end. In this context, human rights violation is not only a consequence, but also a cause of instability, insecurity and crisis.

In the early 2000s the foundations of R2P doctrine are laid down. According to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), the Responsibility to Protect consists of three pillars: *responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild*. According to the doctrine if a State or any other non-state entities cannot protect civilians or threaten the safety and lives of their own citizens, the international community has a responsibility to act through collective measures to protect the civilians[10]. This type of action is coercive, the aim being to prevent and put an end to massive human rights violations.

However, the concept is poorly defined in international law, the notions of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention remaining dominant.[11]

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[8]Valentin Naumescu, *Teme de politică internațională. Conflicte, tensiuni, dezbateri*, Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca , 2014, p.194.
[9] Frederic Pichon, *op.cit.*, pp. 70-71.
[10] ICISS Report, "The Responsability to Protect", *International Development Research Centre*, Ottawa, Canada, 2001, pp. 10-18.
[11]Andreas King, *Motivations for Humanitarian intervention: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations,* SpringerBriefs in ethics, Springer, Dordrecht, 2013, pp. 8-16.

Although lawyers have worked to define the concept, the theorists of the just war theory have analyzed it from several angles.

The most important theories that have addressed the issue of the legitimacy of humanitarian military intervention are realism and liberal cosmopolitanism.[12] If for the cosmopolitans the individual and the individual rights are the essence of international relations, they seeing the intervention as the only solution to save the lives of citizens, the realists have a minimalist approach on the right of intervention, on solidarity, the state occupying the central position.[13]

We can say that from the perspective of the states the non-intervention is desirable, while from a personal perspective, which focuses on elements related to ethics and morality, the international community has the obligation to protect and defend the civilian population.

Of course the deployment of a humanitarian intervention has significant implications also on the dynamics of the international system. James Pattison states that an illegitimate intervention weakens the effectiveness and importance of international law, and more than that, destabilizes whole regions and areas, offering here the example of the massive flow of refugees.

Louise Arbour argues that the application of R2P should be regarded as a legal, moral responsibility to intervene.[14] Another author, Alex Bellamy wants to answer to those who criticized the legitimacy and legality of the new doctrine of humanitarian intervention, R2P doctrine. He pays tribute to this doctrine, arguing that although it has some shortcomings, R2P is the only coalition instrument of the international community against possible future atrocities.[15]

Bellamy argues the legality and legitimacy of R2P, appealing to constructivist logic. Thus, he reiterates the importance of ideas in modeling the behavior of states and the international community. Human nature, he says, has a certain tolerance for cruelty as genocide or war crimes[16]. Although we faced regularly situations that had a tragic ending, the case in which there have been interventions since 1945 to date have been quite a few (one in ten cases).[17] Of course other factors contributed to the state of "lethargy", the lack of clear political will and also a certain caution from international community.[18]

In this context R2P doctrine shows its usefulness and legitimacy, by achieving a global consensus to prevent and fight against future atrocities. It provides that framework in which individuals, state actors, governmental and nongovernmental organizations can mobilize their resources to work together and reach a consensus on preventive humanitarian intervention.[19]

States are the main actors of this approach, as the responsibility for the life of their own citizens belongs to them. How they manage to fulfill their task is varied, there is never a unique

[12] *Ibidem,* p. 10.
[13] *Ibidem.*
[14] Louise Arbour, ”The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice”, Review of International Studies, 34, 2008, p. 452.
[15] Alex J. Bellamy, *The* **Responsibility to Protect: A Defence**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p.11.
[16] *Ibidem*, p.17.
[17] *Ibidem*, p. 50.
[18] *Ibidem.*
[19] *Ibidem.*

recipe. This diversity should be encouraged because it is imperative that the R2P objectives be contained in the rules, policies and strategies of state actors.[20]

Bellamy stresses the importance of regional organizations and civil society (NGOs, actors, academics, opinion leaders) to promote and propagate the objectives and values of R2P. Only through joint efforts structural changes that will allow the assimilation of R2P global objectives can take place.[21]

He also examines in detail the criticism of the R2P, dismissing them as unconvincing. The same tend to overestimate the role of the international law principles and to underestimate the importance of policies, he says.[22]

In his view, the moral dilemma of R2P doctrine has implications upon the way in which military force is used in humanitarian operations and upon the connection between R2P and peacekeeping operations. He states that there is no total solution to the dilemma, but certain measures can be taken to more or less counter-balance the existing weaknesses. It is imperative that in any humanitarian action, the response and the international community be individual and customized.

He still argues that whether appealing or not to *R2P* doctrine, any action must be adapted to the specific of the situation and of the area. The ultimate goal of the doctrine is to make the states conscious and responsible towards their duties to their own citizens and to other states.[23]

Alex J. Bellamy tries to defend the reputation of R2P doctrine, the same being among the authors who see this construct as a great revelation of the global community. Indeed R2P doctrine is in itself a significant ideological commitment of the United Nations, reflecting the recognition of the international community of their own responsibilities.

According to Roland Paris in the logic of humanitarian intervention there are five fundamental tensions seemingly irreversible, all expressing doubts about the feasibility, legitimacy and long-term prospects of R2P.[24]

The author calls these tensions, *structural problems of humanitarian interventions* and identifies five such problems*: the problem of mixed motives, the counterfactual problem, the inconsistency problem, the problem of obvious risks* and *the state problem.*[25]

The problem of mixed motives is considering the pretext underlying the decision to carry out a humanitarian intervention. Paris argues that it is impossible that behind such a judgment be only humanitarian reasons, the decision to intervene involving also a certain personal interest of the states engaged in the operation. Thus, humanitarian intervention under R2P umbrella will always generate political opposition, being delegitimized.[26]

[20]*Ibidem*, p. 90.
[21]*Ibidem*.
[22]*Ibidem*, p. 97.
[23]*Ibidem.*
[24]Roland Paris, ”Responsabilitatea de a Proteja (R2P) și problemele structurale ale intervenției umanitare preventive”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 21, Nr. 5, 2014, pp. 569-603.
[25]*Ibidem*, p. 570.
[26]*Ibidem*, p. 574-782.

The counterfactual problem refers to the inability to make accurate predictions about the success of such interventions, especially in relation to the number of human lives saved. It is impossible to predict whether the intervention was a success or not.[27]

Selective application, the decision to intervene or not in situations such as those in Libya and Syria, highlights the *problem of inconsistency*, while the emergence of collateral victims reveals the *problem of obvious risks.*[28]

The last problem, *the state problem* is about the way the international community can provide the reconstruction and later the stability of the states.[29]

According to Paris, these problems represent an insurmountable obstacle to the full implementation of R2P. They greatly complicate the conduct of humanitarian operations and together form the great dilemma of R2P.

In support of his thesis, Roland Paris analyses the intervention of the international community in the spring of 2011 in Libya, emphasizing that all five issues are addressed in this intervention.

Paris suggests that the R2P doctrine, however, is not yet doomed, at least not entirely. Non-military diplomatic methods, promotion of human rights and furthermore, the idea that countries have a duty to protect their own citizens, will continue to enjoy great international support.[30]

Roland Paris gives us a different perspective on R2P and although he is quite acid in relation to it, he emphasizes very well the existing problems in the doctrine. If we also apply the logic proposed by Paris in the analysis of the Syrian crisis we see that, like in the case of the Libyan conflict, the structural problems of the humanitarian intervention have created and continue to influence the decision on intervention.

Conclusions

Given the above, we may say that R2P doctrine has some limitations. The doctrine application dependence on the political will, but also on obtaining the approval of the UN Security Council, affects its efficiency.

Moreover, political disputes at the levels of the makers of the Security Council, particularly the position of Russia, China, Brazil, India, South Africa and Lebanon have blocked the implementation of the R2P doctrine. It seems that uprisings like those carried out during the Arab Spring did not work also in the case of Syria, Bashar al-Assad's regime being also in power today.

With Russia's involvement in the conflict, the premises for the establishment of a climate of stability in the region seem increasingly remote. The failures of all diplomatic initiatives demonstrate that the major powers are not yet ready to assume the principles governing R2P doctrine.

[27] *Ibidem*.
[28] *Ibidem*.
[29] *Ibidem*.
[30] *Ibidem*, p. 599-603.

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE SIX-STEP PLAN:

A FAILURE OF IMPOSING DEMOCRACY

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Abstract: The aftermath of worldwide recent terrorist events has opened a new page in the history of international relations. A page written by the Islamic State which plans to redraw first the Middle East map, and then the world map. This jihadist movement proliferation can be seen as an effect of the Western policy failure to control the effects of a war begun more than 15 years ago. The key elements in our analysis will focus on the implementation of the six-step plan of the Islamic State and the Western failure to suppress this radical movement.

Keywords: Jihad, Islamic State, Global Caliphate, Democracy, War on Terror

Originile Statului Islamic pot fi urmarite încă din 1999, când militantul iordanian Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi înființează în Afganistan un grup radical numit *Jund al-Sham*. De-a lungul timpului, așa cum o să vedem, gruparea condusă de al-Zaraqawi avea să își schimbe în repetate rânduri numele. La doar câteva luni de la apariție, se transformă în *Jamaat al-Tawhid wal Jihad* (Organizaţia Monoteismului şi a Jihadului[1]). Odată cu invazia trupelor coaliției conduse de Statele Unite în Afganistan și înlăturarea regimului taliban, al-Zaraqawi mută gruparea în Irak, marcând astfel o nouă etapă în evoluția acesteia. Acolo, în Irak, în vara anului 2003, minoritatea sunită nemulțumită – înlăturată de la putere prin căderea regimului Saddam Hussein – a lansat o vastă campanie de insurgență, la care au luat parte cinci grupuri distincte. Patru dintre ele erau compuse în mare parte din irakieni din fostul regim, naționaliști, elemente tribale și diverși luptători islamici, iar al cincilea grup era format din membrii Organizaţiei Monoteismului şi a Jihadului[2]. Aceasta din urmă s-a dezvoltat într-o rețea care avea ca scop rezistența

[1] Danilov, Alexandru, "Amenințarea Statului Islamic la adresa securității internaționale", disponibil la: [http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/amenintarea-statului-islamic-adresa-securitatii-internationale], data accesării: 6 octombrie 2016

[2] Hashim, S. Ahmed, "The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate", in *Middle East Policy*, Volumul XXI, Numar 4, Iarna 2014, disponibil la: [http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/islamic-state-al-qaeda-affiliate-caliphate], data accesării: 6 octombrie 2016

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împotriva forțelor coaliției americane. Obiectivele acesteia erau: (1) forțarea retragerii trupelor coaliției din Irak, (2) răsturnarea guvernului irakian interimar, (3) asasinarea celor care colaborează cu regimul de ocupație, (4) atacarea populației șiite și a forțelor de apărare ale acestora, (5) stabilirea unui stat Islamic guvernat de Sharia, legea lui Dumnezeu.[3] În scopul atingerii acestor obiective, gruparea condusă de al-Zaraqawi a deschis calea unui lung șir de crime și distrugeri în Irak. În 2004, după îndelungi negocieri, al-Zaraqawi s-a alăturat Al-Qaeda[4], schimbându-și încă o dată numele, în *Al Qaeda în regiunea dintre fluviile Tigru si Eufrat,* cunoscută și sub numele de *Al-Qaeda din Irak* (AQI)[5]. În ianuarie 2016 aceasta se distanțează, însă, de organizația condusă de Bin Laden și în încercarea de a crea o umbrelă pentru grupurile sunite, organizația a început să se intituleze *Consiliul Mujahedinilor Shura*[6]. Mai târziu în același an, după moartea lui al-Zaraqawi – în urma unui raid aerian american –, conducerea grupului este preluată de egipteanul Abu Ayyub al-Masri[7] și irakianul Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi, care proclamă *Statul Islamic din Irak* (ISI). După uciderea celor doi lideri ai ISI într-un raid american în aprilie 2010, conducerea organizației teroriste este preluată de Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi[8], actualul calif al Statului Islamic. În 2013, după ocuparea mai multor teritorii din Siria, pe fondul războiului civil și al vidului de putere creat, este adoptată denumirea de *Stat Islamic din Irak şi Siria* (ISIS)[9]. Odată cu creșterea încrederii în sine și cu extinderea ariei de acoperire, în 2014[10] ISIS a început să se perceapă ca un califat global și și-a simplificat numele în Statul Islamic (SI), ca semn al faptului că: pe de o parte, ambițiile și suveranitatea sa nu se limitează la granițele Irakului si Siriei, iar pe de altă parte, respinge granițele impuse lumii musulmane de puterile coloniale.[11]

Modificările de nume reprezintă mai mult decât o extindere teritorială a grupului: proclamarea Statului Islamic are o puternică încărcătură religioasă cu care au rezonat adepți ai jihadului din peste 90 de state (printre care Statele Unite si Europa)[12]. Statul Islamic controlează un teritoriu în Irak și Siria similar cu suprafața Marii Britanii, cu o

[3] *Ibidem*
[4] Deși Bin Laden a sprijinit financiar formarea grupării conduse de al-Zaraqawi, acesta din urmă, din dorința de a rămâne independent a refuzat în primă fază să se supună liderului Al Qaeda.
[5]Byman, Daniel, *Al Qaeda, The Islamic State, and the global jihadist movement. What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 163
[6] Barrett, Richard, *The Islamic State*, The Sufan Group, New York, 2014, p. 11
[7] "Al-Qaeda in Iraq names new head", in *BBC NEWS*, 12 iunie 2016, disponibil la: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5073092.stm#top], data accesării: 3 octombrie 2016
[8] Baghdadi a devenit liderul AQI în 2010, chiar înainte ca grupul să înceapă să se deplaseaze în Siria. Baghdadi a încercat să ducă AQI la un nou nivel, atunci când, în prima noapte de Ramadan în 2014, a proclamat întoarcerea califatului, cu el însuși în calitate de lider. Ca și calif, el ar fi "comandantul credincioșilor," și, astfel, cel puțin în teorie, musulmanii de pretutindeni i-ar datora ascultare. Vezi Byman, *Op. Cit.* p. 165
[9] Solomon, Hussein, *Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 3
[10] Pe data de 29 iunie 2014, în urma câștigurilor teritoriale rapide, care a inclus capturarea Mosulului la 10 iunie, ISIS a declarat renașterea Califatului, numindu-l Statul Islamic iar Abu Bakr devine Califul Ibrahim. Vezi: "Sunni rebels declare new 'Islamic caliphate'", in Al Jazeera, disponibil la: [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new-islamic-caliphate-201462917326669749.html], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016
[11] Byman, *Op. Cit.* p. 164
[12] Ibrahim, Raymond, "The CIA Doesn't Know Why Muslims Join ISIS" in *PJ Media*, 18 martie 2015, disponibil la: [http://www.meforum.org/5138/cia-muslims-isis], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016

populație de peste 10 milioane de locuitori. În cadrul acestui teritoriu și-a creat armată, poliție, sistem judiciar, având la dispoziție un buget anual de aproximativ 2 miliarde de dolari[13]. Hussein Solomon subliniază importanța faptului că SI are, din toate punctele de vedere, controlul *de facto* asupra unui *"stat"* în interiorul granițelor celor două state *de jure* Irak de și Siria. Pe lângă controlul unui teritoriu din ce în ce mai mare, SI și-a extins activitatea la nivel global, înființând celule în peste 60 de state.[14]

Prin actele de violență și sadismul dus la extrem pe care îl afișează, Statul Islamic și-a asigurat promovarea media care îl pune într-o situție *win-win*: pe de o parte, creează panică și insecuritate în rândul inamicilor săi, iar pe de altă parte, le insuflă fanaticilor religioși care i se alătură un puternic sentiment de omnipotență la nivel global.[15] Din câte se pare, strategia politică generală a SI este una de accentuare a polarizării și intensificare a tensiunilor dintre facțiuni. Prin videoclipurile macabre postate online cu acte de cruzime împotriva yazidilor, creștinilor și a altora asemenea lor, SI a mizat pe atragerea de partea sa a musulmanilor "moderați". În urma atacului din ianuarie 2015 de la sediul Charlie Hebdo[16] din Paris (12 morți), un val de islamofobie a cuprins Europa, care a fost realimentat și de restul atacurilor care au urmat, dintre care cele mai terifiante fiind: noiembrie 2015 - Paris[17](130 morți), martie 2016 – Bruxelles[18](31 morți) sau iulie 2016 – Nice[19] (86 morți). Această islamofobie a dus la antagonizarea și mai mare a comunității europene de musulmani, deja alienate. Mulți dintre acești musulmani s-au alăturat Statului Islamic[20]. Întoarcerea acestor jihadiști instruiți în țările de origine a contribuit, de asemenea, la creșterea anxietății cetățenilor europeni în materie de securitate. Mai mult decât atât, zecile de mii de imigranți din Siria și Irak, care au venit în Europa, au creat

[13] Atwan, Bari, Abdel, "When it comes to 'Islamic State,' the West just doesn't get it," in *Open Democracy* , 9 iulie 2015, disponibil la:[https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/abdel-bari-atwan/when-it-comes-to-%E2%80%98islamic-state%E2%80%99-west-just-doesn%E2%80%99t-get-it], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016
[14] Solomon, Hussein, "Expanding the Jihad: IS in Africa," in *RIMA Occasional*, Vol. 3, Nr. 2, martie 2015, disponibil la:[https://muslimsinafrica.wordpress.com/2015/03/11/expanding-the-jihad-isis-in-africa-professor-hussein-solomon/], data acesării: 7 octombrie 2016
[15] Atwan, *Op. Cit.*
[16] Doi atacatori mascați (Saïd și Chérif Kouachi) au intrat în redacția săptămânalului satiric francez Charlie Hebdo ucigând 12 persoane și rănind alte 11. Martorii au declarat că au auzit trăgătorii strigând "Noi l-am răzbunat pe profetul Mahomed" și "Dumnezeu este mare", în arabă în timp ce strigau numele ziaristilor. "Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror", in *BBC News*, 14 ianuarie 2015, disponibil la: [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016
[17] Pe data de 13 noiembrie 2015, 130 de persoane sunt ucise și sute rănite într-o serie de atacuri asupra mai multor locații din Paris. Atacul a fost revendicat de SI. "Paris attacks: 'What happened on the night'", in *BBC News*, 9 Decembrie 2015, disponibil la: [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016
[18] Cel puțin 31 de persoane au fost ucise și 150 rănite în trei explozii care au avut loc la aeroportul din Bruxelles și la o stație de metrou din centru. Procurorul federal al Belgiei a confirmat faptul că incidentele au fost atacuri sinucigașe. "Brussels explosions: What we know about airport and metro attacks", in *BBC News*, 9 aprilie 2016, disponibil la: [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016
[19] În seara zilei din 14 iulie 2016, un camion de marfă de 19 tone a fost condus în mod deliberat în mulțimea care sarbatorea Căderea Bastiliei pe Promenada Englezilor din Nisa, Franța, având ca rezultat moartea a 86 de persoane și rănirea altor 434. "Nice attack: What we know about the Bastille Day killings", in *BBC News*, 19 august 2016, disponibil la: [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801671], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016
[20] Tausch, Arno, "Estimates on the global threat of Islamic State in the face of the 2015 Paris and Copenhagen attacks " in *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 19, Nr. 1 (Primăvara 2015), disponibil la: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2702356], data accesării: 7 octombrie 2016

oportunitatea perfectă pentru SI de a-și infiltra membrii în spațiul occidental. Având în vedere valurile de imigranți disperați la ușile lor, multe țări europene nu au avut posibilitatea să treacă fiecare persoană prin controalele de securitate ale Uniunii Europene.

Sentimentele de frică și insecuritate ale lumii ocidentale au fost alimentate și de mediatizarea unui document de 32 de pagini care descrie Armaghedonul musulman. Descoperit în Pakistan, în august 2015, documentul scris în dialectul urdu denumit „O scurtă istorie a califatului Statului Islamic, Califatul potrivit Profetului“[21] promovează o bătălie apocaliptică drept soluție finală. Documentul susţine crearea unei noi armate teroriste în Afganistan şi Pakistan care să declanşeze un război în India şi să provoace o bătălie decisivă cu Statele Unite ale Americii. De asemenea, în el se detaliază complotul Statului Islamic care vizează atacul soldaţilor americani, în timp ce aceştia se retrag din Afganistan şi uciderea diplomaţilor americani şi a oficialilor pakistanezi. Documentul dă vina pe înfiinţarea Israelului pentru dezvoltarea organizaţiilor jihadiste.[22] *„Imediat ce guvernul britanic a renunţat la controlul Israelului, Ben-Guiron, liderul evreilor, a declarat independenţa statului, declanşând migraţia globală a evreilor către statul evreu şi lansând persecutarea sistematică a musulmanilor palestinieni care şi-au abandonat casele şi migrează“*, se arată în document.[23]

„O scurtă istorie a califatului Statului Islamic, Califatul potrivit Profetului“ descrie un plan în șase etape pentru dezvoltarea SI și cucerirea lumii[24]:

Faza 1 “Trezirea” 2000-2003: Statul Islamic solicită „o operaţiune majoră împotriva SUA [...] pentru a provoca o cruciadă împotriva islamului“. Această fază a strategiei ar provoca SUA în a declarara război asupra lumii islamice, rezultând în "trezirea" musulmanilor.

Faza 2 “Șoc și groază” 2004-2006: Statul Islamic va ademeni SUA în mai multe teatre de război, inclusiv atacuri cibernetice, şi va înfiinţa organizaţii caritabile în lumea musulmană şi arabă care să susţină terorismul. În această fază, jihadiștii au sperat să facă Occidentul conștient de "comunitatea islamică".

Faza 3 “Bazarea pe forțe proprii” 2007-2010: Statul Islamic va crea „interferenţe“ în statele care se învecinează cu Irak, în special în Siria. Această etapă urmărește o serie de atacuri în Turcia și Orientul Mijlociu, inclusiv Israel.

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[21] Traducere preluată din Stan, Ana, “Planul Statului Islamic de cucerire a lumii, un „Mein Kampf“ jihadist”, in *Adevărul*, disponibil la: [http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/planul-statului-islamic-cucerire-lumii-mein-kampf-jihadist-1_55d1e850f5eaafab2c9aef80/index.html], data accesării: 8 octombrie 2016

[22] *Ibidem*

[23] “ISIS vision echoes Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf, Jewish News Service”, in *New Boston Post*, 26 august 2015, disponibil la: [http://newbostonpost.com/2015/08/26/isis-vision-echoes-hitlers-mein-kampf/], data accesării: 8 octombrie 2016

[24] “Secret ISIS document found in Pakistan attempts to unite Pak-Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda”, in *Khaama Press*, 17 august 2015, disponibil la: [http://www.khaama.com/secret-isis-document-found-in-pakistan-attempts-to-unite-pak-afghan-taliban-and-al-qaeda-1400], data accesării: 8 octombrie 2016

Faza 4 "Recoltarea / șantajarea / primirea" 2010-2013: Statul Islamic va ataca „SUA şi interesele occidentale" pentru a le distruge economia şi pentru a înlocui dolarul cu aurul şi argintul, şi pentru a expune relaţia guvernelor musulmane cu Israelul şi SUA.

Faza 5 "Declararea califatului" 2013-2016: Aici nu se oferă multe detalii. Documentul stipulează doar „Califatul potrivit Profetului". Presupunem că descrie momentul în care a fost instaurat SI sau Califatul.

Faza 6 "Război deschis" 2017-2020: Statul Islamic prevede conflictul cu necredincioşii, iar „Allah va da victoria credincioşilor, după care pacea va stăpâni pământul". Viziunea Mesianică a documentului prezintă o imagine a unei lumi în care numai musulmanii credincioși rămân în viață.

Documentul cere talibanilor și adepților Al-Qaeda să se alăture Statului Islamic în încercarea de răsturnare a guvernelor arabe care au relații cu SUA și Israel. Spre deosebire de Al Qaeda, al cărei scop a fost slăbirea Americii și a altor naţiuni occidentale, documentul spune că liderii Statului Islamic consideră că acest lucru este greşit din punct de vedere strategic: „În loc să ne epuizăm energia cu SUA, ar trebui să ne concentrăm pe înarmarea lumii arabe pentru înființarea califatului." Tonul documentului, „O scurtă istorie a califatului Statului Islamic, Califatul potrivit Profetului" este unul foarte intransigent și nu lasă loc de compromisuri: "Acceptați faptul că acest califat va supraviețui și prospera până când va acapara întreaga lume și va decapita până și ultima persoană care se revoltă împotriva lui Allah. Acesta este adevărul amar..."[25]

Așa cum am văzut, fenomenul SI a crescut și și-a extins activitatea de la an la an, adunând tot mai mult adepți și generând panică în rândul celor care dezaprobă obiectivele, mijloacele și acțiunile lor. Parte a acestei dezvoltări a islamismului în spațiul Orientului Mijlociu și în special în zona Irakului se datorează eșecului occidental de stabilizare a zonei în perioada post-război (în anii care au urmat intervenției SUA în Irak). Consecințele intervenței au fost cu totul altele decât cele prefigurate de SUA în momentul declanșării războiului împotriva terorismului, ocuparea Irakului fiind, de altfel, momentul în care al-Qaeda a devenit pentru prima dată o forță politico-militară. Războiul a atras în Irak islamiști din toate colțurile Orientului Mijlociu, iar lupta lor împotriva șiiților irakieni avea să fie doar un precursor al războaielor sectare care au urmat[26]. Înlăturarea lui Saddam Hussein a creat un vid de putere care a deschis calea emergenței grupărilor jihadiste. Fostul comandant american la Camp Bucca din Irak a recunoscut că detenția a 24.000 de prizonieri, printre care: lideri ai rețelei al-Qaeda, ofițeri baath-iști și civili nevinovați, a creat o "oală sub presiune pentru extremism". Mai mult, în timpul detenției în această închisoare în perioada 2006-2007, nouă lideri al-Qaeda au pus la punct detaliile

[25] Tomlin, Gregory, "ISIS 'Mein Kampf' discovered in Pakistan; promises final solution in 2020", in *Christian Examiner*, 18 august 2015, disponibil la:[http://www.christianexaminer.com/article/isis-mein-kampf-discovered-in-pakistan-promises-final-solution-in-2020/49381.htm], data accesării: 8 octombrie 2016

[26] Porter, Gareth, "Why the U.S. Owns the Rise of Islamic State and the Syria Disaster", in *Truth Dig*, 8 octombrie 2015, disponibil la: [http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-the-u-s-owns-the-rise-of-islamic-state-and-the-syria-disaster-2/5481572], data accesării: 8 octombrie 2016

cu privire la crearea Statului Islamic.[27] Un alt punct important în analiza emergenței SI îl reprezintă retragerea SUA din Irak, acțiune care a lăsat deschisă calea unui puternic val de insurgențe într-un stat care era departe de o maturitate democratică. Astfel că, în momentul în care procesul democratic a fost perceput ca fiind ineficient de către sunniți irakieni, mii de oameni au ieșit pe străzile din Ramadi, Hawija, și Falluja pentru a-și exprima frustrările politice și socio-economice. Protestele anti-guvernamentale care au avut loc între 2012-2014 au fost înăbușite violent de către serviciile de securitate și ale armatei irakiene; conform unor estimări conservatoare, acest lucru a dus la sute de morți și arestări ale protestatarilor suniți pașnici într-o perioadă de doar doi ani. În realitate, al-Maliki a fost un prim-ministru la fel de opresiv ca oricare dintre liderii anteriori ai Irakului, cu o singură excepție: armata irakiană care o comanda era acum înarmată și antrenată de armata SUA. Forțele irakiene erau nedisciplinate, nesigure, neprofesioniste și depindeau în totalitate de armata Statelor Unite, pentru a-și putea desfășura operațiunile. În conformitate cu noul regim democratic al Irakului, care a fost înarmat de SUA și sprijinit de Iran, suniții din nord s-au simțit din ce în ce mai lezați, iar acest lucru a oferit oportunitatea perfectă pentru SI pentru a umple vidul de putere[28]. Astfel că după proclamarea Califatului pe 29 iunie 2014, pe principiul "dușmanul dușmanului meu este prietenul meu", grupurile de rezistență ostile anti-americane au câștigat impuls, simpatie și legitimitate datorită acțiunilor întreprinse de forțele occidentale în Orientul Mijlociu. SI, care controlează deja și jumătate din Irak (la fel de mult ca și guvernul de la Bagdad), pe lângă teritoriile din Siria, reprezintă un “eșec al serviciilor de informații occidentale”[29]. Impunerea democrației în Irak s-a dovedit a fi un eșec îngrozitor, iar presupunerea Statelor Unite că înlăturarea de la putere a liderului irakian va duce la o democratizare rapidă a Irakului declanşând astfel o explozie democratică în lumea islamică de o magnitudine comparabilă cu cea produsă de sfârşitul Războiului Rece, s-a dovedit a fi greșită. Era greu de crezut că un regim democratic avea să pună capăt diferendelor vechi de 14 secole dintre suniți și șiiți (care sunt majoritari în Irak), nemailuând în calcul problema kurzilor. După zeci de ani de opresiune din partea lui Saddam Hussein (care era sunit), o reacție a șiiților care au așteptat atât de mult timp să aibă un cuvânt de spus în conducerea țării, nu era greu de prevăzut.

[27] McCoy, Terrence, “How the Islamic State evolved in an American prison”, in *The Washimngton Post*, 4 noiembrie 2004, disponibil la: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/04/how-an-american-prison-helped-ignite-the-islamic-state/], data accesării: 8 octombrie 2016
[28] Hussain, Dilly, “ISIS: The ‘unintended consequences’ of the US-led war on Iraq”, in *Foreign Policy Journal*, 23 martie 2015, disponibil la: [http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/03/23/isis-the-unintended-consequences-of-the-us-led-war-on-iraq/], data accesării: 8 octombrie 2016
[29] Richardson, Graham, “We can’t impose democracy where it’s not wanted” in *The Australian*, 26 septembrie 2016, disponibil la: [http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/graham-richardson/we-cant-impose-democracy-where-its-not-wanted/news-story/22e945342456b8d164311f438eb6f11a], data accesării: 9 octombrie 2016

Un punct de vedere comun al societății internaționale susține că "democrația nu se poate instaura sub amenințarea armei"[30]. Democrația nu reprezintă doar guvernarea "pentru" oameni, ea este în egală măsură guvernare "de către" și "a" oamenilor. Dacă oamenii nu se percep ca un popor și nu sunt dispuși să plătească impozite, să își apere granițele sau să respecte regula majorității, atunci democrația nu este sustenabilă.[31] Democraţiile necesită o serie de precondiţii sociale, istorice şi economice foarte speciale, incluzând disponibilitatea culturală faţă de compromis şi faţă de acceptarea unor decizii nepopulare atunci când acestea sunt luate printr-un proces legitim. Experiența irakiană și eșecul acesteia în consolidarea democrației ar trebui privite ca o lecție dură, învățată cu prețul unor pierderi umane și materiale greu de cuantificat. Din experiența irakiană, societatea internațională trebuie să țină minte că: o democrație stabilă presupune compromis și incluziunea minorităților; în lipsa unei stabilități și încrederi politice, regimurile autoritare pot reveni oricând; totuși, corupția și democrația pot coexista.[32]

Pe termen mediu și lung, fenomenul SI va continua să crească: pe de o parte, datorită faptului că până acum a fost reținută de rezistența clericilor conservatori; mai mult decât atât, fundamentalismul religios este alimentat de factori demografici și de mediu; pe de altă parte, având în vedere măsurile de austeritate adoptate de statele occidentale, forțele de securitate nu dețin resursele necesare pentru a face față provocării ridicate de jihadiști. În realitate, datorită răspândirii extremismului islamic, lupta împotriva acestuia se va extinde cel puțin pe durata unei generații.

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[30] Pitts, Patrick, "Jumping the Loaded Gun: How Promoting Democracy Fails" to *Achieve Peace*, 5 februarie 2013, disponibil la: [http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/05/jumping-the-loaded-gun-how-hastily-promoting-democracy-fails-to-achieve-peace/], data accesării: 9 octombrie 2016

[31] Doyle, W. Michael, "Promoting Democracy Is Not Imposing Democracy", in *The World Post*, 25 mai 2011, disponibil la: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-doyle/promoting-democracy-is-no_b_826574.html], data accesării: 9 octombrie 2016

[32] Khalaf, Roula, "Iraq's difficult decade with democracy. Most depressing to many is sense of a creeping authoritarianism", in *Financial Times*, 4 martie 2016, disponibil la: [https://www.ft.com/content/e729b3e0-84c4-11e2-aaf1-00144feabdc0], data accesării: 9 octombrie 2016

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LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE POLITICAL GAME AT 1895: THE STABILISATION OF THE ROMANIAN TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

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Abstract: The premises of the Romanian two-party-system's stabilisation are to be found in 1895, when a new pattern of government alternation, more organised and efficient, is shaped in the political regime, generating political stability during 1895-1914, the last stage of Charles I's reign. This article aims to examine precisely the political moment of 1895, which marked the replacement of a dezorganized government alternation with an organized and efficient one. This type of government alternation between the National-Liberal Party (1875) and the Conservative Party (1880) lead, ineluctable, to the stabilisation of the Romanian two-party-system. In this regard, the liberal government (1895-1899) defined the Romanian two-party-system's stabilisation, initiating the government alternation (governmental rotation, 1895-1914), a particular feature of this political mechanism. Gradually, it became a custom on the Romanian political arena and a factor of stability.

Keywords: Romania, 1895, government alternation, liberals, conservatives.

Introduction

Le bipartisme roumain à l'époque de Charles I^er^ est le résultat d'un long processus, formé de plusieurs étapes reflétant toute une série d'aspects liés au régime politique roumain, à savoir le projet et la promulgation de la Constitution de 1866, le système électoral, la formation et la consolidation des deux partis au gouvernement, le Parti National-Libéral (1875) et le Parti Conservateur (1880), la vie politique avec les traits spécifiques de l'espace roumain, la relation de Charles I^er^ avec l'élite politique, la relation entre le Gouvernement et l'opposition, les manifestations publiques (manifestations de rue, démonstrations, réunions publiques), la presse etc. Tous ces aspects du régime politique ont favorisé la création du bipartisme roumain.

Le politologue Maurice Duverger, qui analyse la formation et l'évolution des partis politiques ainsi que les systèmes de partis, montre que « le suffrage censitaire a d'abord engendré un bipartisme <<bourgeois>>, caractérisé par l'opposition des conservateurs et des libéraux »[1].

Dans le cas roumain, l'évolution du système bipartite à l'époque du règne du Charles I^er^ a connu aussi plusieurs étapes liées à la vie politique en général. L'élite politique roumaine

[1] Maurice DUVERGER, *Les partis politiques*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1976, p. 300.

a appliqué le modèle britannique de gouvernement car ce dernier assurait la stabilité politique; toutefois, le bipartisme roumain a eu ses propres traits, spécifiques à l'espace roumain. *La rotation gouvernementale* (1895-1914), analysée dans ce cas comme une particularité du bipartisme roumain[2], représente la dernière étape du règne de Charles I^er^, caractérisée par une stabilité du contexte politique. En Roumanie, le système bipartite est le résultat d'un processus de longue durée, traversant plusieurs moments difficiles; néanmoins, les libéraux aussi bien que les conservateurs, appuyés par Charles I^er^, parviennent à un consensus politique qui se traduit par l'imposition de *la rotation gouvernementale*. Le syntagme de *rotation gouvernementale* est employé pour la première fois en 1946 par Mattei Dogan. Analysant ce mécanisme politique, il affirme que « *nous avons affaire /.../ à une alternance gouvernementale de deux partis qui se succèdent au gouvernement par une rotation régulière* »[3].

Ainsi, le jeu politique est-il bien défini. Charles I^er^ aussi bien que les leaders politiques, soient-ils libéraux ou conservateurs, prennent conscience de la nécessité de l'imposition d'un tel mécanisme politique. Sorin Cristescu mentionne également le fonctionnement de ce mécanisme dans le régime politique à partir de 1895, année où le leader libéral « D. A. Sturdza devenait premier-ministre, ce qui consacrait dès lors la formule de la *rotation gouvernementale* »[4]. Dans ces conditions, après 1895, la *rotation gouvernementale*, commence à devenir une pratique habituelle de l'époque, fonctionnant « ensuite de manière presque automatique »[5], dans le régime politique roumain.

L'articulation du régime politique roumain (1866-1895)

En 1866 le projet d'un prince étranger prend forme par l'avènement de Charles de Hohenzollern – Sigmaringen au trône du pays; cela marque la fin de la lutte politique, l'accroissement du prestige du pays et la prise en compte d'un autre objectif important du peuple roumain, à savoir l'indépendance du pays. Enfin, les groupements politiques, libéraux et conservateurs, parviennent à un consensus, pour le bien du pays: « in 1866 a broad consensus of the elite about the principle of a foreign dynasty united the different party groups, and this principle was consecrated in the Constitution of 1866, which claimed popular sovereignty and a hereditary monarchy as state goals »[6]. Le jeune prince a des convictions solides concernant le respect de la loi fondamentale, adoptée la même année (selon le modèle de la Constitution belge de 1831).

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[2] Cosmin-Ștefan DOGARU, *Charles I and the Romanian Two-Party System (1866-1914): History Seen through Political Science Lenses*, Editura Universității din București, Bucarest, 2016, p. 27.
[3] Mattei DOGAN, *Analiza statistică a „democrației parlamentare" din România (Analyse statistique de la « démocratie parlementaire » en Roumanie)*, Editura Partidului Social-Democrat, Bucarest, 1946, pp. 109-110.
[4] Sorin CRISTESCU, *Carol I. Corespondența privată (1878-1912) (Charles I^er^. Correspondance privée. 1878-1912)*, Tritonic, Bucarest, 2005, p. 38.
[5] Vlad GEORGESCU, *Istoria românilor de la origini până în zilele noastre (Histoire des Roumains depuis les origines jusqu'à présent)*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 1992, p. 166.
[6] Edda BINDER-IIJIMA, "Creating Legitimacy: The Romanian Elite and the Acceptance of the Monarchical Rule", in Tassos Anastassiadis and Nathalie Clayer (eds.), *Society, Politics and State Formation in Southeastern Europe during the 19th Century*, Alpha Bank, Historical Archives, Athens, 2011, p. 178.

La Constitution de 1866, qui représente le fondement juridique du nouveau régime politique, instaure une monarchie constitutionnelle héréditaire où le roi s'impose progressivement comme un arbitre dans la vie politique, notamment après la proclamation de la Roumanie comme Royaume en mars 1881 et l'institution de la *rotation gouvernementale*, après 1895. L'article 93 de la loi fondamentale stipule clairement que le prince régnant « *nomme et révoque ses ministres. Il sanctionne et promulgue les lois* »[7]. Plus loin, l'article 95 souligne le fait que le prince régnant « *a le droit de dissoudre soit les deux Chambres dans le même temps, soit une seule Chambre. L'acte de dissolution doit comprendre la convocation des électeurs dans un délai de deux mois et des Chambres dans un délai de trois mois* »[8].

Dans la première période du règne du Charles I[er] (1866-1871), la succession gouvernementale se traduit par plusieurs gouvernements (expériences gouvernementales échouées) s'avérant impuissants pour offrir au pays un environnement politique stable. Cette période tendue connaît dix gouvernements et six dissolutions des Corps Législatifs[9], la scène politique étant visiblement divisée entre plusieurs groupements libéraux ou conservateurs. Dans cette étape, Charles I[er] est confronté à la situation difficile du pays, à la mentalité politique et aux attaques des libéraux radicaux (qui s'intensifient les années qui suivent). Après certains épisodes (la proclamation de la « République de Ploieşti », le 8/20 août 1870; le moment de « Sala Slătineanu » du 11 mars 1871) et attaques dans la presse (dans le journal *Românul*) envers le prince régnant et le gouvernement, Charles I[er] menace d'abdiquer[10]. C'est une carte magistralement jouée par Charles I[er] en 1871 qui fait preuve de beaucoup d'habileté de sa part et qui détermine l'élite politique à y réagir promptement. Le problème se posait dans termes suivants : *Qu'est-ce qui se passerait si le prince régnant renonçait au trône ?*

Heureusement pour le régime politique roumain, Charles I[er] abandonne cette option et décide de rester au trône du pays, menant l'Etat vers la voie de la modernisation, étant appuyé par l'élite politique qui tient un rôle nodal pour le prince régnant dans ce processus. Charles accepte de continuer de diriger le pays, mais il pose une condition nette, à savoir la formation d'un gouvernement conservateur uni, dirigé par Lascăr Catargiu (1871-1876); assurant la stabilité politique tellement voulue par Charles I[er]. Mais le bipartisme roumain, ayant comme repère le modèle britannique classique de gouvernement, connaît les années qui suivent d'autres étapes qui mènent à sa stabilisation au sein du régime politique. Entre temps, deux gouvernements de longue durée se sont fait remarquer: le gouvernement libéral, connu comme « le long gouvernement libéral » (1876-1888), et le gouvernement junimiste-conservateur (1888-1895). Ces expériences politiques font penser Charles que les longs gouvernements constitueraient un obstacle pour le fonctionnement normal du régime politique; les deux partis tendent inéluctablement à un gouvernement personnel, les passions

[7] *Constituţiune şi Lege electorală (Constitution et Loi électorale)*, Tipografia Statului, Bucarest, 1884, p. 29.
[8] *Ibidem*, p. 31.
[9] Sorin Liviu DAMEAN, *Carol I al României 1866-1881 (Charles I[er] de Roumanie 1866-1881)*, Bucarest, Paideia, 2000, p. 100.
[10] Radu ROSETTI, *Amintiri. Ce am auzit de la alţii. Din copilărie. Din prima tinereţe (Souvenirs. Ce que j'ai entendu dire. Mon enfance. Ma première jeunesse)*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 2013, pp. 526-528; Sorin Liviu DAMEAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-144.

politiques étant parfois plus fortes que les objectifs rationnels ou les intérêts qui relèvent du bien commun.

L'année 1895 et le mécanisme de l'alternance au gouvernement des libéraux et conservateurs: le passage d'une coutume à une pratique politique fonctionnelle

Le jeu politique se déroule normalement en 1894, alors que les disputes entre junimistes et conservateurs, au gouvernement alors, s'intensifient visiblement à cause du projet de la Loi des mines; au bout de longues discussions, parfois enflammées, la loi est finalement votée en avril 1895. L'attaque des libéraux envers le gouvernement vise l'aspect suivant: « ils [les libéraux -n.n.] ont fait grand cas de la non-constitutionnalité de la loi, vu qu'elle permettait aux étrangers de détenir des propriétés foncières, une violation de l'article 7 stipulant que seulement les citoyens roumains pouvaient acquérir des propriétés rurales »[11]. Finalement, « lorsque les libéraux ont perdu, et la Loi des Mines a été votée, ils se sont retirés du Parlement afin de bloquer l'activité ultérieure du gouvernement et pour obliger le Roi de faire appel à eux pour remplacer les conservateurs »[12]. Les libéraux manifestent ainsi leur volonté d'arriver au pouvoir, après une longue opposition et, à cet égard, ils ont recours à tous les moyens nécessaires, connus à l'époque. La crise qui a lieu au sein du cabinet conservateur constitue un point de repère pour les libéraux dans leur démarche de parvenir au pouvoir.

Ces problèmes internes de la Roumanie n'échappent pas aux diplomates étrangers qui les débattent de manière intense. Dès lors, le jeu politique de 1895 peut être également connu par les comptes-rendus diplomatiques austro-hongrois. Le 23 septembre (5 octobre) 1895, Rudolf Welsersheimb (ministre plénipotentiaire de l'Autriche-Hongrie entre octobre 1894 et 12 octobre 1895) dépeint la situation de ce moment-là à Agenor Goluchowski (diplomate austro-hongrois) ainsi: « *la crise latente que traverse le cabinet depuis plusieurs mois semble se rapprocher maintenant du dénouement. Les ministres junimistes P. P. Carp, Menelas Ghermani et Al. Marghiloman ont présenté leurs démissions à Sa Majesté le Roi /.../ M. Carp /.../ semble fermement décidé d'imposer le renversement depuis longtemps planifié du gouvernement /.../ ayant l'intention reconnue de céder le terrain à l'Opposition libérale* »[13]; il y fait également référence à la position du roi : « *M. P. P. Carp n'a pas pu réussir à obtenir quelque décision de la part du roi. Le souverain a invoqué ses obligations constitutionnelles* »[14]. Les dissensions entre les junimistes et les conservateurs créent donc l'occasion pour les libéraux de demander le pouvoir, vu qu'ils étaient en opposition depuis sept ans.

[11] Keith HITCHINS, *România 1866-1947 (Roumanie. 1866-1947)*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 2014, p. 119.
[12] *Ibidem*.
[13] „Raport diplomatic, Rudolf Welsersheimb către Agenor Goluchowski din 23 septembrie (5 octombrie)" [« Compte-rendu diplomatique, Rudolf Welsersheimb à Agenor Goluchowski du 23 septembre (5 octobre)], Sinaia, in *Regele Carol I în rapoartele diplomatice austro-ungare) (1877-1914) (Le Roi Charles I^er^ dans les comptes-rendus diplomatiques austro-hongrois. 1877-1914)*, Vol. I (1877-1896), Paideia, Bucarest, 2013, pp. 387-388.
[14] *Ibidem*, p. 388.

Les stratégies de renversement du gouvernement sont bien définies à l'époque: les attaques de l'opposition envers le gouvernement dans le Parlement, à travers la presse, lors de manifestations publiques etc.; néanmoins, en 1895, il s'agit d'un transfert de pouvoir réalisé d'une manière plutôt modérée que violente (voir le renversement du gouvernement I. C. Brătianu en mars 1888). Dans ces conditions, selon la pratique politique, le 4 octobre 1895, Charles I[er] appelle les libéraux au gouvernement: c'est le moment où l'imposition de la *rotation gouvernementale* devient une chose certaine. Désormais la vie politique roumaine change, on observe le plein fonctionnement du « système de la rotation gouvernementale, le chef de l'Etat, le roi Charles I[er], ayant l'occasion d'exercer le rôle d'arbitre dans la vie d'Etat, appelant alternativement les deux partis au pouvoir »[15].

Le régime politique roumain passe ainsi à une autre étape, où le roi Charles I[er] désigne le libéral D. A. Sturdza pour la fonction de premier-ministre, ce dernier étant chargé de former le nouveau cabinet. Aux élections de novembre 1895, le gouvernement libéral obtient sans surprises une majorité confortable au for législatif. Au moment de la chute du gouvernement conservateur, D. A. Sturdza, un fervent adepte de l'alternance au gouvernement des deux forces politiques, exprime ainsi sa vision: « *lorsque les conservateurs tombaient, le Roi ne pouvait pas laisser le pays tomber avec eux, par amour platonique pour le parti conservateur /..../ et lorsque le Roi nous a appelés, nous étions tous prêts, unis et disciplinés, à répondre à l'appel du Souverain* »[16]. Dans ce contexte politique, les libéraux reviennent au pouvoir au bout de sept ans d'opposition. Le jeu politique accepté par les libéraux aussi bien que par les conservateurs annonce un autre type d'alternance, à savoir une alternance organisée (la durée d'un cabinet étant de 3 ou 4 ans), ce qui laisse entendre qu'il y a une sorte de pacte tacite entre le roi et les leaders politiques.

Le changement de gouvernement en 1895 constitue également un sujet de discussion entre Charles I[er] et sa mère. Dans une lettre du 5/17 octobre 1895 qu'il lui adresse, le roi décrit en détail la situation politique interne: « *aujourd'hui le pays s'appuie sur un fondement si ferme, et mon autorité est tellement renforcée que les crises internes passent sans trop de tremblements* »[17]. Charles I[er] y exprime la conviction que « *l'actuel changement de gouvernement s'est calmement passé /.../ les libéraux ont reçu le pouvoir de moi et ils ne sont pas arrivés à gouverner par des luttes ou manifestations, fait qui a calmé considérablement toutes les passions* »[18]. On le voit, le changement de gouvernement d'octobre 1895 a eu lieu dans un rythme modéré avec le consensus de toutes les forces politiques. A ce propos, il faut rappeler que, en effet, « la crise politique engendrée dans une bonne mesure par les libéraux a coïncidé avec la fin du mandat législatif normal des conservateurs et le Roi en a profité afin

[15] Nicolae ISAR, *Istoria modernă a românilor: 1774/1784-1918 (Histoire moderne des Roumains. 1774/1784-1918),* Editura Universitară, Bucarest, 2006, p. 440.
[16] D. A. STURDZA, *Discurs rostit la 13 octombrie 1895 la Iaşi (Discours prononcé le 13 octobre 1895 à Jassy)*, Tipografia Voinţa Naţională, Bucarest, 1895, p. 43.
[17] *Scrisorile Regelui Carol I din arhiva de la Sigmaringen 1878-1905 (Les lettres du Roi Charles I[er] dans l'archive de Sigmaringen 1878-1905)*, Paideia, Bucarest, 2010, p. 337.
[18] *Ibidem*, p. 338.

d'appeler au pouvoir les libéraux. Les politiciens des deux partis politiques ont vu cette situation comme une conséquence naturelle du système de la rotation »[19]. L'alternance au gouvernement des libéraux et conservateurs était devenue une coutume, une pratique politique dont le but principal était d'assurer la stabilité politique et où le rôle principal de ce jeu politique était tenu par l'artisan même du système bipartite, à savoir le roi Charles I[er].

A cet égard, nous rejoignons la vision selon laquelle le roi Charles I[er] a été un monarque constitutionnel préférant toutefois s'impliquer parfois dans la vie politique roumaine et constituant sans aucun doute un facteur de décision: « le premier Roi de Roumanie a été impliqué dans les problèmes du gouvernement/de l'administration ou, tout au moins, il en a été au courant »[20]. En effet, le roi était très bien informé sur les problèmes importants auxquels le pays était confronté et il tirait des signaux d'alarmes à chaque dérapage de l'arène politique. Dans le même temps, le roi se tenait « *toujours loin des luttes politiques, au moins en apparence, n'ayant ni camarilla, ni favori, il avait /.../ sa police personnelle qui faisait toutes sortes d'enquêtes /..../ lorsque les oppositions devenaient trop impatientes et sortaient dans la rue et convoquaient des réunions publiques, le roi envoyait ses émissaires afin de prendre le pouls du public, le degré de surexcitation de l'opposition /.../ et l'affluence des réunions* »[21].

Quoi qu'il en soit, Charles I[er] a eu sans aucun doute une influence majeure dans l'imposition de la *rotation gouvernementale* et, implicitement, dans la stabilisation du système bipartite, les libéraux aussi bien que les conservateurs acceptant cette pratique politique: « du point de vue politique il « a élaboré » un mécanisme de domination des intérêts, des passions et des jeux politiques: la rotation gouvernementale. Le roi a insisté, après 1895, sur l'alternative au gouvernement des deux grands partis: le Parti National-Libéral et le Parti Conservateur »[22].

Quelques années plus tard, après le changement de gouvernement de 1895, le journal *Timpul* soulignait cet épisode important du régime politique roumain: « *nous, les conservateurs, avions inauguré le système bienfaisant par lequel la rotation naturelle des partis au gouvernement de l'Etat se fait sans bouleversements violents, par l'intervention de la Couronne* »[23]. Dès lors, nous sommes persuadé que lors du changement de gouvernement de 1895 l'élite politique roumaine était consciente de la nécessité du fonctionnement d'une alternance organisée.

Les hommes politiques ont progressivement acquis de l'expérience politique dans les différentes positions occupées au sein des institutions de l'Etat roumain. L'année 1895

[19] Keith HITCHINS, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
[20] Mihai GHIȚULESCU, *Domnie și guvernare. Organizarea și funcționarea instituției guvernului în România (1866-1940) (Règne et gouvernement. L'organisation et le fonctionnement de l'institution du gouvernement en Roumanie. 1866-1940)*, Aius, Craiova, 2015, p. 35.
[21] Constantin BACALBAŞA, *Bucureştii de altădată (Le Bucarest d'antan)*, Vol. II (1885-1900), Editura Ziarului „UNIVERSUL", Soc. Anonimă, Bucarest, 1928, p. 249.
[22] Niculae CRISTEA, *Imaginea publică a monarhiei în România: 1866- 1947 (L'image publique de la monarchie en Roumanie: 1866- 1947)*, Cavallioti, Bucarest, 2011, p. 30.
[23] Timpul, « Pretenţiune absurdă » (« Prétention absurde »), No. 43, 25 février (9 mars), 1899.

rendait compte d'une maturité de la classe politique et annonçait dans le même temps l'apogée de l'influence de Charles I[er] qui réussit à s'imposer davantage en tant qu'arbitre de la vie politique. Lors de cet épisode, le leader conservateur Titu Maiorescu était d'avis que le gouvernement libéral de 1895, dirigé par D. A. Sturdza, ne s'inscrivait pas dans ce que le discours public qualifiait de « gouvernement personnel », mais « *par contre, je me dois de le reconnaître comme un ministère constitutionnel correct* »[24].

Les années antérieures le syntagme de « gouvernement personnel » était souvent rencontré, étant utilisé à l'époque par l'opposition comme une formule d'attaque contre le gouvernement en place. Cette pratique politique a caractérisé notamment les deux gouvernements de longue durée (le gouvernement libéral entre 1876 et 1888 et le gouvernement junimiste-conservateur entre 1888 et 1895); peu à peu, cette formule est toutefois oubliée par l'imaginaire collectif de la scène politique, notamment dans la dernière étape du règne de Charles I[er] (1895-1914). Ce syntagme n'échappe pas non plus à la presse de l'époque. Faisant référence à l'épisode de l'avènement au pouvoir des junimistes en 1888, *Epoca* (journal officieux des conservateurs) soulignait que: « *lorsque le gouvernement actuel* [le gouvernement junimiste - n.n.] *arriva au pouvoir il fut accueilli avec cette accusation qu'il était un gouvernement personnel. De temps en temps cette accusation refait surface, mais peu à peu on abandonna cet argument* »[25].

Après la stabilisation du bipartisme roumain en 1895, l'alternance au gouvernement entre le Parti National-Libéral et le Parti Conservateur devient de plus en plus efficace et mieux organisée. Néanmoins, entre 1895 et 1914 il existe des tensions et attaques dures de l'opposition, mais le changement du gouvernement se produit dans des limites normales (par exemple, le renversement des gouvernements en 1901, 1907, 1910, respectivement en 1913). La presse, un instrument utile à l'époque, tient elle aussi un rôle important dans le jeu politique. *Viitorul* (journal officieux des libéraux) met ainsi en discussion le transfert de pouvoir de 1907, une année très importante pour le régime politique roumain: « *le changement de gouvernement a eu lieu dans des conditions inhabituelles parce que cette fois-ci pour la première fois le gouvernement qui arrivait avait présenté à celui qui partait son programme politique et, ce qui plus est, il lui avait demandé l'appui pour le mener à bonne fin* »[26]. La *rotation gouvernementale* représente, par conséquent, une alternance organisée entre le Parti National-Libéral et le Parti Conservateur, ce qui mène à un climat stable entre 1895 et 1914, nécessaire dans le processus de modernisation de l'Etat roumain. A cet égard, la *rotation gouvernementale* devient une pratique politique de plus en plus fonctionnelle au sein du régime politique et engendre la stabilisation du bipartisme roumain.

Conclusion

[24] Titu MAIORESCU, *Discursuri parlamentare* (*Discours parlementaires*), Vol. V (1895-1899), Albatros, Bucarest, 2003, p. 65.
[25] Epoca, « Iar guvernul personal » (« Sur le gouvernement personnel »), No. 852, 28 septembre (9 octobre) 1888.
[26] Viitorul, « O înțelegere patriotică » (« Une entente patriotique »), No. 6, 10 (23) novembre 1907.

Après 1895 le jeu politique devient beaucoup plus clair grâce à une sorte de pacte rationnel entre les acteurs politiques, libéraux et conservateurs, et le roi Charles I[er]. Tous ont accumulé de l'expérience politique et ont essayé, certains y sont même parvenus, d'éviter de répéter les fautes du passé. La stabilisation du bipartisme roumain a défini les paramètres pour le fonctionnement et le maintien de ce type d'alternance organisée pouvant assurer la rotation des deux partis au gouvernement pour une brève période de temps. La pratique politique enracinée dans l'espace public a mené à l'élimination d'éventuels dangers qui auraient pu ébranler le fonctionnement du régime et des institutions de l'Etat.

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MIGRATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

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Abstract: After World War II, Migration flows towards Europe were welcomed since the economy between those countries destroyed during the war was to be boosted. However, around the 70s, policies to regulate migration flows and populations that stood for a threat to security were needed, which was also reinforced after signing up Schengen agreements regarding people's free movement. Failures regarding common European policies, generated by the States' fears to yield part of their sovereignty on this purpose, have triggered unexpected consequences. Refugees' flows grew bigger , and the current measures proved to be unsufficient to stop migration.
Keywords : illegal migration, security risks, refugess, asylum seekers, migratian policies

Les accords Schengen et la suite de leur application

L'Europe s'est préoccupée de l'application d'une politique de sécurité pour l'Union, beaucoup avant la chute du mur de Berlin. Cette politique devait prévoir un contrôle des flux migratoires et des populations présentant des risques. La tendance de l'appliquer se développe lors des négociations multilatérales qui précèdent et accompagnent la signature des Accords Schengen (1985) sur la libre circulation des personnes. L'espace européen s'ouvre et parallèlement, des fonctionnaires appartenant aux différents ministères (internes, justice, finances, défense) et à certains services (douane, police) se réunissent pour anticiper les effets pouvant apporter des préjudices à l'Union et pour définir les nouvelles missions. L'objectif qu'ils se proposent c'est l'application des accords et leur extension en vue d'assurer des conditions optimales de sécurité pour le nouvel espace unifié. La construction communautaire pensait une politique au niveau de l'Union qui prévoie entre autres l'abandon d'une partie de la souveraineté des Etats. Mais cette mention est repoussée aussi pour des raisons pratiques que par principe. Les années passent et ni avant le Traité de Maastricht (1992), la Communauté n'a pas encore de compétence en matière de migration, de drogue et de sécurité.

L'UE a essayé de trouver les instruments nécessaires pour esquisser une politique commune sur l'immigration, l'asile et la citoyenneté mais elle s'est heurtée au concept de souveraineté de l'Etat nation. Certains ont considéré le fait de vouloir penser à gérer les politiques nationales à un autre niveau comme un pas en avant vers une bonne gouvernance, d'autres l'ont vu comme faisant partie d'un système excessivement sécuritaire dans la gestion du phénomène migratoire.

On a pensé la création d'une Union seulement pour les Européens, d'une Europe à l'intérieur de laquelle il y ait la liberté de circulation pour les citoyens des pays concernés,

mais qui puisse contrôler en même temps les divers effets qui en résultent sur le plan interne. Et ici, les craintes visaient la menace islamique.

Depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale jusqu'aux années 70, les immigrants entraient dans la responsabilité des Etats qui les abritaient. Dans les nouvelles conditions offertes par l'UE (interdépendance économique, union monétaire) chaque Etat membre de la communauté européenne change le mode d'exercer la souveraineté et les frontières ouvertes, la liberté de mouvement et la mobilité du travail ont créé le contexte pour un phénomène migratoire perçu comme nécessité et en même temps comme facteur de risque.

Dans la nouvelle construction, les frontières perdent leur sens territorial. On contrôle les flux transnationaux et en même temps on surveille les populations considérées de risque, installées sur le territoire européen. Le risque ne se réfère pas aux problèmes de sécurité mais à la crainte de remettre en discussion l'identité nationale. Ainsi, l'Europe, en supprimant ses frontières internes pose d'urgence le problème de son identité et fait la différence entre ceux qui se trouvent dedans et ceux qui existent en dehors de ses frontières. Il faut intégrer les immigrés établis dans l'Union par une politique qui doit avoir en vue le fait de bénéficier, eux-aussi, de la liberté de mouvement à l'intérieur de l'UE. Mais cela entraîne d'autres préoccupations et inquiétudes visant les Etats nations : peut-on intégrer les immigrés dans la culture dominante pour qu'ils deviennent à leur tour des citoyens de plein droit de l'Union ? Une « citoyenneté européenne » résoudrait-elle cette situation ?

Les efforts de la communauté européenne commencent à se matérialiser par le Traité de Maastricht (1992), puis par le Traité d'Amsterdam (1997), quand on a avancé des initiatives de coopération au niveau européen dans le domaine de la justice, de la liberté et de la sécurité et la législation communautaire s'engageait à inclure des politiques concernant les visas, les conditions de délivrance du permis de résidence pour les immigrés et pour les demandeurs d'asile, puis par le Conseil européen de Tampere (1999), le Programme Haga, la Directive 2000 /43/EC[1], la Directive 2000/78/EC[2].

2001 a signifié la fin de la bipolarité dans les relations internationales, moment où l'Europe a commencé à se préoccuper d'autres aspects de la sécurité. Elle est passée de « hard power » (le pouvoir acquis par coercition) à « soft power » (le pouvoir acquis par collaboration et attraction)[3]. Dans ce contexte, la Commission a présenté le *Plan Stratégique sur la Migration Légale* [4], qui devait aider à l'Union de faire face aux défis économiques et

[1]Official Journal of the European Communities, Art.3 of European Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, L 180/22, 19.07.2000, **http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do**,

[2] European Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, L 303/16, 2.12.2000, **http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do**,

[3] Joseph Nye, professeur à l' Université Harvard, a lance le concept de "soft power" dans son livre de 1990 *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* et l'a développé ultérieurement en 2004 en *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*; dans la politique internationale le "pouvoir soft" d'un pays est formé de trois éléments: culture, valeurs politiques et politiques etrangères (definis par légitimité et autorité morale).

[4] Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission, Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM (2005) 669 final, Brussels, 21.12.2005, **http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do**,

démographiques et, en même temps, de contrôler le phénomène de la migration. Ce plan a compris la période 2006-2009 et parmi ses propositions on peut retenir la Carte Verte européenne, qui devait permettre aux ouvriers des pays tiers, ayant une bonne qualification professionnelle, de travailler dans des pays membres de l'UE sans permis de travail, la carte étant considérée un visa de résidence.

La mondialisation, les mouvements transfrontaliers, l'intensification de la professionnalisation sur le marché du travail ont déclenché bon nombre de flux d'immigrants légaux et illégaux. Qu'elle soit venue de l'Est à l'Ouest, qu'elle fût ethnique ou visât le marché du travail, la migration a contribué toujours au développement démographique de l'Europe, remarquent les chercheurs dans le domaine social.[5]

Mais ce que l'Union n'a pas réussi dans toutes ces années a été la *politique commune* concernant la migration. Ses institutions ont défini les droits des immigrants, la manière de laquelle ces droits doivent être protégés, comment accorder le visa et l'asile, mais les Etats continuent à contrôler les canaux de migration, le processus d'intégration, la citoyenneté, le permis de résidence, le permis de travail, etc. Ils n'acquiescent aux contraintes du niveau supranational, parce que les problèmes de l'immigration, de l'asile et de la police aux frontières « sont étroitement liés à leur souveraineté et trop sensibles pour être soumis aux décisions supranationales. » C'est ainsi qu'apparaissent des contradictions dans les nombreuses négociations et on arrive à beaucoup de situations de compromis et à des mesures ambiguës.

Les antagonismes intergouvernementaux empêchent la réalisation de certains objectifs importants tels la libre circulation et la protection des droits de l'homme. L'Etat membre est pratiquement libre de contrôler ses frontières intérieures. La libre circulation devient *un acquis* relatif dépendant des effets de contexte. D'où la conclusion que les antagonismes entre la souveraineté des Etats membres et la communautarisation sont très puissants.

Pourquoi ? Tout vient d'une crainte pour la propre sécurité. La migration a été depuis toujours un problème de sécurité qui, de nos jours, devient de plus en plus aigu, une fois avec tant d'événements terroristes qui se sont multipliés depuis 2001 (voir 2004- Madrid, 2005- Londres, 2015- Paris, et tant d'autres en 2016, Bruxelles, Nice, etc. Dans ce contexte, les préoccupations des Etats membres visant la sécurité nationale diminuent l'impact des politiques communautaires pour la migration et, en même temps, la capacité de l'UE de créer un environnement positif pour les immigrés. La conséquence immédiate de cette attitude est l'augmentation de la migration illégale et la prolifération des dogmes xénophobes de la politique d'extrême droite, conformément auxquels les migrants sont des voleurs, des terroristes, des criminels, ils sont donc indésirables. En plus, l'amendement du projet de loi sur la maîtrise de l'immigration, l'intégration et l'asile déposé en 2007 qui proposait le prélèvement de l'ADN aux immigrants pour le regroupement familial et adoptait des

[5] Cristina Elena Bobu , „Politica UE în domeniul migrației-mai multe fațete ale aceleiași dileme" în *Sfera Politicii* nr.137 in http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/137/art14-bobu.html

méthodes utilisées pour les criminels (introduction des bracelets rouges pour les refugiés) ne faisait que démontrer l'incompréhension de ce phénomène.

La migration est devenue aujourd'hui une priorité surtout parce que les niveaux actuels de mobilité des personnes sont massifs en Europe. Le problème doit jouir d'une attention toute particulière tant dans les pays de destination que dans ceux d'origine, et ce, par l'élaboration des politiques cohérentes qui relient la migration au développement. Le développement ne représente pas une solution pour atténuer la migration. Les chercheurs soutiennent que la migration et le développement sont des réalités complémentaires qui, ensemble, contribuent à améliorer les conditions de vie de tous les hommes.

En outre, la migration est en étroite relation avec la sécurité[6]. D'une part, la migration peut être le résultat des menaces à la sécurité des individus (la migration, résultat de l'insécurité), ainsi que la violation des droits de l'homme, les conflits ethniques, la guerre civile, etc. D'autre part, la migration-même peut constituer une source de risques, périls et menaces (la migration en tant que source d'insécurité) quand elle n'est ou ne peut pas être contrôlée et donc elle contribue à accentuer la criminalité organisée, la violence xénophobe et raciale etc. Mais la migration est en même temps une source de sécurité (elle contribue à l'augmentation de la sécurité économique des pays d'origine ainsi que de ceux de destination).

Entre les dimensions de la sécurité, peut-être la plus affectée, reste celle sociale, en raison de l'influence que les flux de migrants exercent sur la stabilité sociale, l'identité culturelle, les caractéristiques démographiques, le niveau de vie, le respect des droits de l'homme et du fait que ces flux peuvent contribuer à accroître le niveau de la criminalité organisée dans le pays de destination. En même temps, dans les pays d'origine la population diminue et vieillit et la production baisse suite à l'émigration de la main d'œuvre surtout jeune.

Mesures concrètes

Le 11 septembre 2001 et les événements qui ont eu lieu ce jour-là restent un moment de référence dans l'histoire des problèmes de sécurité de la planète. Ils demandent impérieusement une redéfinition de la notion de sécurité de l'Etat, qui au sens classique, signifiait jusqu'alors la protection de son propre territoire exercée par l'Etat. On a pris de nouvelles mesures, parmi lesquelles la surveillance des mouvements des personnes aux frontières et on a conclu de nouveaux accords concernant la migration. Aujourd'hui la surveillance se réfère à un contrôle préalable du profil personnel et aux actions vigoureuses qui visent d'empêcher certaines personnes considérées un péril pour la sécurité de l'Etat de franchir les frontières.

[6] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *„Migraţie şi securitate",* ed. UNAp"Carol I", Bucureşti, 2008,pp.10-11

On a ajouté de nouvelles mesures préventives comme la biométrie et les techniques de reconnaissance faciale, l'examen de l'iris, l'imagerie numérisée et la géométrie de la main. Quelques-uns des Etats ont institué aussi un système de contrôle sanitaire et de mise en quarantaine à la frontière.

Dans le domaine de la sécurité les échanges sont réciproques (surtout l'échange de données) et sont accompagnés d'accords et d'amendements législatifs. La méthode la plus usitée c'est la prévention mais aussi les mesures à application interne, absolument nécessaires pour empêcher les personnes qui représentent un risque pour la sécurité nationale d'agir à l'intérieur des Etats.

Les mesures et les procédés concernant la migration sont prévus par des politiques d'Etat, mais ils ne doivent pas influer de manière négative la sécurité nationale au plan politique, économique ou d'autre nature. Chaque pays résout ses problèmes de sécurité de manière de ne pas empêcher le mouvement légitime de personnes et, par conséquent, il doit améliorer les politiques sur la migration par :

-des contrôles à l'entrée et préalables à l'entrée sur un territoire ;

-la déviation des mouvements non autorisés des personnes, surtout des personnes qui sont aidées par les guides clandestins ;

-le renforcement de la capacité d'arrêter et de suivre les personnes qui représentent un risque pour la sécurité.

L'échec des modèles d'intégration

Les pays occidentaux ont mis au point l'intégration des immigrés pas à pas, chacun d'après un modèle. Mais ces modèles n'ont pas réussi. Leur échec en Grande Bretagne, en France, Allemagne, Italie, Espagne, Pays-Bas influence profondément les relations entre les populations allogènes et celles indigènes et, donc, la logique de la coexistence pacifique entre les citoyens. Par conséquent, les politiques sur l'immigration doivent être repensées et tenir compte de :

« - la nature du phénomène migratoire, individuel ou communautaire ;

- des effets de la mondialisation et de la notion d'Etat-providence ;
- de l'influence de l'Islam dans son rapport avec la laïcité ;
- de l'univers des idées inculquées concernant l'Autre, l'Etranger ou l'Ennemi ;
- du lien établi entre le Communautarisme et l'Islamisme, qui détermine d'inscrire les migrations dans le registre sécuritaire et dans la lutte internationale contre le terrorisme ;
- la gestion de la mobilité qui devient de plus en plus incompatible avec la misère des pays d'origine, la crise économique et la notion d'humanisme héritée du XIXe siècle, ainsi qu'avec la notion d'égalité au bénéfice de l'idée de ségrégation et d'hybridation sociétale ;

- des notions fondamentales de systèmes de valeurs ».[7]

Une chose reste claire : la nature des immigrés d'un pays va déterminer la politique interne et aussi celle étrangère de ce pays-là, laquelle, à son tour, va tenir compte des politiques des pays d'origine et va influencer plus loin la politique internationale par rapport aux déviations de la politique interne.

Les modèles nationaux d'intégration en Europe, et donc les sortes de multiculturalisme adoptés ont apporté, dans des degrés divers, l'hétérogénéité dans l'homogénéité sociale préexistante et ainsi ont-ils changé la vision qu'une société doit avoir sur elle-même et sur le futur commun.

Les trois modèles d'intégration que l'Europe a offerts ont été : britannique, allemand et français. Le premier ministre britannique avait reconnu, le 5 février 2011, à Munich : « le multiculturalisme a échoué ». « Nous avons échoué parce qu' « Avec la doctrine du multiculturalisme d'Etat, nous avons encouragé les différentes cultures à vivre séparées les unes des autres ».[8]

En ce qui concerne les Allemands, dont les immigrés représentent 20%, c'est-à-dire 16 millions de citoyens, Angela Merkel a clairement affirmé : « multi-culti…a échoué »[9]. Elle a continué en montrant qu'on ne doit pas seulement « soutenir » les immigrés, mais « qu'on doit aussi leur demander davantage. » La chancelière a reconnu que l'échec de l'intégration est dû en principal à l'essor de l'islamisme et à la constitution des communautés qui vivent séparées et d'après leurs propres lois (ex. insoumission des enfants aux obligations du « système scolaire » allemand, géré par les Landes et qui permet d'accéder dans de meilleures conditions au marché du travail, le principal facteur d'intégration étant considéré la maîtrise de la langue allemande.) Cela dans les conditions dans lesquelles le fondement de la société allemande est le judéo-christianisme.

En France, le concept de laïcité, base du « modèle républicain » interdit des campagnes virulentes, comme celle des minarets en Suisse. Le pays défend par un consensus de stigmatisation le concept d' « identité nationale », celui d'une république « unie et indivisible » qui s'oppose aux « identités plurielles ». Mais n'oublions pas que même le président de la République a soutenu la promotion politique et sociale de quelques personnalités provenues de « l'Autre », au nom de l'ainsi-dite « discrimination positive », et c'est justement pour favoriser l'apparition d'une nouvelle élite politique et d'une classe moyenne visible provenue de l'immigration.

En même temps, des indicateurs négatifs concernant la distance entre les taux de chômage aux fils d'immigrés et à ceux des français de souche persistent, indiquant entre 1,5 et

[7] D'après IERI (l'Institut Européen des Relations Internationales), Irnerio Seminatore, *Les migrations comme thème de politique étrangère, du 16.02.2011*

[8] Isabelle Cornaz, „Le multiculturalisme a échoué. Et après ?" in http://www.arte.tv/sites/britishness/2012/06/17/le-multiculturalisme-a-echoue-et-apres/accesat 21.07.2016 și Discursul lui David Cameron inhttp://www.valeursactuelles.com/monde/apres-angela-merkel-david-cameron-denonce-lechec-du-multiculturalisme-28537, accesat 24.07.2016

[9] in *La gazette de Berlin* du 21.11.2013

2 fois plus grands chez les premiers, à cause des performances « faibles » des immigrés, d'après le rapport de l'OECD, performances dues à un système d'éducation considéré trop peu incitatif.[10]

En plus, voici ce qu'on écrit dans l'Observateur OCDE à propos du taux de chômage dans quelques pays occidentaux:

« *En octobre (2015, n.a) (dernier chiffre disponible), le taux de chômage s'est établi à 8,4 % en Italie, soit un pourcentage supérieur à la moyenne de l'OCDE mais inférieur aux 8,9 % de l'année précédente, et au Royaume-Uni le taux de chômage standardisé se situait à 4,9 %, soit 0,2 points de pourcentage de moins qu'un an plus tôt. Dans la zone euro, le pourcentage de sans-emploi a augmenté de 0,2 % par rapport à l'année dernière, pour atteindre 8,8 % en décembre. La baisse importante du taux de chômage en Italie a été contrebalancée par des hausses en France, avec 9,5 % contre 9,1 % l'année dernière, et en Allemagne, où le taux de chômage est passé de 9,0 % à 9,2 %. Les chiffres de décembre font apparaître une diminution du taux de chômage aux États-Unis et au Japon. - See more at:* http://observateurocde.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/914/Taux_de_ch_F4mage_en_baisse.html#sthash.SCpGOtjh.dpuf

Les conséquences des échecs de l'Union

En 2015, à peu près d'un million de personnes sont entrées en Europe sans visa, venant tant sur mer que sur terre. Si jusqu'à présent, dans l'étude des migrations, la frontière la plus périlleuse qui enregistrait le plus grand nombre de victimes au passage était celle située entre les Etats Unis et le Mexique, cette fois-ci les côtes méditerranéennes ont pris la relève.

Une crise migratoire sans précédent met à l'essai les valeurs fondamentales de l'Europe, de la libre circulation entre ses territoires jusqu'à la reçue des ressortissants des Pays tiers, qui nécessitent une protection internationale.

La première question qui s'est détachée et qui a concerné la nature de cette crise a été la suivante : « c'est une crise des migrants ou des réfugiés ? » Une autre question concernait bien sûr la modalité de s'en sortir et, si l'on se peut, le plus honorablement possible.

Dès 1980 on a enregistré des entrées clandestines en Europe venant sur la Méditerranée. Cette migration était due à l'imposition des visas pour les ressortissants des pays tiers, suite à la crise économique de la moitié des années 70. Jusqu'en 2013 le nombre d'entrées irrégulières a été presque le même pour chaque année (sous ou à peu plus de 55000 personnes).[11]

[10] Les Français enfants d'immigrés non européens sont un peu plus nombreux que leurs parents à accéder aux études supérieures mais sont plus nombreux à être au chômage. Ils sont ainsi 24,2 % à être privés d'emploi, contre 20,2 % chez leurs parents. Et à niveau de diplôme égal, ils sont deux fois plus au chômage que des Français nés de parents français. Le sort des non-diplômés est encore plus difficile puisque le taux de chômage dans cette catégorie grimpe à 40,5 %, in L'Humanité du 18 juin 2012, *Le chômage subi des enfants d'immigrés*, par Maud Dugrand

[11] P. Fargues, „Un million de migrants arrivés sans visa en Europe en 2015: Qui sont-ils?" *Population et Sociétés*, n°532, Ined ,apr.2016 in https://www.ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/25200/532.population.societes.avril.2016.migrants.europe.fr.pdf, accesat 21.07.2016

Mais depuis 2014 les flux augmentent à 200000, pour arriver en 2015 à presque un million de personnes. Si les nombreux conflits situés dans le voisinage de l'UE (Syrie, Lybie) ou plus loin (Irak, Corne de l'Afrique) ainsi que les contrôles intensifiés des pays de transit (Maroc) ou de destination (Espagne) avaient fait que les routes migratoires changent plusieurs fois, depuis 2014-2015 les routes se déplacent de la Méditerranée centrale (zone de grand risque) vers la Méditerranée orientale (considérée moins périlleuse).

De 1 664 211 de personnes ayant traversé la Méditerranée entre 2000 et 2015, 26115 ont décédé. Dans ce délai, la mortalité en mer a diminué chaque année parce qu'on a intensifié les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage de la marine italienne et, de l'autre côté les itinéraires ont été changés. Ainsi la route de 250 jusqu'à 500 kilomètres entre la Lybie et l'Italie a été remplacée par celle d'à peu près 20 kilomètres entre la Turquie et les îles grecques.

Les flux qui sont entrées en Europe ont été mixtes, comprenant à la fois refugiés et migrants économiques. Si l'on s'arrête aux nationalités entrées clandestinement par la Grèce et l'Italie entre 2011 et 2015, alors il faut retenir quelques chiffres :

-syriens, de 947 (2011) à 462689 (2015)
-afghans, de 17841 (2011) à 186617(2015)
-irakiens, de 4514 (2011) à 64417 (2015)
-pakistanais, de 5960 (2011) à 25044 (2015).

Tous ceux-ci et ceux d'autres nationalités venus d'Erythrée, Albanie, Nigéria, Somalie, Tunisie et de Bangladesh ont compté en 2015 presqu'un million de personnes (952246 personnes).

On a constaté que :

- même si leur nationalité suggère qu'ils ont fui la guerre, les persécutions et les menaces, bon nombre de personnes entrées clandestinement ne demandent pas d'asile dans le premier pays européen où ils arrivent, même si ce pays est sûr. C'est pour cela que quelques-uns ont cru qu'il ne s'agissait pas de vrais réfugiés, mais de migrants économiques ;
- beaucoup de réfugiés arrivent clandestinement en Europe après un long séjour dans des pays de premier asile, où ils n'ont pas réussi à trouver un emploi. Quand leurs économies se sont épuisées ou ont été en train de s'épuiser, ils ont essayé de trouver une source de revenu et, par conséquent, sont partis pour travailler quelque part.

L'Europe a cherché la cause de cette crise (soit son appel à l'occupation des emplois, soit la fuite devant les horreurs de la guerre du pays d'origine). La première cause se base sur l'explosion d'entrées clandestines en 2014, encouragées en grande partie par les opérations de sauvetage en mer de l'Italie. La seconde semble être plus importante, du moment que le niveau de la violence dans les zones comprises par la guerre du Moyen Orient de 2014 et

2015 a été des plus élevés. L'Etat Islamique a consolidé ses positions en Irak et a conquis presque toute la Syrie centrale. Cela a déterminé des vagues de déplacés et de réfugiés en plus. D'autre part, l'aide humanitaire insuffisante et les tensions apparues entre réfugiés et les hôtes ont déterminé la détérioration de la situation dans les pays de premier asile, voisins de la Syrie.

Quelle est la situation des pays de premier asile ?

Ce dont il faut tenir compte c'est que la moitié des réfugiés sur la planète, c'est-à-dire dix millions de personnes, ont leur lieu d'origine mais aussi de destination dans le Moyen Orient. Les pays de la zone n'ont pas signé la Convention des Nations Unis pour réfugiés de 1951, mais ils les ont reçus, sans leur accorder le statut de réfugiés. Par conséquent, les réfugiés ont le statut d'invités, donc ils n'ont pas de droits. Une fois leur visa expiré, ils deviennent des migrants illégaux, et donc la proie de tous les maux, y compris des réseaux de crime organisé ou de terrorisme.

En même temps, sous la charge de tant de réfugiés, les pays hôtes ne peuvent plus assurer des conditions de vie décentes ni pour leur population ni pour les migrants. Depuis 2011, la Turquie, le Liban, la Jordanie et, en partie l'Irak, ont reçu 4,7 millions de réfugiés syriens, mais en 2014, la Jordanie et le Liban ont pris des mesures pour arrêter la migration, pour leur avoir affecté l'économie. C'est seulement la Turquie qui les reçoit encore. Ainsi a-t-on constaté que les départs pour l'Europe ou les retours en Syrie se sont multipliés.

La reçue d'un grand nombre de réfugiés affecte non seulement l'économie d'un pays, mais aussi son équilibre social, sa stabilité politique et sa sécurité. D'autre part, leur interdire d'entrer en Europe et se barricader devant eux ce sont des solutions qui déstabilisent n'importe quel pays et ainsi mettent en péril la sécurité de toute l'Union.

La réponse de l'Europe à la crise des réfugiés

L'Europe n'avait que choisir entre deux variantes : l'ouverture ou la fermeture des portes devant les migrants. A la fin de 2015, l'Europe a choisi, par un compromis, de les maintenir dehors et a pris des mesures pour un meilleur contrôle des deux routes principales de migration clandestine. Ainsi, à la fin du mois de novembre 2015 on a décidé que l'UE et la Turquie contrôlent la route de la Méditerranée orientale, par un accord signé pour assurer la protection temporaire des syriens, soutenir les communautés turques qui les ont accueillis et pour consolider la coopération en vue d'empêcher les migrations clandestines entre la Turquie et l'Europe.

À la suite de la signature de l'accord, l'Europe a atteint son objectif de retenir en Turquie un bon nombre de réfugiés syriens, la Turquie, en échange, a obtenu une assistance financière accrue et la négociation de la libéralisation des visas accordés aux travailleurs turcs qui viennent en Europe. L'accord laissait ouvert le problème de l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Union.

À la moitié du mois de mars 2016, la coopération de l'Union avec la Turquie a été renforcée par un accord qui engageait la Turquie à réadmettre tous les migrants qui sont passés clandestinement de son territoire en Europe, pendant que celle-ci admettait un nombre équivalent de syriens dont le statut de réfugiés aurait été déterminé en Turquie. Mais il semble que l'effort de L'UE soit insuffisant du moment que le Liban, qui a un revenu par habitant cinq fois moindre que l'UE, reçoit un contingent syrien qui représente 25% de sa population.

Les migrations clandestines peuvent être contrôlées par visas accordés aux réfugiés par des pays de premier asile, pour qu'ils ne tombent pas dans les mains des passeurs. Les ambassadeurs des pays européens au Liban, en Jordanie et en Turquie peuvent accorder des visas humanitaires ou d'asile. On assure ainsi en même temps la sécurité des réfugiés et celle des Etats membres de l'Union, parce qu'on vérifie l'identité des voyageurs avant qu'ils entrent dans l'espace de l'Union.

On est en cours d'installer en Grèce et en Italie des centres d'enregistrement (*hot spots*) pour prendre des empreintes digitales aux migrants et leur déterminer le statut. Ces centres sont encore nécessaires pour assurer le tri et pour éviter la formation des foules qui traversent en désordre le continent, depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'au Nord-Ouest de l'Europe. Ce sont les réfugiés-mêmes qui demandent la création de ces centres dans les pays voisins à ceux d'où on part massivement, c'est-à-dire en Turquie, Jordanie et Liban, vraiment pour éliminer du trafic les passeurs de la Méditerranée. En plus, il est souhaitable que les visas humanitaires ou d'asile soient délivrés dans les pays d'origine des réfugiés, avant qu'ils partent.

Malheureusement, la crise des réfugiés a lieu en parallèle avec d'autres deux crises puissantes : une crise économique interminable, qui produit du chômage massif et une crise démographique, à perspectives sombres pour la population européenne. En ce moment les migrants peuvent être à la fois le problème (car ils occupent les emplois des européens, c'est vrai, mal payés et rudes) et la solution , car ils remplacent les autochtones qui manquent. Comme la crise démographique va non seulement continuer mais s'approfondir, les migrations de remplacement en seront peut-être la solution.

Ayant en vue les nécessités à long terme de l'Europe, il faudra qu'elle se construise des politiques qui fassent des refugiés un atout et qui leur facilitent l'accès sur le marché du travail.

Conclusions

Consciente de sa crise démographique, l'Europe a encouragé la migration dans le but de rester au niveau de développement qu'elle avait atteint, en dépit du fait qu'elle savait que la migration pouvait être non seulement un facteur de développement, mais aussi de risque.

L'UE n'a pas réussi à élaborer une politique commune sur la migration à cause des antagonismes intergouvernementaux et du fait que les problèmes de l'immigration, de l'asile et de la police aux frontières sont trop directement liés à la souveraineté des Etats et trop sensibles pour être soumis aux décisions supranationales.

La suite naturelle de ces phénomènes était bien sûr l'échec des modèles d'intégration.

La migration ne peut pas être arrêtée. Elle ne l'a jamais été en histoire, en dépit des empêchements. Ces dernières années la Méditerranée est devenue le lieu où un bon nombre de réfugiés a trouvé la fin de son chemin vers une vie meilleure (15%0) entre 2000 et 2015, et les entrées clandestines sont passées de 33% à 76 %.

Parallèlement avec la crise des réfugiés, l'Europe vit une crise démographique qui l'inquiète, mais dont la solution, il semble être cette migration de remplacement.

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THE SEPARATIST ACTIONS FROM UKRAINE – TOWARDS A NEW FROZEN CONFLICT

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Abstract: The conflict in Ukraine began in April 2014 and lasted months before Ukraine and the separatists reached an agreement to stop the violence and release prisoners. But the ceasefire has not been complete. Both sides used the lull to build forces and the rebels tried for months to take advantage of the Donetsk, a symbolic strategic advantage. The Russian Federation involvement in such insurgent actions qualifies it as, instigator, intervener, supporter and as mediator. In Ukraine's case we must identify and take into consideration a number of explanatory operational variables.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, geopolitics, frozen conflict, separatists

The analysis of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine highlights a major feature with older roots related to its history and simultaneously to the status as a former Soviet country. It envisages the insurgency as in most post-Soviet conflicts. But this insurgency is linked to the Russian Federation's vulnerability, which in order to protect their borders it must exercise more control, beyond them. The Russian Federation's involvement in triggering such insurgent actions qualifies it as an actor, instigator, intervener, supporter and mediator. The potential for conflict was predictable since 2004 according to some analyses on the Ukrainian space. According to the documentary, "more than $12 billion a year disappear from the Ukrainian budget. In its most recent analysis of global grafting off, anti-corruption monitoring, the Transparency International has ranked Ukraine on the 142 place out of 174 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index, lower than countries such as: Uganda, Nicaragua and Nigeria"[1]. Another highly relevant aspect it was the decision of Viktor Iuscenko, the Ukrainian President, to abolish the traffic police because of "widespread corruption in the circulation service, the symbol of corruption in the former Soviet Republic"[2]. This decision demonstrated that in the Ukrainian society it has developed a weak culture of the public service, and today it was maintained or transformed and adapted to the new realities imposed by the oligarchic interests in the context of conflict. The potential for conflict in Eastern Ukraine can be explained by the infiltration of the Russian agents in the

[1] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/10/corruption-may-send-ukraine-back-to-russia/.
[2] http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1219160-ucraina-prima-tara-fara-politie-rutiera.htm.

security and military structures, the existence of a subversive network, a corrupt political system, the dependence on trade with Russia.

The social, economic and political developments in the former Soviet Union have facilitated the Russian subversion, which in situations of insurgency their military escalating is controlled in order to deter the foreign intervention and by extension the transformation into a viable hybrid warfare. In the regional context there are highlighted at least four attributes of the region "ethnic heterogeneity; the presence of latent historical discontents; the weakness of civil society; the Regional complexity that the Russian Federation understands by its positioning in relation to external actors"[3]. In the political vision of the Russian Federation, all former Soviet republics should be part of its sphere of influence, which from geographical perspective, it gives a dominant position to control the escalation of conflict up to certain limits by the military power used rather to threaten and discourage a military reaction. At the same time it wants to "maintain the conflict at local level and to deter the foreign intervention, to expand its sphere of influence and to revise the status quo by changing borders and influencing the political regimes of neighboring states."[4] Amid the existence of a weak civil society, ethnic and linguistic slippages, the Russian propaganda exploits easily the local discontents that weaken from within the Ukrainian society. By well-orchestrated actions of the Russian Federation "frozen conflicts have increased and it has supported separatist regions in countries in its sphere of interest, including Transnistria in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia"[5], conflicts that are exploited as a tool to curb the integration of former Soviet states in the "near neighboring states" of the European Union. The Russian Federation by its external actions presents itself as an actor with negotiation and mediation power.

Another operational variable in the former soviet space is represented by the "use of the political power to obtain economic benefits for certain interest groups. This in turn has further increased the concentration of power of the oligarchic clans that have deepened the Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia."[6] Also, amid the economic difficulties and the economic crisis it could not allocate funds for real reforms in the military domain. In such defined context, it was created the ease with which the Russian intelligence services infiltrated, recruited collaborators, etc. As the crisis in Ukraine maintains and there are not identified solutions, the Russian Federation is emerging globally as a winner.

From an economic perspective, differences in business models between the European and former Soviet space shows that the "open markets and relationships based on rules are contrary to the Russian way to do business in the near vicinity, reinforcing the growing

[3] Alexander Lanoszka, *Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe*, International Affairs, 2016, p. 181.
[4] Alexander Lanoszka, *Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe*, International Affairs, 2016, p. 189.
[5] International Security and Estonia, 2016, p.19, https://www.teabeamet.ee/pdf/2016-en.pdf.
[6] Ibidem, p. 21.

perception in the Russian Federation that the EU is a problem, rather than an opportunity."[7] Another particular element is represented by the "centrality of the mass-media" that facilitated the information warfare outlining more and more the characteristics of a hybrid warfare as "one of the most innovative and popular tools in the contemporary international politics and not confined to post-Soviet spaces, it is now used in a systematic way, subtle and refined, supported by a state official discourse that denies it and supports it at the same time, and to which the international community seems unable to respond."[8] The formations of private military battalions that do not always act under the direction of the government of Kiev, financed by rich people defend also their local business interests. They are pro-Ukrainian rather than pro-government. The insurgency in eastern Ukraine is also based on "groups of separatist paramilitaries. The local population, rapidly captured by the Russian mass media, was actively mobilized in order to achieve secession and the creation of the so-called Novorossia, which included the Ukrainian regions on the Black Sea's coastline."[9] The existence of paramilitary groups in the separatist regions makes for the "military power to generate the political power and the strongest group, obviously, will form the new local power elite. At the same time the military power generates also the financial power"[10], which as such it offers the mechanisms for controlling trade, the organized crime and other activities that thrive in the chaos and confusion of conflict.

The component for Russian manipulation and propaganda of the hybrid warfare in Ukraine led to the position taken by the European Parliament to prepare "a communications strategy to counter the Russian campaign propaganda directed against the EU, against its neighbors in the East, including Russia and to develop tools to allow the EU and its Member States to tackle the propaganda by campaigns at European and national level"[11]. From a sociological perspective, the insurgency in eastern Ukraine is rather a rebellion "homo sovieticus" in an area which over time became the industrial center of the former Soviet Union.

In the current situation it may be debated also the legal uncertainty developed on "the weak position on which the Ukrainian state is acting, the high dependency to the Russian markets and energy supply, this hybrid warfare requires legal, innovative changes and not least the Ukrainian elites are viewed as being undemocratic and corrupt".[12]

The Russian Federation conducted an extremely aggressive propaganda in the mass-media, social media, cultural institutions, non-governmental organizations etc. which are

[7] Kenneth Geers (Ed.), Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine, NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn 2015, p. 21.
[8] Licinia Simao, The Ukrainian conflict in Russian foreign policy: Rethinking the interconnections between domestic and foreign policy strategies, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2016.1175141?journalCode=fswi20.
[9] The journal Romanian Foreign Policy, no. August-September, 2015, p. 44.
[10] Ibidem, p. 45.
[11] European Parliament, Russia's disinformation on Ukraine and the EU's response, Briefing November 2015, p. 7, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/571339/EPRS_BRI(2015)571339_EN.pdf.
[12] Tetyana Malyarenko, David J. Galbreath, Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2016, p. 122.

components of this type of hybrid warfare, which among others aims also at decentralization among others. A divided and dysfunctional Ukraine is, ultimately, a major advantage of Russia to exert influence, thus expressing "great power status in the world in a fairly traditional way."[13] With reference to the vision of Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation "must continue through international dialogue searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants."[14] Thus, Russia implements its "own independent foreign policy in the pursuit of its geopolitical interests"[15] especially since the international landscape is so varied and it changes so quickly in the light of dynamic development in a lot of countries and regions.

In fact Ukraine by its geo-economic orientation has become the stakes for the competition between the EU and Russia. Thus, Russia was involved to prevent Ukraine's accession to NATO and to "draw it in the Eurasian integration project, whose basic element regarded the reunification in the Russian world and also for achieving a new federal readjustment of Ukraine in order to hold total domination of Kiev and thus making impossible any structural point of view of NATO"[16]. It is noteworthy that after 1991, when Ukraine declared its independence during this period until the Euromaidan events it has manifested as a rather weak, fragile and insecure state.

It can be concluded that the separatist actions in Eastern Ukraine are presented as extremely problematic and complex. It seems to us that the Russian Federation wishes rather maintaining the conflict on moderate coordinates with insurgent or guerrilla tactics, so as not to be forced to intervene militarily and thus the intervention of other bodies. We also appreciate that from the Russian side there is an approach to control the strategic risks so as to have solutions to "as many instabilities it can manage."[17] The worsening of the continuation of insurgent actions depends also on the ability of Ukraine to implement the economic, political and military reforms, of the role of state institutions and their ability to strengthen the sovereignty.

Furthermore we take also into account the developments of the Russian relations with the European Union, the US and NATO. This leads to a "sustainable confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West. Wishing to demolish the hegemonic position of the US in a world that has never ceased to denounce it as being monopolar, Russia craves to being a parity.[18] Expanding the analysis of the conflict at global level, then we can advance the idea that we need to understand the context, rather at the global level than the local one, the global

[13] Hrant Kostanyan, Stefan Meister, Ukraine, Russia and the EU Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process, No. 423 / June 2016, p. 5. https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/WD423KostanyanMeisterMinskII_0.pdf.
[14] Vladimir Putin, Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10 februarie 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
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[18] The European Foundation Titulescu – Center for Strategic Studies, The debate on the battle for Ukraine, 2015, https://nastase.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/batalia-pentru-ucraina.pdf.

geostrategic context in fact. Given the overall interests of the USA expressed by the strategic vision of being able "to win the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations with other governments and international organizations"[19] Russia will continue to claim its status of great power.



Figure 1. Crisis in Ukraine[20]

[19] Joint Vision 2020, America's Military- Preparing for Tomorrow, 2000, http://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads/1225.pdf.
[20] https://www.google.ro/search?q=war+in+ukraine+2016+pdf&biw=1366&bih=659&source.

Figure 2. The percentage of the population identified as being Russian[21]

Figure 3. Frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus[22]

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THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN POLITICAL MYTHS. ANALYSIS OF ION ILIESCU AND CORNELIU VADIM TUDOR AS EXPONENTS OF THE SAVIOR MYTH

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explain the importance of collective memory in political myths and the way memory contributes to the preservation and understanding of the political field. In the context of post communist countries there is a distinctive relationship with political myths and it will be shown how collective memory has a great impact on them. In addition to the explanation of this connection, this paper will also show the real implications of it by analyzing the political profile of Ion Iliescu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor as emblematic figures of the Savior Myth. By doing so, we will show how myths penetrate the political world and political communication, and the way collective memory plays a crucial role in understanding this process.

Keywords: Collective memory, political myths, Ion Iliescu, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the Savior Myth.

Peisajul cercetărilor din domeniu științelor politice a devenit din ce în ce mai mult unul multidisciplinar. Este greu de imaginat o cercetare politică riguroasă lipsită de elemente împrumutate din domeniul sociologiei, psihologiei sau istoriei. Din acest motiv, abordarea și analiza miturilor politice nu se poate valida în lipsa perspectivei oferită de conceptul de memorie colectivă. În cadrul acestei etape incipiente este necesar să se înțeleagă faptul că "mai mult decît o fotocopie sau o imagine reprodusă întocmai, memoria se prezintă întotdeauna ca o formă de manifestare a trecutului, luminată din cînd în cînd de lucirile prezentului și de proiectoarele viitorului."[1]. Astfel, dacă se admite ideea conform căreia memoria personală a individului reprezintă un bun cu încărcături și conotații intime, memoria colectivă poate fi considerată un pilon de bază al societății: "(...) este destul de evident că grupurile recunosc, tacit sau în mod declarat, fapte, evenimente, locuri și simboluri ca ținînd de patrimoniul propriu comunității din care fac parte, întrucît toate acestea explică, vizează sau construiesc cultura lor materială, instituțională și simbolică, garanție a identității lor."[2]

Sociologul Maurice Halbwachs a fost primul care a enunțat termenul de *memorie colectivă*[3], un domeniu relativ nou de cercetare, dar care a permis lărgirea orizontului de înțelegere a numeroase dileme politice. Dintre acestea, lucrarea de față va prezenta

[1] Michel-Louis Roquette (coord.), *Gîndirea socială. Perspective fundamentale și cercetări aplicate*, Iași:Polirom, 2010 p. 19.
[2] Ibidem, p. 20.
[3] https://memorialworlds.com/what-is-collective-memory/

importanța conceputului pentru definirea și explicarea miturilor politice. Totodată, prin utilizarea memoriei colective se va asuma și perspectiva istorică a temei, mai ales dacă se acceptă că ”toată istoria este memorie”[4]. În mod evident, această interpretare aduce un argument nu doar în favoarea acceptării importanței trecutului, cât și în favoarea unei apartenențe identitare. Acest fapt se confirmă deoarece ”memoria este validă doar pentru persoana care experimentează evenimentul istoric și este mereu o sintetizare a faptelor”[5]. Dacă această perspectivă poate fi agreată la nivel individual, în ceea ce privește memoria colectivă are loc o aprofundare a celor enunțate anterior.

În primul rând, explicarea conceptului de mit prin intermediul memoriei colective presupune acceptarea ideii de memorie moștenită, de memorie sub forma unui mit colectiv[6]. Însă dificultatea de acceptare a acestui fapt provine tocmai din cauza modului în care memoria a fost percepută până acum. Văzută mai mult prin prisma unei facultăți decât a unei modalități[7], memoria a fost lipsită de o anumită autoritate a argumentelor, nefiind considerată mai mult decât o constatare a trecutului. Dar în ceea ce privește țările post comuniste, nu este neobișnuită tratarea trecutului prin referire la conceptul de memorie colectivă, culturală sau istorică[8]. Această conexiune este parte integrantă din ceea ce se cheamă conștiință istorică, concept care integrează memoria colectivă[9]. Aceste perspective nu sunt altceva decât ipostaze ale validării istoriei trăite de un grup, dar și modalități de raportare la istorie sau la formarea conștiinței istorice.

Legătura intrinsecă dintre mit și memorie colectivă nu este una inedită, dimpotrivă, ea are la bază însăși elementele componente ale memoriei colective, care pot fi ”concepții mitice, amintiri ale evenimentelor și personalităților istorice, tradiții sau obiceiuri.”[10] Astfel, mitul devine o parte integrantă a memoriei colective, având o forță socio-politică prea puțin exploatată din punct de vedere științific. Faptul că participarea la memoria colectivă certifică afilierea la un grup[11] potențează caracterul politic pe care miturile îl asumă pe scena publică. Se atestă așadar caracterul public al memoriei, precum și importanța acesteia pentru sfera publică, memoria colectivă putându-se conceptualiza doar prin interacțiunea perspectivelor asupra lumii[12]. Această relevanță la nivel public devine și mai acută prin implicațiile aduse de mit; ”în timpul secolelor XIX și XX anumite mituri au devenit o forță mobilizatoare semnificativă pentru anumite națiuni și grupuri sociale (...). Multe asemenea mituri supraviețuiesc și azi în conștiința istorică și în memoria colectivă.”[13] Mai mult decât atât,

[4] Anne Rønning Holden, *Some reflections on Myth, History and Memory as Determinants of Narrative*, Coolabah, vol. 3, p. 148. Precizez că traducerea aparține autorului acestei lucrări.
[5] Ibidem, p. 148.
[6] Ibidem, p. 149.
[7] Jeffrey Olick, *Collective memory and chronic differentiation: Historicity and the public sphere*, p. 3.
[8] Jiří Šubrt , *Historical Consciousness in the Focus of Sociological Enquiry*, Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, Volume 14, 2014, No. 2 p. 173.
[9] Ibidem, p.178.
[10] Ibidem, pp. 179-180.
[11] Ibidem, p. 180.
[12] Jeffrey Olick, *Collective memory and chronic differentiation: Historicity and the public sphere*, p. 23.
[13] Jiří Šubrt, *Historical Consciousness in the Focus of Sociological Enquiry*, p. 187.

”miturile sunt o modalitate narativă de a explica lumea din jurul nostru, fie sub formă de celebrare sau de explicare, fiind transmise și generațiilor viitoare.”[14]

Cu toate acestea, mitul ca distorsionare a memoriei[15] reprezintă un derapaj conceptual care trebuie asumat și luat în considerare atunci când este vorba de spectrul public; această atenție se amplifică atunci când sfera politică este inclusă în dezbatere. Nu se poate ignora nici relația dintre memorie și putere[16], un element care printr-o abordare mai mult sau mai puțin subtilă certifică și puterea miturilor politice. În acest caz se evidențiază un potențial paradox: deși ”politica memoriei” este un concept care asumă diferite manifestări ale memoriei[17], ”apariția miturilor politice de sine stătătoare este un fenomen tipic modern”[18]. Totodată, trebuie ținut cont și de faptul că memoria colectivă poate suferi modificări în clipa în care cei care au trăit un anumit eveniment sau au auzit despre acesta vor deceda.[19] Acest tipar de înțelegere a relevanței memoriei colective pentru formarea miturilor politice se poate explica prin teoria lui Halbwachs, care atestă reconstrucția trecutului pe baza prezentului, apartenența la un grup fiind crucială pentru memoria colectivă[20].

Astfel, atât miturile politice cât și memoria colectivă adresează evenimentele trecutului, modul în care ele pot fi interpretate, dar și felul în care acestea pot avea o dublă relație cu prezentul: memoria colectivă poate transforma prezentul, dar acesta poate modifica la rândul lui modul în care un grup se raportează la trecut. Deși poate părea o abordare facilă, aceasta își dezvăluie fațeta complexă datorită faptului că miturile politice pot avea o unică, validă definiție: un mit nu este politic doar grație conținutului, cât faptului că produc semnificație, sunt împărtășite de un grup și adresează probleme politice specifice grupului[21].

Datorită acestei definiții, relația dintre putere și memorie este una naturală. Orice element care poate afecta raportarea la mediul politic deține o importantă doză de autoritate. După cum s-a precizat și în paragrafele anterioare, mitul este caracterizat de o asemenea autoritate, fiind situat în interiorul memoriei colective. Prin extrapolare la mediul politic, mitul legitimează comportamente și atitudini politice, oferind o încărcătură simbolică identității unui grup, identitate constatată prin memoria colectivă. Din moment ce ”politica este tot mai mult o *luptă pentru imaginația oamenilor* decât o luptă pentru coerciția fizică legitimă”[22].

Dincolo de aceste aspecte, memoria colectivă și miturile politice au un caracter universal; desigur, diferențele culturale și cele socio-politice au un grad ridicat de influență

[14] Anne Rønning Holden, *Some reflections on Myth, History and Memory*, p. 145.
[15] Ibidem, p. 144.
[16] Dovile Budryte, *Traumatic Memory and Its Production in Political Life: A Survey of Approaches and a Case Study*, prezentare, p. 1.
[17] Cristian Tileagă, *Communism in retrospect: The rhetoric of historical representation and writing the collective memory of recent past*, Memory Studies, 5 (4), 2012, p. 463.
[18] Chiara Bottici, Benoît Cahlland, Rethinking *Political Myth : The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(3), p. 317.
[19] http://www.hum.leiden.edu/history/talesoftherevolt/approach/approach-1.html
[20] Dovile Budryte, *Traumatic Memory and Its Production in Political Life: A Survey of Approaches and a Case Study* p. 3.
[21]Chiara Bottici, Benoît Chaland, *Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*, p. 320.
[22] Ibidem, p. 330.

asupra modalității de percepție sau de interpretare a evenimentelor istorice sau politice, dar indiferent de apartenența culturală, toate societățile au grupuri a căror identitate se bazează pe evenimente istorice împărtășite, precum și mituri politice care să ofere semnificație și legitimitate preocupărilor politice de actualitate.

În cele ce urmează, lucrarea se va concentra asupra analizei a două personaje politice din România, Ion Iliescu și Corneliu Vadim Tudor, prin intermediul cărora se va evidenția legătura dintre memorie colectivă și mit politic. Ținându-se cont de faptul că miturile politice reprezintă narațiuni prezente în numeroase contexte și peisaje politice[23], următoarea parte a lucrării va sta sub semnul mitului salvatorului, cel care întruchipează cel mai bine cele două figuri politice menționate în rândurile anterioare.

Ion Iliescu

Pentru o mai bună înțelegere a prezentării ce urmează să fie realizată, trebuie înțeles faptul că prezența mitului salvatorului pe scena politica românească nu este un caz ieșit din comun și cu siguranță nu este un caz singular: ”Nu ne aflăm în fața unui procedeu tipic românesc. Dimpotrivă, nimic nu este mai universal, mai arhetipal, decât personalizarea istoriei și a resorturilor social-politice.”[24] Acest argument poate reprezenta însă și o pledoarie în favoarea memoriei colective. Dacă în cazul acesteia este vorba de emanarea unei identități, a unui sentiment de apartenență, personalizarea la care face referire Lucian Boia pledează în favoarea unei împliniri a nevoii de speranță; aceasta se regăsește îndeosebi în momentele de criză, dar se păstrează în mod constant și în perioade lipsite de evenimente. [25]

În mod cert, pentru o țară eliberată de mâna grea a comunismului, cum este cazul României, nașterea unui salvator nu putea fi judecată prin prisma vreunei strategii de marketing politic, această apariție era amprenta unei nevoi colective. Din acest punct de vedere, Ion Iliescu, cel care avea să devină primul președinte al unei Românii democrate, a ocupat din perspectiva poporului român locul salvatorului. Acesta s-a constituit în principal datorită Frontului Salvării Naționale (FSN), simbolizată de imaginea lui Ion Iliescu. [26] De asemenea, sloganul ”*Iliescu apare / Soarele rasare”*[27]confirmă statutul de salvator al fostului președinte. Mai mult decât atât, există voci care compară imaginea acestuia cu cea a lui Moise: ”Cel mai exact exemplu de Moise al contemporaneității îl poate servi președintele român, Ion Iliescu. Moise are misiunea de a conduce poporul peste deșert. El va vedea exact limanul, dar va dispărea în momentul atingerii acestuia. Destinul lui Iliescu s-a pliat uluitor de exact peste acest mit.”[28]

[23] Aici se face diferențierea clară între personaje mitice sau mitificate, precum și între ipostaze politice. Amintim faptul că există mituri ale Uniunii Europene spre exemplu, care deși pot permite o analiză a peisajului politic românesc, beneficiază totuși de o altă încărcătură istorică și socială; tocmai de aceea, mitul politic trebuie identificat și interpretat în funcție de contextul în care se regăsește.
[24] Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, București: Humanitas, 2010, p. 368.
[25] Ibidem, p. 368.
[26] http://www.scrigroup.com/istorie-politica/stiinte-politice/Mitul-Salvatorului-in-discursu23497.php#_ftn29
[27] Ibidem
[28] Aurelia Peru, *Dimensiuni Simbolico-mitologice în conceptul elaborării imaginii politice*, disponibil la https://ibn.idsi.md/sites/default/files/imag_file/Diminsiuni%20simbolice_mitologice_0.pdf , p. 90.

O formă de completare adusă acestui argument este adusă de Horia-Roman Patapievici, cel care susține că: ”O parte din a bazei electorale solide de care dispune Ion Iliescu aici stă: în sentimentul unei solidarități de destin.”[29] Distincția între cele două argumente prezentate rezidă în interpretarea deșertului consemnat de Aurelia Peru-Bălan. Dacă pentru aceasta etapa de tranziție, deșertul, era asigurată de prezența salvatorului, în acest caz Ion Iliescu, Patapievici consideră că ”*Boala României nu este tranziția, este regimul Iliescu.”*[30]În mod paradoxal, același Patapievici declară într-un interviu că în viziunea mamei sale, Iliescu era un salvator pentru el[31], așadar această perspectivă, chiar dacă ulterior respinsă de Patapievici, a fost una agreată (cel puțin la nivel simbolic) în diferite contexte. Controversele ridicate de regimul Iliescu au fost semnalate și de Silviu Brucan[32], dar s-a constatat și existența unei aure de mister în ceea ce privește viața fostului președinte român[33], despre care se cunosc multe date, dar nimic cu adevărat semnificativ.

Totuși, în ciuda controverselor, a argumentelor mai mult sau mai puțin nuanțate, Ion Iliescu rămâne un personaj mitificat al istoriei politice românești. Ceea ce însă atrage atenția este faptul că Ion Iliescu nu și-a construit această imagine a salvatorului, ea s-a născut din interiorul unui popor care voia cu tot dinadinsul să privească înainte și prea puțin spre ceea ce ascund umbrele lăsate de comunism. Patapievici este unul dintre oamenii care asumă acest subiect: ”Cu excepția unei părți a elitei culturale, aproape nimeni din oamenii medii, din ceea ce ne-am obișnuit să numim *popor*, nu se arăta interesat de conservarea memoriei care a fost genocidul communist în România.”[34] Se observă în acest caz lacunele societății românești de a incheia anumite socoteli istorice cu trecutul, angajament care nu poate fi substituit cu apariția unui salvator politic, chiar dacă și el este un personaj colectiv. Lipsa acestor asumări, conform lui Patapievici, poate avea consecințe deosebit de grave: ”Nu mi se pare deloc exagerat să conchid că *românii vor trebui să-și regleze conturile cu memoria colectivă sau nu vor mai fi deloc.”*[35]

Cu toate acestea, nu trebuie să ne situăm într-o ipostază a încremenirii. Mitul salvatorului, la fel ca oricare alt mit politic, nu reprezintă un proiect de țară și nici un argument pro sau contra unui politician. Este, totuși, o miză simbolică cu încărcături istorice, miză care și-a dovedit tăria nu atât prin imaginea lui Ion Iliescu, cât prin longevitatea acesteia.

Corneliu Vadim Tudor

Un alt personaj emblematic pentru mitul salvatorului este fără doar și poate Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Personaj susținut de FSN, acesta a înființat împreună cu Eugen Barbu

[29] Horia-Roman Patapievici, *Politice*, ed. A IV-a, București: Humanitas, 2006, p. 139.
[30] Ibidem, p. 141.
[31] http://www.ziare.com/ion-iliescu/psd/patapievici-tot-ce-e-rau-in-romania-azi-e-din-cauza-lui-iliescu-1020767
[32] Silviu Brucan, *România în derivă*, București: Nemira, 2000, p. 24.
[33] http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/apostolii-epocii-aur-episodul-29-ne-a-zambit-ion-iliescuu-elena-ceausescu-erediar-e-lipsit-caracter-1_5780c0a35ab6550cb8b2b263/index.html
[34] Horia-Roman Patapievici, *Politice*, ed. A IV-a, București: Humanitas, 2006, p. 186.
[35] Ibidem, p. 187.

”România Mare”, cotidian ce se regăsește și astăzi în presa națională[36]. Controversat în primul rând datorită temperamentului coleric, Vadim Tudor și-a construit o imagine tipică de salvator, promovând un discurs naționalist feroce, totul prin susținerea partidului său, PRM (Partidul România Mare). Cariera politică a lui Vadim Tudor, autointitulat ”tribun al neamului”[37] a fost marcată de numeroase conflicte cu personalități publice ale României, dar și de o serie de declarații care au condus la un succes politic chinuit și de scurta durată. Anul 2000 rămâne totuși o dovada că românii au crezut în calitățile de salvator ale lui Corneliu Vadim Tudor, acesta obținând 33,17% din voturi în cadrul turului doi de scrutin al alegerilor prezidențiale[38].

Deși a fost un învins al alegerilor, Vadim Tudor a fost departe de a se retrage din lumina reflectoarelor. Mai vocal ca niciodată, politicianul și-a continuat discursurile demagogice, extremiste și profund naționaliste[39], fără să renunțe la imaginea de salvator al României. Ca urmare a eforturilor sale, salvatorul Vadim Tudor își găsește succesul în alegeri în anul 2009, când un parteneriat neașteptat cu George Becali îi asigură un mandate de europarlamentar[40]. Relevant în acest caz este sloganul cu care s-a prezentat în alegeri: ”Doi creștini și patrioți vor scăpa țara de hoți”[41]. Acesta este cel elocvent mod de a exemplifica imaginea de salvator construită de Corneliu Vadim Tudor; ceea ce a contribuit la rezistența în timp a acestuia a fost loialitatea față de propriile convingeri, dar și înverșunarea cu care își exprima opiniile.

În urma decesului neașteptat al lui Vadim Tudor, survenit în 2015, s-a ridicat o problemă reală a politicii românești: cine va înlocui tribunul?[42] Admirat sau contestat, plecarea politicianului relevă un gol la nivel de discurs și cultură în mediul politic. Dincolo de a fi vorba de o practică politică validată de electorat, ceea ce se observă este în primul rând absența unui discurs naționalist convingător, complet: ” Când discursul nu este asociat cu imaginea politicianului, apare o ruptură, iar mesajul naționalist nu ajunge la electorat, nu are putere de convingere.”[43] Asumarea acestui întreg pe care un astfel de politician trebuie să-l prezinte pentru a fi convingător reprezintă o sarcină care nu se poate înrădăcina în timp în mentalul unui actor politic, ea tebuie să fie parte centrală a credințelor sale și să stabilească o relație bazată pe încredere între cel care o propune și cel care este în poziția de a o accepta, respectiv alegătorul.

În mod cert, diferențele dintre cei doi salvatori prezentați în paragrafele de mai sus este una evidentă, pornind de la discurs și terminând cu temperamentul celor doi, dar datorită

[36] http://www.scrigroup.com/istorie-politica/stiinte-politice/Mitul-Salvatorului-in-discursu23497.php#_ftn51
[37] http://www.amosnews.ro/arhiva/corneliu-vadim-tudor-criticat-termeni-duri-psd-23-05-2004
[38] http://www.dcnews.ro/sociologul-alfred-bulai-cine-l-inlocuie-te-pe-corneliu-vadim-tudor-pe-scena-politica_484472.html
[39] http://www.contributors.ro/reactie-rapida/corneliu-vadim-tudor-epitaf-pentru-un-ceausist/
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[41] Ibidem
[42] http://www.dcnews.ro/sociologul-alfred-bulai-cine-l-inlocuie-te-pe-corneliu-vadim-tudor-pe-scena-politica_484472.html
[43] Ibidem

acestor diferențe se disting cu ușurință punctele commune care fac din cei doi reprezetanți ai mitului salvatorului.

Așadar, în cadrul acestor pagini s-a arătat felul în care înțelegerea corectă a memoriei colective ne ajută să tratăm cu seriozitate și claritate implicațiile acesteia în formarea miturilor politice. S-a prezentat totodată faptul că în cadrul memoriei colective există mereu și o valență mitică, așadar se poate spune că între mit și memorie există o relație de complementaritate. Aceasta din urmă se extrapolează cu ușurință în cazul miturilor politice, care au un punct major comun cu memoria colectivă: ambele sunt făuritoate și păstrătoare de identitate. Desigur, acest lucru nu desemnează o stare de captivitate, dar marchează o relație de putere și demonstrează cu ușurință motivul pentru care miturile politice continue să dăinuie și să modeleze culturi și comportamente politice. În aceeași ordine de idei, a doua parte a lucrării a constat în analizarea a două personaje ale politicii românești, fostul președinte Ion Iliescu și Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Analiza acestora a stat sub semnul mitului salvatorului, cei doi politicieni dovedind prin parcursul lor profesional și prin reacțiile alegătorilor că sunt reprezentanții acestui mit. În final, trebuie reținut faptul că identitatea unui grup, a unui popor se manifestă mai ales prin experiențele comune pe care indivizii le-au trăit, acestea arhivându-se în memoria lor colectivă. Iar dacă mitul face parte din aceasta, atunci lecția României trebuie să fie una a clarificării trecutului și a salvării tututor aspectelor care constituie identitatea românească.

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PERSUASIVE ASPECTS IN FOOD ADVERTISING FOR CHILDREN

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Abstract: The advertisements are well known for their ability to attract attention. The force of persuasion is able to create a need that did not exist before. This way are born desires to purchase various goods or services, to donate money by buying products for different unknown charities or even to change one's lifestyle. Apparently the advertisements are a type of anticipated socialization, because the customer not only that he knows what he wants to buy, but he also knows how to buy. And as for the children we see a change in the transfer of information between parent and child, because the child becomes the one who shows the parent what and how to buy. In this article I want to highlight some of the persuasive issues that lead children to ask or to want a certain product, although advertisements sometimes do not target products belonging to the children's sphere of interest, such as advertisements for detergent and hygiene products for household use. In order to highlight the persuasive aspects of advertisements I will analyze the most popular advertisements broadcasted on the most watched children channels.

Keywords: advertising, children, persuasion, communication, sociology

Advertising has undoubtedly been used since antiquity. The fact that one of the most common occupations of people in antiquity was trade inevitably leads us to the thought that they somehow made themselves known. Although we consider it a primitive form, advertising began by shouting in markets, so that everyone to find about the objects for sale (Tungate, 2007, 11), this being a form of information about the services or products offered. Today we can notice a modern form of what we called above as primitive advertising. By caravan type cars, which not only that "shout" when will the next fair will take place or what are the offers of certain restaurants or the best man in election campaigns, but they also offer an audio background and colorful and attracting images through the displayed banner. And thus the informational purpose reaches the next level, becoming persuasion.

So we can say that advertising is a means of communication made to influence buyers to purchase goods or services, being impersonal and paid. Advertising aims to attract immediate attention, to determine as quickly as possible a buying decision and to change customers' attitudes. It transmits information and uses various means to convince consumers to buy. The main goal is the short-term trading (Kotler, 1999, 793).

Advertising is one of the components of marketing, with a versatile use. It proves to be effective from the launch of a product or service to the customer's loyalty and product repositioning, highlighting other qualities. Advertising can also be presented in various forms (written, audio, video or combinations thereof), using various channels (television, internet, radio,

press). Television advertising has issued a significant number of advantages, such as ease of repetition, low cost per person, impersonality and better appreciation for the advertised products (Prutianu *et al.*, 1998, p. 187). According to the studies, advertising through the audiovisual channel is still the top choice of advertisers. So from year to year advertising costs increase. The Global Advertising Revenue Forecast Spring Update study, conducted by Magna Global, exposed the media advertising revenue in the last three years. It showed that the revenue has increased by 3.2 percent in 2014 compared to 2013, reaching to 3.9 percent in 2015 and to 5.4 percent in 2016, representing 480 billion dollars. In this business, advertisement is the most popular form of promotion through the broadcasting channels. And one of the most used and successful channels is the audiovisual medium, occupying 36 percent of all global distribution channels. Today television is marked by an increase of 4.4 percent, meaning 179 billion dollars in 2016, the biggest increase in the last 4 years (Magna Global Survey 2016, 2-3). According to the study Media Consumption Forecasts 2015, conducted by ZenithOptimedia, television is worldwide the most attractive media with 183.9 minutes of use per day (2014), followed by internet with 109.5 minutes per day. According to the forecasts for 2017, television will remain on the first place (Media Consumption Forecasts 2015, 4)

Television has remained an effective means for transmitting the advertising, being undoubtedly a means of information. With many advantages, television advertising comprises a large number of viewers. In 2009, the number of households equipped with color TV was at 94% of the population (96% of urban inhabitants and 92% of rural residents – CENG study, 2009, 12). Another advantage is that audiovisual advertising cannot be restricted like the advertising in online or on mobile phones and the access to this information channel is easy. Therefore, the publicity offered through this medium uses an invasive method, because the child or the adult cannot choose what advertisements are aired on his TV. It is true that both children and adults are not forced to active listening to each advertisement because they can change from a TV station to another or even to shut down the device or leave the room where the TV is. But when children or adults are watching a favorite show, advertisements frequently appear during the show. For children it is a more delicate situation because they are sometimes attracted by advertisements more than the cartoon. If the online advertising can be restricted by installing a simple program, the advertising page in newspapers and magazines can be skipped, when it comes to television, the only restriction is limiting the children's viewing time. But this limit does not protect the child from advertising (Bansal, 2010, 17)

But why should we protect the child from advertising? Apparently advertising shows only some information for several minutes. But doubts about this information comes from the way that it is transmitted. If advertising is a means of presenting what's new is not a problem, but it becomes one when it uses sentimental exploitation or takes advantage of a child innocence and inability to understand the reality of the message. That is why advertising is seen as detrimental to the interests and welfare of children. And most times the advertisement is not realized for a particular product but for a particular brand that produces a particular product. One study found that brand recognition begins at the age of 2 and increases with age and the ability of recognition. And more than that, the same study found that the children's exposure to advertising offered by television is one of the

means with the greatest influence through which children learn to recognize and remember the promoted brand (Valkenburg, Buijzen, 2005, 463-465). Another study found that children have the greatest influence on the purchases of relevant items for themselves (*e.g.* cereals, toys, clothes), a moderate degree of influence for the family activities (vacations, restaurants) and the less influence regarding the purchases of long-use goods and expensive objects (Tufte, 2004, 71).

What is the actual message of advertising?

A simple analysis can easily show that advertising gives us information in order to transform us either in short-term customers, either in loyal customers for the product or the brand. In other words, advertising aims at attracting attention and stimulating the interest in the purchase. But the answer above is only part of the whole. By repetition and the whole assembly of elements constituting advertising, the long term aim is the recording of the message beyond consciousness (Pope, 2003, 4).

The previously mentioned author states in his book *Making Sense of Advertisements* that the tobacco industry has always confirmed that advertising objectives are creating customer loyalty and creating the desire to smoke. The author argues his claims by exemplifying the advertisement of a cigarette brand now forgotten. The main characters of the advertisement are adult men with bruises around the eyes, as if they had just come from a fight, presenting the message "I'd rather fight than switch". Apparently one could believe that this advertisement is addressed to smokers, but the analysis of the message and image highlights strategies for gaining new customers and inducing the desire to smoke (Pope, 2003, 3).

But unfortunately not only adults get to act instinctively according to the advertising message. Another study shows a wide range of food advertising techniques and channels used to reach children and adolescents, promoting brand awareness in order to encourage the sale of cigarettes. For example, young children have been targeted by selling candy and chewing gum packages that resemble those of real cigarette brands. Commercials for the popular cigarette brands presenting young people were selectively placed in youth magazines. Promotional products (hats, sport bags, lighters with logos from cigarette brand), raffles and promotions were constantly used. Studies prove that Joe Camel cartoon character was used to promote Camel cigarettes. So 30% of the 3 years old children and over 80% of the 6 years old children could make the association between Joe Camel and a pack of cigarettes. In the three years since the launch of the cartoon, the preference for Camel cigarettes rose to 32% among adolescent smokers (Story & French, 2004, 1-17).

Thus we are now provided with solutions for any "need", "all our desires, projects and applications, all passions and all relationships are now materialized as signs and objects to be bought and consumed" (Baudrillard, 1996, 201). But the effort of this production activity is not confined just to obtaining a profit, but also to subjugate the human to matter (Baudrillard, 1996, 85-105).

The persuasion of advertising

To attract attention, to recognize products and ultimately to acquire them, advertising uses a number of strategies depending on the objective of the announcement. Persuasion is defined as

more than a conviction. It is rather the distortion, modification or exchange of values, desires, beliefs and actions of others (O'Shaughnessy, O'Shaughnessy, 2004, 5). While the degree of advertising impact on adults can be problematic, it can be devastating in the case of children. TV shows do not only provide fun for children, but they "teach" how to become consumers before they reach the age of 14 (Oates *et al*., 2002; Petruți *et al.*, 2007). Children are the most sensitive due to age and incapacity of understanding the advertising message. That is why minors are easier to persuade compared to adults (Bansal 2010, 50). The average child is exposed to more than 40,000 TV commercials per year (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2006, 2564). According to the studies, children under 8 years old cannot make a difference between advertisements and other textual or discursive forms offered on television, more than a third of children believing the advertisements, regardless their backgrounds (Oates *et al*., 2002; Petruți *et al.*, 2007; Nash *et al*., 2009; Dovey *et al.*, 2011; Olsen, 2010).

Advertising studies indicate that there are several types of strategies of persuasion. Among the techniques of persuasion there are:

- Bandwagon
  - it uses arguments which create certainty that people must act just as everyone does
  - product purchase will be made because people want to belong to a certain group
  - shoppers believe that if more people purchase the product, this means that the product is qualitative.

- Bait and Switch
  - buyers are attracted because they are promised that they will receive something (usually a discount) if they purchase the product;
  - shoppers are convinced to buy and then to spend much more.

- Celebrity Spokesperson
  - famous persons present the product
  - buying affinity is achieved due to the celebrity

- Emotional Appeals
  - it causes feelings like fear, fear, joy, sadness, anger
  - buyers will associate the emotion with the product

- Glittering Generalities

– beliefs as high patriotism, freedom, peace are highlighted
– consumers accept the received information even if they have no real support but they are part of the culture and principles of life

- Humor

– it provides a moment of relaxation, fun, entertainment, but very little information about the advertised product
– shoppers remember the product through the induced positive feelings, determining them to purchase.

- Individuality

– it appeals to the desire of uniqueness
– it transmits the satisfaction of owning an own style
– consumers see the product as stylish, distinguished, cool

- Loaded Language

– it uses contradictions in order to highlight certain aspects of the product, making it the best of all
– the words used appeal to emotions rather than reality

- Name-calling

– it uses attacks on group / individuals in order to discredit the beliefs and to highlight the product;
– buyers focus on the attack itself, not on the presented product

- Plain Folk

– it highlights ordinary consumers supporting a product
– consumers are induced the belief that the product is generally considered good

- Product Comparison

– the comparison is usually done with an inferior product, in order to highlight how special and unique qualities the product has or that it alone can fulfill the buyer's needs.

Persuasion is also realized through musicality, used colors or tones.

Analysis of children advertisements

The advertisements analyzed below are presented on TV channels for children with the highest rating, given the number of appearances per day. Rating analysis was conducted by Kantar Media Audiences for the Romanian Association for Audience Measurement. Target audience taken into account in the measurement is older than four years, both urban and rural. According to the data from Kantar Media Audiences, the audiences recorded by the programs for children in 2014, 2015 and the first five months of 2016 have remained high, exceeding the rankings of TV programs such as Acasă, B1, Pro Cinema, DigiSport 1, AXN, Realitatea TV, Digi 24, TVR 2, History Channel, National Geographic or Discovery. There are currently six programs for children who meet the criteria set by the Romanian Association for Audience Measurement and the results can be tracked in the table that we have synthesized below, the numbers representing the viewers per minute.

	2014		2015		2016		Evolution in 2016	
	Rating		Rating		Rating		Rating	
	National	Urban	National	Urban	Național	Urban	Național	Urban
Disney	99468	45840	83750	40000	92000	40600	+8250	+600
Cartoon Network	57609	23271	61667	28500	72600	29400	+10933	+900
Disney Junior	50493	33095	50333	31667	54800	31200	+4467	-467
Boomerang	40805	21297	44250	23250	49600	24600	+5350	+1350
Minimax/A+	38688	11499	35667	9250	44000	16400	+8333	+7150
Nickelodeon	36125	22950	32583	19833	21800	13000	-10783	-6833
TOTAL	**323188**	**157952**	**308250**	**152500**	**334800**	**155200**	**26550**	**2700**

Corso ice cream (the serpent)

In this advertisement there are 3 adults. One of them is turned into a "snake" being wrapped in a carpet and trying to reach the ice creams that his friends are baiting him with. The advertisement highlights a moment of fun, but it is silent about the advertised product, with the exception of one frozen ice cream that is presented in its pack for less than one second at the beginning, showing the name of the product.

The advertisement lasts 15 seconds and ends with "of Corso you are Corso! Crazy at all, all, all!". It draws attention to the background sounds and vocalizations during the playback. The setting is as neutral as possible with mostly grays colors, being put in the background, almost unclear. In the foreground there are two ice creams. It can be seen here a name-called strategy because the buyers focus on the actions of the young people. I also consider that buyers will remain with a

pleasant feeling offered by the ad and the product will be associated with the sensations. This advertisement is one of the most played during cartoon programs. The key question is how appropriate is to present this material to children, which passes beyond the children's desire for entertainment.

Johnson's gleaming hair

In this advertisement it is presented a Johnson's baby shampoo. The protagonists are two girls and their mother. The announcement lasts over 29 seconds. The setting is placed in the bathroom and in the girls' room primary and towards the end of the ad on grass in a playground. The inner setting is dominant in the presentation, where the predominant colors of things, decorations and furniture is pink and white. There are also many white pencil drawings showing the royal symbols (the crown and different decorations). The advertisement's message is played back in lyrics, but as a story, by a male voice with a cheerful melody:

A fost o dată
o zâna minunata
care a zis ușor:
să fie multa spumă
pentru un păr sclipitor
pa ra pa ra pa pa!
Și viața s-a colorat
și păsărelele au cântat
când soarele a zâmbit
peste regatul înflorit,
si ca prin magie părul prințesei un râu de satin a devenit.
Descoperă noua gamă Johnsons baby păr sclipitor pentru mica ta prințesă, păr nobil.

There can be seen repeating words such as princess and hair, highlighted by the song but also by symbols. The ad itself appeals to the emotional side of the viewers because each of them want to be princesses from fairy tales and cartoons, and now they are presented a product that would help them to be one. The product itself is poorly presented, but emphasizes its ability to raise the viewers to the rank of little princesses.

In conclusion, there can be seen that advertisements do not have a simple informational role, but also a persuasive one and children are the easiest target of all because they do not have the ability of understanding the advertising message. And this leads to an ethical question because their free will is attacked through the invasive stimuli that make them want the advertised product, inducing them a need that they do not really have. More than that, the appeal to the emotions makes the advertisement harder to resist and the music makes the message more difficult to forget even after a long period of time.

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ABOUT E-LEARNING PLATFORMS – A RESEARCH IN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITIES FROM ROMANIA

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Abstract: Astăzi, avantajele pe care platformele de e-learning le oferă sunt din ce în ce mai numeroase. Educația modernă presupune utilizarea acestor platforme în invățământul preuniversitar, dar cu precadere în invățământul superior. Tot mai multe universități își gestionează propriile platforme de tip e-learning asigurând interacțiunea la distanță între student și profesor. Lucrarea de față prezintă aspecte privind platforme de e-learning utilizate în universitățile din România. Autorul a realizat, legat de acest subiect, o cercetare bazată pe chestionar având ca grup țintă universitățile tehnice din România. Nucleul articolului il reprezintă rezultatele prezentei cercetări. Pe baza analizei datelor obținute sunt evidențiate câteva aspecte finale.

Keywords: platforme e-learning, universități tehnice, cercetare, România

Abstract: Today, the advantages of e-learning platforms are numerous. Modern education involves the use of these platforms in schools, but also in universities. More and more universities manage their own e-learning platform providing remote interaction between student and teacher. This paper presents aspects regarding e-learning platforms used in Romanian universities. A research regarding this issue, based on a questionnaire having as target group the technical Romanian universities, was made by the author. The focus point of the paper are the results of this study. Based on the data analysis, final aspects are presented at the end of the paper.

Keywords: e-learning platforms, technical universities, research, Romania

1. Introducere și context teoretic

O platformă e-learning este un produs program avand următorul set minimal de cerinţe care să permită [1]:

- asigurarea procedurilor privind instalarea, configurarea și administrarea;
- utilizarea unei interfețe prietenoase adaptabilă dinamicii procesului educaţional;
- utilizarea de suport logic de comunicare sincronă și asincronă;
- administrarea și monitorizarea informaţiilor;
- un management accesibil al conţinutului educaţional;
- utilizarea de module de editare de conţinut educaţional sub diverse formate;
- facilitarea autoevaluării offline prin proceduri asincrone și evaluării online prin proceduri

sincrone a cunostiinţelor asimilate;
• un program de pregătire continuă cu verificări parţiale pe tot parcursul procesului educaţional;
• asistarea utilizatorilor în utilizarea software-ului educaţional;
• înregistrarea feedback-ului privind calitatea serviciilor educaţionale oferite, precum și a calităţii platformei educaţionale.

Aceste facilităţi tehnice au ca scop final întâmpinarea dorinţelor și a nevoilor de instruire ale studenţilor, pentru aceasta fiind necesară o bună corelare a aspectelor tehnice cu cele pedagogice.

Faţă de sistemul tradiţional de invăţământ, e-learning-ul prezintă ***numeroase avantaje*** [1]:
• independenţa geografică, mobilitatea
• accesibilitate și administrare online
• prezentare concisă si selectivă a conţinutului educaţional;
• individualizarea procesului de învăţare
• metode pedagogice diverse
• costuri reduse de distribuţie
• timp redus de studiu
• interacţiuni sincrone și asincrone
• tehnologii dinamice diverse
• dacă învăţământul tradiţional este organizat pe grupe de varstă, cel online este organizat pe subiecte; într-o clasă virtuală pot fi reuniţi subiecţi de toate varstele, cu pregătiri diferite, neglijand graniţele spaţiale.

Tendințele cele mai pronunțate în materie de *eLearning* sunt [2]:

- **Tranziția către *m-learning*** - odată cu avansul tehnologic, informatizarea procesului de învățare se poate releva ca fiind insuficientă din punct de vedere al accesibilității. Telefoanele și tabletele (utilizate de un număr crescând de oameni) îndeplinesc majoritatea funcțiilor unui calculator și au, în plus, calitatea de a fi portabile. Una dintre cele mai accentuate tendințe este aceea de a evolua spre *m-learning*, învățarea folosind telefonul mobil sau orice alt dispozitiv de care dispune cursantul.
- **Îmbogățirea platformelor de *eLearning* cu elemente specifice jocurilor video** - pentru a înlătura monotonia instrucției într-un cadru tradițional, elementele specifice jocurilor video sunt introduse într-o măsură din ce în ce mai mare în sistemele de tip *eLearning*. Procesul de învățare este astfel ușurat, iar viteza de asimilare a informațiilor crește.
- **Folosirea de noi accesorii** - posibilitatea ca noile accesorii, precum ochelarii Google Glass sau casca Oculus Rift, să fie folosite în combinație cu soluțiile de *eLearning* este una foarte mare, iar avantajele, de asemenea. Deși discuțiile în acest sens încă se desfășoară la un nivel speculativ, beneficiile soluțiilor *eLearning* însoțite de noile tehnologii apărute pe piață ar putea influența decisiv atât felul în care sunt concepute *trainingurile* de către diverse companii, cât și metodologia din cadrul instituțiilor de învățământ.

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- **Clipuri video – încă de impact –** pentru a spori eficacitatea soluțiilor de *eLearning*, introducerea de clipuri video este o practică frecventă în acest domeniu.

În concluzie, industria *eLearning-ului* se află în plină expansiune, iar sfera de aplicabilitate a soluțiilor de acest tip devine din ce în ce mai cuprinzătoare, datorită flexibilității acestui domeniu și a deschiderii către inovații [2].

În cele ce urmează sunt prezentate rezultatele unei cercetări bazate pe chestionar, cu respondenți

din universitățile tehnice din România.

2. Cercetare în universitățile tehnice din România

A. Metodologia cercetarii

Această cercetare reprezintă un studiu pilot care a fost realizat pentru a investiga aspecte tehnice ale platformelor de e-learning în universitățile cu profil tehnic din Romania. Grupul țintă a fost constituit din studenti și absolvenți ai universităților tehnice din România. În acest context, cercetarea empirică din această lucrare are urmatoarele obiective:

- Să studieze tipuri de platforme de e-learning utilizate în universitățile tehnice din România precum și utilitatea și caracteristicile acestora;
- Să facă propuneri privind îmbunătățirea platformelor de e-learning atât din punct de vedere tehnic, cât și al utilizării.

Variabilele cercetării

Există două tipuri de variabile: nominale și variabile ce țin de utilitatea și caracteristicile tehnice ale platformelor de e-learning în universitățile cu profil tehnic din România. În sumar, Tabelul 1 prezintă structura variabilelor relevante ale cercetării.

Tabelul 1. Maparea variabilelor cercetării

Variabilele cercetarii		**Descriere conceptuala**
Variabile nominale	Variabile demografice	Gen
		Varsta
		Background profesional
Variabile ce tin de utilitatea și caracteristicile tehnice ale platformelor de e-learning în universitățile cu profil tehnic din România		Caracteristici tehnice
		Utilitatea platformelor de e-learning
		Propuneri de îmbunătățire

Întrebările calitative au fost măsurate folosind o scala în trei puncte (exemplu Foarte bună / Bună / Slabă) (adaptare după [3]). Respondenții și-au exprimat opinia generală în legatură cu urmatorii itemi (selecție): tipul platformei de e-learning folosite, usurința de navigare, calitatea graficii, calitatea conținutului, propuneri de imbunătire etc. Chestionarul include atât întrebări

deschise cât și închise. Itemi (întrebări) corelați sunt de asemenea utilizați pentru a ajuta respondentul în a furniza un răspuns clar și precis.

B. Analiza datelor și rezultatele cercetării

Chestionarul, care debutează cu întrebări privind caracteristicile și utilitatea platformelor de e-learning și se finalizează cu caracteristicile demografice ale respondentilor, a fost distribuit unui număr de peste 300 de persoane, 221 dintre aceștia l-au completat. Numărul de răspunsuri zilnice este prezentat în Figura 1.



Figura 1: Numărul de răspunsuri zilnice

Respondenții au background tehnic, studenți sau absolvenți de Calculatoare și tehnologia informației, Inginerie și management, Ingineria sistemelor, etc. În termeni de gen, structura eșantionului este echilibrată: 89 - 40.3% bărbați, 132 - 59.7% femei. 215 (97.3%) dintre respondenți au vârsta cuprinsă între 20-25 de ani, 2.7% având între 26-30 de ani.

În ceea ce privește ciclul și forma de învățământ, situația este prezentată în Figura 2.

Sunteți student la	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Licența	183	82,8%
Master	37	16,7%
ID/IFR	1	0,5%



Figura 2: Ciclul și forma de învățământ urmate de respondenți

37,6% dintre respondenți sunt angajați, restul de 62,4% înca nu. 94,1% (208) dintre participanții la studiu au declarat că în universitatea lor există o platforma de e-learning. Situația detaliată privind tipurile de platforme utilizate în universitățile tehnice din România urmate de respondenți este prezentată în Figura 3. Cea mai utilizată platforma de e-learning este Moodle.

Tipul de platforma utilizata	**Nr. de respondenți**	**% dintre respondenți**	



Moodle	171	78,8%
Edu 2.0	11	5,1%
Blackboard	4	1,8%
Wiki	14	6,5%
Altele	17	7,8%

Figura 3: Tipul de platforma utilizata de respondenți

În ceea ce privește caracteristicile platformelor de e-learning, situația detaliată este prezentată în continuare – Figurile 4, 5, 6, 7. Se poate observa că atât calitatea graficii, ușurința de a naviga pe platformele utilizate, precum și calitatea conținutului sunt evaluate de către peste 80% dintre respondenți ca fiind bune și foarte bune.

Calitatea graficii	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Foarte bună	63	28,5%
Bună	119	53,8%
Slabă	39	17,6%



Figura 4: Calitatea graficii platformelor de e-learning

Ușurința de a naviga	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Foarte bună	68	30,8%
Bună	117	52,9%
Slabă	36	16,3%



Figura 5: Ușurința de a naviga in cadrul platformelor de e-learning

Calitatea conținutului	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Foarte bună	68	30,8%
Bună	123	55,7%
Slabă	30	13,6%



Figura 6: Calitatea continutului in cadrul platformelor de e-learning

Gradul de actualizare	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Foarte bună	60	27,1%

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Bună	111	50,2%
Slabă	50	22,6%

Figura 7: Gradul de actualizare in cadrul platformelor de e-learning

Apreciere generală	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Foarte bună	62	28,1%
Bună	129	58,4%
Slabă	30	13,6%



Figura 8: Apeciere generală a platformelor de e-learning

Din analiza datelor cercetării putem concluziona că aprecierea generală – Figura 8, este bună sau foarte bună în peste 80% dintre cazuri. Totuși, deși în peste 80% dintre cazuri respondenții consideră utilă o asemenea platformă în procesul educațional, mai mult de jumatate (peste 40% - vezi Figura 9) dintre aceștia spun că nu este obligatorie. În plus, aceștia au făcut și recomandări pentru îmbunătățirea utilizării platformelor – vezi Figura 10. Din punct de vedere tehnic, îmbunătățirile ce trebuie realizate platformelor de e-learning țin de posibilitatea de a a avea aplicații colaborative sau de a transmite live cursurile.

Considerați utilă folosirea unei platforme de e-learning în procesul educațional tehnic?	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Da, este obligatorie folosirea unei platforme de e-learning	101	45,7%
Da, dar nu obligatorie	96	43,4%
Nu este utilă o asemenea platformă	24	10,9%



Figura 9: Utilitatea platformelor de e-learning

Propuneri legate de utilizarea platformelor de e-learning in universitatile tehnice	**Nr. / % dintre respondenți**	
Nu sunt necesare schimbări	35	16%
Cursuri și /sau aplicații înregistrate	110	50.2%
Cursuri transmise live	73	33.3%
Aplicații colaborative online	78	35.6%
Sesiuni de pregatire online	114	52.1%
Altele	6	2.7%



Figura 10: Propuneri legate de utilizarea platformelor de e-learning în universitățile tehnice

3. Aspecte finale

E-learning, termen introdus in 1998 de Jay Cross, fondatorul Internet Time Group, a devenit extrem de popular. O căutare cu Google la inceputul lui august 2010 oferea aproximativ 197.000.000 de referinte pentru e-learning, reprezentând de trei ori mai mult faţă de aceeasi perioadă a anului 2006. Învăţământul electronic sau e-learning reprezintă o modalitate actuală de dezvoltare a educaţiei, in concordanţă cu descoperirile tehnologice [1]. O definiţie concisă a termenului de invăţământ electronic poate fi: "oferirea educaţiei, instruirii sau invăţământul prin mijloace electronice" [4]. Termenul este utilizat in zilele noastre si ca termen unificator pentru o multitudine de tehnici de invăţare, instruire prin mijloace asistate de calculator. Invăţământul electronic se referă la utilizarea tehnologiilor Internetului pentru a furniza un vast sir de soluţii care amplifică performanţa si cunostinţele. In general, termenul de e-learning este sinonim cu online learning, Web based learning [1].

Această lucrare încearcă să sublinieze importanța folosirii platformelor de e-learning în universitățile tehnice din România. Rezultatele sunt interesante. Ca posibilele cercetări ulterioare se poate conduce un studiu pilot despre caracteristicile tehnice și posibile recomandări privind îmbunătățirea utilizării platformelor e-learning folosite în universitățile non-tehnice din România.

Chiar dacă această cercetare are mai multe limitări, cum ar fi selectarea eșantionului sau numărul de respondenți, se pot trage urmatoarele concluzii:

- Peste 50% dintre respondenti propun ca posibile îmbunătățiri ale platformelor e-learning cursuri și /sau aplicatii înregistrate sau sesiuni de pregatire online.
- Un procent mare dintre respondenți - 43,4% consideră utilă o platforma e-learning, însa nu obligatorie.
- 10,9% dintre respondenți nu consideră utilă folosirea în universitate a unei platforme e-learning.

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WEDDING TRADITIONS IN DÂMBOVIȚA COUNTY

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Abstract: Romanian folklore has imposed itself through its originality, richness and variety. From its birth up to its demise, people's artistic and spiritual creation intertwines, at every turn, with life and its multiple manifestations. Folk genres are in constant transformation, changing not only in looks but also in functions in accordance with people's mentality, which is in permanent evolution. Customs, which are engrained in people's life and which sometimes are expressed in identical forms and, some other times, in a different manner throughout history, are of great value and still require exhaustive research. They accompany man's life and, once in a while, extend even after death covering various and multiple aspects. Many of these aspects appear as interesting folk holidays and comprise a spectacular, dramatic characteristic. Folklorists define custom as a way of acting passed on through tradition that is necessarily connected to a community and repeated in the same circumstances.
In our study, we shall deal with some wedding customs in villages from Dâmbovița County: the proposal, the marriage offer, going with the plosca 'hip flask', the wedding, the dressing of the bride, wedding duration, the geavrele, all in all customs that have been kept since very old times.

Keywords: dowry, dressing of the bride, hip flask walking, geavrele, wedding.

Romanian folklore has imposed itself through its originality, its remarkable richness and variety, in each and every place that its most gifted messengers have taken it.

Throughout the centuries, folk creation has expressed itself in a variety of categories, genres and repertories, characteristic forms meant to answer various circumstances.

From cradle to grave, folklore, people's artistic and spiritual creation, intertwines, at every turn, with life and its multiple manifestations, "*being like a fir tree forest which, seen from above, gives the impression of an everlasting season, or, from down below, from the roots, gives the impression of permanent renewal, when fallen leaves are being replaced by others in a dynamics that is hard to capture*" [1].

Folklore genres are in constant transformation, changing not only their appearance but also their function, in accordance with people's mentality that is in permanent evolution. Obsolete folklore genres, which are no longer fitting, are forgotten or undergo various transformations. A number of creations, disburdened of their magical meaning of

[1] Constantin, Manolescu. *Plai domnesc*. Târgoviște: Editura Bibliotheca, 2003, p. 7.

yore, turn, before our very eyes, into festive artistic manifestations. Folklore changes endlessly, just like the very life, which, in its own way, it expresses: "*Eu cânt că știu să cânt dar m-apucă câte-un gând / Eu nu cânt că știu cânta / Cânt să-mi stâmpăr inima / Mie, și cui m-o asculta*" ["*I sing for I know how to sing but once in a while a thought comes to my head / I do not sing because I can / I sing to appease my heart / Mine and of whomever might listen*"[2]].

Each people has built its own national artistic treasure, resting upon olden native elements.

As regards folklore in Dâmbovița County, a brief presentation of this area, located in the geographical space of the former *plai domnesc* ("princely land") bordered by the Dâmbovița, Ialomița and Cricovul Dulce rivers, is required. The Dâmbovița and Ialomița Valleys, gates to Transylvania, travelled as early as the 14th century, had each a road for pilgrims (*Drumul Mare* "High Road" – which ran mostly through villages) and one for animals (*Drumul mocanilor* "Shepherds' Road" – which passed through open areas). These roads crossed the mountains through the ravine of the two waters, passed through the *Ulița Vămii* "Customs Street" reaching as far as the square of the city of Brașov.

Passing through these valleys in times long ago, a lot of foreign travellers recorded ethno-folkloric testimonies on them.

"*Anton Maria del Chiaro gives certain details on fabrics and embroideries, naturally popular in style, that were manufactured in the basements of the Princely Court: kerchiefs, head dresses with silk flowers, silk floral shirts, etc. He also mentions the various folk beliefs and customs such as that of decorating eggs [for Easter] 'with bizarre flowers and patterns', which denotes a certain degree of abstraction*" [3].

Details on clothing are revealed by votive paintings in Dâmbovița churches. The church of Săcuieni (built in 1667) presents the founding boyar Ștefan Logofătul and his wife Stana, who wears, under her cloak, an *ie* ("Romanian blouse") embroidered with national motifs.

The votive painting in the church of Runcu, painted in mid-19th century, shows the wives of founding villagers wearing long head scarves (*marame*) touching the ground.

Another aspect of the artistic creativity of the people of Dâmbovița lands is recorded by the enamelled pottery, a craft and art that flourished in the 12th up to the 15th centuries, which turned the city of Târgoviște into one of the centres of highest cultural dissemination, as regards both household and decorative ceramics.

The first folklore collections in Dâmbovița appeared and were compiled in the 19th century by the poet and playwright Nicolae Scurtescu, a native of Valea Lungă-Ogrea. Under the pseudonym Niță Vintilă Stroe, he published folklore in *Ali* magazines. Some of the items collected by N. Scurtescu were included in G. Dem. Teodorescu's great collection.

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[2] *Antologia poeziei românești,* vol. I, București: Editura de Stat pentru Literatură și Artă, 1957, p. 67.
[3] Constantin, Manolescu. *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Grigore Tocilescu published Dâmbovița folklore around 1900, in his corpus entitled *Materiale folclorice*. The pieces were collected from our area by his collaborator, Ion Ionescu.

In *Răspunsuri la chestionarul istoric*, Nicolae Densușianu offered the teachers of Dâmbovița (Stan Negoescu from Raciu – who left the first text of the ballad *Radu Anghel*; M. Teodorescu from Pietrari, Andrei Popescu from Șotânga, Jan Demetrescu from Voinești etc., who enriched the folkloric corpus with such works as *Marcu, Ghiță Cătănuță, Jianu Corbea, Soarele și luna, Chira Chiralina, Radu Anghel, Mioriţa* etc.) the chance to pass on items of great value to us.

B. P. Hasdeu's *Chestionarul lingvistic* (1885) provides descriptions of customs, folk beliefs, data on the choreographic repertory, gathered and transmitted by passionate collectors of Dâmbovița folklore.

A special part in promoting the folklore of Dâmbovița both in the country and abroad was played by the work of the poetess Elena Văcărescu, *Le rapsode de la Dâmbovitza*. Even if it cannot be considered a collection of folklore proper, the presence of the local folkloric universe is to be noted.

The songs were collected by the poetess in the villages where her family had some domains: Văcărești, Șotânga, Moțăieni, Pietroșița, Moroieni, Bezdead, Ulmi, Pitaru, Lucieni. Due to her genius, the Dâmbovița folklore was shown to foreigners as a picture of essences of the Romanian people's spiritual life.

Between the two world wars, outstanding intellectuals such as professor Ion Negoescu or composer Vasile Popovici (who was, at the time, a teacher at the Military High School of Dealu Monastery, Târgoviște) published carols and folk songs accompanied by musical notations in the pages of Dâmbovița newspapers (*Graiul Dâmboviței*, *Ancheta*).

Many music informants (recorded before the war and by Constantin Brăiloiu) like Vasile Bursuc (Teiș), Ion Șerban (Râul Alb), Oprescu Vasile (Moțăieni), Grigore Grancea (Pucioasa), etc. provided folk pieces for *Comoara neamului* compilation, published by Gh. I. Tăsloanu in 1943.

It was in Târgoviște that the musicologist and folklorist George Breazul worked before World War II. And it is also here that the remarkable educator Iancu Stroescu, author of the well-known song *Tărășelul* (composed for 4 voices by Nicolae Lungu) and of numerous folklore collections from Dâmbovița, lived.

The foundation of the *Dâmbovița Folklorists' Association*, the creation of "Nicolae Scurtescu" award or of "Elena Văcărescu" folklore circle encouraged the discovery and exploitation of folk creation of Dâmbovița County.

Folkloric works we absorb today represent only the contemporaneous age of the oldest stratum of our culture. They add up to older collections, news from chronicles, documents of the epoch, notes of foreign travellers and highlight the successive ages of our folklore.

The Ballad of Miorița circulated in several variants in this geographical area which is specific to the transhumance from Muntenia to Ardeal and vice versa. This epic song relating to the shepherd profession lies somewhere "midway, as if it were building a bridge between epos and ballad…"[4].

The differences of artistic expression do not change the poetic message of this ballad. In the Dâmbovița version of the ballad of *Miorița* the ordinary language of the people living in these places may be noted.

The ballad of *Miorița* represents, in any of its variants, a cluster of metaphors, epithets, comparisons and parables, allegories, which point to man's merging into nature in life and in death.

The creative genius of the dwellers of these lands gave birth to a treasure of folk spiritual culture, refining it, over the centuries, with the innermost urge, inasmuch as it has reached artistic perfection.

The folklore of Dâmbovița was brought to the fore last century by Anton Pann's collections and came to the attention of V. Alecsandri, who wrote that "… the Romanian folkloric universe was heralded to the world by the Country of Dâmbovița". There were eulogies upon the Dâmbovița folklore which was made famous by *Le Rapsode de la Dâmbovitza* published by poetess Elena Văcărescu (granddaughter of Iancu Văcărescu) in Paris in 1892 (Alphonse Lemerre Publishing House).

Romanian folklore, an expression of man's wisdom and inward experiences, reflects, in the most direct way, the spiritual profile of our people and is, at the same time, a document, an element of education and source of inexhaustible inspiration just like a river that is continually nurtured by its own springs.

Wedding customs.

The marriage proposal, the courtship, was done in the past by sending someone with the hip flask, "trimiterea cu plosca". This implied that a person, whom the boy had faith in, would go with the *ploska*, a flask containing *țuică* (plum brandy), to the girl's family, who had been previously informed. Although this practice was always performed in the evening, the wooer who entered the house would say "good morning". Introductions having been made, he would put down the flask in the middle of the house; after the appropriate whims and grimaces, the girl, if she was willing, would pick it up, kiss the wooer's, her mother's and her father's hand and take a sip. Then the flask would pass from hand to hand to all those present and they would get to talking as they kept on drinking. If they agreed upon the marriage, they would arrange the dowry of the boy and the girl and even set a wedding date.

Sometimes, very rarely though, when the girl's parents did not approve of the marriage, the girl was kidnapped[5]. The groom, helped by a few friends with a curricle

[4] Al.I.Amzulescu. Preface to *Toma Alimoș. Balade populare românești*, București: Editura Biblioteca pentru toți, 1967, p. XIV.
[5] Gr. Tocilescu, *Un simbol juridic la români*, "Foaia Soc. Renașterea", I, 1874, pp.113-116.

drawn by fine horses, would meet her in the street, especially on holidays, while going to the *hora* 'dance', seize her by force and put her in the curricle and would whirl away and vanish, the girl screaming and all, but it was often for show only. Faced with a fait accompli, the girl's parents were forced, with very rare exceptions, to give their consent. Some other times, the two youths would simply leave, arm in arm, and hide somewhere for a while; they eloped. In most of the cases, marriages occurred not as a result of the youths' will, but of their parents', and the eligibility criteria were not the feelings of the spouses-to-be, but material interests, their land in particular; as a local saying goes, "pământul mărită urâtul" (the land would marry the ugly)[6].

Nowadays, this both poetic and tragic custom is nothing but a museum item. Sometimes, if the boy and the girl come to an understanding, he takes her by the hand and takes her to his place; at other times, the boy's parents go the girl's family and, if they concur, often return home with their daughter-in-law.

On the wedding day – usually on Sunday – the groom would send his bride a pair of fiddlers he had paid, as the wedding would take place at both the girl's and the boy's parents. However, all wedding gifts or money would go to the groom's parents who had paid for the wedding, as practised today.

The fiddlers arrived at the groom's house on Saturday afternoon. Someone holding the flask, accompanied by the musicians, would go from door to door, to relatives and friends, to invite them to the wedding. The bride personally did the same with her next of kin.

Today, the flask is still used in wedding invitations, but without the fiddlers, who come on Sunday morning, for the wedding lasts only one day, not three as it did once. Saturday night, *fedeleşul* took place. At the groom's, the table was laid for *alergători* (errand boys, those who helped), in-laws and closest relatives and everyone would party with fiddlers; at the bride's house, girls, in particular, but also boys would gather and also party. In the morning, the groom would send his bride the fir tree with *plocon* 'gifts' and a pair of fiddlers who would stay there until the end. The bride, accompanied by boys and girls, with fiddlers and the always-present flask, would bring water from a farther well. She gave a drink from the flask to whomever she met.

Starting with 11 o'clock in the morning, gifts would begin to arrive to the groom from his people: baskets with bread, eggs, cheese, sugar, fruit, etc.

At noon, the table was laid at the groom's and the bride's house, for *alergători* and for those who were bringing gifts.

In the afternoon, the groom would send the *plocon* with the musicians to bring the godparents. The latter and a few of the close relatives would go fetch the bride in several curricles. Before the curricles, there were 5-6 wedding guests riding the best horses with braided crests and knotted tails, with traditional woven towels hanging from

[6] Marin, Paţac. *Monografii dâmboviţene – Morteni,* Târgovişte:: Muzeul Judeţean de Istorie, Dâmboviţa, 1973, p.150.

bridles, fir branches and ribbons. The curricle horses were adorned in the same way. They would all race to the bride's house. Gunfire was released on leaving from the groom's and at arrival at the bride's.[7]

Once the group arrived at the bride's, "orations"[8] were delivered, a beautiful epic narrative in verse. Basically, there were two crowds (or armies) facing each other: the groom's and that of the parents of the bride. After wishing all the best, the purpose of the arrival was revealed and, addressing the generals leading the opposing army, the groom, who was the head of his army, would send one of his commanders to warn the adversaries that they had come to take the bride and that they should give her to them willingly if they wanted peace, if not, they would take her by force for they were ready, they had many armies and the best generals, but, should that happen, those who would stand in their way would suffer; in any case, they – the groom's men – would not leave without the bride. The bride's people did oppose, for they had a larger army. A brawl followed; meanwhile, the groom would stand waiting, while the bride would take shelter behind her people.

Eventually, despite the opposition of the bride's entourage, the groom would come out triumphant and manage to take his bride and all would get on carriages, standing. The godfather put a loaf bread and a glass of wine on the bride's head and tore the bread into four pieces which he threw into four corners and the wine as well; the youths' home should be thus plenty of wine and bread from the four corners of the world. The bride's things were loaded and, along with the godparents and the tree that was placed in the front carriage and the mounted guests, firing guns and yelling, they would go get married by a registrar, if they hadn't the day before, and, from here, to the church for the religious ceremony.[9]

After the religious ceremony, groom, bride, godparents and the entire suite would head for the groom's house. In the evening, a feast at the groom's where gifts were brought followed. The wisest fiddler would give away napkins, nicely sewn with *arnici*, to the godfather who sat at the head of the table and to all diners; if the man was accompanied by his wife, only the man received the napkin. Then they collected the gift.

At the bride's parents' house, a meal without gifts, but with her next of kin.

The next day, on Monday, the *pocânzei*, who were the bride's relations, that had attended the meal a night before, were now sent to the groom's feast, together with the musicians that were still at the bride's house; women carried gifts in baskets. A large feast followed and the gift was received.

The third day, on Tuesday, the *alergători* and the in-laws would join in the feast and bring a gift of their own; it was what they called "the bride's earrings", i.e. something

[7] Ibidem, p.151.
[8] *Oraţiuni ţinute la nuntele ţaranesci sau binecuvântarea tinerilor ce se însor*, Bucureşti, 1872, 1876, 1890 (three brochures containing old orations); I. Păunescu, *Oraţii populare care în unele sate obicinuiesc a se zice la nunţi*, Bucureşti, 1848, 98 p.
[9] Marin, Paţac. op.cit., p.152.

additional, for the bride's jewellery. By noon, all was over and things would go back to normal.

The table for the guests was laid on bed boards, stretching from one corner of the room to the other; a board would serve as a collective chair and another, at the same level, as table, on which woven table cloths, specially made for this occasion, were laid.

The menu was generally very simple: meat and cabbage soup, with or without meat, *mămăligă*, rarely bread; meal was served in ordinary clay bowls, with wooden spoons, while the *ţuica* flask was passed from hand to hand: each would take a sip and then give it to their neighbour and so on.[10]

The first Sunday after the wedding, the couple, accompanied by the groom's parents, would bring *plocon* to the bride's parents, eat and drink together. It was said that they "retraced their steps".

In the area there is another custom called *geavrele*.[11]

This is an ancient tradition passed on, year after year, by *iordănitori* at winter time (*Boboteaza* "Epiphany").

The custom involves a flag, 14-m long, decorated with various *geavrele*. The *geavrele* are handkerchiefs girls sew manually. They are collected by *iordănitori* over a period of 13-14 days who go from door to door to get them. Having gathered 2,000 *geavrele*, they start fastening them to the flag.

After the flag is thus decorated, it is brought to the centre of the village in order to be baptised alongside of the holy water, then it is taken to the houses of all people bearing the name of St. John the Baptist. This custom in practiced in every part of the commune, except the village of Neajlov.

Neajlov (Cacova) is represented differently by a star which is decorated with *geavrele* as well and is to be taken to the church to be baptised.

The *iordănitori* wear clothes that are typical of this area, namely white wool pullovers and a traditional white sash over.

In conclusion, the first function of the folkloric creations interpreted within family life customs is to comply with the ceremonial, properly marking the important moments in the existence of a traditional family. The texts sung or recited during the folkloric wedding concentrate the meanings of each ritualistic stage it consists of, the transition from celibacy to marriage: the courtship oration refers to courtship, the fir tree moment is synthesised in the fir oration, the separation songs accompany the groom's and bride's dressing out, the gift exchange is accompanied by the gift oration, etc.

Folkloric wedding creation enhances and marks the ceremonial, preserving its structure by virtue of the traditional character of folk culture.

[10] Ibidem, p. 153.
[11] Ibidem, p. 154.

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THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLITICAL PARLIAMENTARY ELITES FROM ROMANIA ON SOME CHANGES OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM BY THE INTRODUCING OF THE QUOTA FOR WOMEN

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Abstract. The Romanian tradition and ethos regarding the involvement and participation of women in political and public life is quite conservative and after 1990, some small steps ahead were made due to the negotiations for the accession in the euro-Atlantic structures such as European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO, etc
In achievements of these goals, of democratic representation, the Romanian Constitution enshrined the principle of gender equality and non discrimination, but women are still underrepresented in the Parliament of Romania.
This study is a part of a greater research on the political parliamentary elites and the change of the electoral system. The hypothesis is that the change of the electoral system does not change the quality of the political elites but the introducing of the quota for women could be a solution for the increasing of female parliamentary elites. Therefore, this paper aims at analyzing the perceptions on the phenomenon of quota by measuring, using specific questionnaires, two groups of populations: male and female parliamentary elites elected in the actual legislation (2012-2016). Because there is a Special Committee for the New Electoral Code, for the future elections in 2016, we infer that quota might be a solution only if the male and female parliamentary elites succeed in building consensual elite.

Keywords: gender, discrimination; representation; participation; quota; political parliamentary elites.

1. The Romanian tradition in searching the civic culture. From patriarchal culture to dependent one

In the past century, in Romania, the feminine gender was subjected to the male gender and the assets of women, according to the article 199 from Civil Code (second part of the 19th century) couldn't be estranged without the husband's approval. Before the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Marxist-Leninist-oriented governments of the Eastern European countries had high female representation in the national parliaments. For example, in the late 1980s, on average 33% of the national deputies were women. Unfortunately, requests for equality and quota systems that gave women considerable numerical representation

were strictly for symbolic purposes. An eloquent example in this respect is the model of Elena Ceausescu, the wife of the former communist dictator till 1989.

Much more, on this historical background, in the new regime of building democracy, the gender quotas are rejected in the name of traditions that respect the Christian values and the "natural" differences between men and women. In the same time, these claims are categorized in three positions: being Marxist, neo-communist and feminist, so we could remark that they are still blamed in the post communist public and political space.

In Romania, the lack of involvement and participation of the citizens, in the public sphere, generally, and of the women, specially, are due to the recent past and to the way in which the former communist regime approached this aspect: the communist party's propaganda regarding the equality between women and men, the introducing of the minimum representative gender quota in the political bodies. All these led to a demonetization and delegitimization of the issue (Băluţă, 2012:94).

That's why, the debates on gender equality and the increase of the women political representation face some prejudices and stereotypes coming from the past, the traditional social representation on the roles of men and women being spread and accepted at the social level.

2. Techniques and methods

This research is explorative through a diachronic and synchronic perspective, so it will not offer an exhaustive solution on this phenomenon. We used a quantative evaluation of women's presence in the Romanian post communist parliament. Also, we used the results of the previous researches when we collected empirical data based on questionnaires. Therefore, we try to find out the reasons that led to the rejection of the legislative proposals to introduce gender quotas in various political and social processes.

The paper is organized as follows: a focus is given on the conceptualization of gender and gender empowerment. The paper is based on secondary data of various sources of European and international bodies, reports and literatures of studies conducted worldwide. Another set of data is from the official site of the Chamber of Deputies.

The sociological investigation made in the Romanian Parliament, at the Chamber of Deputies, at two different times showed the opposite: vote *per se* does not alter the structure of parliamentary élites, does not produce better élites and thus does not increase the quality of democracy. The purpose of sociological survey was to measure the perceptions of the parliamentary élites upon some certain issues and, especially, on the electoral process, women's representation, on the „uninominal" vote, and the way it was expected to enhance the quality of democracy and its effects in the consolidating of democracy (Stoica, 2011: 868).

These results are part from a greater research that took place at the Chamber of Deputies in two different chronological and political moments[1]. The first chronological moment was in October 2008 and the second was in November 2009. The political moments are given by the presence of two different types of electoral systems. In the first research, the political élites analyzed belonged to a parliament elected by a proportional representation system on closed lists, and in the second, the elections took place by „uninominal" system. The methods of investigation are case study and comparative analysis of the data based on the research (Stoica, 2013). This is why in our questionnaires we projected the design of questions able to produce information about what élites believe and what are their perceptions. Then, the paper concludes and makes recommendations for future research.

3. Conceptualization on gender, gender quotas typology, political empowerment of women

Approaching this field we found a very rich literature both in Romanian and foreign authors**.** Further, we try to define the main concept related with this issue. Gender is a set of characteristics that are seen to distinguish between male and female entities that are socially and culturally constructed. Or according to the Report of European Institute for Gender Equality (2014:15), gender refers to women's and men's position in society, their social identity, which is shape through history of social relations and can be changed.

Political empowerment refers to the equitable representation of women in decision-making structures, both formal and informal, and their voice in the formulation of policies affecting their societies. Gender gap refers to inequality in opportunities and participation of men and women in development.

Equality and gender relationship are relevant indicators for the degree of development of a society and, in reverse, gender inequality is consider a major barrier in the modernization and democratization of a society. Gradually, it has been accepted that women are the target of discrimination, that social stereotypes focused on them have numerous negatives consequences on their personal, family and professional lives.

In order to ensure this vital gender balance we have to find tools to eliminate the causes that generate imbalance. If it is about discrimination, lack of regulation, disinterest of the political parties and authorities, then we can intervene by public policies. The level of women's involvement in elections reflects the mentality, the cultural level and the state of mind of a people. A strong argument was launched by the resident representative of PNUD in Romania, Yesmin Oruc, who stated that with the help of women, the political parties could win and change the perception on the politics (Oruc, 2010).

[1] Two questionnaires were applied to the population of deputies, belonging to the legislature 2004 -2008 and 2008 - 2012, and two types of groupings were built. The first grouping included 57 deputies and the second one 62. For the two groupings we used a simple, random and crossed procedure on layers. In 2016, we conducted a survey by using a telephonic questionnaire on 51 deputies.

Taking into consideration the Romanian traditional particularities described above, in this matter, Romania is no exception from the European pattern, being under the average regarding the women's involvement (Patru, 2014:3).

Today, quotas exist in more than one hundred countries around the world, but more than three-quarters of these measures have been passed within the last fifteen years.

The adoption and implementation of quotas highlights the recruitment practices of political elites, indicating that political actors are the central factor producing and mitigating inequalities in representation. The growing literature on gender quotas presents a variety of typologies for classifying different kinds of quota measures. Special measures include reserved seats, constitutionally mandated quotas, electoral law quotas, and political party quotas and targets aimed at increasing the proportion of women among political candidates and representatives.

Candidate gender quotas have, in fact, taken on a variety of different forms across countries in every major region worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2003). Candidate gender quotas, thus, have now been adopted by numerous political parties and national legislatures around the world.

Krook is making an analysis on increasing the women's participation. The most common reforms, from a global perspective, have been provisions for the increased representation of women. Most of these provisions take the form of quota policies aimed at increasing the selection and election of female candidates to political office. The origins of many of these policies can be traced back to the United Nations' (UN) Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in September 1995. The resulting Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, signed unanimously by all 189 member states, called on governments to take measures to ensure women's equal access and full participation in power structures and decision-making, as well as to increase women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership (United Nations 1995) so the importance of this event can be seen in patterns of quota adoption around the world (Krook, 2009: 3).

By one account, at least 103 countries today have experienced the proposal, the adoption, or the repeal of candidate gender quotas to increase the number of women in parliament, with the majority of these quotas being proposed after 1995 (Global Database of Quotas for Women).

4. ***Quality of Elites in Romania in respect with the electoral systems***

The recent democracies of central and Eastern Europe have fragile political systems, consisting of traditional parties (those that existed in the interwar period and were outlawed by the communists) and new parties (which claim to represent interests of certain social groups who need political representation in order to promote their rights and interests).

Also, another element of a functional democracy is the quality of political parliamentary élites that are the product of electoral system. Thus, the question that arises and we are trying to answer, is whether the change the electoral system in Romania leads

to more efficient élites that contribute in improving the quality of democracy and its consolidation. From the multitude of elements that measure the degree of functionality of a democracy we will stop, below, at the electoral process.

In Romania, the institutional changing of the electoral system was necessary in order to change the structure of the parliamentary élites. A diachronic analysis of the results in the post communist legislatures regarding the presence of women in the parliament indicates us the data presented in table 1. As we can see, in the first three legislatures after the 90's there was a low representation of women and there appeared "a ceiling" around an average of 10%.

Table 1. The representation of women in the Romanian Parliament

Legislature	Mandate won by women (%)	The type of electoral system
1990-1992	4,9 %	Proportional representation (PR)
1992-1996	3,7%	Proportional representation (PR)
1996-2000	4,7%	Proportional representation (PR)
2000-2004	10,8%	Proportional representation (PR)
2004-2008	10,2%	Proportional representation (PR)
2008-2012	9,8%	The system of "uninominal" vote (single constituency) and PR
2012-2016	11%	The system of "uninominal" vote (single constituency) and PR

(Source: www.cdep.ro)

In terms of social representations, the "uninominal" vote system was invested in the Romanian society, with a central quality: it is a much more direct link established between electors and elected, reducing the distance between them. This is the reason for its introduction was seen as a panacea to the crisis of social representativeness of the political class. On the same time, more women were expected to be elected in the uninominal system.

This social perception was based on the belief that individual choice will lead to an increased quality of Romanian Parliament's elected members and to their responsibility to voters, and the great stake was that changing the electoral system could generated a better democracy.

Table 2. Which of the following statements you agree?

Legislature	2004- 2008	2008 - 2012	2012-2016	
The uninominal system promotes worse deputies	54%	**77%**	**79%**	↗
The uninominal system promotes better deputies	**46%**	23%	21%	↘

As we can remark in the Table 2, (one of the question used in the above mention researches), the answers indicate that the majority of deputies disregard the effectiveness of the uninominal system. These results could be an argument for the Electoral Code Committee that decided that the election for the next legislature (2016- 2019) to be organized again in the proportional representation system (reached to a consensus) and rejected all the parliamentary initiatives for gender quotas also as a result of a political consensus). The researches for determining the MPs perceptions on gender quotas are ongoing and highlight that women's representation will be higher under a more proportional electoral system than under a uninominal vote. Some of the data suggest that the return to PR is favor of women, the solution being the consensus of political elites.

To sum up, we can say that there is a direct proportional relationship between the functioning of a party system and an electoral system in a democracy and the efficiency of that democracy and of democratic consolidation.

In the majoritarian democracy, the people are governing for its own interest because the governing is done by the majority according to its will. The consensualist democracy involves broad participation in government and as widely agrees on policies that the government should follow (Lijphart, 2000: 26).

The majority government rule is exclusive, competitive and antagonistic, while the model of consensualism is characterized by inclusiveness, consensus, negotiation and compromise. For this reason, democracy of consensual can be called "negotiation democracy" and more democratic than the democracy of majority (Lijphart, 2000: 39).

The concept of citizenship is central to the analysis made by Schmitter and Lynn because only the presence of this concept makes a political system to be democratic or not (Philippe Schmitter, Terry Lynn Karl, 1991:77) and as the author showed, citizenship itself is a product of contemporary democracies, because over time, most political restrictions were made to citizenship (by gender, social class, income, religion, race, etc).

Cooperation among citizens in order to aggregate interests, to join civic and make them available to those who represent the formal institutions and therefore, representativeness is the feature offering the unique character to democracies (Philippe Schmitter, Terry Lynn Karl, 1991:79). The body of representatives is composed of professional politicians who make political decisions making a job, a profession.

No modern democracy can survive without such politicians and the central issue arising from this situation is not whether an elite is professional or not, but how is chosen, and especially how can such an elite to be held responsible for decisions making while is in power. Considering this, the presence of professional elites makes a modern democracy.

The consensual democracy is not a specific institutional framework but a common effort of elites to deliberately create a stable and functional system (Weiler, 2009:130).

5. A chronological overview on the gender quota in Romania. Reducing Inequity via Gender Quotas

All the researches indicate that women are still underrepresented. For instance, according to the last published OSCE results, in the OSCE region the proportion of women representatives in the lower chamber is 24,4%. Therefore, more and more countries introduce legal means to increase legal participation in politics like quotas, equal shares or similar rules (Cinca, David, 2015:47).

Many arguments for gender quotas, in Romania, are influenced, undoubtlly, by the public discourse pro or against quotas from the European and international level.

One of the parliamentary initiative initiated by a women MP was in 2011, and proposed

A quota of minim 40% for the political parties (Sulfina Barbu, 2011). Unfortunately, after long debates and a lot of tergiversation it was definitely rejected.

In 2015, another proposal was made by a female MP, that enshrined an amendment for an equilibrated representative of women, at least 30%, but also this initiative was rejected. As argument, the MP stated that in Romania more than a half of the population is women and the female representation in Parliament is only of 11%. In the same time, the first aggregate index of the parliamentary activity and the scale of MPs was realized by Andreea Paul, MP, who came to the conclusion that, in the mandate starting in 2012 to present, the 65 women MPs are more active than their 509 male MPs (Andreea Paul, 2015: 32).

Another significant research was conducted by the Permanent Electoral Authority, during February-March 2014, called “The gender dimension of political life in Romania-interest, involvement, discrimination”, in which two main concepts were used – the level of interest in politics, as a crucial element in decision making in terms of participation in electoral process and the active involvement of women in the political life. There were interviewed 1.045 persons, only women, age over 18 years, coming from different groups in terms of level of education, residence, geographical area and income valued. The results showed that 71% of the total number of respondents believes that active involvement of a large number of women in political life would be a solution for significantly improving the political class in Romania.

Thus, is valid argument belonging to the normative field according to which the women representing more than 50% have the rights to an equal political representation.

The political representation of women responds to some needs and interests specific to women, and the researches and academic theories from the public sphere could lead to the increasing of the quality of the democracy.

As Krook stated, party quotas are the most common type of gender quota. They were first adopted in the early 1970s by a limited number of socialist and social democratic parties in Western Europe. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, they appeared in green parties, social democratic parties, and even some conservative parties more broadly across Western Europe, as well as in a diverse array of political parties in other regions around the world (Krook, 2009: 6).

In Romania, the main left party did not agree the introducing of gender quotas in the legislation, and yet, the Social Democrat Party, have permanently the best representation of women both at the legislative ang governamental level and was the first party that adopted an internal parity gender quota system.

6. Conclusions and future research directions

Gender quotas have become an increasingly prominent solution in recent years to the under-representation of women in electoral politics. When it comes to motivations and strategies, normative questions play a central role in quota debates. Although a majority of these discussions revolve around competing definitions of equality and representation, the exact content of these norm-based arguments vary widely across country and party contexts (Krook, 2009:220).

Notions of equality and representation vary across countries, as well as across political parties. In recent years an increasing number of countries have adopted national legislative quotas, either by reforming the constitution or the electoral law, to require that political parties nominate a certain percentage of women among their candidates. The first country to official adopt and implement a national legislative quota was Argentina (Mona Lena Krook, 2003: 215). In Argentina, proposals to establish a quota law first appeared in the late 1980s. Only two countries (Belgium and France) have legally binding quotas (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA] & University of Stockholm 2007).

Although, based on the parliamentary data research, we discovered that the representative social role in the Romanian society is strongly related to women's perception in the public sphere as a family character rather than a political one.

To wrap up, women political representation are highly influence by the following factors: the way in which electoral law is constituted and the legitimized and valued resources in the political game. All these are supporting the way in which the political skill is constituted. Therefore, the ideological positions related to the gender equality between men and women, gender social representation maintains a "masculine" definition of the Romanian political sphere in post communism.

Therefore, it is a subject that implies deeper reflection on both construction and reconversion of the political elites in the post communist era. As already noted, relations between new and old institutions may be reinforcing or conflicting, and consequently, produce harmonizing or disjointed sequences of reform (Krook, 2009: 222).

The affirmative measures force the elimination of the prejudices and stereotypes, generally, of the discrimination, and could lead to the construction of some models for the underrepresented groups (Miroiu:2011).

Starting from the idea that political parties are the main source of recruitment of political élites, we conclude that an atomized party system can only produce dysfunctional élites, interested only in political survival and in promoting their own interests. The lack of ideological affiliations and values and the lack of democratic political culture make the Romanian political élites a product of the electoral system, a negative indicator of the functioning of a democracy. Given all these factors, it appears that Romanian democracy has its own functioning coordination and is in a process of change led, on one hand, by the conditions and social values from inside and, on the other hand, by the recommendations and conditions imposed by the European Union.

The Romanian political field is a male-dominated and the aim is to raise awareness of the under representation of women and questions of gender equality among the member associations. All individuals, men and women, have the right to equally take part in political life at all levels as voters, candidates, electoral officials and civil society representatives. Equal participation of women in politics and government is essential to build and sustain democracy.

The evolution of the democratic system depends on creating and improving its mechanisms for the inclusion of all citizens.

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AS A FAILURE OF THE WESTERN WORLD – AMERICA AND THE END OF AN ERA

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Abstract **:** *This short theoretical incursion into the topic of United States' nuclear doctrine is built upon two major pillars. A first one is considering a brief historical perspective upon Americas' nuclear strategy. It starts with the beginning of the nuclear age and stops at the end of the Cold War. The second one tries to see in which measure Americas' historically configured nuclear doctrine could be sustained in the present. The second perspective unveils the fact that contemporary international context is so dramatically different from the one of the Cold War and because of this is no longer possible to sustain the old nuclear doctrine of mutual deterrence between any two major powers.*
The historical perspective offers a brief picture upon the concept of mutual deterrence as this concept was consolidated within the Americas' nuclear doctrine after Hiroshima and after the beginning of arms race with Soviet Union. Beyond the general presentation this historical description is also considering two fundamental factors which in our view were decisive for the United States nuclear doctrine at least until the end of the Cold War. The first one is unveiling the role of the nuclear submarine force (SSBN) within the ultimate concept of mutual nuclear deterrence. The second one is discussing the most sensitive concept from within US nuclear doctrine regarding the possibility of first strike made by the US. The NFU concept is being here also analyzed.
The contemporary approach is considering the actual international context by disclosing two of its new major risks. The one is the behavior of a rogue state like North Korea regarding the issue of developing nuclear weapons and the other one is discussing the new major risk, which could be in some forms a nuclear one raised by the danger of radical Islam. The Iran situation is also briefly discussed.
Conclusions are trying to indicate some possible evolutions in order to adapt the Americas' nuclear doctrine to the new international conditions.

*Keywords***:** *Nuclear Deterrence, Mutual Annihilation, Submarine Deterrence Fleet, First Strike*

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USS SSBN 736 West Virginia / Ohio class nuclear submarine – A Trident II D5 / MIRV Launching on March, 2016 (US Navy photo / Released)

Introduction To talk about nuclear deterrence in a historical time like is the one of today could be seen as a little inappropriate or, at least, obsolete. This is true for someone which understands that the Cold War has indeed ended and, regardless of the perspective you decide to adopt, the issue of nuclear deterrence is now much less present than it was two or three decades ago. We totally reject this point of view and because of this we will try to argue that the issue of nuclear deterrence but also the issue of having nuclear weapons is today one of the most sensitive and complicated reality of the international political context.

The entire approach will be centered on United States` nuclear doctrine as this was historically configured from the historical moment of Hiroshima until this moment.

America has the Button – Mutual Deterrence from Hiroshima to the end of Cold War.

From a strictly historical perspective, as it is known, the American nuclear doctrine, with all its aspects and sensitive issues, begins with Hiroshima. At that point the History, as we all very well know, was changed forever. It is not our purpose here to develop a deep analysis on the internal American political situation from the end of the Second World War, a situation which later determined America to use nuclear weapons against Japanese Empire. This is a task for historians and other analysists. What is sure and what is relevant to our short undertaking within the space of this paper is the fact that the historical moment of Hiroshima had placed America in the position of leader within an arms race even if United States did not intend to do so. And what it was followed is very well known. But the most important aspect regarding that original historical moment could be reduced in our view to the fact that America has sent a very powerful message, maybe the ultimate one, regarding the

way in which it considers to make war with nuclear weapons. And this is reduced to the essence of the fact that America, if necessary, *will always could use first its nuclear arsenal on its enemies regardless of who these enemies might be*.

Later developments within the arms race between United States and Soviet Union never had the power to change this ultimate principle of Americas` nuclear doctrine. Of course, as we know, the arms race has ended in that balance of terror between the two superpowers but it never questioned the possibility for United States to firstly use the nuclear weapon.

As it was stated many time until now by numerous analysts the concept of the equilibrium of terror was fit for a western type rationality of making and winning or losing a *complete* war. The main factor placed at the foundation of this theoretical approach of making an eventually ultimate war with your deadly enemy was the idea that if the enemy strike at you first and by doing this it has the possibility to annihilate you, you also will have the possibility annihilate him. In this equation is guaranteed a mutual destruction and because of this, in theory, none of the opponents is expecting to strike the other one just because of the terrifying consequences. Of course, this is a resume of this concept but it worked, with very small conceptual changes, during the entire period of the Cold War. Maybe, in one sense at least, the perfect historical example for the concept of mutual deterrence was the Cuban Missile Crisis from 1962. At that historical moment president Kennedy, one of the most prominent American presidents and maybe the most important political figure of the 20th century, has stated very clearly, on October 22, 1962 that any attack from Cuba against American soil will be considered as an attack from the Soviet Union against United States. This moment was one from a very few in which the concept of mutual nuclear deterrence between United States and Soviet Union was politically public expressed. From that moment on any of these two parts has tried to consolidate its nuclear deterrence force. Technologically speaking the use of nuclear submarines was the only force able to guarantee a proper response in the eventuality that the other parts strikes first. This is the only practical reason for which nuclear submarine had become for the both parts the most advanced and deadly weapon ever conceived and ever built in the human history. The Ohio class nuclear submarine, on the American part, and Typhoon class on the Soviet part, were, and still are, the most lethal weapons of war ever produced by mankind. A single American *Ohio* class nuclear submarine, equipped with Trident II ballistic missile system, has today the capacity to wipe out from the face of the Earth entire nations in matter of minutes if necessary. Only one MIRV (Multiple Intercontinental Reentry Vehicle) is enough to put Europe out of History in less than 60 minutes. And an *Ohio* nuclear class submarine has more than one MIRV on board.

The concept of mutual nuclear deterrence was pushed to its limits during the last period of the Cold War. In that time the ultimate deterrence nuclear force was for the both superpowers, United States and Soviet Union their fleet of *nuclear submarines*. *Built and maintained with huge human and material sacrifices on both sides this nuclear force, from the perspective of a western rationality of an eventually making the final war, was the only asset able to guarantee a second thought from the enemy before a possible first nuclear strike from its part.* Even today both superpowers have at any moment somewhere deep into the planet`s oceans at least

one nuclear submarine ready to deliver the ultimate strike in the event of a final nuclear engagement between them. Of course, the tension and the fear from the Cold War are no longer present but speaking from a strictly technical and military point of view, regarding the ultimate task of a strategic nuclear submarine, *nothing has changed*. What is today different is only the way in which the concept of *permanent* mutual nuclear deterrence is used at political level between United States and Russia but not the military and technical aspects of this eventually final concept of mutual assured annihilation.

In addition to what has been said until this point it is also very important to mention that in the military equation of mutual and permanent nuclear deterrence a key role during the Cold War era was played also by the fleet of nuclear attack submarines of both superpower. These submarines has become today, with the new Virginia attack class nuclear submarine, a state of the art piece in terms of military power and deterrence upon the other side (Christley, 2007, pp. 5 – 32, 36 – 47) . Their main role was to track down the heavy nuclear equipped submarines of the opponent.

USS SSBN 732 Alaska – An *Ohio* nuclear class submarine

But the terrible balance of terror was effective and possible only within a western type rationality of conceiving a final war. It is not a clever action to strike first your opponent if these will destroy you later anyway!

The ideological confrontation of communism and capitalism during almost the entire period of the second half of the 20th century has ended officially in 1991, the year in which Soviet Union has ceased to exist. It does not matter too much for the

purpose of our study how the nuclear arsenal was distributed and managed by its successors. What counts is the fact that the balance of terror has nowadays lost its initial meaning even if it remains an ***ultimate*** element of deterrence between Russia and Western World. To consolidate this it is enough to remember here the reluctance of the Unites State to adopt a no first use nuclear policy (NFU).

Who is Today the Enemy? The Limits of Mutual Deterrence

The contemporary world is a one from which the balance of terror in terms of a nuclear final engagement is totally different from that of the Cold War era. We all know too well this thing but we should also realize that in the present the concept of having nuclear capabilities implies something different than only keeping your enemy away from doing harm to you.

In the present there are two new major source of risk. One of these is represented by the so called "rogue states" as are North Korea and Iran. In these situations we do not talk directly of a threat against the West in terms of a nuclear attack but rather of a totally different type of threat, a one which aims to obtain by these states the capacity of influencing some western policies in different parts of the world in a manner that limits the West to do whatever it wants in those regions. This thing was politically expressed, in 2015, in a dramatic way by the Israeli Prime Minister at a meeting at United Nations when he clearly stated that by getting the bomb, to use here his own words, Iran will change forever not only the ultimate actual nuclear stability on the planet but also the nonproliferation policy adopted until now by many states, both deeply analyzed by many commentators, with all the consequences from this (Harvey, 1997). Those 45 seconds of pure silence in front of the General Assembly of the United Nations were maybe the most powerful symbol from the history of facing the nuclear threat for the world in general since the Kennedy discourse to the American people in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Another dramatic change in the concept of mutual deterrence is coming from the fact that these rogue states are not part, so to speak, and do not act accordingly with a western type rationality of making an eventually so called final war against the enemy. This means that nuclear deterrence might not have upon these states the same effect of considering the consequences if they decide to use first nuclear weapons against the West. Outside the Western World it seems that war, in its most terrifying form, has a completely different meaning than it has for the West! And this is the most dangerous aspect of today nuclear issue on a global scale. Also, this aspect is maybe the major factor because of which the nuclear deterrence from United States, generally speaking, has almost no effect on them. In this way, and only in these conditions, the policy of nuclear deterrence might not have the slightest effect on the international policies that these states should decide to have in their relations with United States. The behavior of North Korea is maybe the most powerful example for this. Of course, the Iran Deal could be seen as a slightly different aspect of this topic but it preserves the concept of nonwestern type rationality regarding the *possibility* of using or not using nuclear weapons by these rogue states.

America was always fully aware about this type of situation and by the refusal from the United State to adopt in its nuclear doctrine the concept of *no first use* is one mode through which America understands to respond to ***any*** possible nuclear threat on a global scale policy.

But maybe the most terrifying possibility of a nuclear threat, against the West in general and not only against America, remains today the threat of radical Islam. Of course, in this eventuality the threat is not yet a conventional one, in terms of using nuclear weapons, but an ***asymmetric*** one. It is the possibility that at one moment those terrorists groups might use, in different forms, nuclear material, which can be not necessarily warheads or explosive nuclear devices in general, in order to attack the West. This horrifying scenario is today the most dangerous of all and the West has the tremendous responsibility to avoid this possibility regardless of any form of costs. Also, this dark scenario has the capacity to put into question the entire western approach of nuclear deterrence because those terrorists groups could not be convinced or discouraged by any possible retaliation if they decide to use nuclear material against the West. This is why America should take the lead in this fight and to enforce its defensive capabilities in order to avoid any leak of nuclear material to those groups. This is a fight of everyday and it should be done by all means necessary

From a theoretical point of view it is obvious that today, nor the so called rogue states, and here we refer especially to North Korea, nor the radical groups from the Middle East, could not make further viable for the United States the concept of nuclear deterrence as this concept was theoretically adopted and practically used in the time of the Cold War. What is needed now, even if from some points of views this is much harder than a traditional nuclear deterrence, is to determine, on one hand, those rogue states to renounce, in different forms, to their nuclear ambitions, and, on the other hand, to keep the level of operational vigilance in the field so high than those radical groups never get their hands on nuclear material. This last task it is today the most important responsibility of the Western World and at this stage it should be focused on prevention by using all necessary means, from the set of tools which is specific to intelligence services to black operations specific to special forces.

These two major lines of approach should be today in our view the necessary elements of adapting the Americas' nuclear doctrine to the conditions of contemporary world, conditions which are dominated, as been already disclosed by numerous leading analysts in the field, by the factor of uncertainty and instability (Delpech, 2012, p. 46 – 47).

Conclusions

It is obvious that today America needs a profound adaptation of its nuclear policy to the set of challenges of contemporary political international relations. Maybe one of these changes is the document adopted on April 6, 2010 by the United States regarding upon the so called policy of no first use the nuclear weapons. However, as it was widely observed by prestigious commentators, this document maintain for the United States the possibility of using first the nuclear armament, of course, in a relative diverse range of circumstances and after a serious analysis (Gerson, 2010). Briefly, today America, in its inner core of its nuclear doctrine, has adopted the

possibility of first using the nuclear weapons on every *ultimate* enemy if this proofs to ne unavoidable. Even if this is not something new for America it is, however, important to notice that at declarative level the role of nuclear weapons was refined to a specific set of extreme political and military conditions. The most important issue is to determine these conditions properly in the terrifying eventuality that some radical groups decide to use nuclear material against United States. And from this completely negative and undesirable possibility everybody knows now in the West that the possibility of using nuclear deterrence against radical groups has no chance to be effective. This is the most important reason because of which the nuclear deterrence, in its historically configured frame against new forms of contemporary threats it is today a form of specific *failure* not only for the United States but for the Western World in general.

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